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This thesis seeks to answer the question: were markets in Roman Egypt driven by financial 
rationality? 4,367 financial transactions - leases, sales and loans - recorded on papyri from Roman 
Egypt in the period AD 1 to 350, form the data set analysed. Before conclusions as to market 
behaviour were drawn it was necessary to understand the underlying financial conditions in the 
period and a review of the available evidence for general price trends was completed and an index 
based on a basket of goods established.  
The data for the agricultural land, housing and credit markets were then analysed on a statistical 
basis so as to identify patterns as to the status of participants, e.g. ages, genders and locations, the 
terms involved, and the diachronic changes in the type and nature of the transactions undertaken. 
Based on the information collated, typical rates of return and the risks associated with different 
types of investment were calculated. This hierarchy of returns and risks was used, along with the 
information as to the motivations of market participants and market mechanics, to enable 
conclusions to be drawn. 
These conclusions fell into three areas which were identified as being of particular interest within 
academic debates on the Roman economy: the quantification of its size, its impact on society 
including the quality of life, and the nature of the markets it contained.  
The key macroeconomic conclusion related to the quantification of the economy concerned prices. 
The analysis revealed that prices for most goods, after a period of stability from the middle of the 
first century, grew from around the middle of the second century until around AD 274 at an annual 
average rate of close to 1%, which means that prices more than trebled over this period. This 
contradicts the accepted view that a doubling of prices between AD 160 and 190 was the only 
significant change between AD 45 and 274.  
The implications of economic conditions, notably real rates of investment return, on society were 
then considered. It was concluded that, following the theoretical framework established by Piketty, 
it was probable that over the Roman period wealth concentrated in the landed class, and thus that 
social inequality grew. 
Finally, the nature of the markets was dealt with and it was concluded that for most financial 




nature of the markets varied, we must think, not of a single market but, of a series of sectors and 
sub-sectors. The unsecured loan market, of generally small, village-based, cash loans cannot be 
considered as a sub-sector driven by financial rationality given the financially sub-optimal outcomes 
for a lender. Similarly, lending of commodities had such a wide variability in outcomes, that it could 
only be considered financially rational for a professional gambler. The rural housing market, with its 
poor liquidity, conventional pricing patterns and the importance of intra-family transactions, was 
also not likely to have been driven by financial rationality. However, the secured cash loan and the 
agricultural land markets showed all the features of market sectors driven by financial rationality. 
The answer to the question posed is thus that it is highly probable that the agricultural land and the 
secured credit markets were driven by financial rationality, whilst the housing and unsecured credit 
markets were driven by reciprocity and redistribution. This conclusion is of relevance to the wider 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Section 1.1 The Context 
 
This section sets out the wider context of the thesis. It outlines previous thinking on the broad 
subject of the place of the economy within society, and then focuses on studies of the ancient world. 
The question being posed, and why answering this question is important, are explained.  Three 
aspects of the Roman economy of particular interest to the academic community are then identified, 
which help determine the structure of this thesis. Finally, based on the preceding discussion, the 
methodological approach that I have chosen to take, given the constraints and opportunities posed 
by the available data, is set out.  
When examining the historiography of the ancient economy, we are faced with the question of 
when to start. From the ancient writers themselves, such as Columella describing the investment 
preferences of the Roman elite, or Tacitus commenting on a Roman monetary crisis?1 From the 
founders of classical economics such as Adam Smith who drew on ancient texts to help them 
formulate their own ideas?2 From the neoclassicists like Alfred Marshall who built on earlier work to 
produce models of the market?3 From Max Weber and Karl Polanyi whose influence on the 
economists and historians of the ancient world was so profound? In the interests of space and 
clarity, I will start with some of the neoclassical economic concepts which still deserve consideration 
and are key to the question posed, and then move on to subsequent scholarship. The neoclassical 
economic concepts which are most relevant to this thesis relate to exchange value and the market. 
In neoclassical economic theory there are three key pre-requisites for an effective exchange value-
based market to exist:  
- frictional costs of transactions should be minimised;  
- sufficient information should be available to all participants and 
- participants should act in a ‘rational’ manner.4  
 
1 Columella, de r.r. 3.3.9-10, Tacitus, Annals 6.16-7. 
2 See for instance, Smith 1776/1976: 111 on usury in the Roman Empire. 
3 Marshall 1890: 883-90. 




In neoclassical theory, homo economicus, who seeks to maximise income in a rational manner, is the 
central actor in the market. This approach may be considered to be ‘formalist’. 
This orthodoxy was challenged by Weber who rejected the emphasis on homo economicus and 
stressed instead the wider environment in which humans interact. Specifically, in the ancient world, 
he sought to emphasise that homo politicus was driven by considerations of ‘status’ and he saw a 
clear distinction between that world and the pre-modern or modern societies where homo 
economicus operated. He defined status to mean ‘an effective claim to social esteem in terms of 
positive or negative privileges’.5 He did not associate this form of status directly with wealth or class, 
but thought that it was founded on style of life, formal education or hereditary or occupational 
prestige.6 Weber’s view of the markets, which covered millennia within a single simple sweeping 
statement, was that ‘where stratification by status permeates a community as strongly was the case 
in all political communities of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, one can never speak of a genuinely 
free market competition as we understand it today’.7     
Polanyi was another key figure to provide a different conceptual basis for contemporary and later 
scholars of the ancient economy. His key contribution was the development of ‘substantivism’ which 
emphasised that any economy is ‘embedded’ within the society which surrounds it.8 He contrasted 
this view with the ‘formalism’ inherent within neoclassical economic theory. As regards the key issue 
for this thesis, he drew a distinction between the market and the institutions that were contained 
within it. His view was that ‘although market institutions, therefore, are exchange institutions, 
market and exchange are not coterminous’.9 Within pre-modern markets he saw socially-driven 
redistribution and reciprocity as being stronger drivers of economic behaviour than the exchange 
value drivers of the neoclassical approach.10  
The scholars discussed above were interested in the ancient world, but studied a wide range of 
societies and timeframes. However, their ideas influenced two specialist scholars of the ancient 
world: Finley and Rostovtzeff. Their opposing attitudes provide the key dialectic within which this 
thesis is based. The ‘modernist’ approach to the Roman economy drew on the neoclassical 
economists, and saw the motivations and actions of individuals as being similar to those of people 
 
5 Weber 1978: 305. 
6 Weber 1978: 305-6. 
7 Weber 1978: 937. 
8 Polanyi et al 1957: 242. 
9 Polanyi 1957: 267. 




within a ‘modern’ market economy. This viewpoint was adopted by Rostovtzeff.11 It assumes that 
people in the ancient world were exemplified by the homo economicus. The ‘primitive’ approach, 
developed by Finley, and drawing on both Weber and Polanyi, stressed that there were other, more 
important, drivers for an individual’s behaviour within the ancient economy, such as the ‘very large 
non-economic element in the preference’ for investment in land.12  Whilst Rostovtzeff and Finley 
were strongly influenced by formalist and substantivist concepts in the development of their 
modernist and primitivist positioning, there is a danger of conflating terms. For instance, 
‘substantivism’ is not identical to ‘primitivism’. A substantivist economy may certainly be embedded 
within wider society, and its markets not subject to formulaic neoclassical drivers, without it being 
‘primitive’.13 Consider, for instance, the planned economies of the communist states of the 
twentieth century. Similarly, ‘formalism’ and ‘modernism’ should not be conflated. As Lewis pointed 
out ‘modern economic actors are also embedded in social norms’, a position that Williamson viewed 
as being ‘taken as a given for most institutional economists’.14 Finally, with regard to the primitive 
versus modern debate, there is an evident division of opinion between francophone and anglophone 
scholars as to the drivers of the market. Andreau and Lerouxel would question the degree to which 
evidence for a competitive market can be seen, whilst Rathbone, Scheidel, Temin and others would 
be more positive as to the prevalence of market forces.15 
The debate on the nature of the ancient economy has been modified by the concepts developed 
within New Institutional Economics (NIE). Most scholars of the ancient economy feel the need to 
reference NIE, but it is far from a ‘new’ conceptual framework having been first mooted some thirty 
years ago and some of its precepts are simple common sense.16 Under NIE it is recognised that not 
all market participants will operate in a manner which seeks to maximise profit, but will adopt 
‘bounded rationality’ strategies which may be described in a somewhat clumsy expression as 
‘satisficing’: providing a financial outcome which satisfies a party within a transaction since their 
 
11 See, for example, Rostovtzeff 1957: xiv for an example of his positive view of the ‘city-capitalism’ of the early 
empire. 
12 Finley 1999: 116. It should be noted that Marshall (1842-1924) pre-dated the other scholars specifically 
mentioned here, but Weber (1864-1920), Rostovtzeff (1870-1952) and Polanyi (1886-1964) were, broadly 
speaking, contemporaries.  
13 See Granovetter 1985: 482-3 for a rejection of a clear distinction between ancient embedded and modern 
disembedded markets. 
14 Lewis 2018: 24, Williamson 2000: 596. 
15 Andreau 2010, Lerouxel 2016, Rathbone 1991, Scheidel 2012a: 10, Temin 2013. 
16 Morley 2013: 118-9. See also Temin 2012: 49 on NIE ‘This body of thought grows out of a belated 
recognition by economists that institutions affect economic activity – and are in turn affected by economic 




needs have been met, although profit may not have been maximised. 17 It is a general principle of 
NIE that in any situation the ability for an individual to act perfectly rationally is constrained by the 
time that they have to make the decision, the information at their disposal and cognitive limitations. 
NIE also recognises that an individual’s actions may be ‘path dependent’ in that an action may be 
pre-conditioned by the choices and the outcomes that the individual or those known to him within 
his social group may have made in the past. However, as Lewis stated, in a recent summary of the 
state of the debate on the ancient economy, it is appropriate to look beyond NIE and include 
consideration of the theoretical advances in behavioural and financial economics in our assessment 
of the Roman economy.18  
Therefore, I believe that there are two other theoretical concepts that are relevant to this thesis: 
Behavioural Finance and Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Behavioural Finance is ‘the study of the 
influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on 
markets’ and is considered part of behavioural economics.19 It is of particular interest to today’s 
financial community as the behaviour of participants has significant impacts on the ultimate 
efficiency of the markets. By examining patterns of financial behaviour hidden within the ancient 
sources I will seek to identify when exchange value or alternatively redistribution/reciprocity may 
have been the primary drivers of the markets. MPT underlies much of the institutional investment 
behaviour in today’s wholesale financial markets. Markowitz first outlined the theory which looks at 
the relationships between different investment options and their risks, returns and correlations.20 
Markowitz, along with his collaborators, Miller and Sharpe, was awarded the Nobel prize for 
economics in 1990 for his work in this area. By examining the correlations, risks and returns for 
different investment options in Roman Egypt I will seek to identify indicators of financial rationality. 
Turning to the question that I am seeking to answer, it is, for Roman Egypt, were markets driven by 
financial rationality? This question clearly sits within the wider academic context described above 
and, in particular, within the ‘modernist’ and ‘primitivist’ dialectic. As we saw above, the debate has 
moved on somewhat from these simple oppositional postures. The terminology of ‘primitive’ and 
‘modern’ is, however, still used. This has not created a helpful theoretical framework in which to 
work, in that ‘primitive’ has a strongly pejorative emphasis while ‘modern’ suggests a progressive, 
superior system.  In addition, when we view ancient economies, no matter how strongly we seek to 
 
17 This concept was originally set out in Simon 1947, and was described within the context of the ancient 
economy in Frier & Kehoe 2007: 121.  
18 Lewis 2018: 39. This recognition of the importance of socioeconomic behaviours has echoes in the 
francophone school of Andreau and Maucourant. See Maucourant 2004. 
19 Sewell 2001: 1.  




be objective, we are influenced by the economic and social institutions that surround us in day to 
day life and our own personal views on whether the modern economy and financial system work 
well for society. Finally, this perspective also introduces terminological confusion since we lack a 
common definition for either ‘primitive’ or ‘modern’.  
Instead of framing the question in primitive/modern terms, I have preferred to refer to rationality, 
adopting Behavioural Finance and MPT methodologies. This thesis therefore looks at the nature of 
the financial markets and concentrates on whether the actions of market participants were 
‘financially rational’. The concept of rationality in markets is one of the pre-conditions for an 
effective market in neoclassical theory, but it is not a purely formalist concept. Individuals may act 
rationally within a substantivist economy, though their goals may not be financial.  In ancient world 
economic scholarship, rationality has always been a key point in the discussion of the nature of the 
economy, but it was given prominence by Rathbone for Roman Egypt and then elaborated on by 
Christesen for the ancient Greek world.21 The use of the term ‘rationality’ takes us away, to some 
degree, from a pejorative oppositional debate, since rationality is not an exclusive attribute of either 
‘primitive’ or ‘modern’ economies. Many ‘irrational’ financial decisions are made within modern 
economies. ‘Rationality’ should be a more neutral term but is not without its own problems of 
perceived bias. Bresson has stated that ‘opposing a “rationality” of the capitalist world to an 
“irrationality” of other societies merely reflects an evolutionist prejudice’.22  Bresson is correct to 
suggest that to assume that the capitalist world is more rational than other societies is a groundless 
pre-judgement. However, provided we add a modifier to the term, and recognise that actions can 
be, either financially, economically or socially rational, then rationality is still a useful benchmark 
when studying the ancient economy. 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the concept of ‘financial rationality’, I need a clear 
definition. In a homo economicus context, rationality is typically defined within Jevons’ ‘rational 
choice theory’ as pursuing actions that optimise the ‘utility function’ within the available options.23 I 
need to clarify this somewhat to deal with the financial environment, so therefore I need to outline 
some of the defining aspects of such behaviour. Rational behaviour in a market context generally 
involves a comparative decision, a choice between two, or more, options which have different 
expected outcomes, and the use of reason to make that decision. Individuals exercising financial 
rationality must also have self-defined financial goals that they wish to achieve, and which they use 
 
21 Rathbone 1991, Christesen 2003. 
22 Bresson 2016: 27. 
23 See Zouboulakis 2014 for a discussion of the definitions of economic rationality and in particular Zouboulakis 




to make the choice between the available options. If, when making this choice, they have due regard 
to maximising return and minimising risk, then I would consider that they have made their choice in 
a financially rational way. Establishing a clear benchmark against which to judge whether actions can 
be described as financially rational avoids some of the terminological problems described above. 
Dealing with each of the elements of my definition, I would hope that we all have a common view of 
what the terms ‘reason’ and ‘comparative decision’ mean. However, there is an important point 
here. Financial decisions which are based purely on conventional, embedded social values, no 
matter how successful their outcome, would not meet my definition, since they are not based on 
reason, neither do they involve a comparison of options.  ‘Goals’ in this context can cover a variety 
of desired outcomes. In some cases the goal will be to achieve the greatest net gain in financial 
terms from the transaction, which, within a monetised economy, is normally assessed in cash 
terms.24  In times of high inflation, however, an individual’s goal may be to avoid a reduction in the 
true value of their savings, and profit and risk need to be assessed in real terms, after allowance for 
inflation. ‘Return’ can thus be described in either nominal or real terms.   
Finally, we need to consider what is meant by ‘risk’. I would stress that my definition relates to 
financial risk on an individual basis. Each individual will have their own definition of the risk or risks 
that they fear in a transaction. For some it may have been related to loss of land ownership, for 
others it may have been related to a loss in capital value. We should also recognise that any 
assessment of risk is unlikely to be perfect given the human tendency for cognitive biases to over or 
under-weigh certain factors.25 In practical terms, evidence of an understanding of risk and its 
assessment, even on an heuristic or ‘rule of thumb’ basis, and allowing for cognitive biases, would be 
sufficient to meet my definition of financial rationality.26 There is no need for a mathematical 
assessment of expected risk. 
In the context of my definition, if an individual has limited requirements, which do not involve 
maximising return but which satisfy their personal financial goals, then their actions can also be 
considered financially rational, provided risk is reduced to a minimum. For instance, I may have a 
required outcome to earn 60 drachmas in the next year from my capital of 1,000 drachmas, perhaps 
to meet a known tax demand. My principal risk is that I fail to meet this target, but if I earn 60 
drachmas, in NIE terms, I am ‘satisfied’. If I choose an investment which provides a return of 60 
drachmas but at a higher risk than another investment within my available options, then I am acting 
 
24 I believe that Roman Egypt should be considered as a monetised economy. See Rathbone 2013b for a 
discussion of the issue. 
25 As first described within a behavioural economic context by Kahneman and Tversky 1979. 





irrationally. If I choose an investment that is the most likely to yield the 60 drachmas, even if there 
are options that might provide me with more return, then I have acted in a financially rational 
manner, but within a ‘satisficing’ context.  
However, actions whose primary goal is in Polanyi’s terms, ‘redistribution’, such as the transfer of 
property to another family member at a price below market level, cannot be considered financially 
rational. Similarly, actions which are driven by ‘reciprocity’, such as loans provided for mutual 
support within a village community, do not fall within my definition of financial rationality. An action 
which was driven by social motivations, perhaps to enhance the individual’s social capital, or one 
which was structured according to socially imposed conventions or state-imposed practice, would 
not be considered financially rational in my definition since it does not relate to specific ‘financial 
goals’.27 Another example of behaviour which would not meet my definition of financial rationality is 
that which Kehoe attributes to large landowners in Roman Egypt. He believed that landowners 
‘aimed to achieve security, and that security could be measured in access to productive land…which 
could be depended upon to provide a stable and regular harvest’. This would not meet my definition 
of financially rational behaviour, since it does not involve a process of comparison or the 
consideration of financial terms.28 Finally, a transaction where the frictional costs are so large as to 
absorb an excessive amount of the economic benefit to the participants cannot be considered 
financially rational. 
Another point to note is that the focus in this thesis is on the actions of the owners of capital – 
lenders and landlords - rather than their financial dependents – borrowers and tenants. The 
definition reflects this, given that it deals with financial goals, such as wealth accumulation, rather 
than needs, such as subsistence. Evidence for financial rationality is likely to be clearer in the actions 
of the capital or asset holder rather than in those of the counterparty in the transaction. For 
instance, in the credit market, we can see whether the lender has been financially rational in 
providing the loan by examining the return he would have made in interest, and the risks attaching 
to the transaction, and comparing this to potential alternative uses of the capital. The rationality of 
the borrower in accepting the loan is much more opaque since we normally lack information on why 
the borrower wanted the loan, although there are clues within the terms of the transaction and the 
gender, age, family status and locations of the participants. Overall then, this thesis will concentrate 
 
27 I concentrate in this thesis on capital in its economic sense, and not with the intangible forms of 
relationship-driven social capital and prestige-driven cultural capital as discussed in Bourdieu 1986.  




on the financial rationality of the lender rather than their counterparty. Similarly, it will concentrate 
on the financial rationality of the real-estate landlord rather than the tenant. 
Two further points of clarification need to be made. Firstly, the question asks whether markets were 
‘driven’ by financial rationality. This is a much stronger statement than, say, ‘influenced’, and 
suggests that rationality had primacy of causality, rather than simply being one of a number of 
influencing factors. Therefore, I looked for indicators within the data that implied that a majority of 
decisions could, or could not, be considered as being driven by financial rationality, but allowing 
always for the fact that other factors, such as reciprocity or redistribution, could be relevant to the 
markets. Secondly, I took the existence of the ‘markets’ as a given, since we know that people 
bought, sold and lent goods and capital assets, but I have not made any pre-judgement as to the 
nature of those markets. Note that the term markets is plural, since as will be seen later in this 
thesis, their nature varies considerably, and no single answer can be given for the economy of 
Roman Egypt. 
One final point needs to be made as regards the scope of the question. This thesis deals almost 
exclusively with the smaller scale end of the private sector, though the actions of the state are 
reflected in areas like taxation. The nature of our data also means that we have relatively little 
information on large estates and the elite of the province in Alexandria. The state sector of the 
economy, though it varied in size over the course of the period considered, was always very large 
and many people would have been dependents of the state, through the leasing of public land or 
public employment. Also note that I do not seek to draw conclusions about the economy as a whole, 
but deliberately concentrate on financial markets.29  
 
So why is the question posed important? Scheidel stated, when addressing the 
substantivist/formalist debate, the question of ‘which types of relations were essential or dominant 
in bringing about observed outcomes is not merely of intellectual interest but of vital importance for 
understanding the dynamics of Roman economic development and especially its limits and 
decline’.30 The question addresses this directly by considering whether exchange value or 
redistribution/reciprocity was the dominant driver in the markets. In addition, when the question is 
answered, differences in the nature of the markets for different sectors of the economy will be 
 
29 I will therefore not deal with the broader economic question as to whether the Roman economy as a whole 
can be considered as a ‘market economy’, neither will I consider whether there was a significant waged labour 
sector. See Meikle 1995: 180 for a discussion of the importance of waged labour for the ‘ancient economy’, 
though for Meikle, ‘ancient’ seemed to equate with ‘Greek’ since he did not engage with the evidence from 
the Roman period. 




identified and information will be provided on the challenges and opportunities for economic 
advancement for ordinary people within the Roman world. The analysis of likely returns and risks 
from investment will provide key data for consideration of the degree of inequality in society and its 
trend over time.  But it can also shed some light on wider issues. It may help us address, at least 
partly, the questions Morley posed in a recent review of the ‘market’ in classical antiquity: how far 
can ‘we assume a universal human nature and universal principles of economic behaviour?’ and  ‘is 
capitalism universal and eternal?’31 However, one possible criticism of the choice of the question is 
that its scope is restricted to Roman Egypt.  This thesis is thus what Bowman and Wilson describe as 
a ‘narrow beam’, regional, study – and thus its relevance to the wider Roman empire may be 
questioned.32 This argument is the particular bane of historians of Roman Egypt. It would serve no 
purpose to repeat his argumentation here, but I would again concur with Rathbone’s view and 
support the ‘romanity’ of Roman Egypt.33  I would however, add that because this thesis 
concentrates on how people felt, reasoned and acted, rather than on the particular local 
institutional constraints, there is a greater likelihood that any conclusions are more ‘transportable’ 
than narrow beam studies which are based on specific regional features. In short, I would hope that 
because there is a greater emphasis on behavioural finance, as opposed to NIE - on people, rather 
than institutions - this will provide stronger insights into how people thought and acted, which for 
me is what history is all about. 
Having outlined the historiography and background to the question, defined its elements and 
considered its importance, I need to explain how I have structured the thesis to address the 
question. The question lies, not only within the framework of the theoretical approaches to the 
ancient economy as a whole, but also within that of recent scholarship specific to the Roman 
economy and the structure of this thesis, particularly of its conclusions, reflects this activity. 
Scholarly interest in the Roman economy can, I believe, be divided into three areas: quantification of 
its size, its impact on society including the quality of life, and the nature of the economic markets it 
contained. The interest in quantification, and in particular the size of the economy and its growth or 
decline, is exemplified by the Oxford Roman Economy Project and work on GDP size by Scheidel 
amongst others.34 Quantification is thus generally approached from a top-down macroeconomic 
perspective. Aspects of growth and decline are increasingly, and to some degree controversially, tied 
into climate science findings, as scholars seek to use proxies such as the lead content in ice cores to 
 
31 Morley 2013: 107. 
32 Bowman & Wilson 2009: 8. 
33 Rathbone 2013c. 
34 See for instance Bowman & Wilson 2009, ‘Quantifying the Roman Economy’ or Scheidel 2009b, ‘In Search of 




identify levels of industrial activity.35 Scholars interested in the impact of the economy on society 
and the quality of life tend to look at a smaller scale than that of the whole economy. Examples of 
this genre include studies devoted to poverty, and wealth disparity, which tie into the increased 
interest in this subject more generally, stimulated by the success of Piketty’s work on modern 
history.36 Gender, sexuality, familial and childhood studies would also generally fit into this area.37  
The third area, that of the nature of the markets, has been dominated recently by scholars following 
an NIE approach. An example of this type of study relates to the influence of ancient institutions on 
transactional costs and information exchange.38 The level of frictional costs and information 
exchange will be addressed within this thesis but it will be noted that conditions for a perfectly 
efficient market are not present within any modern economy and cannot reasonably be expected to 
be present within an ancient one. This thesis will therefore review the extent to which frictional 
costs would have been low enough, and sufficient information would have been exchanged, to allow 
financially rational judgments to be made, rather than seeking to assess whether a perfectly efficient 
market existed. The existence of information asymmetry between principals will be taken as a 
given.39 
Returning to the definition of rationality, the third key pre-requisite of an effective market, one 
question that has been the subject of academic interest is whether participants in the ancient 
economy had the relevant skills and mathematical tools to make financially rational decisions. I 
believe that there can be no doubt that at least some market participants had the mathematical 
skills to calculate profit and evidence for these abilities is presented later in this thesis. However, 
there is a somewhat reductive debate on whether they had the accounting skills to manage complex 
transactions and investments. Finley asserted that ‘Graeco-Roman bookkeeping was exceedingly 
rudimentary, essentially restricted to a listing of receipts and expenditures, from which it was 
impossible to determine the profitability or otherwise of any single activity’.40 However, as Macve 
and Rathbone have shown, this position is difficult to maintain, given the evidence, including the 
Heroninos archive.41  In any event, lack of knowledge of the peculiarities of modern accounting 
techniques is no barrier to the exercise of reason within financial rationality. As Morley noted ‘rules 
 
35 See Haldon et al (2018) and associated papers for a robust challenge to the validity of Harper’s ‘The Fate of 
Rome’ which links the fall of Rome to climate impacts. 
36 Piketty 2014. For an example of a thematic approach to poverty see Atkins & Osborne 2006. 
37 See for instance Huebner 2013 in relation to the family in Roman Egypt. 
38 Kehoe et al 2015. Lerouxel also stressed that the credit market was essentially a market of information: 
Lerouxel 2016: 339. 
39 See Bang 2008 and Johnstone 2011 who stressed the importance of information asymmetry in the ancient 
world. 
40 Finley 1999: 181. 




of thumb, tradition and experience, regarded by Finley as signs of economic primitivism, are instead 
valid tools in determining production strategies’.42  Therefore, this thesis will not deal further with 
accounting or matters of mathematical competence. 
The methodology I have adopted will be set out in detail in the next section but the rationale for my 
choice, with its emphasis on behaviours, statistics and models, needs to be explained. Firstly, I 
believe that we need to dismiss Finley’s criticism of ‘pseudo-histories’ of ancient regions where 
‘every statement or calculation to be found in an ancient text, every artefact finds a place, creating a 
morass of unintelligible, meaningless, unrelated “facts”’.43 It is an indisputable fact that a scribe in 
Arsinoe recorded that in AD 209, Antonia Thermoutharion had bought part of a house in 
Philadelphia from four children of Longinus, for 100 silver drachmas.44  This fact, which is perfectly 
intelligible, can now be related to other similar facts to provide meaningful conclusions using 
computing and statistical tools unavailable to Finley. Finley’s ‘morass’ of facts has been collected and 
curated in an exemplary fashion by the work of generations of papyrologists who have succeeded in 
producing an easily accessible online database of all the published texts. This, together with the 
edited volumes, has provided the data to allow me to extract some meaning from the enormous 
number of texts available. 
Although I emphasise the importance of individual behaviour, as will become clear in the following 
chapters, we very rarely have information on the thought processes of the individuals concerned. 
We must fall back on examining the financial outcomes of market transactions, price formats, social 
networks and other indicators to see if they show financial rationality at work, or if there is stronger 
evidence for redistribution and reciprocity. We are aided in our analysis in that many of our 
transactions are of the purest ‘capitalist’ type: the investment of capital through the real-estate and 
credit markets.45 I am however, very conscious of the methodological difficulties of identifying 
rationality from this type of data, as outlined by Andreau and Maucourant, and this will be discussed 
further when my conclusions are presented.46  
I have concentrated on the individual documents which means I have adopted a microeconomic 
rather than macroeconomic approach. I have chosen Roman Egypt since ‘to approach the ancient 
economy micro-economically we need sets of data…and such sets exist almost exclusively for 
 
42 See Morley 1996: 73-5.  
43 Finley 1985: 61. 
44 P.Hamb. I 16. 
45 It should therefore be easier to identify, and statistically analyse, indicators of financial rationality from this 
data, than from the secondary data for economic rationality used by Rathbone in his assessment of the 
workings of a large estate: Rathbone 1991. 




Egypt.’47  I have also emphasised statistical significance since although ‘numbers provide a greater 
statistical reliability for the conclusions one draws from the evidence’ this is really only true when 
comparative conclusions are accompanied by an assessment of the level of confidence that can be 
assumed.48 Whilst many historians have adopted numerical approaches to the analysis of 
papyrological evidence, there are also some who find a numerical approach challenging. Why else 
could Schubert feel it necessary to write a paper as recently as 2007 to answer the question whether 
it was a dream or reality to study Roman Egypt in a quantitative fashion? 49 We may not be dealing 
with ‘big data’ in the modern sense, but more than 4,300 transactions are available for analysis. I 
have also perhaps gone a little further than previous scholars of Roman Egypt, in my use of 
stochastic and econometric models when I draw conclusions. In the use of these modelling 
techniques I have been inspired by the approach adopted by Hopkins, even if his models were more 
conceptual than mathematical, and it is worth quoting his own justification for the use of models in 
full: 
‘Some of the greatest fun I have had in Roman history has been in constructing models. A model is, 
roughly speaking, a simplification of a complex reality, designed to show up the logical relationships 
between its constituent parts. The utility of models in Roman history, as I see it, is twofold. First, 
models allow us to perceive the structures or repeated patterns which lie behind the superficial flow 
of individual actors and events, which fill the pages of traditional Roman narrative histories. 
Secondly, models allow us to construct whole pictures, into which the surviving fragments of ancient 
source material can be plausibly fitted. The model is a sort of master picture as on the front of a 
jigsaw puzzle box; the fragments of surviving ancient sources provide only a few of the jigsaw 
pieces.’50 
Hopkins, I believe, overstated the utility of models somewhat. If a model does present a ‘master 
picture’ it is one which must inevitably be somewhat fuzzy and out of focus, and it is here that 
stochastic techniques, rather than the deterministic, best estimate approaches adopted by Hopkins, 
come into their own. Stochastic models have inputs and outputs which ‘are probability distributions 
rather than discrete values. The underlying principle is that one first represents the uncertainty 
about the underlying processes or input variables mathematically and then calculates the implied 
 
47 Van Minnen 2000: 216. 
48 Van Minnen 2009: 656. 
49 Schubert 2007: 119. 




uncertainty about the outcome measure—a method called the forward propagation of 
uncertainty.’51 
I have, where possible, tried to marry archaeological and papyrological evidence, but a fully 
integrated approach is beyond the scope of this thesis and it is difficult to see how archaeological 
evidence could be of significant assistance when dealing with financial matters. 52  Also, in general, I 
have not made many comparisons with other geographies and time periods, unless I need to point 
out modern pre-conceptions which may bias our assessment of the evidence, or in a few cases, 
where the evidence from another context could provide a useful model to help us understand how 
pre-industrial societies may have functioned in the absence of direct evidence from Roman Egypt.53 I 
follow Rathbone’s approach in believing that ‘comparative evidence is useful in delimiting the 
possible and probable in ancient economic history, it cannot in itself provide the detailed specifics’.54  
Overall I hope that, following Lewis’s approach of methodological pluralism, and using a toolbox 
which includes previous academic scholarship, NIE, Behavioural Finance, MPT and Stochastic 
modelling for my analysis, our understanding of the ancient economy may be improved.55 I am 
primarily interested in how people in the ancient world thought about key financial decisions which 
would have a great impact on their lives and those of their family. Adherence to a single academic 
viewpoint would hinder this investigation and a pluralist conceptual framework is the best approach. 
I will thus draw from a number of different disciplines, though my emphasis will be more on 
behaviours than institutions.  
This thesis thus has the following structure. In the final section of this initial chapter the detailed 
methodology used in this study is set out. Thereafter, given that price levels and inflationary 
conditions are key to financial considerations, a full chapter is devoted to an analysis of price levels 
for goods over the period under consideration. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 then deal with the agricultural 
land, housing and credit markets respectively, addressing the nature of the markets and the 
motivations of market participants. Chapter 6 then compares the rates of return from different types 
of financial transactions to see if hierarchies of risk/return can be identified which may suggest that 
 
51 Lavan 2016: 21-2 and see appendix B. 
52 See Pollard 1998 for an example of the combined use of different types of evidence to consider a question of 
interest – the chronology of the village of Karanis. 
53 I recognise that it can be argued that rationality is to some degree a subjective concept, so that any study 
requires a comparative approach. The perceived lack of such comparisons was Tchernia’s central criticism of 
Rathbone’s analysis of economic rationalism in the Heroninos archives: Tchernia 2005: 291. However, I believe 
that by establishing a clear definition of financial rationality I have demonstrated that a comparative approach 
is not absolutely required. 
54 Rathbone 1989: 160. 




transactions were, or were not, driven by financial rationality. Finally, chapter 7 draws together the 
evidence set out in the earlier chapters, addressing the three main areas identified above, within the 







Section 1.2 Data and Methodology  
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to review the available data which can help answer the question posed 
in the previous section and to describe the detail of the methodologies that have been used to 
explore this data. Before doing so, I need to define the scope of what I have interpreted as being 
‘Roman Egypt’. I have chosen to define the time period for study as being between AD 1 and 350. 
The start date allows time for Roman institutions and attitudes to have embedded themselves 
within Egyptian society in the 30 years following Augustus’s conquest in 30 BC.  The end date of AD 
350 was chosen to allow for study of the higher inflation period of the fourth century. The 
geographic scope is defined by the province or provinces of Roman Egypt.  
The data available reflect the patterns of survival, publication preference and other variables outside 
my control.56 There are close to 19,000 published documentary papyri where the date of the source 
could fall within the period from AD 1 to 350. Firstly, it was necessary to categorise all these papyri 
to form a ‘normative’ database and then to extract a subset of this data to establish smaller 
databases of documents of particular interest.57 This data sub-set was then ‘mined’ to identify 
features and trends which are relevant to the question of the thesis and the broader debates. For 
this quantitative approach to be effective, it was essential that a strictly objective methodology was 
used and this methodology is described below. However, this quantitative approach needed to be 
allied with a qualitative, and inevitably subjective, analysis of particular texts.  
The structure of this section is as follows: the methods used to construct the normative database are 
described. The process of identification of documents of particular interest is set out, as is the 
general methodology used for data mining. Finally, the processes and techniques used to analyse the 




56 See Lerouxel 2016: 3-8 for a discussion of the issues involved in constructing a database of documentary 
papyri documents. Whilst Lerouxel’s specific points related to the construction of a database relating to loans, 
the general principles apply to the wider database which has been constructed for this thesis.  
57 For a description of the process of normalisation of data within a Roman papyrological context see Bagnall 




1.2.2 Establishing a Normative Database 
The first task was to establish a normative database against which theories could be tested. For 
instance, in order to answer the question ‘were loans more common in the second century than the 
first?’ it is not sufficient simply to count the number of loans. If there were more in the second 
century than the first this could simply be because there are more papyri available from the second 
century than the first. It is necessary to have a larger database so that the question can be answered 
by checking the total number of documents, calculating what proportion of documentary papyri 
were loans, and verifying that there are no other reasons that might explain an apparent trend. This 
process is known as ‘normalisation’.  
The database from which the data were collected is the Duke Databank of Documentary Papyri  
(DDbDP), as set out within papyri.info, including most published papyri collections.58 Ostraca were 
excluded from the normative database since there are relatively few relevant cases and the use of a 
different writing medium will distort the nature of the data. However, any ostraca that have come to 
my attention as having relevance to this paper have been noted and, though not forming part of the 
normative database, will be referenced as appropriate in later chapters. Similarly, mummy labels 
were excluded since they are found in different contexts to the documentary papyri and have a 
fundamentally different purpose. Literary papyri were also excluded, given the scope of the DDbDP. 
Whilst, as noted by van Minnen, no database can be regarded as covering all the relevant papyri in 
existence and there may be published documentary papyri which have been omitted, the vast bulk 
of published papyri are included within the DDbDP.59 Four fields were extracted from the metadata 
on papyri.info for each of the papyri concerned: reference, document date or range of dates, 
document provenance, noting that the alternative of document origin was not always available, and 
document type. The fourth element recorded, document type, had to be determined on a case by 
case basis, since papyri.info does not have a consistent approach in its metadata descriptions, using 
different languages and categorisations. The data were extracted by hand, since it was necessary to 
examine the metadata for each papyri to assign a type, but the accuracy of recording was checked 




58 Collected from http://Papyri.info/ during the course of 2016. Bagnall 2011: 74 suggests the inclusion of 
unpublished papyri inventories to remove some of the bias in the data caused by editorial choice, but time and 
resources did not allow this process to be undertaken. A small number of unpublished documents of particular 
interest, being leases, sales or credit transactions, were included in appendix D, however.  




Given the inconsistency in the metadata descriptions in papyri.info, a typology of documents needed 
to be drawn up which would allow further analysis. Documents were divided into those of an official, 
private or unknown nature. Documents of an official nature were further sub-divided into census, 
customs, liturgies, military, petition, state seed loans, tax and trial types and a final catch-all 
category of other official documents not falling into the previous types. Those of a private nature 
were sub-divided into documents related to commercial business, inheritance, leases, letters, loans, 
marriage and divorce, private estates, sales, temples and a catch-all category of other private 
documents. The assignment of documents to a particular type was straightforward in most cases, 
but on occasions a subjective decision needed to be made as to which category applied.  The 
assignment of a document to a particular type was usually based purely on the metadata description 
in papyri.info. 
The total number of documents examined was 18,962 and the distribution of these by date is shown 
in Fig. 1.2.1. When a source had a range of dates applied to it, it was placed at the central point in 
the date range. In Fig. 1.2.1, where a source’s assigned date fell at the dividing point in the 50 year 
age bands, then it was given a weighting of 0.5 to each of the adjacent year bands. Thus a source 
which had a date range given of the second century would have a central date of 150 and would be 
given a weighting of 0.5 for the range 100-150 and 0.5 for 150-200.  The distribution of all 
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The proportions of official and private documents over time generally follow those shown in Fig. 
1.2.2 but there are changes over time in the proportions of different types of private documents of 





Turning to the provenance of the documents concerned, this is, of course, largely a function of the 
find sites of papyri and the papyri mostly have a provenance from the Arsinoite or Oxyrhynchite 
nome. The distribution of papyri according to their provenance and by date is shown in Fig. 1.2.3. It 
should be noted that we have few papyri from Alexandria and that the bulk of the papyri from the 
Oxyrhynchite nome come from the nome capital – Oxyrhynchus.61 
 
60 See, in particular, sub-section 5.1.2 for a discussion of how the proportions of land and credit transactions 
vary over time. 
61 This thesis uses the term ‘city’ to refer, not only to Alexandria and the other three poleis, but also the nome 
capitals, for instance, Oxyrhynchus. See Tacoma 2008: 87 for a discussion of this categorisation. All other 























1.2.3 Transactions of Particular Interest 
 
One useful by-product of the establishment of this normative database was that it provided an initial 
list of the documents which are particularly relevant to this thesis: land sales, house sales, loans and 
deposits, land leases and house leases. The process of assigning documents to these sub-types by 
use of metadata descriptions did not, however, ensure that all the relevant documents had been 
identified. For instance, the metadata describing a document may be too general and a description 
such as ‘Vertrag’ or ‘Kauf’ could hide details of interest. Thus, there was a risk that a relevant source 
might be missed because of a mistaken description or because the description is too vague. 
Therefore, searches of papyri.info on key Greek words such as daneion or chresis (loan), hypotheke 
(mortgage) or phoros (rent) were undertaken and cross-referenced against the lists from the 
normative database. Thereafter the secondary literature which provides lists of financial 
transactions were cross-referenced against the other lists to ensure that the possibility that a 
relevant source may have been missed was reduced.62  The resulting list of documents of particular 
interest was placed within excel databases.  
 
62 The primary works used for cross-referencing were Bogaert 2000; Drexhage 1991; Gendy 1990; Harper 2016; 
Hennig 1967; Herrmann 1958; Johnson 1936; Kutzner 1989; Lerouxel 2016; Maehler 1983; Montevecchi 1941, 
1943 and 1984; Rowlandson 1996; and Tenger 1993. It had been hoped to make use of the ‘synallagma’ 
database at http://synallagma.tau.ac.il as a cross-referencing tool but unfortunately at the time of compiling of 
this thesis it was not complete, there were numerous cases where the data had not been verified and the 
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Entries in the databases were not limited solely to the contracts themselves, and documents which 
referred to a specific transaction were also included. Examples of these references are petitions or 
letters referring to a transaction, offers to complete a transaction, contract registers or receipts for 
payments. Having identified that a document was of interest, its transcription in papyri.info and the 
published text were reviewed to identify what details they contained. A document, such as a 
contract register, could contain numerous transactions of different types including loans, leases and 
land sales. Five inter-connected databases were thus established, derived from 2,941 documents. In 
total 4,367 transactions were included in these databases which covered land sales, house sales, 
loans and deposits, land leases and house leases and the distribution is shown in Fig. 1.2.4. All the 




It should be noted that when the normative database was used for comparative purposes, then to 
avoid distortions caused by individual documents which contain many transactions such as those 
from the Tebtunis grapheion archive, the comparison was made based on the number of documents 
not transactions.63 I make no claims that the databases thus established are exhaustive, since human 
 
within the Trismegistos website (https://www.trismegistos.org/archive/) were consulted to try to ensure that 
any available information on ages, locations and family connections had been gathered correctly. 
















error inevitably means that some documents may be missed or misclassified. I hope however, that 
the systematic process undertaken will have eliminated any unconscious bias in the identification of 
the documents of particular interest and ensured that the vast bulk of relevant transactions will have 
been included. 
Having identified the transactions which were to be included in the five databases, it was necessary 
to define the information that needed to be gathered to enable the appropriate level of analysis to 
be completed. As with any data-gathering process, there is a balance between the level of detail that 
ideally could be collected and the work needed to collate the information. There was no way to 
automate this process and thus gathering the information was essentially done by hand and was 
time-consuming. Hence the data collected needed to be limited. There were certain items that were 
collected for all five databases and other information collected which differed according to the 
nature of the transaction and these are shown in Fig. 1.2.5. 
Fig. 1.2.5 Data collected within the five databases where available 
Information common to 
all databases 
Database Database specific information 
Document level -
Papyri.info reference, 
date and provenance  
Transaction level -
Additional reference 
such as line number and 
date of the transaction if 
it differed from the date 
of the document 
Participant level - 
gender, age and location 
and family/tenancy 
connections.64 
Land Sales Purchase price, area of land, 
type of land, month of sale 
House Sales Purchase price, fraction of 
house, month of sale 
Loans and Deposits Amount of loan, interest rate 
and form, duration, month of 
loan, month of repayment, 
whether specific security was 
provided 
Land Leases Rent amount, area of land, 
duration, month of lease 
House Leases Rent amount, fraction of house, 
duration, month of lease 
 
By collecting this information, sufficient data were made available to analyse most patterns, but it 
will be noted that no information was obtained as to names, social status, including whether the 
individual was a veteran or freed slave, or the legal format of the transaction.  As noted above, 
offers to transact or incomplete drafts of contracts have also been included in the databases and any 
financial information from these documents was included in the same way as for completed 
contracts on the grounds that these documents provide valuable information on general market 
 




conditions, even if we cannot be certain that the transaction was completed under the conditions 
foreseen. 
Once the data had been compiled they were subject to ongoing review during the process of analysis 
and each transaction was individually double-checked. With such a large number of transactions to 
review it is inevitable that some mistakes will have been made, but the very size of the databases 
should ensure that any errors are not statistically significant. As noted above, the full list of the 
documents constituting the database and summaries of the contents of the most significant 
transactions are provided in the appendices to this thesis to allow the reader to form their own view 
on the accuracy of the information compiled. 
Finally, it will be noted that for the chapter relating to general prices, given that there are a number 
of recent and reliable collections of relevant data, an alternative approach was adopted which is 
detailed in the introduction to that chapter. 
 
1.2.4 Data Mining Process 
Having established the five transactional databases, they needed to be analysed. The database 
format had been chosen as a set of inter-connected excel spreadsheets so as to make this analysis 
process as easy as possible. Using a spreadsheet allowed medians, averages and other attributes of 
the data such as distributions to be relatively easily calculated and displayed. It also allowed a 
number of the conclusions to be tested for statistical significance. Appendix B provides more details 
on the statistical and other mathematical techniques adopted when data were analysed. The 
process of analysing the data was aided by the fact that we have good information on the measures 
and money used in Roman Egypt and for reference the available information is summarised in 
appendix A.  
It might be thought that the databases constructed would be suitable for the application of Social 
Network Analysis given that the documents contain much information on the individuals concerned 
and their geographical location. However, in practice it has not proven useful to use the normal 
techniques to identify standard clustering or density measures, or to display nodal information in 
network diagrams, given that the inclusion of information on individuals, particularly their location, 
is highly selective and varies according to circumstances. For instance, when two principals in a 
transaction were resident in the same village there may not have been any need to record their 




to determine the location of the principals in some circumstances, but I have only assigned an 
individual’s location when it is stated or it is implied by the description of the individual concerned.65    
When looking for patterns in the age structures of participants in financial transactions it was helpful 
to estimate at what age individuals were most likely to receive an inheritance from their parents. 
This distribution and its derivation are set out in appendix C. 
 
1.2.5 Assessing Rates of Return and Risk 
Much of the analysis undertaken in this thesis does not involve any financial modelling, but rather is 
a simple presentation of patterns that have been identified within the relevant database. However, 
modelling the rates of return likely to be achieved and the risks involved in different transactions is 
at the heart of this thesis and the data-gathering process had this firmly in mind. The detailed 
methodology and supporting assumptions for each type of transaction are described in the relevant 
sub-sections, but the broad principles are given below. The first step was to estimate the likely 
return from a specific transaction. Only transactions which pre-date AD 274 have been assessed, 
since the jump in prices after that date and the high inflation described in section 2.2 makes it very 
difficult to assess a real return.  Initially, in sections 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2 respectively, the returns from 
land, housing and loans were estimated by dividing the likely annual financial gain by the amount of 
the capital employed. Thus, the return on a loan was equal to the net interest received divided by 
the amount of the loan, and that from a land or housing lease was equal to the net rent received 
divided by the value of the real-estate. To enable comparison, these returns were expressed in 
percentages per annum.  
These calculations, which are done individually for every transaction where we have sufficient data, 
were first completed on the basis of my best estimate of each component within the calculation. So, 
for example, when the likely financial return on a plot of land which has been leased and where we 
know the rent, is to be assessed we need to have best estimates of the likely value of the land as an 
investment and the monetary value of any rents paid in kind.  This approach is a ‘deterministic’ one 
since a single answer is determined for each investment. All monetary values are expressed in AD 
 
65 Lerouxel assumed that where no location is specified for any of the principals, then their locations were the 
same as the location where the transaction took place: Lerouxel 2016: 128. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption, but I have preferred to be more conservative and not make assumptions which depend on scribal 
habits. I have, however, assumed locations for the participants from their personal description, even if it is not 
explicit. For instance, in P.Tebt. II 395 (AD 150), a document from the village of Tebtunis, which mentions a 
bank in the city of Arsinoe, one of the principals, Pappion, is described as a gymnasiarch-designate, which is a 




150 terms, re-calibrating the amounts to allow for the relatively low inflation after that date up to 
AD 274. 
One problem with a deterministic approach is the reliance that it places on the single best estimates 
of the components of the calculation. Another difficulty with using a deterministic approach is that  
while it can provide an estimate of likely returns on an investment it provides no information as to 
risk. The first problem can be alleviated but not removed by recognising that our best estimate is 
only one of a number of possibilities and by modelling more than one possibility. The second issue 
can be resolved to some degree by the fact that by modelling different possibilities we can obtain a 
distribution of likely returns and plot these on a graph and describe the variability in a mathematical 
way. So for instance we know, intuitively, that from a financial perspective an unsecured loan of 
wheat was riskier for the lender in monetary terms than lending cash secured on a mortgage. 
However, by modelling many different possible scenarios, we can mathematically describe and 
compare the likely returns and risks of different investments and this is done in chapter 6. This 





Chapter 2 Prices 
Section 2.1 Prices to AD 270 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to determine how the cost of living changed for ordinary people in 
Roman Egypt during the period up to AD 270.  The start of the period, AD 1, is that used elsewhere 
in this thesis, though the data for the first half of the first century are generally insufficient to enable 
anything more than an impression of price stability to be deduced. The end point of AD 270 for this 
chapter was chosen to avoid the distortion caused by the jump in prices in the 270’s, which is 
described by Rathbone as a ‘brusque leap in price levels around 274 by a factor of ten or more’.66 
The proposition that there was such a leap will be assessed in the following section but for the 
moment we will concentrate on the period up to AD 270. The structure of this chapter is broadly as 
follows: the first section deals with the methodology used to identify commodity prices and 
construct indices. Then, the prices for the five individual commodities for which we have sufficient 
data - wheat, barley, wine, donkeys and slaves - are analysed to see if trends can be identified. The 
correlations between the price trends of commodities are calculated and the prices from individual 
commodities are combined into a ‘blended’ price index weighted by the number of observations. 
The reasons why commodities showed different price trends are examined. Then price indices based 
on a basket of goods are constructed. Finally, conclusions are drawn as to the nature of the patterns 
identified. 
 
2.1.2 Methodology Used for Individual Commodities  
The data for this chapter have largely been drawn from existing collections of prices for specific 
goods compiled by Litinas, Rathbone, Rathbone & von Reden and Straus.67 The earlier collections of 
Johnson and Drexhage have now largely been superseded by these later works.68 The data for wheat 
and barley were compiled very recently and may be expected to be comprehensive. For wine, the 
data were collected some 20 years ago and I have made a systematic search of those papyri 
 
66 Rathbone 1997: 215. 
67 Litinas 2019 for donkeys, Rathbone & von Reden 2014 for barley and wheat, Straus 2004 for slaves, 
Rathbone 1997 for wine. 




collections published after 1997 to identify any further documents.69  For donkeys, Litinas has 
maintained a listing of relevant sources online since publishing his original article and his list has 
been cross-referenced against Rathbone’s earlier work. For slaves, the data are based on the 
information provided by Straus and a search has been undertaken for additional data in the same 
way as wine.  
Constructing time series for each of the different commodities has challenges related to ensuring 
that the data are homogenous so that a like for like comparison is made.  Performing an analysis of 
wheat or barley prices is relatively straightforward since wheat and barley were generally priced by 
the ‘artaba’. Wine is somewhat more problematic since, apart from price differences arising from 
quality and age, wine measures may have varied geographically.70 Finally the variation in age, sex 
and condition of donkeys and slaves means that inevitably the data for these commodities will be 
more heterogeneous. For donkeys I have included all donkey sales irrespective of the age of the 
donkey given the fact that donkeys mature quickly and thus even a young donkey would have 
commercial value. Children take longer to mature than donkeys and thus for slaves I have looked at 
data excluding and including children to see whether the results vary. For all commodities I have 
included all relevant prices including those which are not definite, given that it is reasonable to 
include probable prices rather than ignore them. 
Given the emphasis on diachronic changes in the value of such elements it has been necessary to 
ignore sources which cannot be adequately dated to a period of time within a range of plus or minus 
25 years.  I have thus only included data which have been dated to within a 50 year period so, for 
example, for donkey prices, P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2846 which is dated to the second half of the first century 
has been included in the analysis, but P.Oslo III 134 which can only be dated to some time in the 
third century has been ignored. Data have been assumed to be as at the mid-point of the date range 
concerned, thus P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2846 is assumed to date from AD 75.  The justification for this 
approach is that to use a longer period would hide the patterns that we are seeking to identify whilst 
a shorter period would ignore significant data that still have something to tell us.  
In this the approach differs from that of Rathbone who uses single dates to display such data, e.g. 
‘“second- or third-century” prices at 190’, when presenting the information in ‘scatter point’ graph 
form, but who also helpfully provides an identifier to indicate if a date or price is uncertain.71  There 
are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. Rathbone’s approach makes full use of the 
 
69 I am indebted to Professor Rathbone for providing a list of the more recently published documents that I 
was able to use to cross-reference these against my own search. 
70 See appendix A for descriptions of the measures used for all commodities. 




available data and allows the reader to form their own opinion from the pattern of points. This runs 
the risk that by leaving ‘room for judgement by the individual “consumer” of the data’ the consumer 
will see, as in a ‘Rorschach’  ink-blot test, what best suits their preconceptions.72 For example if the 
consumer is seeking to identify the effects of the Antonine plague, the third-century political crises 
or coinage debasement, they may be able to convince themselves that they see a suitable pattern.73 
However, the use of only tightly-dated  data suits an approach which seeks to identify a ‘best-fit 
regression’ line, linking the points, which may then be used to identify numerical values for average 
inflation of individual commodities and then combined into a general index, so this is the approach I 
have adopted.74 Duncan-Jones did this on a limited scale by seeing what straight line would best-fit 
the price data he had available for the period AD 100 to 220 but this may hide price developments in 
the interim since it assumes that inflation is constant over the period.75 More recently Harper has 
looked at straight line best fits for two separate periods for wheat only: the period to AD 150 and 
from the late second century to AD 275.76  I believe it preferable to use a more nuanced regression 
line approach which fits the spread of data to a ‘wavy’ curve, technically a ‘third order polynomial’ 
with two points of inflection as seen in Fig. 2.1.1 for wheat. 
When we look for messages within the curves and statistics shown later in this chapter we must be 
aware that, given the small number of observations and the non-temporal price variations that will 
have existed in our data as a result of regional or other differences, in no way can the curve be 
regarded as an accurate representation of the fluctuations in prices over the short term. There will 
have been short-term price differences caused by good and poor harvests, or political and monetary 
events, and a curve simply represents a smoothed indication of price levels over the longer term.   
We should also remember that there are little or no data from the major city of Alexandria and that 
for the bulky and relatively immobile commodities of wheat, barley and wine no data from Upper 
Egypt have been included.  
In a number of documents prices are given for the same commodity for the same year. This type of 
data is treated as a single point with a median value of the prices seen, since otherwise the data 
would be too heavily weighted towards certain sources. The justification for this approach is that the 
data available should be treated as observations within a biased sample of the ‘reality’ of the 
experience of the population of Roman Egypt. We should seek to eliminate as far as possible the 
biases caused by the nature of the data and to ensure that, to as great an extent as possible, each 
 
72 Exner 2002. 
73 Rathbone 1997: 186. 
74 For a definition of a ‘best-fit’ line see appendix B. 
75 Duncan-Jones 1994: 28. 




observation is independent of any other such observation. The data contained within a single source 
for a particular year are clearly not independent and should definitely not be treated as separate 
individual observations and given equal weighting with another observation from an independently 
derived source.  The use of medians reduces some of the sample bias or dependence impacts but it 
should be noted that it does not eliminate the reliance on documents from the Kronion and 
Heroninos archives noted by Rathbone.77  
 
2.1.3 Methodology for Index Construction 
Dealing with the construction of my price indices, in determining the basket of commodities and the 
relevant weight applicable to each component, my calculations have been based on the 
‘Mediterranean Respectability’ and  ‘Bare Bones Subsistence’ baskets described by Allen.78 The types 
of commodities and the amounts included in such baskets were determined by Allen by reference to 
those goods needed to reach a ‘respectable’ standard of living and those required simply to survive. 
In both baskets Allen assumed that 1,940 calories would be needed on a daily basis, but the sources 
of these calories differ between the two baskets, with the respectability basket having larger 
amounts of higher price items such as meat and wine. Allen then applied the prices within 
Diocletian’s Price Edict of AD 301 to the amounts of the commodities to determine an overall cost of 
living. The aim of this chapter is different in that it seeks to assess changes in the cost of living over 
time. In doing so calculations have not been based on the prices within the Price Edict, since these 
post-date the period under consideration, are not specific to Egypt and may not represent real prices 
for goods. Rather, an alternative approach has been adopted which is to construct an initial cost of 
living by applying the available prices in Roman Egypt during the first century AD to the quantities of 
commodities set out by Allen and then see how the cost of this basket changes over time.  
The same basket components and quantities have been maintained over the period and thus 
implicitly the assumption has been made that there would not have been any significant change in 
the pattern of consumption of commodities by ordinary people over the period AD 1 to 270. A 
second assumption is that the baskets proposed by Allen are suitable for use in Roman Egypt. Both 
these assumptions and the mathematics of the construction of the indices will be dealt with later in 
this chapter, but the methodology used in the development of any historical index is inevitably 
influenced by the data available. There must be a compromise between what commodities we 
would wish to include in an analysis and those for which we have both a sufficient number of 
 
77 Rathbone 1997: 185. 




observations and a reasonable spread of such observations over time. Thus, although linen and fuel 
form significant elements of Allen’s basket, we lack sufficient data from Roman Egypt on how their 
prices changed over time to include them explicitly within the baskets analysed even if we may have 
isolated examples of prices. The one very important commodity which appears as a major 
constituent of both the respectability and subsistence baskets is wheat and this has been included in 
the analysis. Wine is also an explicit constituent of the respectability basket and is thus also included. 
There are also commodities which were commonly used in day-to-day life in Roman Egypt which do 
not appear in Allen’s baskets but for which we have sufficient data: namely barley and donkeys, and 
the methodology used to construct the indices seeks to take this data into account by regarding 
their price development as proxies for other tradeable goods.  
As regards other items which could potentially be included in a basket of commodities and services 
which would shed similar light on the cost of living, there are currently no other specific foodstuffs 
or staple items that I am aware of that could be analysed in a similar way since the data sets are not 
large, internally consistent or extensive enough. One item which could not be included in a 
consumption basket of goods for ordinary people but which may provide useful confirmatory 
information on general price developments is slave prices, so these too have been analysed. Note 
that variables which could potentially have a link to the cost of living such as earnings, land/house 
prices and rents and loan amounts and interest rates will be dealt with in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
2.1.4 Wheat Prices 
Turning to each of the individual commodities mentioned above, bread made from wheat was the 
staple foodstuff of Roman Egypt and we have a good spread of data to work from to determine likely 
wheat price trends over time. Wheat should in theory show less variability in price at any one time 
than other commodities such as wine or donkeys given the lack of variations in quality or age.79  We 
should also be aware of possible distortions in price levels such as farm-gate as opposed to retail 
prices, time of year of sale and size of purchase when conclusions are reached. Seasonal variations 
can, for instance, potentially be discerned in P.Sarap. 32 when a low price seems to be attested 
immediately after the harvest.80 Nevertheless the data have been taken for all commodities at face-
value and no attempt has been made to adjust the data for perceived seasonal or other variability 
 
79 Note that Duncan-Jones suggests that there would have been strong regional variations in prices: Duncan-
Jones 1990: 149, but there is no clear evidence for this within the data we have available. 




since the number of available transactions does not permit such an approach and there are no clear 
statistically valid trends apparent that could permit such adjustments.  
In determining the sources to be used, Rathbone’s 2014 data for private sales of wheat have been 
taken as a starting point. 81  Prices contained in penalty clauses have been excluded since these may 
not represent market prices.  No verification of the comprehensiveness of Rathbone’s data has been 
made, given its recent compilation, but when completing the collection of leases which are detailed 
in a later chapter one other source was found which is relevant. This is P.Oxy. XXII 2351 (AD 112) 
where the parties to a lease agree an option to pay rent in either cash or wheat and since, in my 
view, this is an option based approximately on the expected market price rather than a penalty price 
I believe it is a relevant data point. The data included are presented in appendix 2.1.1 and the 
resulting chart of prices in drachmas per artaba with ‘wavy’ and straight-line best-fit curves is shown 
in Fig. 2.1.1 for the period to AD 270: 
 
 
The R² coefficient shown in Fig. 2.1.1 is an indicator of the degree of fit of the data to the line 
drawn.82 Both straight and wavy best-fit lines have been plotted in order to illustrate the differences 
 
81 Rathbone & von Reden 2014: Table A8.15, adding P.Oxy. XXII 2351 (AD 112). 



















Fig 2.1.1 Private Wheat Prices to AD 270




between the two approaches.  The coefficient is 0.42 for the wavy line indicating that there is, to 
some degree, a consistent trend over time rather than the data being randomly distributed, but the 
relationship could not be described as strong, and we will see that other commodities have much 
higher coefficients. However, the wavy line is consistent with Rathbone’s conclusion that there were 
two periods of price stability for wheat: up to AD 160 and from AD 190 to 270.83 This conclusion 
cannot be drawn from the straight line since it does not differentiate between trends within the 
total period. In addition to providing more nuanced information, the use of a wavy line fits the data 
better than using a straight line given that the R² coefficient is 0.42 for the wavy line and only 0.38 
for the straight line.  
The data above were for private sales and it may be of interest to see how sales where the state was 
involved compare to private transactions. The same methodology as for private wheat sales was 
used to determine the sources to be used, no additional sources were found, and the data are 
presented in appendix 2.1.2 and the comparison is shown in Fig. 2.1.2.84  
 
 
Transactions where the state was involved are at prices which generally seem lower than those of 
private sales. The variability of state prices is low and it looks as though prices were conventionally 
 
83 Rathbone 1997: 215. 

















Fig. 2.1.2 - Private and State Wheat Prices to AD 270 




set, typically at eight drachmas, rather than established by negotiation and the operation of market 
forces. This is likely to be related to an inequality within the power relationship of buyer and seller. 
For instance, the state as buyer requisitioned wheat at a price of its choosing. Other forms of state 
intervention were available other than simple requisitions or sales from public granaries, as in the 
case shown in P.Oxy. XLII 3048 where in AD 246 the Prefect ordered that all private stocks of wheat 
in the Oxyrhynchite nome be declared and potentially acquired on behalf of the state at a rate of 24 
drachmas per artaba. As a major actor in the economy, the state’s pricing position would be likely to 
dampen the market price if it was slower to react to increasing prices than private individuals or 
generally made purchases at the lower end of the private market price range.85  Evidence for such 
behaviour can be seen in Fig. 2.1.2 around the beginning of the third century when state prices were 
maintained at the conventional price of eight drachma whilst private prices generally increased to 
around ten to 20 drachmas per artaba.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
2.1.5 Barley Prices 
Though wheat was the staple element of the diet, other commodities were in daily use including 
barley. Barley prices would, in principle, have been subject to similar regional, seasonal or other 
price distortions as those which applied to wheat. Although barley is a similar crop to wheat there 
were important differences in that its utility for bread making is lower, it was used as hard tack, is 
more bulky to transport and it has lower nutritional value.86 Fig. 2.1.3, which shows barley prices in 
drachmas per artaba, is based on Rathbone’s 2014 data adjusted in the same way as wheat for 
median weighting and excluding uncertain dates. 87  Both private and state sales have been included, 
but if private sales only were examined the curve would be similar.  No other sources have been 
identified by review of more recently published papyri and the data are set out in appendix 2.1.3. 
 
85 Rathbone 1997: 198. 
86 Rickman 1980: 5. 





The contrast of barley with wheat prices is striking. The curve looks very different to wheat in that it 
has an exponential shape in the later years with no sign of prices levelling off in the third century. 
The R² coefficient is 0.60, considerably higher than that for wheat, indicating that a trend over time 
can be identified rather than the data being randomly distributed.  
 
2.1.6 Wine Prices 
The data for wine are those that were given in Rathbone and which were supplemented by papyri 
largely published after Rathbone’s paper.88 The data have been adjusted as described above for 
median weighting and for sources of uncertain date. The data are shown in appendix 2.1.4 where 
the prices are in drachmas per ‘keramion monochoron’ or ‘single-size jar’:89 
 
88 Rathbone 1997: 223-33 adding SB XX 14576 (A.D. 46-7), SB XX 14525 (A.D. 57), SB XX 14409 (A.D. 93-94?), 
P.Brem. 45 (A.D. 109), P.Oxy. LXIV 4436 (A.D. 176-208?), P.Bodl. I 126 (A.D. 193), CPR VII 9 (Start third 
century?) and P.Louvre I 50 (after A.D. 216). 






















The chart shows a period of relative price stability from AD 50 to around 150, but prices pick up from 
that point in a similar, but somewhat less marked, exponential curve as was seen in Fig. 2.1.3 for 
barley. The R² coefficient is 0.56 which is higher than that for wheat because the data lie closer to 
the trendline, and thus the indication of a trend is fairly strong. 
Whilst wine is the commodity with one of the largest sets of available price points there is likely to 
have been price variability which had nothing to do with long-term diachronic change. This 
variability would include environmental conditions affecting that year’s yield, retail/wholesale price 
differences, seasonal variations, quality differences and local market conditions. Nevertheless with a 
sufficient number of observations, despite such short-term variations, the amount of data should 
still allow a general price/time long-term trend to be determined. An indication of the variability in 
the data caused by differences in quality can be gauged by Diocletian’s price edict of AD 301 where 
the price of wine varied from eight to 30 denarii according to age and grade, though the indication 
that old wine was less expensive than new wine is contradicted to some extent by the evidence from 
Egyptian estates.90 Wine was difficult to store for more than a couple of years and the price 
variations would not have been as extreme as in modern times where large amounts are paid for 
 





















older vintages. The prices available to us from Roman Egypt also appear to be for locally produced 
wine rather than imported premium wines which may have commanded a higher price, and this 
should tend to reduce variations caused by differences in quality. 
The bulk of the wine data come from the Arsinoite nome and it is worth checking to see if a different 
pattern would be shown if only Arsinoite sources were considered. Fig. 2.1.5 for the Arsinoite 
documents only has the same R² coefficient as the all-Egypt data and shows a similar pattern though 
the period of flatter prices in the first 150 years is more pronounced. The data for the other nomes 
are too sparse for any useful analysis, but the similar shape of the curve for the Arsinoite and All-
Egypt curves shows that there is a degree of internal consistency within the data indicating similar 
price patterns in the Arsinoite nome and Roman Egypt more generally. 
 
 
2.1.7 Donkey Prices 
As regards donkeys, the latest collection of prices has been collated by Litinas and this, together with 
Rathbone’s earlier collection, has been used for the analysis here.91 I have also added one source 
 





















which I identified separately: CPR XV 48 from the later second century AD. Although donkeys lack 
the obvious direct linkage to the cost of living that cereals and wine have, they could constitute part 
of a basket of goods and services that might be used to assess that cost since they were very 
commonly used as beasts of burden and for general agricultural tasks.  Whilst donkey leasing costs 
would perhaps be a better measure for cost of living purposes than purchase costs, we lack 
sufficient leasing data to enable a diachronic analysis to be performed and thus donkey purchase 
costs are the nearest proxy we have as to the costs of having a donkey available for day to day use. 
Apart from donkeys, the only animal for which we have sufficient numbers of source documents to 
consider a diachronic analysis is camels, where there are roughly the same number of dateable 
prices (24) as for barley (25) or slaves (25).92 Unfortunately the camel prices are limited in date range 
and relate almost exclusively to the mid second century, and are not sufficiently coherent to provide 
a reliable indicator of shorter–term price trends. Data for donkeys are more widespread and robust. 
The same approach as to the median weighting of multi-price sources from one year and to 
documents of uncertain dates as was adopted for the other commodities was used, and the data are 
presented in appendix 2.1.5. Both foal and adult donkeys are included since donkeys mature quickly 
and foals could also be put to economic use before reaching full maturity in any event. Whilst 
donkeys lack some of the farmgate/market differentials of goods which are costly to transport, they 
have greater intrinsic variation through their age, condition and sex. It is difficult to determine any 
strong trends in this regard though Rathbone notes that male donkeys may have been preferred to 
female, and young donkeys to old.93 The price curve for donkeys, with prices in drachmas per 
donkey, is shown in Fig.2.1.6. 
 
92 Drexhage 1991: 286-94. 





The exponential shape of the curve in later years is similar to that for barley and wine. The R² 
coefficient is somewhat higher than wheat at 0.49 despite the heterogeneous nature of the data set 
with considerable variability in pricing at similar dates reflecting amongst other things the age, 
condition and sex of the animal. 
 
2.1.8 Slave Prices 
There is one other form of ‘livestock’ which could be considered as fitting within a basket of living 
costs, at least one applicable for very prosperous individuals: slaves.  Straus’s list of slave sales has 
been used as the primary data set and the information is presented in appendix 2.1.6. The data have 
been adjusted for uncertain dates as above. These data exclude cases such as Jur.Pap. 37 where the 
slave was purchased outside Egypt. In Fig. 2.1.7 children under 12 years old have also been excluded 
since child prices would be likely to be less than an adult given infant mortality risk and their smaller 
economic utility. To show whether an alternative approach where children between ages five and 12 
are assumed to have half the value of a slave over age 12 would result in a different conclusion, I 
have also plotted a curve on this basis in Fig. 2.1.8. In both approaches children of four or younger 
are ignored. The only direct data we have on the value of slaves who are definitely aged under five 
come from BGU III 859 (AD 162-163) where a home-raised male slave aged around three years old is 























for 320 drachmas. As may be expected, these prices are much lower than adults but there is no way 
of including this data within our analysis in a logically coherent fashion. 
The heterogeneous nature of the data, with the value of slaves being influenced by age, sex, skills, 
health and character, means that the data points are quite widely dispersed, but the R² coefficient of 
the curve in Fig. 2.1.7 of 0.44 is still higher than that for wheat. Whilst there is insufficient 
information for the first century to draw any conclusions about early price trends, there is once 
again evidence for continued price inflation in the third century: 
 
A very similar curve and R² coefficient is shown if child prices were included with a weighting of 50% 























Given the similar nature of the two curves it appears that the conclusions are not materially 
impacted by the methodology used for younger slaves. The simpler approach of ignoring such slaves 
has been adopted in the remainder of this chapter since this uses the curve with the higher R² 
coefficient and there is no need to make a subjective assumption as to the value of children.  
 
2.1.9 General Trends and Patterns 
So what do these findings contribute to our understanding of price developments? The accepted 
view as Scheidel states is that the ‘distribution of prices of particularly well-documented goods – 
wheat, wine, and donkeys – points to the existence of two distinct periods of price stability, from the 
late first century CE to the 160s CE or a bit later and from the 190s to the early 270s CE’.94 This is 
repeated by Howgego et al as ‘There is also Rathbone’s study of Egyptian prices, the only useable 
series from anywhere in the Empire, which sees the doubling between AD 160 and 190 as the only 
significant change between AD 45 and AD 274/5’.95 These statements are clearly supported if the 
pattern for wheat prices is examined in isolation. However, the other commodities show different 
patterns. None of the commodities show a levelling off of prices in the period after AD 190.  
This conclusion can be supported by comparing a general ‘blended’ inflation measure with wheat 
prices for three distinct periods which have different patterns and which are shown in Figs 2.1.9 to 
 
94 Scheidel 2008: 3. 






















2.1.11. The charts show a line composed of a combined blended indicator of prices, where the 
weightings of the four lines of price data from barley, wine, donkeys and slaves are determined by 
the number of points in each set, which is compared to the line for the wheat price. The information 
from the first half of the first century is too sparse for an analysis to be made. In the first chart the 
blended data and the wheat prices data are thus rebased to a common nominal value of 100 at AD 
50 and projected from this date to AD 150. Note that this blended line is not a price index in the 
common meaning of an indicator which is based on a basket of commodities and which reflects the 
cost of living for a certain type of individual. Such indices will be developed later in this chapter. 
Rather it is a line which represents a best estimate of general price changes in an environment 
where the data are sparse and this approach has the advantage that it does not require any 
subjective assumptions as to the nature of a basket of commodities. The weighting by the number of 
observations means that greater weight is given to the commodities where there is a more robust 
statistical expectation that the data reflects the experience, and thus the line is more likely to reflect 
‘reality’.  
 
It can be seen that over a hundred year period the prices remain relatively level though they do 
seem to pick up in the second century. There is relatively little difference between the pattern of 
wheat and blended prices. 
Looking at the second half of the second century, which includes the period identified by Rathbone 
as containing a significant increase in prices, both wheat and other goods show increases in a very 



















































































Fig. 2.1.9 General Trends from AD 50 to 159






However, when the third period between AD 200 and 270 is examined there is a clear divergence 
between the stable price of wheat and the strong increase in prices for other goods as seen in Fig. 
2.1.11. 
 
Thus the evidence in fact shows that, in the period after the 190’s, for commodities other than 
wheat, inflation continues. This pattern can be expressed in tabular form by comparing the 
geometric average inflation rate for different commodities and the blended data in Fig. 2.1.12. The 
geometric average rate is calculated as the increase rate per annum which, if applied in a compound 












Fig. 2.1.10 General Trends from AD 160 
to 189












Fig. 2.1.11 General Trends from AD 190 to 270




the commodity matching the trend line at the end of the period selected. It thus incorporates the 
‘wavy’ nature of the trend line without resorting to a simple straight line analysis. Note that the 
information for slave prices is insufficient to establish a rate from AD 50 to 160: 
Fig. 2.1.12 – Average Inflation Rates  







50 to 160 0.4% -0.1% 0.4% 0.4% NA 0.3% 0.3% 
160 to 190 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 1.5% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 
190 to 270 0.1% 1.4% 0.7% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2% 
 
If wheat increases are compared to other items the clear outlier is the period from AD 200 to 270 
when, as we have noted, wheat prices are steady but all the other commodities continue to show 
price increases. In later chapters of this thesis similar increases will be shown to occur in this period 
for other indicators of inflation such as house and land prices or rents for fodder land.96 
Another way of looking at the degree to which the prices of similar goods move in tandem or 
differently is to consider the correlation factors which link each commodity.97 The correlation 
factors, excluding slave prices where there is insufficient data to enable correlation across the whole 
time period, are as follows: 
Fig. 2.1.13 – Correlation Factors  
  Wheat Barley Wine Donkey 
Wheat 1 0.46 0.74 0.77 
Barley 0.46 1 0.88 0.92 
Wine 0.74 0.88 1 0.95 
Donkey 0.77 0.92 0.95 1 
 
The strong correlation factors between barley, wine and donkeys (ranging from 0.88 to 0.95) and the 
poor correlation between wheat and the other commodities is striking. The internal consistency 
among the commodities other than wheat strengthens further the case for the existence of 
continued inflationary pressures in the first three-quarters of the third century.  
There is another way, other than in the development over time, that prices of wheat seem to differ 
from other commodities and that is in their numerical format. In an economic sector where prices 
 
96 See Figs 3.1.20, 3.2.17 and 4.1.15. 




are determined by supply and demand and there is significant competition in the marketplace we 
would expect to see prices whose numerical format reflects the competition between and among 
buyers and sellers and could also reflect changing market conditions. The format of a market price 
needs to allow for relatively small price changes in the marginal pricing of commodities to facilitate 
offer and bid processes. Therefore in Roman Egyptian terms, for commodities such as barley, wheat 
or wine, where the per unit price was typically under 20 drachmas, it would be an indication of free 
market activity if prices were expressed in fractions of drachmas, or obols. Such ‘fractional’ pricing is 
clearly present in wine transactions where many of the prices include obols. Fractional pricing in 
obols is also present in a number of the barley sources such as P.Louvre I 51 (AD 217-8?). Given the 
higher per unit pricing of donkeys and slaves, fractional pricing at the obol level was not necessary to 
allow market prices to be struck but the prices show sufficient ‘marginal’ variability to allow market 
processes to function. However, for wheat the pattern is different. Fractional pricing in obols is 
relatively rare even within private sales, where there are no examples after AD 160 and where prices 
tend to be expressed in tetradrachm steps.  State wheat pricing exhibits few signs of fractional or 
market pricing and the majority of prices seem conventionally set at eight drachmas. Note that there 
is little or no evidence for conventional pricing of barley, wine, donkeys or slaves, other than in the 
‘stepping’ of prices in multiples appropriate to the coinage system.98 
 
2.1.10 Why Do Wheat Prices Show a Different Pattern? 
We have seen that there appears to be a significant difference between the pattern of wheat prices 
and those for other goods, but what could have caused such variation? What was different about 
wheat?  
Firstly it will be noted that bread made from wheat was the staple element of the diet of the 
ordinary people of Roman Egypt and thus it had a particular social importance. It was also critically a 
commodity where the state intervened to a greater extent than with other commodities. This state 
intervention took a number of forms. Taxes or rents from state lands were usually levied in wheat.99 
State tenants were frequently supplied with seed loans for wheat but I am not aware of any state 
loan for other commodities. The annona was also usually levied in wheat. The greater interest of the 
state in wheat compared to other goods can be demonstrated by the simple evidence of the number 
of price points we have for private and state sources for wheat and barley. For wheat we have a 
total of 40 private price points within our sample and 29 for state, so state prices represent 42% of 
 
98 Rathbone 1997: 195. 




our overall total. For barley we have a total of 21 private price points and four for state, so state 
prices form a much smaller proportion of the admittedly small sample: 16%. These figures support a 
conclusion that the level of state intervention in wheat transactions was greater than for barley. The 
absence of state prices for wine or donkeys in our sample would support the conclusion of greater 
state interest in wheat than other commodities. To support this interest in wheat there was an 
‘organization involving the whole province from local farmers and village granary keepers up to the 
Procurator Neaspoleos at Alexandria, all tightly under the surveillance of the Prefect of Egypt’.100 
Given this extensive state apparatus embedded within key actors in society, I would agree with 
Rathbone in his statement ‘that the wheat market was not entirely free is not surprising’.101  
This is not to say that there was no state involvement in the market for commodities other than 
wheat. The state did require and, on occasion, requisition donkeys, barley and wine for military and 
civilian purposes.102 However, wheat had a special status as I trust I have demonstrated above. 
Barley is the closest good to wheat and can be produced in an autarkic fashion alongside wheat even 
in relatively small farm holdings. However, we have seen above that prices of barley differed from 
wheat in both development over time and in numerical format. Given the relative similarity of wheat 
and barley as goods, in the absence of other discernible factors, the greater involvement of the state 
in wheat would seem to be the only clear reason why the price pattern is different between these 
two commodities. Turning to wine, it differs from wheat and barley in that it would typically not 
have been produced in an autarkic way within the family unit of a small farmer. This is a commodity 
which would have had to be purchased in the marketplace by most people. As regards donkeys, on 
certain occasions, they also have had to be purchased in the market rather than bred. Given the lack 
of evidence of state intervention in these commodities and the pattern of prices - where there is 
marginal pricing, a clear increasing trend over time and no sign of pricing by convention - wine and 
donkeys may perhaps be regarded as commodities where ‘exchange-value’ was the dominant 
feature in the market.103  The similar price patterns and strong statistical correlations between the 
price developments for barley on the one hand and donkeys and wine on the other, would indicate 
that barley prices were influenced by similar market forces as those which drove donkey and wine 
prices.  
What this analysis shows is a co-existence of two economic sectors, with the prices of wheat being 
influenced by economic interventions by the state, whilst other commodities were largely left to 
 
100 Rickman 1980: 82. 
101 Rathbone & von Reden 2014: 189. 
102 For example PSI X 1123 (AD 152) where the state requisitioned wine for Alexandria from the Oxyrhynchite 
nome. 




float to find their own market price. It should be stressed for wheat that this was in no sense an 
attempt to fix prices as in Diocletian’s Edict. We have no evidence as far as I am aware in the period 
concerned for any central state directives coming from Rome requiring that wheat prices be set at a 
certain level and there is little evidence for central government grain agents operating at a provincial 
level.104 This pattern of prices seems rather the result of state interventions which appear to have 
had the effect of encouraging wheat production at the expense of other crops. State intervention 
also seems to have dampened both the level and variability of the market price of wheat, given the 
policy of state prices being generally lower than private ones and being conventionally set at eight 
drachmas for the bulk of the period. 
 
2.1.11 Constructing a Basket of Goods and a Price Index 
Having determined the price curves for individual commodities and investigated the potential 
reasons for differences in these curves, we can use the data for these commodities to construct an 
index of prices. The components of such an index would have to be weighted, not by the number of 
data points as in the ‘blended’ curves shown in Figs 2.1.9 to 2.1.11, but by the patterns of 
consumption of goods, in the same manner that modern day price indexes attempt to do, so as to 
try to estimate the impact of price changes on an individual type of consumer. As noted above, 
Allen’s attempts to determine the amounts of food and other commodities necessary to construct 
‘Mediterranean Respectability’ and ‘Bare Bones Subsistence’ baskets have been taken as the basis 
for the indices. For the Mediterranean Respectability basket Allen based his assessment on the 
spending pattern of a ‘respectable’ worker though he does not define what he means by 
‘respectable’.105  The basket is based on his earlier work on early modern Northern Europe and is 
adjusted to a ‘Mediterranean’ location by replacing wine for beer for instance. It is based on a daily 
calorific intake of 1,940 calories which he suggests would have been sufficient for an adult male. For 
the Bare Bones Subsistence basket he maintains this daily calorific intake but replaces most meat 
consumption with other cheaper forms of food while eliminating wine and reducing the amounts of 
other components.  
As noted above, the same basket components and quantities have been maintained over the period 
and thus implicitly the assumption has been made that there would not have been any significant 
 
104 Rickman 1980: 224. 
105 Note that in the summation of the cost of the Mediterranean Respectability basket in Allen 2009: 334 there 
is a mathematical error as the total sum should amount to c.232 rather than 163.921 as quoted by Allen. 
Whilst this calls into question some of Allen’s later conclusions, the amounts of the commodities in the basket 




change in the amounts of consumption of commodities by ordinary people over the period to AD 
270. In this the indices differ from modern price indices which frequently change the components of 
the baskets to reflect changing tastes and spending patterns. Significant changes in consumption 
patterns, if they arose, would have been likely to have been driven by one of the following factors: 
changes in social conditions such as a change in religious practice; significant technological advances 
which provide new goods which replace existing commodities within an index; supply-side economic 
changes such as the reduction in costs of certain goods and finally changes in disposable income 
which means that individuals direct their spending on goods in different ways. I am not aware of any 
strong evidence that there were significant changes to religious practice or that there was a 
technological advance that would have influenced the consumption patterns of ordinary people, 
although Rathbone suggests that there may have been a trend to replace beer with wine ‘as an 
aspect of the institutional, monumental and social development in Egypt under Roman rule’.106 
Whilst there would certainly have been changes in economic conditions over the period, there is no 
clear evidence that these would have influenced spending patterns. However, undoubtedly real 
incomes will have varied over the period as economic conditions and taxation burdens changed.  
In any event, the ‘Bare Bones Subsistence’ basket would have been unlikely to have been influenced 
by the above factors which relate at least in part to disposable income. The concept of ‘subsistence’ 
assumes that there is no significant disposable income and thus the basket would be likely to have 
remained substantially unchanged over the period. I believe that for both the subsistence and 
respectability baskets it is a reasonable assumption that, within an agrarian economy with relatively 
little disposable income, spending patterns were broadly unchanged over the period. Baskets with 
stable components would also allow relative changes in the standard of living to be assessed by 
comparing the resulting price index with earnings where this information is available. The 
applicability of the components of both of these baskets to Roman Egypt is debatable, in particular 
since barley is omitted, but all the items included in the baskets were available in Roman Egypt and 
for the moment these baskets are the best available for our purposes. The components of the two 









Fig. 2.1.14 – Cost of Living Index – Basket Components 
Mediterranean Respectability Bare Bones Subsistence 
Component Amount Unit Component Amount Unit 
Bread 182 Kg Wheat 172 Kg 
Beans/peas 52 l Beans/peas 20 Kg 
Meat 26 kg Meat 5 Kg 
Olive oil 5.2 l Olive oil 5 L 
Cheese 5.2 kg Soap 1.3 Kg 
Eggs 52 each Linen 3 M 
Wine 68.25 l Candles 1.3 Kg 
Soap 2.6 kg Lamp oil 1.3 L 
Linen 5 m Fuel 2 m BTU 
Candles 2.6 kg 
  
Lamp oil 2.6 L 
Fuel 5 m BTU 
 
Having determined the components of an index which are suitable, in order to construct an index, 
the price data for each component needs to be multiplied by their weighted value within the index. 
Ideally there would be time series of data for each component but within Allen’s components we 
only have credible price trends for wheat and wine and there are many other components within the 
indices. So the methodology must be adapted. The approach that has been taken is to divide Allen’s 
baskets into three categories: bread, wine and other market commodities. The wheat price is taken 
as a proxy for that of bread, thus assuming that the additional production costs of bread moved in 
the same way as the price of wheat. The wine price can be applied directly to the wine component 
of the Mediterranean Respectability basket, although it does not appear in Allen’s Bare Bones 
Subsistence basket. For the ‘other’ market commodities category the blended index derived above, 
excluding wheat, has been taken as a proxy for items which may be considered as being subject to 
market forces since these products would typically have required purchase rather than autarkic 
production. Before the price trends above can be applied to the categories of the index we need 
however, to determine the relative weighting of each category. 
As noted above the approach adopted is to incorporate the evidence for prices in Roman Egypt 
within the methodology to determine the weightings. Scheidel used this approach when he 
attempted to use Allen’s basket data to assess living standards.107 However, his approach was 
fundamentally flawed for the latter part of the period under review since he assumed that the 
period from AD 190 to 270 was a period of ‘price stability’ for most commodities which the 
 




discussion above has shown to be incorrect.108 His assumption that prices were largely stable over 
what he refers to as ‘Period 1’ from the late first  century to AD 160’s is, however, fully supported by 
the analysis above. Fig. 2.1.15 is based on Scheidel’s ‘Period 1’ weightings for the Mediterranean 
Respectability basket with two further columns that I have added which are my assumed cost of the 
components based on the reasoning in the footnotes to the table:  






Period 1 Price (dr.) 
(Scheidel) 
Assumed first-century 
midpoint cost (dr.) 
Bread 182 kg (?)52.8 - >63.4 55109 
Beans or 
Lentils 52 l 
(?) 3.8 (beans) 6.2 
(lentils) 8 to 28, 18 assumed110 
Meat 26 kg 51-102 56 
Olive oil 5.2 l 18.5 18111 
Cheese 5.2 kg ? 0112 
Eggs 52 each 8.8 9 
Wine 68.25 l 24.9-64 47113 
Soap 2.6 kg ? 0 
Linen 5 m 40 40 
Candles 2.6 kg - 0 
Lamp oil 2.6 l 9.3 9 
Fuel 5 m BTU ? 0 
Total     209- >312 251 
 
For meat, whilst the amount proposed by Allen appears reasonable, the prices need further 
investigation. Scheidel relies on a per kilo price derived from Drexhage of between two and four 
drachmas per kilo. However, as Scheidel states ‘meat prices are particularly poorly known: the 
estimate for Period 1 rests on only two price points’.114 A different approach has been taken which is 
 
108 Scheidel 2009a: 3.  
109 Scheidel assumes a price of eight drachmas per artaba for wheat and derives a price of 0.29 to 0.32 
drachmas per kilogram. I would agree with the eight drachmas assumption and have taken a midpoint value of 
0.3 drachma per kilogram and this leads to a total of 55 drachmas. 
110 For beans or lentils I cannot reproduce Scheidel’s assessment based on Drexhage’s prices. For the first 
century Drexhage shows one source for vegetable prices at 20 and 21 drachmas per artaba, which assuming 
38.8 litres to the artaba would indicate a maximum price of 28 drachmas. Prices for lentils are more common, 
and range from four to eight drachmas per artaba, which would imply a total price for 52 litres of around eight 
drachmas. 
111 For olive oil, eggs, linen and lamp oil, Scheidel’s figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 
112 I have a zero assumption for cheese, soap, candles and fuel since I have no useable data and cannot derive 
a suitable estimate. 
113 I have assumed five drachmas per ‘keramion monochoron’. Assuming that the capacity of a keramion 
monochoron was 7.3 litres then the price for 68.25 litres would be 47 drachmas which lies within Scheidel’s 
bounds. 




to look at the prices of one of the animals concerned: chickens.  Pig prices were also examined but 
the variation in size and meat quantity from a suckling pig to a whole hog makes it impossible to 
draw any conclusions. Chickens are more homogeneous in size and a typical price of two drachmas 
per bird is evident from the sources.115  Allen assumed that on a daily basis 174 calories would be 
provided by the meat component of the basket. This equates to some 65,000 calories per year. 
Assuming that Egyptian hens, were, like those elsewhere in the Roman Empire, around the same size 
as modern birds with an average weight of around two kilograms and that the edible weight was half 
this amount, then a roasted bird would contain around 2,350 calories.116 Thus some 28 birds, or 
roughly a half chicken per week, would be needed to provide the 65,000 calories at a total price of 
56 drachmas which lies at the lower end of Scheidel’s meat cost. However, the total assumed basket 
cost at 251 drachmas lies close to the centre of Scheidel’s range of 209 to 312+ drachmas. 
To convert these drachma amounts into an index that can be used to track the cost of living going 
forward the proportions of the basket must be determined as per Fig. 2.1.16. 
Fig. 2.1.16 - Mediterranean Respectability Index 
  
Assumed first-century 
midpoint cost (dr.) % Total 
Bread 55 21.7 
Beans or Lentils 18  7.2 
Meat 56 22.3 
Olive oil 18 7.2 
Cheese 0 0.0 
Eggs 9 3.6 
Wine 47 18.6 
Soap 0 0.0 
Linen 40 15.9 
Candles 0 0.0 
Lamp oil 9 3.6 
Fuel 0 0.0 
Total 251117 100.0 
Total excluding bread and wine 150 59.7 
 
An index which simply has a basket which is weighted 21.7% wheat, 18.6% wine and 59.7% ‘other’ 
has thus been used. As noted above, the approach adopted assumes that the physical amount of 
various goods remained steady over the period concerned. However, it should be noted that the 
 
115 Drexhage 1991: 309-10. 
116 Brothwell 1997: 330-2, https://ndb.nal.usda.gov/ndb/foods (4/12/2016). 




proportions spent on each category of goods would have changed over time since different price 
trends apply to each group. Under this model the proportion spent on wheat would be less at the 
end of the period than the beginning since wheat’s relative price to other commodities would have 
fallen. 
For the Bare Bones Subsistence basket, Fig. 2.1.17 summarises the relevant weighting, with my 
assumed first-century midpoint costs being derived pro-rata from the amounts in Fig. 2.1.15: 






Period 1 Price  (dr.) 
(Scheidel) 
Assumed first- century 
midpoint cost (dr.) 
% 
Total 
Wheat 172 kg 45.4 52 44.6 
Beans or 
lentils 20 kg 
(?) 4.9 (beans) 3.9 
(lentils) 7 6.0 
Meat 5 kg (?) 9.8 11 9.3 
Olive oil 5 l 17.8 18 15.4 
Soap 1.3 kg ? 0 0.0 
Linen 3 m 20 24 20.7 
Candles 1.3 kg - 0 0.0 
Lamp oil 1.3 l 4.6 5 4.0 
Fuel 2 m BTU ? 0 0.0 
        116 100.0 
 
As may be expected, the proportion spent on wheat increases considerably. An index which simply 
has a basket which is weighted 44.6% wheat and 55.4% ‘other’ has thus been used. As noted above, 
the approach adopted is to assume that the amount of the goods within the basket remained steady 
over the period concerned. 
The indices which result from the application of the weightings above to the price data can be shown 





In terms of the average price increases implied these are presented in Fig. 2.1.19: 
Fig. 2.1.19 - Average Price Increases p.a. 
  
All Blended incl. 
wheat 
Mediterranean 
Respectability Bare Bones 
50 to 160 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
160 to 190 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 
190 to 270 1.1% 0.9% 0.7% 
 
50 to 270 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 
 
Overall there is not a great deal of difference between the three measures of inflation, though in the 
latter part of the period inflation rates for the Bare Bones Subsistence consumer do not increase as 
much as for other measures given the higher weighting for bread which in turn is linked to wheat 
prices which appear to have levelled off in the third century.  
 
2.1.12 Conclusions and Implications 
To conclude this section, whilst the data analysed above have a high degree of internal consistency 
displayed by the correlation of certain goods, it must be remembered that any results are based on 
relatively few observations: a few hundred in total. However, as will be seen in future chapters there 
is corroborative evidence from other indicators of inflation such as rents and asset prices that would 














Fig. 2.1.18 Price Indices




low in absolute terms, never exceeding around 1.1% per annum, and in relative terms are 
considerably lower than those which have often occurred in modern economies. Also, my view of 
the price trends for ‘free market’ items in Roman Egypt in the private sector is perhaps a simpler one 
than that suggested by Rathbone and accepted by Scheidel and Howgego et al. There was indeed a 
period of price stability from around AD 50 to 150 at which point prices started to rise moderately all 
through the period to AD 270 when thereafter there was a sharp jump in prices. This conclusion is 
contrary to the commonly held view that the years from AD 190 to 270 were a period of price 
stability since the cost of living would have roughly doubled over this period. If this conclusion were 
to be true for regions beyond Egypt this would have important implications for issues such as the 
degree to which army pay increases exceeded inflation during the third-century crises and for 
attempts to quantify the Roman economy which depend on having a common view on the value of 
goods over time.  
Turning to other macroeconomic implications, it should be noted that a systemic level of low long-
term inflation would, according to neoclassical economic theory, be consistent with a period of 
moderate economic growth to AD 270 although it may reflect other economic drivers. As regards to 
why the period after AD 150 saw inflationary increases, it is tempting as Rathbone postulated to link 
this change in conditions to the Antonine plague.118 In other historical contexts a plague has been 
linked to an inflationary spurt, for instance in medieval England after the Black Death.119 The issue of 
why there was a jump in prices in the 270’s is dealt with in the following sub-section.  
The differential patterns of wheat prices against other commodities mean that this was an economy 
where the state influenced the price of the politically and fiscally vital commodity of wheat, but left 
other commodities to find their own level and these market sectors co-existed. This approach was 
economically viable since even barley could not act as a direct substitute good for wheat, since 
amongst other differences, the two cereals produced different types of bread. However, as 
Rathbone stated, a dampening of prices for wheat could have increased demand for other goods, 
which would be consistent with the different patterns seen and the increase in prices for other such 
goods.120 
So how would price variations and inflation have been perceived and experienced by people in 
Roman Egypt and how might they have influenced their financial behaviour?  Although average long-
term inflation was very low, individuals would have been very much more aware of shorter-term 
 
118 Rathbone 1996b: 334. 
119 Munro 2004: 11. 




price fluctuations particularly in food prices, either within a year or from year to year as events such 
as the level of the Nile flood impacted the harvest and thus supply and demand. There is certainly 
evidence that such short-term price variations were understood and also that short-term trends 
presented opportunities for entrepreneurs to exploit conditions. For instance, in P.Brook. 18, a 
papyrus from Upper Egypt dating to some time after AD 215, a woman refuses to take up an option 
to buy wheat ‘at the universal price in the city’ but the agent selling the wheat believes he can sell at 
32 drachmas per artaba, which is a high price if this text pre-dates AD 270. Speculative activity is also 
clear in other commodities as is evidenced by P.Giss. 79 for wine when in a letter of around AD 117 
the impact of the wine harvest size on the price is linked not just to the price of wine as a commodity 
but also to the price of vineyards as long-term investments. We can also see evidence for 
speculation in loans in kind such as BGU I 77 which dates from AD 169-175 from the village of 
Karanis when a man borrows large amounts (63 artabas of wheat and 76 artabas of barley) from a 
younger woman. The size of the loan, much larger than necessary for personal consumption, and its 
mixed nature which would also not be necessary for personal use would indicate that this was a loan 
of a speculative nature rather than one where the borrower required the grain for household needs. 
That such speculative activity was known as a common feature of the market by the local authorities 
is demonstrated within P.Oxy. XLVII 3339 from AD 191, which required all private wheat throughout 
Egypt to be registered and put on the market so that ‘nobody is to hide it away banking on 
opportunistic prices’.  
Overall, I believe that the low level systemic long-term inflation over the period, never rising above 
around 1.1% per annum, would have been almost imperceptible in the period to the 270’s, with the 
potential exception of the period around AD 160 to 190 when conventional pricing of goods such as 
wheat may have been challenged by inflationary pressures from market forces of supply and 
demand. Individuals are unlikely to have pursued financial strategies that are common in the 
modern world of protecting themselves against inflation, or deflation, during this period. However, 
following the substantial jump in prices in the 270’s it would have been financially rational to avoid 
transactions which were of a long-term nature where income was in cash of an uncertain real value 
and transactions in kind may have been preferred over those in coin. These hypotheses will be 





Section 2.2 Prices from AD 270 to 350 
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
The aims of this section are to identify the timing and nature of the sudden increase in prices 
experienced in the decade starting in AD 270 and to see if inflationary conditions persisted during 
the remainder of the third and the first half of the fourth century. The end of the period under 
consideration is the same as that for this thesis more generally. Since the purpose of this chapter is 
essentially to establish the facts as regards price development, rather than to speculate on why the 
changes occurred, no attempt has been made to identify the causes of inflation within this chapter, 
other than to note the potential linkage between the dates of coinage reform and inflationary 
events.121 Neither has any attempt been made to analyse the effects of inflationary conditions since 
this will be addressed in later chapters. 
When the period from AD 270 to 350 is examined, a different methodology is required from that 
adopted in the previous chapter, given the abrupt nature of the change in prices and the much 
higher price amounts. The 270’s also see a sharp drop in the available papyri data as Fig. 2.2.1 
demonstrates:122 
Fig. 2.2.1 Number of Documentary Papyri Documents per Decade 
  Commercial All 
250-259 71 311 
260-269 85 307 
270-279 38 125 
280-289 52 110 
290-299 60 204 
 
The sources above only include those which may be securely dated to the decade concerned and 
‘commercial’ documents are those which, in my opinion, are primarily related to private economic 
activity such as loans, leases, sales and other forms of contracts and activity. Whilst the sudden fall 
 
121 For a good discussion of the various theories related to price increase events see: Haklai-Rotenberg 2011. 
Note that I have preferred the term ‘coinage’ reform to the more commonly used ‘currency’ or ‘monetary’ 
reform to avoid any risk of confusion with modern currency and monetary events which carry their own 
connotations. For a general discussion of inflation in the fourth century across the Empire see Camilli & Sorda 
1993 and for Roman Egypt specifically see Bagnall 1985b. 




in available sources could be a function of the accident of survival or geographical or other factors 
that mean fewer documents from this period have been published, it is interesting that the number 
of sources decreases so suddenly in the 270’s and this in itself could indicate a general decline in 
both economic and official business and the associated recording of such activity.  
This section therefore firstly looks in detail at the relatively few sources of price data within the 
270’s to see if any of the sources concerned contain prices or other indicators which are clearly very 
much higher than the data outlined in the previous section. However, given the few pieces of 
evidence available for the decade concerned it is necessary to include indicators which were not 
dealt with in the previous detailed diachronic analysis but for which we have some indications of the 
’normal’ level of prices for the earlier period. Such indicators include: an apprenticeship contract  
from AD 271 in SB XVIII 13305; land prices, e.g. P.Oxy. XVLIX 3498 of AD 274 and a horse price from 
AD 275 in P.Cair.Isid. 85. By ‘very much higher’ prices it is meant prices which are an order of 
magnitude higher than the ones which generally applied prior to AD 270 and so are unlikely to 
represent outliers within the usual price distribution: for instance a case where wheat prices per 
artaba are in the hundreds rather than tens such as O.Mich. I 157 from AD 276. By examination of 
the securely dated sources, the year or range of years when prices clearly jumped can be identified.  
As to the question of whether prices continued to rise after the initial jump in the 270’s through to 
AD 350 we can revert to a diachronic approach which is similar to that which was used to analyse 
price increases in the period up to AD 270. However, the prices concerned cover a much wider 
numerical range than in the earlier period and there were some important changes in coinage which 
are detailed below and which influence the choice of methodology and thus a different 
mathematical approach is demanded. 
 
2.2.2 Coinage and other Reforms 
Interest in the changes in coinage and monetary policy during the period under consideration has 
generated an extensive bibliography from numismatists, papyrologists and ancient historians.123 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to consider relationships between money and inflation in any 
detail, whether it relates to issues of coinage debasement, reform or re-tariffication. However, we 
need to understand monetary conditions if we are to develop inflation measures.  
 




The changes in coinage in this period were extensive and before considering their nature it is helpful 
to set out certain monetary concepts. ‘Money’ can broadly have four functions: a medium of 
exchange, a store of value when its purchasing power remains stable, a standard of deferred 
payment in the form of credit and as a money of account ‘or standard of value used in reckoning 
prices, costs and values’.124 It is this final category to which most of the sources in this chapter relate.  
As regards the typology and nature of the coinage in Roman Egypt, by AD 274 the silver content 
within Roman ‘silver’ coinage had declined so much that it was increasingly ‘fiduciary’ in nature, that 
is money whose value depends on it being trusted as an accepted medium of exchange. However, as 
Haklai-Rotenberg pointed it out it was never purely fiduciary in that ‘it enfolded a promise that it 
could be converted into a valuable good, i.e. into metal, whether precious or base’ no matter the 
degree of debasement.125 For the purposes of this chapter it will also be noted that there were two 
important changes in coinage with Aurelian’s (AD 274) and Diocletian’s reforms (AD 295-96).126 
These changes in coinage mean that a peculiarity of this period is that the units used as a medium of 
exchange, e.g.  Diocletianic nummi, could be different from the units used as a money of account 
where the documents typically retained the drachmas and talents which were largely used for both 
purposes in the period prior to AD 274. The most significant state intervention in prices was, of 
course, Diocletian’s attempt at price fixing, in his Price Edict of AD 301. That this attempt failed will 
be evident in the discussion that follows.127 
  
2.2.3 Methodology for the Period after AD 274 
There are two possible approaches to the analysis of prices in this period. The first is to normalise all 
prices into a value expressed in gold which is the approach adopted by Bagnall.128 Bagnall described 
this process as ‘indexing’ commodities by ‘applying a multiplier representing the number of units of 
the commodity normally bought by a pound of gold’.129 The term ‘normally’ is not defined. The 
second is to adopt a similar approach to that in the previous chapter and analyse individual 
 
124 Munro 2012: 1. 
125 Haklai-Rotenberg 2011: 3-4. 
126 Harl 2012: 37-8. 
127 For a discussion of the background and details of the Edict see Ermatinger 1996: 67-108. 
128 Bagnall 1985b. 
129 Bagnall 1985b: 3. Note that Bagnall’s ‘index’ is not a price index as described in the previous chapter but 




commodities by reference to the prices in the transactions concerned. These prices are monetary 
units of account, expressed typically in silver drachmas or talents of such drachmas.130  
To illustrate Bagnall’s methodology, consider the price of wheat in P.NYU 18 for which Bagnall used a 
date of AD 312-3. The papyrus has a price of 2,000 silver drachmas per artaba. Bagnall used an 
‘index’ for wheat of 576 which he applies to prices in talents (of 6,000 silver drachmas). Bagnall 
attributes an indexed value of 192 to this price derived as: 
2,000 times ‘index’ (576) divided by 6,000 = 192. 
The advantage of this approach is that it can be applied to any commodity for which an index can be 
derived. It also allows prices in gold solidi to be included in the analysis. However, there are two 
significant difficulties. Firstly it depends on the assumption that the relative prices of ‘wheat, barley, 
vegetable seed, wine, meat and the like will tend to remain fairly constant over a long period unless 
external demand or supply alters significantly’.131 The previous section has shown that this 
assumption is not borne out for the earlier period under review and can thus be called into question. 
Secondly, it requires an assumption to be made as to the relative price of a commodity to others or 
gold in order to determine the ‘index’. Bagnall’s indices have large uncertainties in their 
construction. For instance he noted that the relative price of vegetable seed could be double or 
three times that of wheat before deciding on double and stated that his index of 900 for a knidion of 
wine is ‘very approximate’.  
It should also be noted that although Bagnall sought to link prices to an equivalent value in gold, the 
majority of price points for the period are in talents and drachmas, and thus defined in units of 
account.132  The increase in prices assessed by his index method is thus still largely driven by changes 
in the units of account prices in talents and drachmas in the original papyri although he has gained 
some additional price points from the price of gold itself. Bagnall’s mixing of money in the form of 
‘units of account’, for day to day goods, with gold, which had fiscal and ‘store of value’ functions, 
could also be criticised as conflating different types of money. I also believe it is preferable not to 
use the gold price as a measure for inflation when assessing the day to day cost of living. 
 
130 For a further discussion of different measures of inflation and the relation of the prices of goods to gold see 
van Minnen 2006: 168-9.  
131 Bagnall 1985b: 4. 
132 Note Harl 2012: 39 stated that the drachmas used in this period as units of account were ‘Attic’ drachmas, 
where Bagnall 1985b: 9 stated that each Attic drachma would have been equivalent to an Alexandrian 
tetradrachma, that is four Alexandrian drachmas, but I have found no evidence to support Harl’s supposition 




I have therefore taken a different approach which is to continue to concentrate on those 
commodities for which we have data for the period concerned and to construct individual 
commodity price curves and blended and price indices as was done in the previous section. The 
same approach to using medians for sources with multiple prices for the same year has also been 
adopted. Given the reduced overall time period of 80 as opposed to 270 years in the previous 
chapter it has been necessary to further tighten the acceptance criteria for useful data by restricting 
acceptable data to those dateable to within a 30 year period as opposed to the 50 year range used 
earlier.  
 
2.2.4 Displaying the Data 
I have also decided to display the price data with a logarithmic scale, an approach first used for this 
period by Mickwitz as early as 1932 to display gold prices, and to use a best-fit line which is an 
exponential equation, which displays as a straight line on a logarithmic chart.133 To explain the 
rationale for this decision, consider the data for wheat prices which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. In Fig. 2.2.2 the data are plotted with a linear scale for prices in drachmas on the vertical 
axis. Much of the detail of the development of prices in the earlier years is not visible and whilst the 
third order polynomial has a very high R² coefficient, any conclusions as to price development that 
can be drawn are clearly ludicrous since the price becomes negative at the beginning and middle of 
the period concerned. A casual observer might even conclude that prices only really stated to pick 
up after AD 320. 
 
 

























It is preferable to display the data with a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis and fitting the data to 
an exponential function. This allows the trend of the data to be identified visually and a similarly high 
R² coefficient is displayed in Fig. 2.2.3. The higher the R² coefficient in these circumstances, the 
better the data fits an exponential function which would in turn mean that the annual increase in 
inflation was broadly constant across the period. 
 
 
This chart much more clearly illustrates the trend in rising prices, certainly for the period after AD 
290, though there is some doubt as to the trend for the period from AD 274 to 290. 
 
2.2.5 Prices in the 270’s 
Before the longer-term analysis described above is performed, it is necessary to consider the first 
decade in some detail. As noted above, the data for the 270’s are sparse and in order to determine if 
there was a jump in prices all data related to monetary amounts need to be taken into account. 
However, the criteria for choosing the data I have adopted are very strict so as to avoid the 
implications of circular logic. For instance P.Kellis I 62, which has amounts of rent payments, is stated 
to date to AD 275 under papyri.info, based in part on Rathbone’s proposal that AD 274 was the year 
of a great jump in prices. To consider such a document as securely dated is inappropriate when the 
proposition that there was such a jump in prices is the very proposition that is being tested. 
Therefore, only sources where the dating of the year concerned may be considered secure and not 






















Price data containing indicators of prices which can be securely dated to the decade of the 270’s are 
as set out in Fig. 2.2.4 together with a commentary as to whether there is clear evidence for an 
abrupt jump to a very much higher set of prices. 
Fig. 2.2.4 Price Indicators in the 270’s 
Date Description Clear evidence for price jump? Reference 
270 
Offer to lease house, 
including five 
workshops, for a 
monthly rent of 180 dr. 
No. This is the highest house rent known prior to 
AD 271 and substantially higher than the typical 
house rents of the period to that date. However, 
it is not an order of magnitude difference in rent 
from BGU I 253 dating from AD 244 to 248 of the 
lease of part of a house, court, dining room and 
bedroom for 100 dr. per month. Furthermore, 
this is a substantial metropolite house with a 
number of opportunities for sub-leasing or other 
use of workshops which might have been 
expected to command a high rent and thus it 
does not constitute clear evidence for a price 
jump in or before AD 270.  
P.Turner 37 
271 House sale at 3,000 dr. 
No, see prices in chapter on houses as an 
investment. 
SPP XX 72 
271 
Apprentice contract 
with terminal payment 
of 60 dr. to the 
apprentice. 
No, amount of terminal payment is small by 
comparison with cost of living after jump in 
prices. 
SB XVIII 13305 
271-272 
Receipt for the 
purchase of dates - 
price is 16 dr. though 
amount is unknown. 
No. O.Kellis 66 
271-272, 
see BL VII 
p138 
Report of proceedings 
of senate. 
No, though inflationary pressures are clear. See 
below. 
P.Oxy. XII 1414 
272 
Lease of a house at a 
yearly rent of 400 dr. 
No, this level of rent is of a similar magnitude to 
earlier house rents such as SPP XX 53 where two-
thirds of a house was rented for a yearly rent of 






BL VII, S. 
215 and 
APF 44, 
1998 p 274 
Sale of two donkeys for 
4 talents.  
Yes, given prices in previous chapter, but cannot 
provide a firm date as to jump in prices, simply 
that it occurred after March 272. 




Date Description Clear evidence for price jump? Reference 
274 
Sale of Land - half of 25 
and 11/16th arouras for 
30,000 dr. 
No, at c. 2,336 dr. per aroura this is higher than 
attested land sale prices in the 260's - P.Ryl. II 165 
at 400 dr. per aroura and P.Oxy. XII 1475 at 821 





Sale of mare for 5,000 
dr. 
Questionable. Although the price is considerably 
higher than the typical range of horse prices in 
the period up to AD 270 which vary from 72 to 
400 dr., there is one example of a horse sale at 
2,800 dr. in AD 77, PSI VI 729, which presumably 
reflects the quality of the animal concerned.134 
Thus, although 5,000 dr. is a high price indicating 
inflationary pressures it is not an order of 
magnitude difference from the AD 77 example 
and may partly reflect the quality of the animal 
rather than an abrupt jump in prices. 
P.Cair.Isid. 85 
275 
Bid to purchase private 
land in possession of 
state (800 dr. plus extra 
charges for 11 arouras).  
No, though a bid to purchase state land was 




adaeratio at a price of 
200 dr. per artaba. 
Yes, given prices in previous chapter. 
O.Mich. I 157 
with TAPhA 76 
(1945) 144-6 
276 
Sale of adult donkey at 
a price of 3,800 dr. 
Probably, given prices in previous chapter. P.Stras. III 139 
c.279 
Sale of pitch at 3,400 dr. 
per talent. 
Yes, given prices per talent in P.Lond. III 1177 and 
P.Oxy XXXI 2580 in the tens of drachmas per 
talent of pitch or BGU I 14 which has a rate of 240 
dr. per talent for dry pitch in AD 255. 
P.Oxy. XII 1497 
279 
Deposit of 148 talents 
and 1,280 dr. 
Yes: this is an enormous and unprecedented 
amount by earlier standards and equal to almost 




It will be seen that there appears to have been a step-change in prices which occurred sometime in 
this decade. A possible terminus ante quem for such a jump is possibly provided at AD 275 by 
P.Cair.Isid. 85 but this is not definitive. A more secure date for such a jump is AD 276 when there are 
two sources which clearly show a step-change in wheat and donkey prices. It is more problematic to 
determine a terminus post quem since there may be transactions which were proposed at prices in 
line with the 260’s and these may be ‘hang-overs’ from previous practice between market 
 
134 Other available prices for horses in the period prior to AD 270 are: SB XVIII 13303, 1st century, 200 dr.; PSI 
XIV 1405, AD 133, 80 dr PSI IX 1031, AD 134, 72 dr.; P.Ross.Georg. II 18, AD 140, 400 dr.; PSI I 39, AD 148, 188 




participants where the parties had not realised that the ‘rules of the monetary game’ had 
changed.135  
Of interest is P.Oxy. XII 1414 which is a record of the proceedings of the Senate of Oxyrhynchus. This 
text was originally dated to the period between AD 270 to 275 by the editors but can be refined to 
AD 270 to 271 in BL VII 138 if the ‘tentative’ argumentation proposed by Bowman is accepted.136 The 
dating of this document is critical since it contains one of the rare references to physical action as a 
result of price and wage inflation since the Senate accepts  to make a payment of in excess of 200 
drachmas  in response to a petition from the city cloth-workers that ‘…more drachmae should be 
given to them on account of the rise in the value of the materials and in the wages of their 
workmen’.137  If the dating proposed for this source were to be accepted then it would re-affirm that 
prior to Aurelian’s currency reform of AD 274 there were already systemic inflationary pressures 
which manifested themselves in both price increases for free-market goods and wages. However, 
the small amount of the payment of a few hundred drachmas when in the same document there is 
discussion of multiples of talents would not seem to point to a change in prices of an order of 
magnitude and therefore this would imply that the ‘jump’ in prices came after 270 to 271. Note that 
P.Oxy VII 1036, a transaction from AD 272, is concluded at rates consistent with those that pre-date 
AD 270 which would support the conclusion that the jump in prices post-dated AD 272. 
It appears logical therefore to conclude that the jump in prices occurred between AD 273 and 275. A 
tenfold jump in prices is a one-off event compared to the endemic and systemic low inflation of 
earlier years and can only have been caused by an exogenous driver. As to which external event 
triggered such a change, Roman Egypt in the first half of the decade of the 270’s was a period of 
significant political and social disruption. These five years included the period of the Palmyrene 
coup, then Roman re-conquest and Aurelian’s currency reform. The currency reform is the event 
that Rathbone views as the likeliest reason for the jump in prices and the diachronic analysis above 





135 Haklai-Rotenberg 2011: 18. 
136 Bowman 1971: 152-3. 
137 P.Oxy. XIV 1414. 




2.2.6 Prices from AD 274 to 350 
When looking at prices in the later part of the period under review, as noted above it seems logical 
to examine the day to day commodities that were analysed in the previous chapter, and I have done 
so for wheat, barley, wine and donkeys only, since these are the commodities with a sufficient 
number and spread of prices.139 Looking first at wheat prices, both state and private, and based 
again on the data contained within Rathbone’s collection, the data on a logarithmic scale were 
presented in Fig. 2.2.3 and show that price increases were generally exponential in nature.140 The 
data are set out in appendix 2.2.1. Given the rapidly changing prices over time it is not possible to 
come to any conclusions as to whether state or private prices were lower but it is clear that the state 
could not maintain the conventional prices set in low multiples of eight drachmas and had to follow 
market as is evidenced by O.Mich. I 157.  
The data for barley are set out in appendix 2.2.2. These data are from the same collection as wheat 
but are more sparse. Fig. 2.2.5 shows a similar trend to wheat and a high R² coefficient:141 
 
For wine, the data have been derived from Rathbone’s collection of third-century and Bagnall’s 
collection of fourth-century prices updated for any more recently published sources.142 The 
assumptions as to the relative size of the vessels concerned are as set out in appendix A. 
 
139 Bagnall 1985b: 63-72. 
140 Rathbone & von Reden 2014: A8.12, A8.14, A8.15. 
141 Rathbone & von Reden 2014: A8.16. 
142 Rathbone 1997, Bagnall 1985b. Note that P.Ryl. IV 629-639 from AD 316 has been ignored since 629-638 
and possibly 639 all relate to travel accounts outside Egypt and a number of corrections or updates have been 























Once again there is a very high R² coefficient indicating continued, consistent price increases. Finally, 
for donkeys, the data from Litinas and Rathbone as previously cited have been used and are set out 
in appendix 2.2.4. The data are displayed in Fig. 2.2.7. 
 
The R² coefficient is significantly weaker than for wheat and barley and this could reflect the greater 
heterogeneity of the commodity with donkey prices varying not only over time but according to sex, 
age and condition of the donkey itself. The implications of this weaker R² coefficient are explored 





































increase is, as can be seen below, considerably lower than those for wheat, barley and wine which 
have much higher R² coefficients and consistent increase rates. I suspect that the lower increase rate 
may reflect the lack of data in the later years, since the vast bulk of the data are clustered around AD 
310. We can track the average inflation rate over the period from AD 275 to 350 which is reflected in 
the best-fit lines in the figures above and these are shown in Fig. 2.2.8. 
Fig. 2.2.8 Average Inflation p.a. AD 275 to 350 
 Inflation p.a. R² coefficient 
Wheat 13.3% 0.92 
Barley 13.5% 0.87 
Wine 14.9% 0.94 
Donkeys 8.0% 0.70 
 
As noted above, the clear outlier from this table is donkeys with a significantly lower inflation rate 
and R² coefficient. Using the same methodology as in the previous chapter, price indicators for 
‘blended’ trends and consumer price indices based on baskets of goods are shown in Fig. 2.2.9. 
Fig. 2.2.9 Average Inflation p.a. AD 275 to 350 
Blended including wheat 13.7% 
Blended excluding wheat 13.8% 
Respectability Basket Index 14.1% 
Bare Bones Basket Index 13.7% 
 
The rates of inflation are very much higher than those of the earlier period but do not, at least when 
averaged, indicate hyperinflationary conditions.143  Rathbone postulated that after the jump in prices 
in AD 274 there would have been a pause in price increase until Diocletian’s replacement of the 
Alexandrian tetradrachm with his new imperial coinage in around AD 296.144 When the graphs above 
are examined visually there does seem to be a relatively level period in prices up to around AD 300 
when the price points follow the trend line upwards thereafter. If there was a period of relative price 
stability between the two coinage reforms, this would potentially mean that there were higher rates 
of inflation than those shown in the table above in the period after AD 296. To investigate this 
further the price data from AD 300 to 350 have been examined and the results are presented in Fig. 
2.2.10. 
 
143 Cagan 1956: 25. 




Fig. 2.2.10 Average Inflation p.a. AD 300 to 350 
  Inflation p.a. R² coefficient 
Wheat 16.0% 0.95 
Barley 15.0% 0.84 
Wine 16.3% 0.94 
Donkeys 7.2% 0.37 
Blended including wheat 15.3% NA 
Blended excluding wheat 15.0% NA 
Respectability Basket Index 15.4% NA 
Bare Bones Basket Index 15.3% NA 
 
Note the even weaker R² coefficient for donkeys, the lowest of any commodity examined in these 
chapters. The contrast with wheat in this period is particularly striking. Both commodities have the 
same number of price point observations over the 50 year period (19) but wheat has a much higher 
R² coefficient and its inflation rate is consistent with barley and wine. To complete this sub-section, 
in contrast to the earlier period, when looking at the number formats of prices, I could not see any 
significant trend as to ‘fractional’ or ‘marginal’ pricing in the price trends above, that would indicate 
the bid/offer processes consistent with an active market but neither could I identify any sign of 
‘conventional’ pricing.  
 
2.2.7 Why are Donkey Prices Different? 
Unlike the earlier period, the commodity which displays a different pattern to the others is donkeys 
not wheat.  Donkeys show not only a much lower R² coefficient they also have a very different 
average inflation. The lower R² coefficient implies a greater variability of prices for donkeys than for 
other commodities and I would suggest that in turn this variability has two causes: the natural 
heterogeneity caused by age, sex and condition referred to above but also inefficiency in the price 
formation mechanism. The evidence for this inefficiency is best illustrated by considering the 
variability of the prices for donkeys in the earlier period and for the third century as shown by the 
‘relative standard deviation’ or ‘RSD’, a statistical measure where the higher the RSD, the higher the 
variability of the data.145 In the earlier period the RSD for donkey prices is 0.58 for all data points 
during the ‘stable’ price period up to AD 150. For the period in the fourth century where we have 
the bulk of the data, the 12 years from AD 305 to 316, the RSD is 0.90, a much higher variability for a 
 
145 See appendix B. Note that this definition of variability is far preferable to the use of the difference between 





much shorter period of time that cannot be explained solely by the greater variability caused by 
higher inflation. To give a practical example of this variability, the price for a donkey in AD 305 was 
15 talents in P.Oxy. XLIII 3145 and in AD 309 when other evidence would suggest a higher price  by 
around 50%, the price for another donkey was only two talents and 3,000 drachmas in SB VI 9179. 
I would attribute this greater volatility to the inefficiency of the price mechanisms in the 
marketplace to deal with ‘complex’ goods such as donkeys. In times of high inflation even a simple 
marketplace can provide pricing information to market participants on commonly traded, locally 
produced, commodities like wheat, barley or wine with clear per unit pricing in artabas or jars. The 
bid and offer process for such commodities is relatively simple with little room for debate between 
market participants as to quality and the likelihood is that there was relatively equality in 
information between buyers and sellers. Both parties would be likely to have known the prices of 
recent transactions and there may have been multiple counterparties for the buyer or seller to test 
the market as to the price bid or offered. 
Donkeys are a more complex good whose variability by age, sex and condition make pricing a more 
nuanced decision. The information exchange for donkeys within the market appears to have been 
far from perfect and both buyers and sellers seem to have struggled to strike prices which were 
consistent in real terms from year to year in a period of high inflation and I believe that the high 
variability of the prices struck compared to earlier periods reflects this market inefficiency.  
 
2.2.8 Conclusions and Implications 
As regards the pattern of prices, the analysis laid out above has shown that Rathbone’s proposition 
that there was a jump in prices in AD 274 is supported by the available evidence, though I am unable 
to pin down the exact timing of such a jump to a more exact date range than AD 273 to 275. For the 
period between AD 274 and 296, when Diocletian’s coinage changes started to take effect, we lack 
sufficient evidence to come to a definite conclusion, but the available information set out in the 
appendices would seem to indicate a period of price stability or lower inflation compared to that 
which followed. For instance, for wheat, we have an official price of 200 drachmas in AD 276 and by 
AD 294 there had not been a substantial price increase for official purposes with prices ranging from 
208(?) to 232 drachmas per artaba.146 By contrast, for the first half of the fourth century there is 
clear and remarkably consistent evidence within staple goods’ prices of sustained inflation at levels 
 




around 15% per annum. This is a high level of price increase but is not indicative of hyperinflationary 
conditions. 
The suggested shape of the price developments for ‘free market’ goods over the period covered by 
the last two chapters can thus be presented in the schematic, Fig. 2.2.11. 
 
Fig. 2.2.11 Price Schematic
 
 
As Bagnall noted, a number of earlier works have suggested that there were periods of deflation in 
the first half of the fourth century.147 I can however, within the data I have analysed, see no 
statistically significant evidence for such conclusions and the very high R² coefficients for wheat, 
barley and wine would provide evidence that inflation was broadly continuous for this period, since 
any significant period of deflation would be shown in the graphs and would lower the R² coefficients.  
Turning to what caused these price changes, a detailed consideration of the potential causes is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but a number of remarks may be made. The sudden price jump in c. 
AD 274 would have needed an extraneous event, probably monetary in nature, as a cause and I 
would agree with Rathbone that Aurelian’s coinage reforms were probably the driver for change. It 
is tempting also to identify Diocletian’s coinage reforms as being the cause for the higher inflation of 
the fourth century. However, the sustained nature of the inflationary conditions for at least 50 years 
would argue that inflation was systemic in nature, with price increases being caused by supply and 
demand imbalances within the economy, rather than being attributable to a specific event, although 
there may have been an initial monetary change which triggered the period of high inflation. 
 
147 Bagnall 1985b: 2, citing Mickwitz 1932: 98-114, West and Johnson 1944: 124, Rémondon 1957: 130-46.  
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Turning to the effects of the price increases on ordinary people, the price jump of AD 274 would 
have shaken consumer confidence in coinage and in the high inflation period of the first half of the 
fourth century it is likely that they would have been very aware of rising prices. It must however, be 
remembered that the ‘inflation’ that is being dealt with in this section is that of prices in money as 
‘units of account’ not the coinage that circulated at the time. Unfortunately, little can be gathered 
from the available data in this section as to the equivalence or otherwise of these two forms of 
money. The extent to which this awareness of inflation influenced financial decisions as to loans and 
capital investments will be dealt with in the relevant chapters and conclusions drawn. In passing, van 
Minnen’s statement that inhabitants of the cities in Roman Egypt would have ‘died in large numbers, 
because wheat prices soared’ after AD 275 is nonsensical since an increase in prices does not, of 
itself, imply famine.148 
Inflation would also have impacted on the efficiency of the market. If the internal consistency of a 
market in the way in which it prices goods can be regarded as a measure of its efficiency, in that 
similar goods were priced at similar prices at similar times, then it appears that the market managed, 
even in times of high inflation, to operate effectively for simple goods such as barley, wheat and 
wine. However, the wider variety of pricing of a more complex good, donkeys, would indicate that 
people struggled to price such goods at this time probably due to inefficiencies in the pricing 
mechanism of the market.   
However, from the evidence described above there is little, other than the inefficiency of the market 
to deal with complex goods, to support Bagnall’s claim that the ‘cause and effects of the price 
rises….can be seen as characteristic of the relatively primitive ancient economy’.149 Prices seem to 
have been driven by exogenous changes in monetary policy or systemic imbalances in the economy 
and there is nothing inherently ‘primitive’ about either feature. Periods of sustained high inflation 
have been noted in modern economies sometimes fuelled by inappropriate monetary changes or by 
exogenous events. For instance, in a ten year period from September 1972, price inflation in the UK 
as measured by the RPI never fell below 7.0% per annum and peaked at 26.9% in August 1975.150  
  
 
148 Van Minnen 2008: 228. 
149 Bagnall 1985b: 55. 





Chapter 3 Agricultural Land 
Section 3.1 The Agricultural Land Market 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Ownership of land is a critical element of any ancient agrarian economy where significant amounts 
of land are held in private hands.151 How such ownership changed hands is therefore central to the 
main question of this thesis, and the purpose of this chapter is to determine what patterns within 
the data can tell us about how the market in privately owned agricultural land functioned in Roman 
Egypt. Land registers have been subject to considerable academic study.152 However, the pattern of 
holdings they attest is the end result of a number of socio-economic factors which include 
inheritance, confiscation, marriage and market transactions. Since the purpose of this thesis is to 
examine the market, an analysis of sales rather than holdings is more likely to provide relevant 
insights.153 Sales have already been reviewed by Montevecchi who discussed their legal forms, 
Hobson who concentrated on gender issues and Rowlandson who examined the social context of 
sales in the Oxyrhynchite nome.154 However, no up-to-date complete analysis of sales and purchases 
of agricultural land exists.  
I have therefore collected data directly from the primary sources using the methodology described 
in section 1.2: that is a comprehensive search of the DDbDP, using descriptions and keywords, 
followed by an in-depth review of the relevant sources and cross-referencing against the previously 
compiled lists of relevant transactions. All transactions, other than gifts, dowries or loans associated 
with sales, that involved the transfer of agricultural land between parties in return for a cash 
consideration are included, whether such transactions are technically considered as divisions of 
property, sales or cessions.155 The exact legal natures of the transactions are not analysed but this is 
an area to which considerable academic effort has already been devoted.156 Nor do I attempt in this 
chapter to analyse the data by reference to legal or fiscal forms of private land such as ‘catoecic’.157 
However, all the transactions concerned have one thing in common: they end with the land 
 
151 For a consideration of the economic theories relevant to land tenure see Currie 1981. 
152 See Lerouxel 2016: 217-23 for a summary of available data and recent scholarship. 
153 Though as Bowman 1985: 155 noted comparisons of land registers from the same location at two different 
dates can provide some evidence as to market activity and turnover. 
154 Montevecchi 1943, Hobson 1983, Rowlandson 1996. 
155 Transactions where the land concerned was a vacant building lot are considered in the chapter on house 
sales. 
156 For instance Taubenschlag 1955. 




concerned becoming the property of a private individual or, more rarely, an institution. Transactions 
which were of a mixed nature, where land was sold along with another asset, for instance a slave in 
CPR VI 73 (AD 229) or a house in P.Amh. II 98 l.6-11 (2nd to 3rd century), are included. There are some 
482 transactions represented within 381 documents in the available data for land sales, although the 
details of many of the transactions are not complete, for instance if the document is damaged or is a 
register which only includes summaries of contracts. 
This chapter has the following structure. Firstly, the nature of the transactions concerned, including 
locations and dates, are analysed in order that the extent and limitations of the data are understood.  
An analysis of the timing of the transactions within the year is undertaken and then the gender, ages 
and other characteristics of the participants in the transactions are reviewed to see if any patterns 
are apparent. Thereafter I comment on sales of state-owned and land requiring intensive cultivation 
before making a more detailed analysis of arable land in relation to both price developments over 
time and other elements. Finally, I discuss the degree to which buyer and vendor motivations and 
other elements of the mechanics of the market may be identified. 
 
3.1.2 Dates and Provenance of the documents 
The data for the number of transactions and documents split by nome of provenance and century 
are shown in Fig. 3.1.1.158  
  
 
158 The figures of 197.5 and 159.5 for transactions in the second and third centuries reflect the allocation of a 
weighting for cases which can only be dated to sometime within these two centuries, of 0.5 for each of two 













Fig. 3.1.1a Number of Land 
Sale Transactions by Nome 
and Date













Fig. 3.1.1b Number of Land 
Sale Documents by Nome 
and Date




It will be seen that the number of Arsinoite transactions/documents drops considerably over time, 
forming the majority of cases in the first and second century but a small minority thereafter. This 
partly reflects the decline of certain Arsinoite villages.  
Rowlandson says that there is ‘no reliable means of assessing the volume of land sales in Roman 
Egypt at any period, and certainly not whether the volume increased at any particular time.’159  The 
above distributions indeed cannot be used without adjustment as an indicator of volume, and the 
peak in the second century does not indicate greater market activity.  Land sale documents, as a 
proportion of all documentary papyri actually form a higher percentage in the first century than in 
later years: 3.7% in the first century, falling to 2.0% in the second, 1.9% in the third and 0.6% in the 
first half of the fourth. It would thus appear that market activity declined over time, which would 
support Rowlandson’s rejection of an increase in land purchases in the third century, but there may 
be other changes in the composition of the underlying data, possibly related to documentary 
practices, which would explain such a trend.160  
The heterogeneity of the data is accentuated by the fact that the provenance of the source 
document, that is where each papyrus was written or in the absence of such information, where it 
was found, varies as to whether it came from a city or village location. Fig. 3.1.2 splits the available 




159 Rowlandson 1996: 187. 
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Transactions also involved different types of land varying by soil quality, suitability for certain crops 
and the way in which it was irrigated. The distribution between the following categories is shown 
below: land being sold by the state of whatever kind, which was typically not cultivated at the time 
of sale; private land which needed intensive farming such as vineyards, orchards or gardens, and the 
other private land which would typically have been arable. As can be seen in Fig. 3.1.3, in many 
sources, it is simply stated that so many arouras of land of an unspecified type have been sold, or 
the nature of the land is missing from the text, but it appears reasonable to assume that such land 
would generally have been arable since most agricultural land in Roman Egypt was planted in cereal 
or vegetable crops.161 
 
In what follows, I have excluded the ‘State Sales’ and ‘Intensive Cultivation’ segments from price 
considerations since they had different characteristics and this exclusion is necessary to reach valid 
conclusions. The transactions can be analysed by the size of the land parcels concerned, by their 
location and by the provenance of the text.  The overall median and average sizes of plots sold are 
5.0 and 8.8 arouras respectively and the median and average sizes by nome and provenance, are 




161 Bowman 2013: 234-9. For consideration of the benefits of crop diversification, which is largely beyond the 













Fig. 3.1.4 Size of Plots in Arouras by Nome and Provenance162 
  
  
Nome where land located Provenance of document 
Arsinoite Oxyrhynchite Other City Village 
Number 108 85 62 110 88 
Median 4.0 6.0 4.0 4.6 5.0 
Average 6.6 12.8 7.1 10.3 7.9 
 
The plot sizes are considerably larger in transactions which come from the Oxyrhynchite nome, 
which might be taken to reflect the predominantly metropolite provenance of the Oxyrhynchite 
data. However, it should not automatically be assumed that there is a correlation between the size 
of plots in transactions and the social status of the participants. Even large landowners could 
purchase relatively small parcels of land of less than ten arouras as is illustrated in P.Oxy. XLII 3047. 
Rowlandson concluded that for the Oxyrhynchite nome ‘little connection can be traced between the 
wealth or social status of the parties and the area of land concerned in the transaction; one fourth-
century villager purchased sixty-one arouras, while an Alexandrian might buy a mere three 
arouras’.163 All that can be concluded is that the relatively few transactions involving large areas 
greater than that needed for subsistence were probably made for investment rather than as part of 
an autarkic smallholding. 
However, not only large transactions might be considered as investment-driven.  Plots which were 
not in themselves of sufficient size to support a family, when allied to other forms of financial 
support, whether it be other owned plots, income from wages or land farmed as a tenant, would 
assist family income and form a suitable savings and investment vehicle in the absence of many 
other options. 
 
3.1.3 Month of Transaction 
In a significant number of cases (167) the month in which the transaction occurred has survived. The 
information available is as follows for all available transactions:164 
 
162 The number of transactions that can be securely allocated to a city or village provenance is lower than 
those than can be allocated to a nome. 
163 Rowlandson 1996: 185. 
164 Excluding sources such as P.Mich. II 121 which contain numerous sources from a register of transactions but 
which only cover part of the year since if these sources were included this would distort the data. Where the 
date of the transaction itself is not provided, the month of the registration of the purchase or other official 
document has not been used since although this often coincided with the month of sale there could be delays: 





The data are generally randomly spread across the year, although there does appear to be a small 
peak in transactions in Mecheir which may not be dismissed as a random fluctuation with 95% 
confidence. If the months of sale of arable land only are examined, a similar picture arises.165  
The seemingly banal fact that the transactions are spread relatively evenly across the year has, I 
believe, an important significance. The implication is that for most market participants their financial 
means were disconnected from the annual cycles of the exploitation of the land. There was no peak 
in transactions at the beginning of the year which might be expected if transactions were linked to 
the availability of cash, which might only be available after the harvest at the end of the previous 
year. Leases show a much stronger linkage to the yearly agricultural cycle, implying that the trigger 
for the transaction was the timing within the farming year to enable the necessary planting to be 
completed, as can be seen in Fig. 3.1.6: 
 
165 Note that this conclusion goes against Rowlandson’s view based on a very small sample that there was a 











I believe this lack of a link to the farming year implies that the cash used to settle these transactions 
was essentially surplus capital which became available at any time of the year to make an 
opportunistic investment. From the perspective of the vendor, the timing evidence would not 
support any link between poor harvests and enforced sale.   
 
3.1.4 Transaction Participants – Gender, Age and Location 
In many cases the gender of the participants is clear from the text and the splits between males and 
females can be examined. The data are as follows: 
Fig. 3.1.7 Number and Proportion of Parties 
  Buyer Vendor Overall 
Males 213 (60%) 205 (64%) 418 (62%) 
Females 144 (40%) 113 (36%) 257 (38%) 
 
When the distribution by plot size is analysed, then a similar, but not identical, pattern is revealed: 
Fig. 3.1.8 Proportion of Aggregate Plot Sizes Bought and Sold by Gender 
  Buyer Vendor Overall 
Males 61% 64% 63% 
Females 39% 36% 37% 
 
Overall, female participation in the land market was more frequent than might be anticipated from 
the evidence from land registers. Rowlandson notes for Oxyrhynchite nome sales that women are 








Fig. 3.1.6  Number of Transactions by Month




in the land registers.166 The relatively high number of female participants in real-estate sales was 
also noted by Bogaert when he examined transactions involving banks, but neither he nor 
Rowlandson offered any explanation as to why this difference arose.167 He also noted that women 
actually form the majority of buyers of real-estate sold by the state. Women are more commonly 
buyers than vendors, and we should remember that women would also have gained possession of 
land through inheritance, dowries and parental gifts.168  
Based on land registers, Tacoma identified three patterns in female ownership: that female 
ownership was more frequent in villages than towns, that females had a stronger preference than 
males for intensively cultivated land such as vineyards and that female land ownership declined over 
time, although he finds it difficult to find rationales for such patterns.169 Does the evidence from land 
sales, as opposed to land registers support Tacoma’s patterns? Dealing first with the number of 
female landowners in villages and towns, the data are as shown in Fig. 3.1.9. 
Fig. 3.1.9 Proportion of Buyers and Vendors who were Female 
  Buyers n=136 Vendors n=102 All n=238 
Cities n=179 40% 31% 36% 
Villages n=59 43% 45% 44% 
 
It does appear that women were somewhat more active in the land market in villages than cities, but 
this cannot be stated with 95% confidence. As regards the possible pattern of a preference for 
women to own intensively cultivated rather than arable land, women bought and sold such land 
more frequently than men. 17% of their land transactions related to intensively cultivated land, 
compared to 13% for men. Once again, the data would appear to suggest a preference for such land 
types for women, but this cannot be stated with 95% confidence.    
 
166 Rowlandson 1996: 182. Bagnall suggests that there was no more than 25% female ownership of the land 
area, whilst Tacoma notes that the proportion of female landowners might be ‘set in the range of 10 to 20%’ 
though also noting some higher proportions from other isolated documents: Bagnall 1993a: 130, Tacoma 
2006: 108. Rathbone 2009b: 224 notes the high variability in the rates of female ownership in different 
registers. Melaerts 2002: 224 for Tebtunis, suggested a somewhat higher level but warned against generalising 
from local village studies to the general position for Roman Egypt. For the later part of the period considered, 
Bagnall 1992a: 138 computed that female ownership was 14%.  
167 Bogaert 2000: 267-8. 
168 Note that I have not attempted to analyse in detail the degree to which women acted in co-operation with 
other family members, although I do distinguish between assets owned solely by females and those held 
jointly with other people. See Yitfach 2015b for a detailed analysis for land sales and other transactions. See 
also Yitfach 2015c: 140-7, for a discussion of how higher charges for female buyers and heirs to ‘allotment’, 
catoecic, land could have influenced the balance of land buyers between the genders. See Tacoma 2006: 216-
20, where he concludes that ‘If dowries were relatively small compared to female inheritances, the effects on 
property holdings cannot have been all that significant’. 




When the data are examined on a diachronic basis another layer of information is revealed and is set 
out in Fig. 3.1.10.170 
Fig. 3.1.10 Number of Vendors and Buyers by Date 
Buyers 
Date 1st century 2nd century 3rd century 
Male  75 (69%) 76 (52%) 47 (55%) 
Female 33 (31%) 69 (48%) 38 (45%) 
Vendors 
Date 1st century 2nd century 3rd century 
Male  73 (76%) 72 (57%) 46 (62%) 
Female 23 (24%) 55 (43%) 28 (38%) 
 
Note the predominance of male participants in first-century transactions contrasts strongly with the 
broad equality of participation in the market in the second century.  It should be noted that in each 
of the periods female buyers outnumber vendors. Thus, in theory, though the numbers are small, 
there may have been a net shift of property from males to females. Such a conclusion would be 
counter to Tacoma’s somewhat reluctant conclusion that female ownership declined over time.171  
There is some evidence for a preference among both genders for transactions with their own 
gender.  As noted above, the total percentage of female participants, is 38% and if women were as 
likely to contract with men as counterparties as with other women, then it would be expected that 
38% of their counterparties would be other women. There are in total 174 cases where we know the 
gender of the counterparty of an adult woman who bought or sold a property that she owned solely. 
We would expect therefore that 66 of the counterparties would be women. However, the actual 
number of female counterparties is higher at 81. So there is a clear tendency for women to transact 
with other women. There is also a tendency for men to transact with other men.  There could be a 
number of reasons for such a tendency but there does not seem to have been any legal barrier to 
the genders doing business with each other. In practice, some women could conclude contracts 
directly without other intervention on the basis of the ius liberorum. However, most women will 
usually have concluded their transaction through a guardian who was frequently, but not always, 
their spouse or a male relative.172 Nevertheless, there was a higher number of female to female 
transactions than would be expected if all other things were equal. I believe that the most likely 
 
170 There are only 18 buyers or vendors for the first half of the fourth century which is too small a sample to 
draw any conclusions. 
171 Tacoma 2006: 110-1. 
172 An example of a woman acting without guardian on the basis of ius liberorum is P.Oxy. XLIX 3498 dating 




reason for such a tendency is, as Rowlandson noted, that most transactions were concluded by 
participants within the same social circle and that social circles would have been different for the 
two genders.173 To conclude therefore there was a gender-differentiated market with an increasingly 
important female component over time.  
In 110 cases the age of the principal participants is given, presumably as an aid to future 
identification in the event of dispute.174. The data are shown in Fig. 3.1.11. 
Fig. 3.1.11 – Median Ages 
Category (Number) All Buyers (60) All Vendors (50) All Male (66) All Female (42) 
Median Age 30 37 37 25 
 
Buyers were generally younger than vendors and female market participants were generally younger 
than males. The overall distribution of buyers and vendors by age is shown in Fig. 3.1.12. 
 
 
The first point to note is the very low incidence of young people selling in the market. The definition 
of financial minority is a grey area, but I have assumed in the chart above that all participants 
mentioned as minors in the data, but without a specific age, were under 23. 175 There also appears to 
 
173 Rowlandson 1996: 183. 
174 Note that in some cases such as BGU I 240 (AD 167-169) the gender of the vendor is not clear, but an age is 
given hence only 108 cases can be analysed by gender. 
175 According to Taubenschlag 1955: 102, there were different ages which constituted ‘maturity’ in Roman 
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be a clear peak in vendor activity in those who were in their late 30’s and early 40’s. This peak in 
selling activity can also be seen in Fig. 3.1.13 which compares the market age distributions with the 
expected age distribution of children inheriting from their parents as set out in appendix C and the 
general population.176  
 
The buyer market appears to follow broadly the population structure, but with an understandable 
lack of activity for minors who may not have been in a position to exercise agency and make 
proactive decisions. This lack of activity by minors is even more marked in the data for vendors. So 
despite the fragmentation of land holdings on partible inheritance, we can conclude that land, when 
inherited by individuals under 30, was rarely sold. Small parcels of land were still highly valued and 
could be farmed effectively under collective family ownership or leased. However, the peak in 
vendor activity for people in their thirties in Fig. 3.1.13 could be interpreted as reflecting the sale of 
inherited land, which was surplus to immediate requirements, by more mature individuals. 
Transactions were normally done face to face between the principals, assisted in some cases by 
signatories and guardians. Only rarely were agents, managers or representatives used to substitute 
 
ceased to be under their patria potestas on their marriage, but for ‘Persians of the epigone’ there was a special 
rule which fixed the age of majority at 20. Under Roman law, Romans were considered not to have reached 
adulthood until age 25 according to Taubenschlag 1955: 134.  
176 The age at inheritance is assumed to occur when both father and mother have died. This is a simplification, 
since as Tacoma 2006: 215-6 notes, under the ‘radical partible inheritance’ system, inheritance could have 
occurred at multiple moments. Maternal and paternal inheritance could be separate events, though this was 
not always the case, and inheritance from siblings and other family members could also occur. If separate 
maternal and paternal inheritance were to be assumed, then typical inheritance would occur at an earlier age 
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Fig. 3.1.13 Land Buyers and Vendors by Age Compared to 
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for the principal buyer or vendor and I have identified only 23 such agents, excluding guardians, 
within sale transactions. The face to face nature of the transaction means that counterparties were 
subject to geographical constraints, but this did not preclude metropolite residents and villagers 
buying and selling land with each other. The known examples of transactions where buyers and 





Fig. 3.1.14 Locations of Buyers and Vendors 














Alexandria 4 1   2 1   2 4     14 
Oxyrhynchus 1 16                 17 
Arsinoe     4         5     9 
Hermopolis 1     12             13 
Other poleis     1 1 6         3 11 
Serving 
Military           1         1 
Oxyrhynchite 
village 2 3         4       9 
Arsinoite 
village     2         5     7 
Hermopolite 
village       2             2 
Other village       2           3 5 





The transactions shown above are those for which the domiciles of both the buyer and vendor are 
explicitly stated in the relevant sources.177  So for instance there are 16 transactions where both the 
buyer and vendor come from Oxyrhynchus and five transactions where the buyer was from a village 
in the Arsinoite nome and the counterparty was from Arsinoe. The locations of parties is further 
summarised in Fig. 3.1.15 and Fig. 3.1.16. 
Fig. 3.1.15 Location Summary 




Cities 50 0 14 
Serving 
Military 0 1 0 
Villages 11 0 12 
 
 
When comparisons are made with the equivalent charts for other types of transactions some 
features will become apparent and this will be discussed in a later section, but there are two 
features of the marketplace which can be seen from the chart above without the need for any 
comparison. Firstly, note that there are no inter-village transactions involving a villager contracting 
with someone from a different village, even within the same nome. I suspect, but cannot prove, that 
 
177 Note that if an individual is stated to have the tax status of an Alexandrian it is also assumed to be their 
residence. Also care needs to be taken in the interpretation of the data since they under-represent the 
number of ‘closed’ intra-village and intra-city transactions where, if the location of all participants was obvious 
to all parties, it would not be necessary to mention this point. The small number of villager to villager 

























many of the transactions from the Arsinoite nome in particular, involved people from the same 
village, where there was no need to record residence since this was clear to all. The evidence from 
the villages suggests that the market was geographically constrained.  This contrasts with sales of 
moveable goods such as donkeys where the parties are, on occasion, from different villages and 
nomes.178 
Secondly, metropolite participants generally transacted with people from the same city. There are 
42 cases where the transaction involved both buyer and vendor from the same city and the two 
clusters of activity are highlighted in Fig. 3.1.13. There are only 25 cases where the metropolite 
participant transacted with a villager and I believe this feature is not a function of the provenance of 
the data or scribal preferences as to recording residence. Metropolite residents were more likely to 
contract with someone from their city than they were with an individual from a village where the 
land was located or someone from another city. Therefore this is evidence for a constrained 
geographic nature for the land market, despite the relative ease and rapidity of travel within and 
between nomes.179 City dwellers largely bought and sold to others from their local social network in 
their own city, villagers to others in their own village. There was, however, a limited interaction 
between city-dwellers and villagers as their social networks overlapped.   
 
3.1.5 Consolidation or Fragmentation? 
One other feature of the market worth examining is whether transactions tended to consolidate 
landholdings or disperse them. Given the principle of partible inheritance it might be expected that 
over time the process of inheritance would give rise to a larger number of parcels of land of smaller 
size.180 There are 274 transactions where the relative numbers of buyers and vendors can be 
determined. 226 of these transactions, the vast majority, have the same number of buyers and 
vendors, and these are overwhelmingly one to one transactions with single counterparties. 
Transactions which appear to consolidate the number of owners, that is where the number of 
buyers is smaller than the number of vendors, at 29 to 19, outnumber transactions where ownership 
was dispersed.  This is relatively weak evidence for consolidation of holdings, but it should be 
remembered that the ‘one to one’ transactions could have been driven by either consolidation or 
fragmentation motives that are not clear from the contract. Whilst consolidation of land under one 
 
178 See Claytor 2015 for a discussion of the donkey trade and in particular the role of markets such as 
Kerkesoucha. 
179 Bagnall 1993c: 19. 
180 See Tacoma 2006: 211-6 for a neat demonstration that fragmentation within a partible inheritance system 




owner after inheritance did occur, consolidation of holdings could also occur when neighbours 
purchased property from each other.181 For instance, in P.Oxy. XXXIV 2723 (first half 3rd century) one 
Alexandrian sells a vineyard with reed-bed, in a state of neglect, to another Alexandrian whose 
family owns the land on three sides of the property sold. It should be noted that joint-holders and 
then neighbours were in theory given prior rights by the state over other buyers when private 
property was put up for sale and were presumed to have a desire to purchase such property.182 The 
evidence for consolidation being a major driver of market activity seems weak and landowners 
appear to have preferred the benefits of diversification over consolidation. Furthermore, the 
question of whether, over time, there is other evidence for consolidation, through the increasing 
importance of the larger estates, is still open.183  
 
3.1.6 State Sales 
Sales of land by the state typically were of land which would have been unproductive at the date of 
sale. State ownership of such land would often have resulted from confiscation where the previous 
owner had failed to meet liturgical or fiscal demands.184 The relatively few sources for state sales 
which include a price per artaba are detailed in appendix 3.1.1 and all 58 state sale transactions are 
listed in appendix 3.1.2. Such land, being normally in an unproductive state, would have required an 
investment in cash and labour in order to cultivate it, and was generally priced at a lower rate per 
aroura than privately owned land. Within the attested cases there are four, which, because they 
relate to land that had recently been cultivated before confiscation, are unusually high.185 
The attested prices in state sales for the period up to AD 274 are shown in Fig. 3.1.17, excluding the 
four outliers at higher prices noted above: 
 
181 For consolidation after inheritance see for instance P.Mich. V 274 (AD 46-48) where a family sells a small 
inherited jointly held vineyard to a third party. 
182 See P.Oxy. XLI 2954 (3rd century) for a discussion of the Edict of Avidius Heliodorus. Another example of the 
interest of the state in land transactions is the requirement, attributed to a rescript of Diocletian, that land be 
sold at its true value: CJ 4.44.2. 
183 See Bagnall 1993: 149 for discussion. 
184 For example P.Oxy. IV 721 (AD 13-14) where the land is specifically referred to as ‘unproductive’. 





Whilst the R² coefficient is relatively high, the number of data points is too low to come to any 
strong conclusions as to the detailed pattern of increase. Many of the prices concerned appear to be 
‘conventional’ in that they are set in multiples of four drachmas. The price of state land, however, 
increased by an average 0.5% p.a. between AD 50 and AD 270. This is a level of increase which is 
consistent with prices generally which increase by an average of 0.6% p.a. on a blended basis. There 
are no examples of state land sales in the period from AD 275 to 350, although confiscations may be 
expected to have continued. 
In a contrast to private sales there is evidence for the ‘marketing’ of state land through auctions and 
’advertising’.186 Consider for instance P.Oxy. XIV 1633 (AD 275) where bids for a plot of state land are 
‘publicly exposed’ presumably to promote competition from different bidders and generate a higher 
price. Other documents concerning sales of state land show the bidding process in practice such as 
SB I 5673 (AD 147) and SB X 10527 (AD 151-2) with individuals placing higher bids in an attempt to 





186 I am aware of only one example of advertising private land for sale, P.Tebt. II 457 (2nd century) a simple 
papyrus presumably for public display stating: ‘Of Theogonis 1 aroura of reed land through Kronion. Who 





























3.1.7 Arable Land – Prices 
There are a number of crops which can be regarded as ‘cash crops’ whose cultivation cannot, in 
isolation, feed a family unit. Gardens, vineyards, orchards, date palms and olive groves would all 
have produced such crops and required more intensive cultivation than arable land.187 There are 50 
private transactions of property in this category and these are listed in appendix 3.1.3. There are 
also seven state sales which relate to land of this type. The data from such transactions are not, 
however, easy to analyse.  They rarely specify the area of the land sold which makes them 
impossible to compare with other land categories. The remainder of the section therefore 
concentrates on arable land. 
Some 374 out of the 482 land sales do not fall into the categories of state sales or land requiring 
intensive cultivation. The contracts often do not specify the type of land or the crops to be cultivated 
but it seems reasonable, given the general evidence that most cultivated land was under cereals, to 
assume that this land was arable.188 Details of the transactions where a price per aroura can 
potentially be determined are set out in appendix 3.1.1.  Appendix D.1 gives a full list of these 
transactions together with those other more fragmentary or less detailed sales where some 
information can be determined, such as location, date or the parties concerned. 
Prices vary considerably, reflecting the heterogeneous nature of land itself. Of particular importance 
in Egypt was the means by which the land was irrigated, whether by the natural Nile flood or 
artificially, and the reliability of such irrigation. It will be noted that 47% of the land prices are 
rounded to the nearest 100 drachmas.189 This rounding may indicate a lack of competition between 
buyers, since if there was an active market more differentiated pricing might be expected. The data 
for prices over time for Roman Egypt as a whole are shown in Fig. 3.1.18. The data included in this 
chart are those which can be dated to within 50 years:190  
 
187 See for instance Rowlandson 1996: 324-6 for examples of the complex terms of vineyard leases which 
indicates the level of investment in capital or labour required. 
188 Bowman 2013: 238-9. 
189 As a percentage of all prices between 100 and 1,000 drachmas. 
190 Excluded are those sources which can only be dated to an individual century or longer period. Adding such 






The very low R² coefficient reflects the great variation in prices at the same approximate date.  The 
upwards slope of the best-fit curve in later years is heavily dependent on the four third-century 
prices of land at 1,000 drachmas or more, of which three come from outside the Arsinoite and 
Oxyrhynchite nomes and may be regarded as exceptional. Nevertheless it is to be noted that the 
trend line in the chart above roughly follows the general shape of price trends determined in an 
earlier chapter with prices relatively steady from AD 50 to 150 and then picking up from AD 150 to 
AD 270.191  Given the variability of land prices no conclusions are possible as regards whether there 
is  any  linkage between land prices and those for wheat or other ‘free-market’ crops. 
To check whether Fig. 3.1.18 masks regional differences the data can be split into the three main 
provenances - Arsinoite, Oxyrhynchite and the rest – for which the best-fit charts are shown in Fig. 
3.1.19. 
 
191 Note that this conclusion contrasts with Scheidel’s view that ‘no clear change in nominal land pries – on the 





























The data are few and the R² coefficients, other than for the Oxyrhynchite nome, are very low. The 
Arsinoite data do seem to show a different pattern to the other nomes, but the lack of any third-
century transactions may well explain this feature. The data for the other nomes show the same 
pattern of moderate price increases from the mid second century but the underlying data are very 
dispersed. The most interesting outcome is that Oxyrhynchite prices seem to have been higher than 
those for other nomes, which may reflect, in some way, the essentially metropolite provenance of 
the data.  
A numerical comparison of the implicit prices trends can be shown in Fig. 3.1.20 which compares the 
average price increases for different commodities and assets. A comparison for the Arsinoite nome is 
not available given that we have no prices for the third century and similarly no comparison is 
possible for the ‘other nomes’ category since we have no data for the first century. Overall the 
average rate of price increase is similar to that for general goods.  








State (excl. outliers) 0.5% 0.54 13 
All Egypt Arable Land 0.5% 0.16 66 
Oxyrhynchite Private Arable 
Land 0.5% 0.43 16 
Wheat (private prices) 0.3% 0.42 40 















































































































Fig. 3.1.19 Private Arable Land Prices by Nome 




One other point worth investigating is whether there is any relationship between the size of the 
transaction and the average per aroura price. Fig. 3.2.21 shows the price per aroura for all arable 
land, re-calibrated to a ‘real’ value as at AD 150 by reducing post AD 150 prices at an average 
inflation rate of 1.0% for the period from AD 150 to 270.192 There is no strong relationship between 
the size of the transaction and the unit price as demonstrated by the miniscule R² coefficient. 
 
There is thus no strong evidence for differential pricing by size of deal.  
 
3.1.8 Motivations for Buyers and Sellers 
Understanding the motivations for buyers and sellers within the market is key to understanding the 
institution of the market itself and the extent to which it was driven by financially rational actions by 
market participants. The documents used in this section rarely provide explicit information on the 
intentions of participants but it is possible to get some indications of their motivations through 
analysis of the data. To do so we need a conceptual framework in which such intentions can be 
placed.  
 
192 If a similar chart were produced based on unadjusted prices then the same conclusions would be produced, 
but in my view the use of adjusted ‘real’ prices is preferable since one potential distorting variable, general 
price inflation, is removed from the comparison. A similar chart where the impact of the outlying very large 
deals is reduced can be produced by limiting the size of deal to 15 arouras. If this is plotted, there is a 
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We can group motivations into two broad categories: 
- “investment” transactions where the exploitation of the land was apparently not to be 
carried out by the immediate family of the party concerned. 
- “familial” transactions where the land was, or was likely to have been, farmed by the 
immediate family members.193 
This sub-section thus seeks to identify what proportion of transactions can be assigned to either 
category as “investment” or “familial”, recognising that some transactions could fall into both 
categories: for example an investment buyer selling off land to make a profit to a smallholder 
seeking to expand his farm to meet new family needs.  
Dealing first with investment transactions, there are some 15 cases where the text of the source 
indicates that the transaction was of an investment nature: 
- P.Oxy. XIV 1648, which can only be dated to AD 57 to 170, where the land concerned was 
associated with a commercial activity, in this case a dyeing works.  
 - CPR VI 73 (AD 222-35) where the land was sold with a mill and other accessories. 
- P.Mich. V 259 (AD 33) mentions that the land being purchased is of poor quality, and in need of 
irrigation or other investment in order to bring back into production. 
- P.Oxy. XLII 3047 (AD 245) records the history of purchases of a large estate then owned by 
Calpurnia Herkalia and includes 10 transactions of smaller plots, some of which date back some 200 
years but others with a more recent date of acquisition.194 
- SB XVIII 13235 (AD 69-78) where the transaction was registered through a phrontistes (manager) 
thus implying that for at least one party the transaction was connected to a wider estate. 
- SB X 10526 (AD 138-61) where the buyer was a serving soldier and unlikely to have been able to 
farm the land himself. 
- P.Oxy. XIV 1636 (AD 249) which was identified by Rowlandson as showing indications of speculative 
activity given that the vendor, Aurelius Serenos alias Sarapion, had engaged in buying and selling 
 
193 For a discussion of the theoretical economic background to direct farming as opposed to leasing see Currie 
1981: 119.  
194 Line 25 of P.Oxy. XLII 3047 records an acquisition in the second year of Tiberius (AD 15-6) of six arouras, 




activities not just in relation to the plot of land concerned in this papyri, but also with regard to 
houses and slaves.195 
Also, the 58 state sales of land were typically at prices which reflected the poor state of the land, 
and in a number of cases it is explicitly mentioned that further investment would be needed to bring 
the land into production.  Rowlandson describes these purchases as a ‘very promising form of 
investment’.196  These sales may also, however have provided an opportunity for an individual to 
establish an initial subsistence holding at little capital outlay. Other investment transactions are the 
50 cases of land producing cash crops requiring intensive cultivation such as vineyards, olive groves, 
orchards or gardens. Other cases which I would consider as being of an investment rather than a 
familial nature are the 40 arable transactions where the area being sold was greater than the size 
which might typically have constituted an autarkic smallholding.197 A small family at subsistence level 
would have required at least six arouras of land simply to produce enough wheat to survive, but we 
have seen in the chapter on prices that even on a bare bones level, goods other than wheat would 
be necessary to provide a minimal standard of living.198 Assuming that half the production would 
need to have been sold to secure a total smallholding of perhaps 12 arouras might be used as an 
indicator of the size of farm necessary to be held by one such family in order to supply the necessary 
income to survive on a bare bones level, which is consistent with Bagnall’s assessment of a minimum 
farm size of ten arouras to provide bare bones subsistence for the average Karanis family.199  
There are 41 transactions relating to arable land where both buyer and seller are metropolites which 
were probably investments, since it seems unlikely that the land would have been worked personally 
by either party or their immediate family.  
Another ‘marker’ of investment driven motivation would be evidence for borrowing or mortgaging in 
order to finance an acquisition, but as will be shown in the chapter on loans, there is little or no 
evidence for financial gearing in this way.200 An example of a clear investment motivation can, 
however, be seen in P.Giss 79 (c. AD 117), a letter from an agent to his principal. It is worth quoting 
 
195 Rowlandson 1996: 190-1. 
196 Rowlandson 1996: 189. 
197 Sales of smaller sized plots could have been motivated by investment considerations but we have no way of 
identifying which of the smaller sales would fall into this category. Large sales where the plot area is greater 
than 12 arouras are listed in appendix 3.1.4. 
198 Carrié 1997: 138. 
199 Bagnall 1993c: 117. 
200 One of the few possible examples of investment-driven behaviour in Roman Egypt, similar to financial 
gearing, is the lease-sale of ships which Rathbone interprets as being the ‘long-term lease of a boat in return 




since it also demonstrates an understanding of the laws of supply and demand, and a sensitivity as 
to purchase price likely to have been driven by a level of anticipated return on investment: 
 ‘Just now wine is selling at a very high price….So everybody wants to sell his vineyard. But if God 
grants a good yield of wine for the year, perhaps the owners will be less eager on account of the 
resulting cheapening of their properties. Therefore we will be able to purchase at a lower price in 
accordance with your desires.’  
Note that although this is a direct testimony of the thoughts of the investor, since no specific 
transaction can be associated with this letter, it is not included in the data analysed. Overall 
therefore there are a total of 214 transactions where at least one party was probably driven by 
investment considerations, which constitutes some 44% of all transactions. 
There will undoubtedly have been transactions where the buyer was driven by mixed motives, but 
these are difficult to identify. Transactions where land was purchased for a minor could fall into this 
categorisation as there may have been both a familial and investment motivation on the part of the 
buyer.201 It is also generally more difficult to identify transactions driven by familial motivations than 
those driven by investment. Family members often acted together, such as the two sisters who sold 
a commercial property in CPR VI 73 (AD 222-35), but this would not necessarily indicate a familial 
motivation. The sisters could simply be selling a commercial holding to make a profit. It would, 
however, seem logical to assume that transactions between family members should be considered 
as at least partly familial but I can securely identify only 27 transactions between family members or 
around 6% of all transactions.202 The limited prevalence of inter-kin transactions and the 
interpretation of this data will be returned to when other forms of transaction are examined later in 
this thesis.203 Overall ‘investment’ motivations are much more apparent in the evidence than 
‘familial’ ones, although this may partly be a function of the manner in which transactions are 





201 An example would be P.Oxy. XII 1462 (AD 83-84). 
202 See appendix 3.1.4.  
203 See Fig. 7.3.3. I thus disagree with Rowlandson who, based on her view that land sales were determined by 
social relationships rather than the market concluded that she doubted ‘that there was ever an opportunity for 




3.1.9 Conclusions – Market Mechanics  
The analysis of such a rich seam of data, relating to more than 480 transactions involving more than 
1,100 individuals, could be used to reach broader conclusions about general economic and social 
conditions including the role of the urban elite and changing land ownership patterns. However, the 
specific purpose of this section is to consider what the data show about the operation of the market, 
including the ‘behaviour’ of buyers and vendors, even if direct evidence of thought and intentions is 
largely lacking. 
Comparative analysis of the land sale data with other financial transactions will shed further light on 
the nature of the market, but some features are already apparent.204 The first conclusion relates to 
the distribution of transactions over the calendar year.  The level spread of transactions with no 
particular bias to any month indicates that the timing of transactions was independent of the 
agricultural year. Finley stated that the ‘normal purchase of land in antiquity . . . was windfall 
purchase’, unplanned purchases when circumstances were propitious.205 Finley defined ‘windfall’ by 
the reference to the price of land as ‘windfall land is visibly cheap or dear, as the case may be; no 
more sophisticated investigation is required than what I have already called crude empirical 
knowledge’ rather than the circumstances that drove an individual to transact.206 If Finley was 
correct, it might be expected that there would be a peak in transactions in the period after the 
harvest when such opportunities might arise given poor or excellent harvests. However, this is not 
the case. Buyers do not seem to have been dependent on the harvest to have had the necessary 
capital to make purchases.  Neither were vendors typically driven by poor harvests to sell. This 
suggests that buyers were using existing ‘surplus’ capital that was or had become available for 
investment to make their purchases. So whilst capital availability for purchases might have come 
from ‘windfalls’ in the day to day sense, possibly from inheritance, purchases were not solely driven 
by ‘windfalls’ in Finley’s sense. 
However, timing is only one element of the market. The modalities of sale in the sense of how the 
sale was transacted can also provide information on the market. The lack of activity by agents and 
the pattern of residence of participants shows that the private market operated on a face to face 
basis, where people transacted with other people known to them or to their social circle. Villagers 
tended to contract with their own neighbours and there is no evidence for inter-village transactions. 
The same pattern is evident in the cities. The impact of social networks can be seen in the fact that 
 
204 See chapters 6 and 7. 
205 Finley 1999: 119. 




women preferred to transact with women and men with men. The market was also gendered in that 
women were present as buyers and sellers to a much greater degree than their underlying 
ownership share would have suggested and their participation increased over time. There were 
relatively few intra-family transactions and consolidation of property holdings does not appear to 
have been a major driver.  More transactions were driven by people who were using surplus assets 
to make investments rather than by familial motivations.  
It is an archaeological and historical trope that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, but 
the remarkable lack of any reference to auctions, marketing, advertising or competitive bidding in 
any of the hundreds of documents relating to private sales should be noted. It contrasts in particular 
with the relative frequency of references to the marketing of state land through public offers and 
counter bids in the much smaller group of state sales. The limitations of such social network 
marketing may be reflected in the fact that the majority of prices are simple rounded multiples of 
hundreds of drachmas, indicating that there was little marginal pricing which would be an indication 
of an active competitive market. However, there is some limited evidence for interactions within 
small social networks providing some impetus for competition in pricing. Consider the third-century 
letter written from Theomnestos to Apion Adonios advising him that a concubine of their 
acquaintance has put some land up for sale and that she should provide him with an option to make 
a bid, given that lots of parties were interested in the sale.207 This example shows that financial and 
social circles were not necessarily distinct and that within both spheres word of mouth was a useful 
channel for the sales process which may have led to some limited competitive pricing pressure. 
However, the great variability of prices of land within regions would tend to argue against an 
efficient and liquid market.208   
Whilst the preceding comments would indicate that there was a relatively free, if not efficient, 
market in land we should be aware that there may have been institutional constraints on the sales 
and purchases. For instance, Rathbone believes that cessions of catoecic land may have been 
 
207  SB VI 9621, editor’s translation: "Elle devrait donc te donner une option de vente, étant donné que 
beaucoup de personnes s'y intéressaient". Youtie 1967: 385-90, reviews and contests the editor’s translation 
without offering a direct alternative but there can be no doubt that the purpose of the letter was to bring the 
sale of the land to Apion Adonios’s attention. Youtie draws comparisons with PSI XII 1259 from AD 120-225 
which is a letter concerning a potential pre-emptive offer to purchase a house.  
208 In contrast to Temin’s suggestion that the ‘relatively uniform’ land prices in a region of Roman Italy is an 
indicator of market forces at work – Temin 2013: 179. Consider also Levi’s suggestion for rural pre-industrial 
Italy, that land prices were extremely variable, not only because of the varying quality of land, but also 
according to the kin relationship between the contractual parties, Levi 2001: 102. The relatively few inter-kin 
transactions in our database, would tend, however, to dismiss kin preference as a main reason for excessive 




restricted to within the gymnasial social group, at least into the second century.209  Owners of 
neighbouring land were given priority over other bidders by law and certain people were forbidden 
from buying which will have reduced competition and thus increased market inefficiency.210 
Prices per aroura for arable land do not show any relationship between the size of the deal and the 
price, indicating that the market was not segmented by size and that market participants for larger 
or smaller transactions used the same pricing mechanisms. There is also a lack of evidence in private 
sales for many intermediaries acting in a broking or other fashion to facilitate the market. This would 
not have helped construct a market in a neoclassical economic sense, though it would mean that 
transaction costs were not inflated by middle-party costs.  
In summary therefore the market was one which operated through gendered, local, social networks 
which were limited in scale. The efficiency and rationality of these land purchases will be explored 




209 Rathbone 2007c: 701, n.14. 
210 See sub-section 3.1.5 for neighbour’s rights. For an example showing that certain individuals were not 




Section 3.2 Agricultural Land Leases 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to assess the financial return which could be gained from ownership of 
private agricultural land in Roman Egypt. It follows on from section 3.1 which dealt with the 
sale/purchase market for this land, and uses the data from that section to assess the value of the 
land. The financial return on land is calculated by dividing the net income received by the landowner 
by the value of the land. 
The subject of the return that could be earned from land was, within a predominantly agrarian 
economy, of key interest to the elite in the Roman empire as evidenced by the consideration of the 
relative risks and returns from a landowner’s perspective by Cato and Pliny the Younger.211 Roman 
attitudes to agrarian investment have been the subject of a long standing academic debate. The 
contrary positions are exemplified by these oppositional statements from Finley and Harris, 
respectively: ‘Investment in land, in short, was never in antiquity a matter of systematic, calculated 
policy, of what Weber called economic rationality’ contra ‘Roman methods of calculating the 
profitability of an estate were as effective as those practiced by a progressive landowner in the 
seventeenth century AD.’212 Questions of anticipated return will, however, only be dealt with in 
chapter 6 of this thesis, and it needs to be stressed that this section 3.2 deals with the likely actual 
return from land ownership, not the return originally expected. 
There are two principal ways of earning an income from ownership of a piece of land: leasing and 
direct farming. This section concentrates on leasing and examines the transactions from the 
perspective of the landlord rather than the tenant, given the overall subject of the thesis relates to 
risks and returns for the asset owner. The documents examined include land leases, receipts for rent 
and other documents which provide evidence that a lease was in existence, including petitions and 
loans between landlords and tenants.213 The data were obtained and verified using the systematic 
approach outlined in sub-section 1.2.3 and were cross-referenced against the lists of documents 
 
211 See for instance Cato, Agr. 39.2 or Pliny, Ep. 9.37. 
212 Finley 1999: 116 and Harris 1993: 25. 
213 Land lists and registers from a particular location, such as P.Petaus 126 (AD 184) which may provide 




contained within the two comprehensive but somewhat aged monographs on the subject of leasing 
and the more recent collection of data by Harper.214  
In total I have identified some 847 documents which deal with land leasing and within these there 
are some 1,273 transactions involving 2,828 people.  Within these 1,273 transactions there are 173 
related to land that may have required intensive cultivation, such as vineyards or orchards, but the 
bulk of the remainder are explicitly described as being arable land under cereal and fodder crops. 
Where no description of the crops is given it is assumed that this land is arable and could be sown 
with cereals. This section concentrates on exploitation of this arable land under cereals, although 
commentary is made on other forms of land. 
Leases of land owned by the state are not included but sub-leases of state land between private 
individuals are, as are sub-leases of private land.215 However, sub-leases are not included in the sub-
sections which deal with returns on land since the sub-leasor is not the beneficial owner of the land 
concerned and the return is not comparable to that of a landowner since no capital is expended and 
the leasing costs of the sub-leasor are typically not visible so returns cannot be calculated. So-called 
‘leases of crops’, the purchase of standing crops in the field to be harvested by the buyer, as for 
example that set out in P.Fam.Tebt. 5 (AD 98), have not been included, since they fit better within 
the category of general commercial and labour contracts and lie outside the scope of this thesis.  
This section has the following structure. It starts with an analysis of the dates and provenance of the 
documents. Next comes a discussion of leases of non-arable land requiring intensive cultivation and 
then the available information for the people who participated in all leases is analysed including the 
gender and age of landlords and tenants. Thereafter the section concentrates purely on leases of 
arable land. The elements of the leases including the size of the plot, the crops to be sown, the types 
of rent and the duration and seasonality of the leases are noted. Then the likely return obtained by 
those who owned land is assessed and a detailed explanation of the methodology and assumptions 




214 Hennig 1967, Herrmann 1958 and finally Harper 2018, which corrects a number of errors made by Drexhage 
but which at the time of writing was by no means comprehensive. A full list of the leases of cereal and fodder 
land where rents may be determined is provided in appendices 3.2.1 to 3.2.4.  
215 This section therefore does not include consideration of pittakia, which were collective agreements for joint 





3.2.2 Dates and Provenance of the Documents 
The data for the number of land lease transactions split by nome and century are shown in Fig. 3.2.1, 
noting that the data for the first century are distorted by the transactions recorded within the 
Arsinoite Tebtunis grapheion register. 
  
Fig. 3.2.1b shows an apparent peak in activity in the second century. However, we need to examine 
the relative frequency of land lease documents compared to the overall number of documentary 
papyri to get an idea of the level of activity in the market and this will be shown in Fig. 5.1.3. This will 
show that whilst leasing activity remained relatively steady throughout the Roman period, the 
market for land sales seems to have declined at the start of the fourth century. The frequency by 
century of land leases can be compared to that of land sales and this is shown in Fig. 3.2.2.216 










Number of land 
leases 62 226 134 85 507 
Number of land 
sales 57 114 75 8 254 
 
216 Included in this table are only those documents which are sale or lease contracts or offers. Documents 
containing numerous transactions, such as contract registers or those which provide indirect evidence of a sale 
or lease, such as a letter, registration document, or rent receipt have been excluded.  These restrictions were 
undertaken since the purpose of this particular analysis is not to assess the general prevalence of land sales 
and lease activity within society, as shown in Figs 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, but rather to assess the relative ratio of 
specific types of transactions. A more exact definition is thus preferable to avoid the distortion, for instance, of 
receipts of rent, whose inclusion in the relative frequency comparison would tend to bias any conclusion as to 
the proportion of land that was leased. Therefore, it will be noted that there are fewer documents referenced 













Fig. 3.2.1a Number of Land 
Lease Transactions by Nome 
and Date







1st C n=149 2nd C
n=408
3rd C n=236 AD 300-350
n=129
Fig. 3.2.1b Number of Land 
Lease Documents by Nome 
and Date





The striking feature of Fig. 3.2.2 is the very high ratio of land lease documents compared to land 
sales in the first half of the fourth century and this feature is worthy of further consideration. One 
possible reason for the high ratio of leases to sales might be distortions caused by particular archives 
containing significant numbers of leases. I therefore examined how the 85 fourth-century leases 
shown in Fig. 3.2.2 were split by archive and this is detailed in Fig. 3.2.3. 
Fig. 3.2.3 Number of Land Leases by Archive AD 300 - 350  
Archive Number 
Alopex 9 
Aurelius Adelphios 5 
Aurelius Asklepiades et al 9 
Aurelius Isidoros 5 
Hatres and Isas 2 
Leonides 8 
Sakaon 4 
No archive noted 43 
Total 85 
 
There are indeed a number of archives which contain multiple leases but even if we eliminate this 
feature by counting only one lease per archive we arrive at 50 independent sources of leases. There 
are only eight land sale documents from the same period, six not associated with any archive, one 
with the archive of Aurelius Adelphios and one with that of Aion and Valerius.  As will be seen in Fig. 
5.1.3 the number of land leases as a proportion of all documentary papyri holds up in the fourth 
century but sales slump. I will return to this point in the conclusion to this section. 
 
3.2.3 Leases for Land not to be Sown in Cereal Crops 
There are some 173 private transactions which involve land which was not to be sown in cereals and 
these are split as shown in Fig. 3.2.4. The detailed terms of these leases, particularly for vineyards, 
included the need for specialist labour. In many cases no size in arouras is given for the land sold or 
leased.217 This makes it impossible to assess securely the likely profitability of farming or leasing 
these types of land. These leases will thus not feature further in the discussion of the rate of return 
 




and the risks associated with ownership of land but have been included in the statistics in sub-
section 3.2.2. 
Fig. 3.2.4 Leases of Land not to be Sown in Cereals  
Land Type Number Percentage 
Date, Palm or Olive 
grove 65 38% 
Flax bed 23 13% 
Garden 21 12% 
Orchard 2 1% 
Vegetable plot 8 5% 
Vineyard 54 31% 
  173 100% 
 
 
3.2.4 Landlords and Tenants – Locations 
As with other types of transaction, land leases were largely contracted face to face by the principals. 
In the 507 leases noted in Fig. 3.2.2, only 89 individuals identified as agents, managers or other 
intermediaries, excluding guardians, are known to have been involved. Although this is a relatively 
small proportion, it is a higher percentage than any other type of transaction dealt with in this 
thesis: 14.4% of land lease documents have individual intermediaries compared to 3.6% for loans for 
instance.218 The relatively large number of intermediaries reflects the more widely dispersed 
geographic distribution of counterparties for land leases compared to other transactions, as 
absentee landlords delegated the day-to-day management of their estates to phrontistes or other 
types of managers.  
Of the 295 landlords in the extant leases where residence is known, 252 (85%) were city-dwellers as 
opposed to villagers. We do not have sufficient information to comment on any changes in the 
proportion of landlords from cities over time. We can, however, examine the locations of landlords 
and tenants over the whole period studied and these are presented in Fig. 3.2.5, where the most 
common interactions are highlighted and are further summarised in Fig. 3.2.6 and Fig.3.2.7.219 
 
218 See sub-section 5.1.6 for credit intermediaries. For the avoidance of doubt both figures for intermediaries 
quoted exclude banks, who have little or no participation in the land leasing market but more involvement in 
the credit market. 
219 For an alternative schematic approach to land leasing relationships, for the Oxyrhynchite nome only, see 




Fig. 3.2.5 Locations and Numbers of Counterparties 














Alexandria   2                 2 
Oxyrhynchus 6 26     1 1 4       38 
 
Arsinoe     13   2     5     20 
Hermopolis 1     12           1 14 
Other poleis 1   1   10     2     14 
Serving 
Military       1   1         2 
Oxyrhynchite 
village 1 50     1           52 
Arsinoite 
village 8   29   7 4   14     62 
Hermopolite 
village 1     8 1           10 
Other village   2     4         2 8 











All cities 75 1 12 
Serving 
Military 1 1 0 
All 
villages 112 4 16 
 
 
The first point to note is the limited involvement of serving soldiers. There are a fair number of inter-
location transactions, but these are largely within the same nome, with the exception of Alexandrian 
landlords in the Arsinoite nome. In the Oxyrhynchite nome, there are few examples of village-based 
landlords, though city-based tenants appear frequently. As Rowlandson noted, this is a distortion 
caused by the city find site of the Oxyrhynchite leases.220 Elsewhere, unlike the equivalent tables for 
land sales and credit transactions, presented in Figs 3.1.14 and 5.1.15 respectively, Fig. 3.2.5 hides a 
significant amount of inter-village activity. Of the 14 examples between villagers in the Arsinoite 
nome, nine involve landlords and tenants from different villages within the nome.221 It is worth 
examining these nine inter-village leases in more detail since I have seen very few inter-village 
transactions in the sales or credit markets.  
 
 
220 Rowlandson 1999: 146. 
221 The one case where they come from the same village is SB XIV 11911, a garden lease from AD 224, but 
there are likely to have been other cases of this type when the location of the two individuals is not given 



































Tenant location Crop Reference 




Unspecified P.Kron. 38 




Palms P.Mich. IX 564 
152 Unknown Dionysias Philoteris Unspecified P.Corn. 41 
220 Herakleia Soknopaiou 
Nesos 
Herakleia Wheat P.Bour. 17 
225 Herakleia Bonaphion Three tenants 
from Abrochon, 
(.)sebastus, Pisae 
Wheat SB V 7665 




Wheat BGU VII 1645 




Wine P.Berl.Leihg. 23 
314 Philadelphia Philadephia From other area, 
probably villager 
Wheat BGU II 411 
338 Boubastos Boubastos Thraso Wheat P.Sakaon 70 
 
Given that only two of the inter-village transactions involve intensive production crops, it is unlikely 
that the primary reason for inter-village activity was crop diversification. The higher than typical 
incidence of sub-leases is not surprising given the likelihood that outright ownership of land 
available for rent was concentrated in city-dwellers so transactions between villagers are more likely 
to be further down the rental chain. The fact that the land concerned is more often in a different 
village to that where the tenant is resident might suggest that there was an imbalance in the supply 
and demand of land available for rent, as Hobson suggests was the case for Soknopaiou Nesos which 
lacked arable land in its own vicinity, and that in order to find suitable land for farming, a tenant 
would sometimes have to lease land away from their home and other obligations, with all the 
inconveniences that would imply.222 Finally, we should recognise that the categories of ‘landlord’ 
and ‘tenant’ were not mutually exclusive social castes and as Bagnall notes, an individual could be in 




222 See Hobson 1984a for a discussion of the somewhat atypical relationship of the village of Soknopaiou Nesos 
to other villages as regards agricultural land. 




3.2.5 Landlords and Tenants – Ages, Genders and Family Relations 
Turning to the age structure of landlords and tenants, the distribution is shown in Fig. 3.2.9, though 
the number of cases is relatively limited. 
 
One point of interest is the relatively high number of young landlords. This may reflect their social or 
legal inability as ‘minors’ to farm the land they own, which is likely to have been inherited. One 
attractive option for them would be to lease the land. Overall the median age of tenants at 37.0 is 
considerably higher than the median age of landlords at 30.5. 
Turning to the representation of different genders as landlords and tenants, the most striking 
statistic is the infrequency of women acting as tenants as shown in Fig. 3.2.10.  
Fig. 3.2.10 Proportions of Males and Females Acting as Principals. 
  Landlord n=959 Tenant n=1,088 
Male 76% 97% 
Female 24% 3% 
 
In the absence of any known legal restrictions on females taking on a lease of land, the low number 
of females acting as tenants is likely to be due to social restrictions on the ability of women to 
mobilise the necessary resources to farm land directly, much as in the case of minors noted above. 
Even the proportion of female as landlords, at 24%, is surprisingly lower than in land purchases 
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only five cases, less than 1% of all transactions, where family members lease land to other family 
members, though there may have been informal unwritten arrangements.224  
 
3.2.6 Features of Arable Land Leases – Plot Size  
The remainder of this section deals solely with leases of arable land since this is the category of land 
for which financial returns can be estimated.225 In sub-section 3.1.2 I examined the sizes of plots 
involved in land sales and the same analysis can be performed for arable land leases. 
Fig. 3.2.11 Number and Size of Plots in Arouras by Nome  
  Arsinoite Oxyrhynchite Other Total 
Number 442 116 104 662 
Median(arouras) 5.0 4.3 8.0 5.0 
 
The overall sizes of land leased are similar to those for land sales as set out in sub-section 3.1.2 with 
the same median size of land leased as that sold at 5.0 arouras. Leased plots were, in all nomes, 
typically of a size that could be farmed by a single family unit. Van Minnen has suggested that the 
size of plots decreased ‘significantly’ in the third century and uses this feature as a support for his 
contention that the third century was a period of agricultural contraction.226 We can test this feature 
by comparing the median plot size over time and this is shown in Fig. 3.2.12. 







century AD 300-50 
Number 274 217 98 87 
Median 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.9 
 
There is indeed a small decline in the median size of plots, but the decline is not as marked as van 
Minnen implies by his use of ‘significantly’. Neither can we take the reduction in the absolute 
number of leased plots in the third century as an indication of contraction in the agricultural sector, 
since, as will be seen in Fig. 5.1.3, the proportion of leases within the documentary record remains 
 
224 The cases are: BGU XI 2123 (AD 85), P.Mich. VIII 464 (AD 99), P.Fam.Tebt. 28 (AD 133), P.Cair.Isid. 104 (AD 
297) and P.Cair.Isid. 18 l.1-3 (AD 305-11). 
225 The leases considered as being sown in cereals include all leases where the crop is specifically identified as 
barley, wheat or fodder or where no crop is specified. 




relatively steady and the reduced number simply reflects the reduction in the number of published 
documentary papyri for this period. 
On a shorter timescale, Duncan-Jones suggested that the size of land leased reduced considerably 
from the period of AD 140 to 165 compared to the period from AD 165 to 185, which he sees as an 
indicator of the impact of the Antonine plague.227  
Fig. 3.2.13 Arable Land Lease Sizes in Arouras   
 Period 140-65 166-85 
Number 68 14 
Median 5.5 5.2 
Average 8.6 5.3 
 
The number of surviving documents from the later period is small and the median plot sizes are 
similar for both periods. The proposition that there was a reduction in plot size from one period to 
the other cannot be considered proven with any strong statistical confidence.228 As such, the 
argument that this is evidence for the effect of the plague is not compelling. 
 
3.2.7 Features of Arable Land Leases – Crops to be Sown 
Landlords took a particular interest in the crops that were to be planted or sown on their land during 
the tenancy. Crops that would exhaust the soil or were perhaps pernicious in some other way, such 
as being difficult to remove at the end of the lease, were sometimes explicitly stated to be avoided 
and leases often specifically forbade the tenant to sow crops such as woad or coriander as in P.Oxy. I 
101 (AD 142), or safflower as in P.Amh. II 91 (AD 159). The simplest and most common way for a 
landlord to ensure that his land was not exhausted was to require that crops were rotated between 
demanding crops such as cereals, and rest crops such as hays or grass, typically called chortos, chlora 
or aracus (chickling), to be harvested for fodder or directly grazed. In the remainder of this section, 
when land is sown in the latter types of plants we will refer to this as land sown in fodder. When 
land was to be sown in cereal crops it was always in either wheat or barley.  
 
227 Duncan-Jones 1996 121-2. Duncan-Jones worked from the existing collections of leases compiled by 
Drexhage and Hennig which totalled 53 from the period AD 140-99, though the number of leases now 
available is higher as seen above. It should be pointed out that I have excluded one document which would 
impact the data shown in Fig. 3.2.13 and which could fall in either period. This is P.Stras. VI 511, a petition 
dating from after February AD 169 in relation to an earlier large lease of 88 arouras. 
228 Using a Mann-Whitney U test the proposition cannot be proven from that the data with a statistical 




Rotation of crops was required in roughly 60% of the leases prior to AD 300 where we have 
information, (89 out of 143), as listed in appendix 3.2.3. However, there was a difference by nome: 
73% of Oxyrhynchite leases require rotation but only 57% of Arsinoite leases.229 These figures should 
be regarded as being lower end estimates of the proportion of land where crop rotation was 
undertaken, since it may well have been in the interests of a tenant, particularly one on a long lease, 
to rotate crops even if they were not obliged to under the terms of the lease. In addition to the 
proportion of leases requiring rotation, there was also a difference in the complexity of such rotation 
schemes by nome as shown in Fig. 3.2.14.230 
Fig. 3.2.14 – Frequency of Required Crop Rotation by Nome  
  Arsinoite n=52 Oxyrhynchite n=27 Other n=10 Total n=89 
1 in 2 67% 89% 80% 75% 
1 in 3 13% 4% 0% 9% 
Other frequency 19% 7% 20% 16% 
 
Given the predominance of second-century leases with data on rotation (85 out of 143) and the 
consequent relatively small number of leases from the first or third century, it is difficult to comment 
on diachronic trends, but I would note and support Rowlandson’s conclusion that the crops to be 
grown became more diversified in the third century in the Oxyrhynchite nome.231   
 
3.2.8 Features of Arable Land Leases – Type of Rent 
There were three different forms of rental payment: fixed payment leases where the rent was in 
cash; fixed payment leases where the rent was in kind, and ‘share-cropping’ rents where the rent 
was payable as a proportion of the overall yield.  Sometimes only one form of rent was used within a 
lease, and in the period up to AD 274 when prices were relatively stable it was usually the case that 
where cereal crops were to be sown the rent was set in kind but that when land was under fodder it 
was set in cash.  Share-cropping of arable land appears to be mostly a fourth-century practice, and 
 
229 In terms of statistical significance, it can be concluded with 95% confidence that Oxyrhynchite leases more 
commonly required rotation than Arsinoite ones. 
230 The higher prevalence of one in three year rotations in the Arsinoite nome compared to elsewhere is 
consistent with the conclusion of Schnebel 1925: 218 based on more limited data. For further commentary on 
crop rotation within leases see Hennig 1967: 51-3. 




may reflect a preference for risk-sharing in an unstable period.232 When share-cropping was adopted 
the most common share of the output between landlord and tenant is 50:50, which is also the 
‘almost universally’ adopted split in today’s developing countries.233 Appendix 3.2.1 lists the leases 
where the rent was paid in cash and where the duration is either a single year or is unknown and 
which pre-date AD 300. Appendix 3.2.2 contains leases where the rent is payable in artabas of cereal 
and where the duration is either a single year or unknown, again up to AD 300 to ensure 
comparability. 
In a number of leases the rent in kind to be paid by the tenant is defined as being inclusive or 
exclusive of seed, which was usually one artaba of seed per aroura of land. Thus, if a rent is 
described as being five artabas including seed of one artaba, I have assumed that one artaba was 
provided by the landlord, and that after the harvest the tenant returned five artabas, making a net 
gain to the landlord of four artabas. Where no mention of seed can be found within the lease I have 
assumed that there was no loan of seed. 
In a small number of leases payment of the rent in advance for a number of years was required 
under the lease, as in P.Oxy. XXXI 2584 (AD 211) where an advanced payment of the rent in cash for 
a lease of five years was required. Rowlandson saw this as a possible indicator of a reversal in the 
typical power imbalance between landlord and tenant, and that the landlord was in need of cash.234 
In the particular case of P.Oxy. XXXI 2584, the effective return to the landlord can be estimated at 
around 5.5% per year, compared to the median sustainable return of 7.4% for the Oxyrhynchite 
nome shown in 3.2.33, and this relatively low return might indeed suggest the landowner was in 
need of cash and willing to strike a deal at poorer than normal rates of return as a result.235 
However, in times of high inflation advance payment of rent would be an entirely rational approach 
from a landlord’s perspective and the advance payment within P.Cair.Isid. 98, which is another five 
year lease, but from AD 291-2, may be explicable by this reasoning. However, this approach was 
obviously dependent on the ability of the tenants to lay their hands on substantial sums and cannot 
have been a realistic option for many of the leases where poorer tenants could not provide the rent 
until after the harvest. 
 
232 The earliest cereal share-cropping lease which can be securely dated is from AD 255-6: P.Princ. II 37, but the 
remainder all could lie within the fourth century. Van Minnen 2000: 212, suggested that Pliny the Younger’s 
adoption of share-cropping was a last resort at a time of agricultural contraction: Pliny, Ep 9.37, whereas 
Kehoe saw it as a rational response to changing circumstances: Kehoe 2007a: 107. 
233 Ostuko et al 1992: 1977, n10. 
234 Rowlandson 1996: 264. 
235 If we allow for the beneficial impact to the landowner of receiving the money in advance, the rate of return 




With inflation averaging around 15% per annum in the first half of the fourth century, which may 
disguise sharp increases in prices over the short term, it would have been risky to define fodder 
rents in cash because waiting a year for the cash payment could mean a significant reduction in its 
real purchasing power value.236 However, there are rational ways around this problem, such as 
expressing the rent for years when the land was under fodder in non-cash terms. It is worth 
examining the forms of rent for leases of the period from AD 300 to 350, where land may have been 
expected to be under fodder, either because the lease is for longer than one year and crop rotation 
may be expected or because the crop is explicitly stated to be in fodder. The relevant cases are 
detailed in appendix 3.2.4.  
When we examine the proportion of rents for plots under fodder which are in cash over time, I 
cannot see a clear statistically verifiable diachronic trend. 237  However, we do some different 
payment types arise in the period after AD 274. The ingenious variety of alternative payment forms 
shown in the cases listed in the appendix include payments not only in fodder itself, but also in 
barley, lentils and wheat which would have kept their ‘real’ value over time. Another equally rational 
approach was to require payment in ’ptolemaic’ coinage as occurred in P.Stras. VI 557 (AD 291), but 
this was only an option when this type of coinage was available and limited in its effectiveness.238  
Finally in this sub-section, there is one particularly strange feature of some of the leases within the 
Tebtunis grapheion register, P.Mich. II 121r (AD 42), which include leases where the rent is paid in 
advance for a lease which is to commence some years in the future: two years in the case of I xiv or 
II i and some five years in the case of III viii. This trust in the counterparty, or the ability of the state 
to enforce the legality of the lease, at a date in the relatively far future in an age of high mortality is 
striking. Perhaps these delayed leases reflect a certain desperation on the part of the landlords who 
may have required immediate cash, as was suggested above for simple advance rental payments, 
though an alternative suggestion is that these leases relate to abandoned land which would take 
some time to bring into production, thus explaining the deferred nature of any rent payments.239  
 
236 See Fig. 2.2.9 for inflation averages for the first half of the fourth century. 
237 Assuming leases of greater than three years must have included some rotation of crops involving the 
sowing of fodder crops. Note that van Minnen’s attempt to show increased monetisation by examining the 
proportions of leases that have rent in kind, cash or mixed is flawed by the fact that he ignores the nature of 
the crops sown and the length of the leases: van Minnen 2008: 230. 
238 Note that the use of the term ‘ptolemaic’ is not thought to mean literally coinage from that period, but that 
the term is a conventional one intended to mean coinage of good quality, see Crawford note to lines 24-5, 
P.Oxy. XLI 2951. 
239 For the abandoned land suggestion: Rathbone, personal communication. An analogy can certainly be made 
with emphyteutic leases of state land, where those who undertook to bring infertile state-owned land into 
cultivation were exempted from taxation, typically for a period of three years. See Bogaert 2000: 181-5 for a 




Unfortunately we lack the data as to the amount of the rent. A low rent would have indicated a 
balance of power weighted towards the tenant rather than the landlord and support the forced 
nature of the transaction from the landlord’s side. In the case of P.Mich. II 121r II i, however, the 
rent for land which was to be planted with wheat or barley was payable unusually in cash rather 
than kind, indicating a need from the landlord for cash. Furthermore, the lease in P.Mich. II.121r II i 
has as a tenant an independent woman, acting with her son as guardian. We have already seen that 
women rarely act as the tenant of land but are more often landlords. Thus, it would seem that from 
the point of view of the tenant, this deferred lease should be regarded as a rational medium term 
‘investment’ rather than a lease intended to provide subsistence or immediate income for the family 
unit. It is likely the woman secured this lease with a view to sub-leasing or having it farmed by her 
family at a later date. 
 
3.2.9 Features of Arable Land Leases - Duration and Seasonality 
As we have noted, arable land leases vary in their term and this could range from one year upwards 
to a maximum of eight years. Zilliacus noted that ‘in consequence of the great inflation, land-leases 
of the fourth century are seldom fixed for a longer period than a year’ and Fig. 3.2.15 shows the 
average length of leases decreases substantially, and in a statistically significant way at a 95% 
confidence level, from a peak in the second century to the first half of the fourth century.240 The 
average lease length overall is 2.8 years.241 










Median 2.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 
Average 
length 2.4 3.4 2.4 1.6 
 
I have verified that this is a diachronic rather than regional trend by checking that the data from 
both the Arsinoite and Oxyrhynchite nomes show the same pattern. These figures would appear to 
 
240 P.Ant. II 89 (Early 4th century), though since the lease concerned is a share-cropping arrangement, where 
the rent would have maintained its real value, inflation should have had no impact on the lease length. 
Statistical significance calculated using Mann-Whitney U test. 
241 This finding contradicts Rowlandson’s assertion that ‘The most regular duration for a lease was a single 
agricultural year’ but Rowlandson was dealing with a longer period of time covering the third century BC to the 
seventh century AD – Rowlandson 1999: 141.  




support the conclusion that a reaction to inflation may have been a reduction in lease length which 
would reduce the risk that inflation would impact on the real value of future cash payments, but this 
would not explain why leases in the first century are relatively short. Also, as we have seen in sub-
section 3.2.8, reducing lease length is just one way of decreasing risk and there would have been no 
need to reduce the lease length if rents were in kind which retained their real value. Van Minnen has 
suggested that leases with even numbers of years were generally for larger plots than those for 
uneven numbers and further, for reasons which are unclear to me, that smaller plots imply more 
‘intensive’ agriculture and larger plots more ‘extensive’.243  It is true, however, that the median plot 
size for leases with one or three year durations are both 5.0 arouras, compared to 7.0, 6.3 and 10.0 
arouras for leases of two, four and six years.244   
There are 90 sub-leases within the documents and these have some different features as to duration 
compared to the primary leases shown in Fig. 3.2.15. In general, sub-leases are of shorter duration 
than the primary lease with a median duration of one year. However, most of the sub-leases in the 
data are for private land and when land owned by an institution such as the state is sub-leased then 
the duration can be indefinite or extremely long. For instance, P.Bingen 59 (AD 33) is a sub-lease of 
state land for a period of 93 years and is explicitly to be inherited by the heirs of the sub-tenant. This 
is essentially a transfer of responsibility for farming the land in perpetuity rather than a true sub-
lease and the same applies to documents such as BGU II 661 (AD 140) where the sub-tenant takes on 
responsibility for as long as the main lease from the state remains in force.245 
The seasonality of the date of agreement of the lease can also be analysed, noting that the date of 
the delivery of cereal rents in kind is invariably in or around Pauni, after the harvest. The pattern of 
arable lease agreements in the year is as shown in Fig. 3.2.16. 
 
243 Van Minnen 2000: 213. 
244 For 1 year leases n=96, 2 year n=48, 3 year n=23, 4 year n=73, 5 year n=9 and 6 year n=17. Given the small 
number of 5 year leases no median is shown. 
245 On occasions it should be noted that sub-leases of public land do not involve any net remuneration to the 
sub-leasor, consisting only in the transfer of the obligation to farm the land and pay the taxes/rent to the sub-





Note that, as may be expected, most leases, 76%, are concluded at the turn of the calendar and 
farming year between the months of Mesore and Hathyr, prior to sowing.246 A significant proportion 
of all data, 59 out of 195 cases, come from the Tebtunis grapheion register documents and the 
pattern of leases from these sources is very similar to the total data shown above. 
 
3.2.10 Methodology for Calculating Return on Ownership of Arable Land Leasing 
Having described the general features of leases and their participants, the rest of this section deals 
with the likely return that landowners would have received on their investment in arable land. The 
overall principles of the methodology adopted have been set out in sub-section 1.2.5 but the 
detailed methodology is set out below.  
Leases varied in their term from one to multiple years, and the one year leases, unless the leased 
land was split into different plots, would often be for a single crop. When the return to the landlord 
from renting is analysed, single crop or mono-culture, one year leases cannot be used directly to 
assess sustainable investment returns since, as will be seen below, the financial return from land in 
fodder was much lower than land under cereal crops. As was noted in sub-section 3.2.7, leases 
frequently required crop rotation, and thus only leases with more than a one year duration, or one 
year leases where part of the land was sown in cereals and partly in fodder can be used to estimate 
directly a smoothed sustainable investment return to the landlord. The leases of this nature which 
 
246 Note Browne 1968: 17 states that leases in the Oxyrhynchite nome are drawn up in the first four months of 
the year from Thoth to Choiak, but only one lease dates from Choiak and the bulk are drawn from the first 
three months only. In contrast to Oxyrhynchite leases, where there is only one case in Mesore, in the Arsinoite 
























pre-date AD 274 are used to determine the return on investment in land. The date terminus of AD 
274 is to avoid distortion caused by the jump in prices of around that time and the high inflation of 
the fourth century. In total there are 105 leases which can be used to estimate the likely sustainable 
return on the land concerned and these are listed in appendix 3.2.3. Within these leases and others, 
listed in appendices 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, there are 76 cases where the annual return for land under 
fodder can be estimated and 115 for land under cereals.  
The return on leases has been calculated for each contract for which we have sufficient data. The 
simplest type of lease for this is that where the rent was set in cash. The return in drachmas from 
the leasing contract to the owner is simply the rent received less any frictional costs and taxes to be 
paid on the land by the owner. Dividing this net income by our best estimate of the land’s value 
provides the return in percentage terms. The rent amount is known as a fact from the contract’s 
terms, the costs and taxes can be estimated with a good degree of accuracy given the extensive 
information at our disposal as to tax rates, but the land’s value is the most difficult element to 
estimate.247 It will be noted that the return is net after tax since we are concerned with the 
rationality from an individual owner’s perspective and the level of tax determines the remainder 
that may be received by the owner. Details of the leases of private land where the rent is in cash and 
where the duration of the lease is either one year or unknown are provided in appendix 3.2.1.  
To determine the net after tax rates of return from leasing when the rent is set in kind requires 
additional assumptions to be made about the value of agricultural produce. The assumptions used 
for this purpose are set out in sub-section 3.2.15 whilst appendix 3.2.2 provides the details of those 
leases where the rent is in cereals and the duration is either one year or is unknown. Leases where 
the rent is mixed in its nature with elements of both cash and kind payments or where the lease is 
for longer than one year are set out in appendix 3.2.3. Leases with rent in barley and wheat appear 
to differ both in the number of artabas paid and in the financial return likely to be achieved, so these 
crops are treated separately.  Fodder crops, whether described as chortos, chlora or aracus are 
analysed as one category.248 Also it should be noted that there was typically a requirement that the 
tenant leave the land in a fit state at the end of the lease period and it is assumed that no 
depreciation of value would have impacted the landlord.249 
 
247 See Wallace 1938: 11-76 for a comprehensive description of the taxes applicable. 
248 Note that Rowlandson believed that different types of fodder crops may have had different values. For 
instance, she suggested that aracochortos may have been of higher value than aracus, but we lack sufficient 
data to confirm this point: Rowlandson 1996: 242.  




A point that should be addressed is one  expressed succinctly by Bagnall as ‘scale is critical’ in that ‘a 
small tenant farmer, planting perhaps seven to ten arouras, is something very different from a large 
operator – even a Soterichos, for example, who no doubt leased more land than his family could 
cultivate with its own labor, from multiple landowners’.250 The data do not lend themselves to any 
attempt to distinguish between these types of tenant, given that plot size alone is not a reliable 
guide, but no clear pattern of different returns for the landlord from different tenants is discernible, 
and I see no absolute reason why the return achieved from leasing land would have varied according 
to the size of the transaction.251 Returns are more likely to have varied according to the length and 
nature of the relationship between landlord and tenant, a sensible landlord valuing the continuity of 
a long-standing tenant who was a reliable payer, compared with the uncertainties of an unknown 
new tenant who might have paid a higher initial rent. This preference is evidenced within the papyri 
by long-standing relationships between landlord and tenant such as that maintained by Kronion and 
his sons and a landlord for a period of more than 40 years.252 
As noted in sub-section 1.2.5 the methodology described above is a ‘deterministic’ methodology. 
The main disadvantages are that the results are highly dependent on the accuracy of our best 
estimates, particularly with regard to the value of land. They also provide little information on the 
risks faced by investors. These disadvantages are addressed in chapter 6 when a stochastic approach 
is undertaken to examine the risks and returns of different investments. 
 
3.2.11 Data for Arable Land Leases – Amounts of Rent 
The amount of the rent is obviously a critical element in the calculation of return and this sub-
section looks at the amounts of cash rents and size of the cereal rents to be received based on the 
data set out in appendices 3.2.1 to 3.2.3. If financial rationality played a part in the setting of these 
rents then it should be expected that the rents were variable according to the quality of the land, 
the manuring and irrigation methods adopted, the frequency of crop rotation and any regional 
supply and demand factors. Care has been taken to ensure that the only rents used in this sub-
section are those which may confidently be asserted whether the land was under fodder or sown 
with cereals. 253 Texts where the crop to be sown is not specified have not been included. The cash 
 
250 Bagnall 1993a: 132. 
251 The intangible management costs may have been somewhat higher when dealing with multiple tenants 
rather than a tenant who leased a number of a landlord’s plots, but the impact on the calculated return is not 
likely to be significant. 
252 See P.Kron. 25, 27-29, 32-34, 36-37, 40-45. 
253 This approach does not totally eliminate the risk of any cross-subsidy in rents between land under cereals 




rents per aroura are shown in Fig. 3.2.17 and cash rates seem to increase along with inflation, 
although we have very little data for the first century.254 The relatively low R2 coefficient reflects the 
wide dispersal of rates. 
 
The typical rates for fodder do appear to vary according to nome as is shown in Fig. 3.2.18, although 
I cannot suggest a plausible reason for the substantially lower rents in the Arsinoite as opposed to 
other nomes. 255 
Fig. 3.2.18 – Median Cash Fodder Rents per Aroura Re-calibrated to AD 150 Prices  
  Median in dr. 
Arsinoite n=21 10 
Other n=15 24 
Oxyrhynchite n=25 22 
All n=61 19 
 
For cereal rents there is no link to inflation since the rents are defined in numbers of artabas of 
barley or wheat.  However, we can see the extent to which the rents per aroura may have varied by 
nome in Fig. 3.2.19, using the data set out in appendices 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Leases or rent receipts 
 
when the land was in fodder in return for a high rent when the land was under cereals, as in P. Mich. XII 633 
(c.AD 30).  
254 The average increase per annum in cash fodder rents between AD 50 and 270 is 0.7% compared to general 
price inflation as assessed by a blended index of 0.6% as set out in Fig. 2.1.19. 
255 There are 61 fodder cases where the rent is expressed solely in drachmas within the 78 fodder cases in 

































where the crop to be sown is not explicitly stated have been excluded. The vast majority of these 
rates are from leases with crop rotation. 
Fig. 3.2.19 – Median Rates in Artaba per Aroura for Cereals256 
  Wheat n=95 Barley n=27 
Arsinoite n=53 7.0 11.5 
Other n=31 6.8 7.7 
Oxyrhynchite n=38 6.4 6.0 
All n=122 6.6 8.3 
 
The Oxyrhynchite rates are somewhat lower than other nomes, and another difference is the 
presence of a specific rent relief clause in the Oxyrhynchite documents by which the rent is to be 
reduced if the land is left dry due to a failure of the Nile flood.257  In the Oxyrhynchite nome most 
land was in the Nile valley and largely irrigated by assisted inundation, whereas in the Arsinoite 
nome a greater variety of irrigation methods were used.258 As Bagnall noted, much of the Arsinoite 
nome was exceptional in being dependent on canal irrigation and in the peripheral villages of the 
nome where our papyri generally come from ‘the supply was limited and the canal system long, 
complex, and vulnerable’.259 With that greater variety of irrigation methods, there would also have 
been a concurrent variety in the quality of that irrigation, not only in the amount of water 
distributed, but also in the degree to which the water included sediment, which acted as a natural 
fertilizer of the land within the flood plain of the Nile or its branches.260 This variability in the extent, 
reliability and quality of irrigation within the Arsinoite nome, together with the greater variability in 
crop rotation practices outlined in sub-section 3.2.7, may therefore explain the wider variability of 
rents.  
 
256 The wheat rates are consistent with Bagnall’s finding that ‘average lease yields from the Arsinoite Nome in 
the first and second centuries are not much different from those of the Oxyrhynchite and Hermopolite Nomes; 
but the range is rather wider, and the highest figures we have come from the Arsinoite’: Bagnall 1985a: 306. 
257 Of the leases set out in appendix 3.2.3 only leases from the Oxyrhynchite nome contain a rent relief clause 
in the case of the land being left dry though such clauses do exist elsewhere for state land leases such as 
P.Tebt. II 374 from Tebtunis in the Arsinoite nome (AD 131). 
258 See Bonneau 1971: Graphique V for a schematic description of the assisted inundation method. 
259 Bagnall 1993c: 17. 




It is worth checking if there is any trend apparent in rates payable over time and this is outlined in 
Fig. 3.2.20 and 3.2.21. It is difficult to see any diachronic trend although perhaps there is a decline in 




261 This proves that Muth’s ‘firm’ conclusion that real land rents declined throughout the first three centuries 
of Roman rule is unfounded: Muth 1994: 220. Muth used data solely from Johnson 1936, did not appear to 





















































Scheidel has argued that land rents in kind in Egypt ‘dropped precipitously’ in the third century 
which might be consistent with the data in Fig. 3.2.20 and Fig. 3.2.21, but the data are very sparse.262 
To test this I examined the data in more detail and the medians by nome and date are as shown in 
Fig. 3.2.22.  
Fig. 3.2.22 Median Wheat Rents per Nome and Date in Artabas per Aroura (Number of Cases) 
  1st century 2nd century 3rd century 
Arsinoite 7.0 (13) 9.0 (19) 4.5 (6) 
Other 9.5 (3) 6.6(18) 5.7 (4) 
Oxyrhynchite 6.0 (5) 6.8 (12) 6.0 (14) 
All 7.0 (21) 7.4 (49) 6.0 (24) 
 
At first sight, if there is a precipitous decline in rents in the third century it stems from the data from 
the Arsinoite nome, and this is apparently confirmed by Fig. 3.2.23, though the R² coefficient is 
relatively low.   
 
 
262 Scheidel 2002: 101. He quotes the following information on wheat rents, based largely on Drexhage to 
support his conclusion: Arsinoite nome - AD 100-165 n= 34, median = 7.55 and AD 211-69 n= 19, median = 
3.54. Oxyrhynchite nome – AD 103-65 n=13 median = 7.5 and AD 205-62 n=14, median = 5.9. Hermopolite 
nome AD 120-60/1 n= 14, median = 7.5 and, AD 253-68 n=4, median = 5.5. Note that Scheidel’s methodology 
and reliance on unadjusted data from Drexhage is heavily criticised by Bagnall in that it does not allow for land 
being under fodder: Bagnall 2002: 119. I have followed an approach which ensures that the rent rates 
concerned are those when the land was actually under wheat or barley as the case may be. Van Minnen 2000: 
212 also suggests there was a sharp decline in agricultural yields in the third century and beyond but it is not 
clear to me whether his argument is that on average total agricultural yield fell along with population or 
whether his argument is that the yield for each farmed artaba fell. His projection of yields goes on into the 
seventh century and is thus outside the scope of this thesis. He updated his argument further in van Minnen 
2008: 231-3. See also Hennig 1967: 26-8 and Drexhage 1991: 162-3 for further discussion of the proposition 
































However, if we examine the geographic distribution of the Arsinoite data a different possible 
explanation emerges. If we define high rates for both barley and wheat as being those of 13 artabas 
or more, then all of the 18 examples, where we know the land’s location, come from the area 
around Tebtunis in the south of the Polemon district of the Arsinoite nome.263 However, in the third 
century we have no examples from the Tebtunis area, and all of the third-century data shown in Fig. 
3.2.23 come from the northern and central areas of the nome.264 
Fig. 3.2.24 – Arsinoite nome – waterways265 
 
 
I would suggest therefore that the sharp third-century decline in rent rates that Scheidel outlined 
cannot be an Egypt-wide effect given that the data from the Oxyrhynchite nome show no such sharp 
decline and that, any apparent decline in the Arsinoite nome is more likely to be a geographic 
 
263 These rates are shown in appendices 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, and include three rates where although it is not 
explicitly stated that the land is sown solely in wheat, the high rent would imply this is the case: P.Mil.Vogl. VI 
275 l.21-23 (AD 133), P.Kron. 39 (AD 139) and P.Mil.Vogl. IV 221 (AD 146). 
264 The locations of the land in the third-century leases from the Arsinoite nome are: SB XIV 12197 (AD 211) 
Hephaistias in the north of the Herakleides district, SB XVI 12323 (AD 218) Theadelphia, BGU XI 2040 (AD 223) 
Theadelphia, BGU IV 1018 (3rd century) Kerkesephis in the north of the Polemon district and SB XII 10982 (AD 
288) Tanis. There is one example of a mono-culture rate in barley for the third century which does happen to 
come from Tebtunis, P.Tebt. II 377 (AD  210) but this is not particularly low at 6.20 artabas per aroura. 




distortion in the underlying data caused by the wide variability within that nome rather than a valid 
diachronic trend.266 
 
3.2.12 Assumptions - Typical Land Prices per Aroura 
As I noted above, typical values of land per aroura need to be estimated and then applied to the size 
of the plots concerned to determine our best estimate of the return on capital employed. It 
appeared in sub-section 3.1.7 that arable land prices from the Oxyrhynchite nome had a higher level 
than those from the Arsinoite or other nomes. I have therefore adopted separate estimates of land 
prices depending on whether the land was in the Oxyrhynchite or another nome.267 
The best-fit lines for land prices for the Oxyrhynchite and other nomes are shown in Fig. 3.2.20.268 It 
should be stressed that as noted in sub-section 3.1.7 there is a great variability in the underlying 
data which is not reflected in the best-fit lines in this figure.269  
 
 
266 The data for nomes other than the Arsinoite and Oxyrhynchite are too sparse to come to any strong 
conclusions. 
267 I have avoided the temptation to try and guess what categories of land may or may not be represented by 
different price levels as was undertaken by Alston 1995: 108 and Scheidel 2002: 102, since I would agree with 
Bagnall as to the difficulties of such categorisations: Bagnall 2002: 116.  
268 These are in nominal drachmas unadjusted for inflation. 
269 As in section 2.1 the best-fit line is a third order polynomial. It would be tempting to suggest that land 
prices in the area near Tebtunis may have been higher than in other locations in the Arsinoite nome in view of 














































































































Fig. 3.2.25 Private arable land prices by nome 




No distinction between the value of land to be sown in barley or wheat has been made. There are 
likely to have been taxes and other costs on acquisition.270 However, no frictional land acquisition 
costs are assumed since the uncertainty of our estimate is such that any adjustment would be 
spurious. In any event these costs would have minimal impact on the sustainable return since they 
would have been amortised over the period when the land was in the possession of the owners or 
their heirs. 
To determine the capital employed, the number of arouras noted in the lease is multiplied by the 
price implied by the best-fit lines shown in Fig. 3.2.25. So for instance if a lease dated from AD 200, 
then the price assumed for land per aroura would be around 600 drachmas if it were in the 
Oxyrhynchite nome, and around 400 drachmas if it were elsewhere.271 The leases used in the 
calculations all relate to land which was immediately capable of producing income and similarly the 
land prices used above all exclude any land which was stated to require investment. 
 
3.2.13 Assumptions - Ongoing Frictional Costs 
The size and nature of frictional costs are important when assessing the nature and efficiency of any 
market. For Roman Egypt a recent collection of essays has provided some valuable insight into these 
frictional costs, but it does not provide all the necessary information to construct the assumptions 
needed for this sub-section.272 Frictional costs impacted the exploitation of the land and the receipt 
of rent. For the purposes of this section the only relevant costs are those which impacted on the 
landowner and thus they must be attributed between the principal parties. There are frictional costs 
payable at the outset of any lease. There would have been fees payable to the scribe to draw up the 
lease document and there may also have been registration fees and taxes. As regards the scribe 
fees, or grammatika, these one might expect to have been paid for by the party who would have the 
greatest interest in recording in writing the transaction. Whilst a written lease would establish 
tenure for the tenant, it was certainly also in the landlord’s interest, since having a written 
document would establish his title to the land, the amount of the rent and his powers over the 
tenant. However, in P.Mich. II 123, the Tebtunis grapheion archive, in five out of the six times that 
 
270 A tax on land conveyances of 5% was payable. A special fee was also introduced for catoecic land which 
depended on the gender of purchaser, his or her personal status and the nature of the alienated land: Yitfach 
2015a: 159. In addition to scribe fees, as Yitfach points out, it was on occasion necessary to gain the approval 
in writing, not only of the vendor, but also of the vendor’s family members: Yitfach 2015a: 146. Gaining this 
approval may have implied an additional cost to the vendor or purchaser, but the size of these costs is 
impossible to estimate. 
271 These figures are before adjustment for general inflation. 




the name of the payer is recorded it is the tenant who is responsible for the payment of the 
grammatikon.273 For the purposes of modelling the return on investment, it is thus assumed that the 
tenant was responsible for the grammatikon or other initial costs or any scribe costs related to rent 
receipts and no assumption is therefore required as to their size. 
Therefore, no frictional costs payable by the landlord have been assumed for the drawing up of the 
lease. On occasion however, there are ongoing costs associated with the landlord’s obligations 
under the lease. In P.Oxy. LVII 3911 (AD 199) for example the landlord needs to provide a team of 
oxen to assist the tenant. These costs are difficult to estimate and are rare so they are ignored. 
Transportation costs also occurred and would relate to the transport to the threshing floor and 
onwards to a granary or the taxes associated with such transport. Adams noted that transport costs 
to the granary were typically paid by the tenant but there were exceptions such as P.Tebt. II 377 (AD 
210) or P. Coll. Youtie I 27 (AD 165) where the landlord paid the transport costs.274 When the 
landlord paid the transport costs, I have assumed that the typical cost was one drachma for every 
eight artabas of wheat or barley for transport from the field to the threshing floor and on to the 
granary.275 This appears feasible when compared with the donkey hire costs and loads quoted by 
Adams.276 I have not allowed for any subsequent transportation costs from the granary to any 
eventual point of sale.277  
 
3.2.14 Assumptions - Taxation 
Rowlandson stated that in almost all cases, taxes on land were met by the landlord and this is indeed 
the case for the vast majority of the leases set out in appendices 3.2.1 to 3.2.3. The one artaba land 
tax rate applied throughout the province at the start of the Roman period and though the rates of 
 
273 P.Mich. II page 91. 
274 Adams 2007: 168. 
275 I have based my estimated costs on the figures supplied in three documents. The first, SB XX 14315 (AD 32-
3), where five artabas of wheat is stated to be the transportation charges in a lease where the rent is 260 
artabas when the land is under wheat. At a typical price of eight drachmas per artaba this amounts to one 
drachma for every 6.5 artabas. The second document is P.Oxy. LXII 4336 (AD 170) where the rate for transport 
paid by a tenant is equal to eight drachmas for just over 73 artabas of wheat and which therefore equates to 
around one drachma for every nine artabas. The third, P.Lond. III 1223 (AD 121) has a charge of one and two-
thirds artabas for 100 artabas of barley, which can be also be estimated at around one drachma for every nine 
artabas, assuming a price of barley of 6.5 drachmas per artaba. I have taken an intermediate assumption of 
one drachma for every eight artabas. 
276 See Adams 2007: 11 for information on the loads and costs of donkey hire. Adams bases his daily cost of 
half a drachma on Drexhage, but there is evidence for higher rates in, for instance, P.Mil.Vogl. VII 302 (AD 151) 
and P.Mil.Vogl. VII 304 (AD 166). 
277 I have also ignored the relatively small taxes related to transportation and the granary such as the foretron, 




taxation changed under Diocletian, for the period under consideration the one artaba land tax is 
assumed to be applicable.278  Although there are variations in the taxes payable on private land, 
unless it is stated otherwise within the lease, it is assumed that the landlord was responsible for a 
land tax to the value of one artaba of wheat for each aroura. A supplement could also be payable 
and the taxation rate assumed including this supplement is eight sevenths of an artaba of wheat per 
aroura.279 I have assumed that the tax was payable whatever the crop sown or the state of the Nile 
flood that year given the lack of direct of evidence for tax refunds, though if land became habitually 
dry the land might be re-classified.280 If the tenant is stated to pay the tax without any 
reimbursement by the landlord, then the tax is ignored. The tax on land raising grain, the dikoinikia, 
of 1/20th of wheat per aroura is also assumed to be payable.281 Finally, another tax which is normally 
payable by the landlord is the naubion tax which is estimated at half a silver drachma per aroura.282  
The most difficult tax to estimate is the crown tax. Wallace sees evidence for this tax applying to 
real-estate as being relatively scarce before the late second century when he views it as an annual 
rather than exceptional extraction and related to land.283 I have assumed that a crown tax of eight 
drachmas per aroura applied on an annual basis from AD 200 onwards. I have not, however, allowed 
for exceptional demands by the state for requisitions or for any additional costs arising from epibole, 
an obligation which could apply to ownership of a privately owned piece of land to farm some other, 
presumably less fertile, plot of public land on the grounds that the sizes of land concerned were 
 
278 Wallace 1938: 11-9 details the levels of land taxation by nome and a useful summary of taxation rates for 
private land is provided in Rowlandson 1987: 292. 
279 See Wallace 1938: 38-41 where he notes that such a surcharge is prescribed in the gnomon for taxation of 
land in the Arsinoite nome and Rowlandson 1996: 54 for a confirmation of a similar surcharge applying in the 
Oxyrhynchite.  For the equivalent rates in the period after AD 274 see Bagnall 1985a: 300-1. 
280 For the Nile flood question see Wallace 1938: 19. I am not aware of any document which foresees relief on 
private land taxation due to the state of the Nile flood. Mountford, whilst arguing that tax relief was granted in 
cases of insufficient flooding through abrochia declarations of insufficient flooding, admits that ‘no 
declaration, however, makes any express claim for a reduction in tax’: Mountford 2012: 70. 
281 Wallace 1938: 12. I have assumed that this is payable only when the land concerned is under wheat and at 
the same time and under the same conditions as the main one artaba land tax. 
282 Based on P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.10-3 gives 14 drachmas as the cash public charges for two years for 13 arouras, 
and of the same order of magnitude as that within P.Achm. 9 (late 2nd century) where the rate is 2.25 obols per 
aroura.  
283 Based on Wallace 1938: 282-4, where he stated that private land in the Oxyrhynchite nome, in the third 
century, paid at a rate of eight drachmas per aroura. See also Bowman 1967 for a description of the 
documents then known to contain references to crown tax and Johnson 1936: 576 for a general description, 
and for an updated list see P.Koeln. II 91 to which add BGU XV 2503-9 and subsequent publications. Note that 
there is no specific mention of crown tax in any of the 105 leases upon which our estimates of sustainable 
term return are based but this is not surprising since when taxes are mentioned generally there is only an 




relatively small and even if a profit was unlikely to be made from this obligation, the owner may 
have been able to cover their costs.284 
 
3.2.15 Assumptions, Values of Agricultural Produce 
The key values of agricultural produce required to assess the return on arable land are naturally 
those for barley and wheat. A number of other commodity prices are also needed for items such as 
bread, cumin, hens/cocks, lentils, vegetable seed and wine which were sometimes included in 
supplementary payments to the landlord but these were relatively trivial items. The best-fit lines for 
the likely prices for barley and wheat are shown in Fig. 3.2.26 based on the data set out in section 
2.1.285 
 
As seen in section 2.1 there were no observable differences in prices by nome and so these 
assumptions apply to all cases. The best-fit lines are, of course, simply indicators of long term 
average prices and do not reflect seasonal or short term differences, but the use of these typical 
rates is appropriate when assessing the likely sustainable rate of return on ownership of land.  
Turning to the supplementary payments, since these are generally relatively small proportions of the 
total income to the landlord, a simpler approach has been taken when assessing their value. The 
typical value assumed for each item is ten drachmas for an artaba of bread, two drachmas for a hen 
 
284 See Rowlandson 1996: 88-90. I have also ignored the catoecic arithmetikon, on the grounds that is a form of 
capitation tax rather than a land tax, following Wallace 1938: 176. 













































































































Fig. 3.2.26 Barley and Wheat prices




or cock, five drachmas for an artaba of lentils, 20 drachmas for an artaba of vegetable seed and 
seven drachmas for a keramion of wine.286 
 
3.2.16 Returns from Leasing – Worked Example 
The above assumptions are applied to specific leases to provide an estimate of the rate of return 
achieved. It is, of course, unlikely that landowners made exactly the same calculations but they had 
the mathematical skills to do so and would actually have had greater knowledge than do we as to 
local prices and other costs that might apply. However, they would not have expressed the results of 
any considerations in percentage terms. Our use of percentage rates of return as a measure does, 
however, allow us to compare easily the profitability of leasing with other forms of investment 
including loans, and to come to some conclusions as to whether outcomes were, in retrospect, 
financially rational. 
To ensure readers are clear on the methodology, a worked example is provided below of the 
estimated return on investment for a lease of fodder. In P.Sarap. 26, a lease from the Hermopolite 
nome which dates from AD 125, eight arouras are to be sown in aracus (fodder) for an annual rent 
of 26 drachmas per aroura with no supplementary payments. The gross income to the landlord is 
thus 208 drachmas, and no frictional costs are attributed to the landlord, but he continues to be 
responsible for land tax which is estimated at one and one eighth artabas of wheat for each of the 
eight arouras. The price of wheat in AD 125 is estimated at 9.14 drachmas, from the best-fit line in 
Fig. 3.2.26, so the value of the artaba tax is some 84 drachmas (8 times 8/7 times 9.14). The naubion 
tax is estimated at half a drachma per aroura and is thus four drachmas in total. Therefore the net 
income to the landlord is 120 drachmas (208 less 84 less 4). The value of an aroura of land in the 
Hermopolite nome at AD 125 is estimated at 285 drachmas from the best-fit line in Fig. 3.2.20, and 
thus the effective capital employed in owning eight arouras is estimated at 2,280 drachmas. The 
annual return is therefore 120 divided by 2,280 or 5.3%. 
 
 
286 The price of an artaba of bread is based on SPP XXII 56 col. II which has a second-century price of 21 
drachmas for two artabas of bread, that for a hen or cock is the value typically attributed to them in leases as 
for example in P.Mil.Vogl VI 267 (AD 125-6), that for an artaba of lentils is based on the prices provided in 
P.Mich. II 127 col.1 (AD 45-6), SB VIII 9699 (AD 79) and P.Berl.Leihg. II 39r col.5 (AD 160), that for vegetable 
seed is based on SB VIII 9699 (AD 79) and P.Princ. II 60 (2nd to 3rd century) and that for wine from the 
commodity prices analysed in sub-section 2.1.6. I have ignored the references to a metron of cumin since the 
only price for cumin that I am aware of is from P.Fay. 101v col.1 (18 BC) when an artaba of cumin has a price of 
seven drachmas which would mean that a metron of one tenth of an artaba would be less than a drachma. No 




3.2.17 Results for Returns in Years when Land under Fodder 
The simplest returns to model are those when the land was under fodder and the results are 
provided in appendix 3.2.5. The typical return to the landlord, after tax and costs, is very low with a 
median rate of return of 1.9%. The results are much more tightly bunched than those we will see for 
returns on land when it was under cereal crops and some are negative as shown in Fig. 3.2.27, since 
it is assumed that the landlord still needed to pay the taxes on the land even when it was under 
fodder. 
 
There is some variability by nome as shown in Fig. 3.2.28, but overall landlords were lucky to cover 
their tax liabilities though they were likely to make a much higher return when the crop was rotated 
to be sown in cereals. 
Fig. 3.2.28 Returns per annum on Land under Fodder by Nome 
Arsinoite n=29 0.1% 
Other n=18 5.0% 
Oxyrhynchite n=31 2.1% 
All n=78 1.9% 
 
One notable feature from this table is the high returns for fodder leases outside the Arsinoite and 
Oxyrhynchite nomes. This is primarily a function of the assumption made as to the price of land in 
these other areas, where I assumed that land prices were similar to the Arsinoite nome. The actual 
rents in the ‘other’ nome category are similar to the Oxyrhynchite nome: 24 and 22 drachmas 




would have fallen by around half. I believe therefore that the safest conclusion we can make is that 
fodder returns in the Arsinoite nome were particularly low and that in other nomes they were still 
lower than that which may have been obtained in the credit or other markets. 
There does not appear to be any trend over time in the level of returns and the essentially random 
distribution is shown in Fig. 3.2.29. There are five outliers where the return is greater than 15% per 
annum and these are listed within appendix 3.2.5. These outliers may reflect a smoothing of rents 
between those plots under cereals and those under fodder within multi-year or split plot leases.287 
To smooth rents in this fashion would be in the landlord’s interest in the case of multi-year leases 
since it would ensure some continuity of income. In the two cases where it possible to examine the 
overall return from the lease, the overall returns to the landlord are relatively high.288 
 
 
3.2.18 Results for Returns in Years when Land under Cereals289 
Returns for land under cereals are much more dispersed than when the land is under fodder and this 
is demonstrated in the figures provided in appendix 3.2.6 and Fig. 3.2.30. It may be that this is due to 
 
287 One of these outliers, P.Lond. III 1229 (AD 145) which I have interpreted as a rent receipt, given the mention 
of the size of the plot, could also possibly be interpreted as a repayment of a loan. 
288 In P.Athen. 14 (AD 22) the overall return is 24.5%, split 15.4% when under fodder and 32.0% and 24.5% in 
the two years when sown in wheat. In P.Lond. III 1225 (AD 70-1) the overall return is 21.1%, split 17.2% when 
under fodder and 25.2% for that sown with wheat. 
289 Note that I have been rigorous in only calculating returns for those documents when I am certain that the 
land concerned is fully under barley and wheat. So, for instance, I have not calculated a return for P.Ryl II 19 
(AD 62-6) where the stated rent is 10 artabas of wheat per aroura, since I cannot be certain that this was an 



























the greater variety of yield that was obtainable from different types of land and the implicit 
assumption of a common land price per aroura within nomes.  
 
Land under wheat shows a range of returns which have a very long ‘tail’ reaching a maximum of 
53.5% in P.Mil.Vogl. III 140 (AD 176), one of the exceptionally high yield cases from mid second 
century Tebtunis noted above. Barley yields do not exhibit such a wide diversity but we have fewer 
data points. Turning to the distribution by nome, the median annual returns are shown in Fig. 3.2.31. 
Fig. 3.2.31 Median Annual Returns by Crop and Nome 
  Cereal n=119 Wheat n=92 Barley n=27 
Arsinoite n=52 22.3% 23.1% 22.3% 
Other n=30 15.9% 18.3% 10.4% 
Oxyrhynchite n=37 10.9% 11.4% 4.2% 
All n=119 14.9% 15.3% 13.8% 
 
In all nomes barley returns are generally lower than those for wheat and more generally the returns 
for the Oxyrhynchite nome are lower than those for the other nomes which is a function of the 
higher land prices in this nome. There is no strong trend over time as to the level of returns. 
 
3.2.19 Results for Sustainable Returns  
Whilst the returns calculated in the sub-sections above for fodder and cereals are of interest, they 
provide no direct information as to the level of sustainable term returns likely to be received by a 
landlord since it would not have been financially beneficial to leave land under fodder indefinitely 













































exhausting the nutrients in the soil. As noted above, the only approach that can provide us with 
reliable estimates is to use the multiple year or mixed crop leases set out in appendix 3.2.3 and the 
results are provided in appendix 3.2.7. The average annual return over the term of each lease has 




The returns are by no means as widely spread as the returns for cereals, and the Oxyrhynchite 
returns are more concentrated around the ‘5% to 10%’ bracket than other nomes which show higher 
modes and a wider distribution. The median and average returns by nome are shown in Fig. 3.2.33. 





In the absence of specific information as to the value of the land contained within the leases, the 
figures above assume all land in a nome had the same value per aroura. If we were to assume that 
land values within a nome were proportional to the rent that they achieved then the distribution 
tightens and there are fewer outliers. The overall medians reduce slightly and there is a more 
significant impact on Arsinoite nome returns than elsewhere. However, I have not presented these 
numbers as I believe that there is a risk of circular logic since we are making an assumption that land 











Fig. 3.2.32 - Mixed and Multi-year Returns by Nome
Arsinoite Other Oxyrhynchite All
  Median Average 
Arsinoite n=65 13.2% 12.4% 
Other n=11 10.4% 10.8% 
Oxyrhynchite n=29 7.4% 7.6% 




A by-product of the analysis above is that it allows an estimate to be made of the tax-take by the 
state from landowners in Roman Egypt. The marginal tax rate on investment in land, without crown 
tax, had a median value of 25%, and when crown tax became payable it was 41%.290 Turning to any 
trend in returns over time, Fig. 3.2.34 shows a decline but the R² coefficient is so low that it is not 
significant.291 A decline after crown tax became annual is to be expected in any event and if the same 
chart is drawn for gross returns before tax, the R² coefficient is even lower at 0.03 and the best-fit 
line is essentially flat. 
  
 
There is one clear outlier within these leases where the return is around 50%: P.Mil.Vogl. III 132, 
another of the high rent Tebtunis leases but one where rents are clearly out of line with other data. I 
cannot provide any reasoning as to why this lease is so out of line with the other examples, but the 
possibility of scribe or other error cannot be discounted. In any event since I present the results on 
the basis of medians rather than averages this means that the relative impact of outliers on my 
conclusions is limited. 
I have reviewed whether there is a relationship between the length of the lease and the amount of 
the return but there is no clear pattern. Finally in this sub-section, I have also reviewed the returns 
by size of plot to see if there are any economies of scale but the results are randomly distributed and 
 
290 This contrasts with a much lower tax rate for tenants. Assuming a plot of 12 arouras would support a small 
family, sown 50/50 in wheat and rest crops, with rent of 6.4 artabas of wheat per aroura sown in wheat with a 
value of 8 drachmas per artaba, and 22 drachmas per aroura sown in rest crops, a yield of twice the rent and 
poll tax of 22 drachmas and 4 obols, then the tax rate as a percentage of income after rent is around 5%. 
291 Any decline would be consistent with Scheidel’s suggestion that in the third century ‘the return diminished 
on land that was farmed by tenants’ though I am not convinced by the evidence he presents to support this 
conclusion: Scheidel 2002: 107. See also the comments on the diachronic distribution of the high yield leases 



























the return to landlords does not seem to have been influenced by the size of the plot they were 
putting out to lease. 
 
3.2.20 Direct Commercial Investment  
The preceding sub-sections have dealt with the likely returns when an asset owner leases their land 
to a tenant. But what of the alternative that the landowner farmed the land commercially using 
slaves or waged labour? The likely return from direct commercial exploitation is more difficult to 
assess since it requires additional assumptions as to the yield from the land and the costs of direct 
exploitation. However, once these two assumptions have been made the methodology adopted 
could in theory be the same as that used for leasing but with profit being defined as yield less costs, 
including wages, less taxes, rather than rent less costs less taxes. 
Dealing first with the likely yield there are two possible approaches. Firstly, the yield on cereals and 
fodder may be estimated from all available evidence in an attempt to determine a likely harvest 
return. The second is to estimate the yield applicable based on the evidence for rents by assuming 
that this constituted a proportion of the total yield. For our purposes the first approach is preferable 
since one of the questions we are seeking to address is the degree to which likely returns from direct 
farming may have differed from leasing, and to adopt the second approach would involve a circular 
argument. The best contemporary evidence for yields which is not derived from rent amounts comes 
from the Appianus estate where the average yield is some 11.5 artabas per aroura for a location, 
Theadelphia, which as Rathbone notes was a ‘marginal corner of the Fayum where irrigation could 
be problematic’ and where, as we saw above, rents were low.292 However, even if we could agree on 
a typical yield, assumptions still need to be made as to the cost of waged or slave labour.293  
Whilst we have some data on wage levels, there are numerous other assumptions to be made. What 
would be the proportion of permanent workers compared to casual labour? What is the average 
number of arouras a single man could farm? In addition to wages, what other rations or perquisites 
needed to be provided and how much would this have cost? What central services would have been 
provided if this investment was part of an estate? What was the role of a labourer’s family in 
harvesting and other farming activities? What was the cost of providing oxen for ploughing? What is 
 
292 Rathbone 1991: 243. Van Minnen’s bizarre graph of agricultural yields over time for Roman Egypt is entirely 
unsubstantiated and has thus been ignored: van Minnen 2000: 212. 
293 We would also need to agree an assumption as to whether double cropping occurred as suggested by van 
Minnen 2000: 212, but rejected by Rowlandson 1999: 144. Monson suggestion that returns on directly farmed 




the difference between work levels when the land was under fodder and that when under cereals? 
All of these cost assumptions have a material effect on the calculation which is a ‘geared’ calculation 
where an increase in an assumed cost has a great proportional impact on the net profit or loss. 
Reluctantly I am forced to conclude that, with the current state of our knowledge, it would be very 
difficult to make a solid calculation for the likely return from commercial direct farming compared to 
that from leasing of land.294 The financial position of a smallholder owning just enough land to 
support their family and where the land is farmed by the family unit would be easier to model, but 
this lies outside the scope of this thesis.295 
 
3.2.21 Conclusions – the Nature of the Market  
By a ‘market’ in land I mean how landlords and tenants made contact and interacted with each other 
and the extent to which the terms of the lease varied, which would be an indicator of negotiation. 
The first important point is that leases show very little signs of conventional pricing in the level of 
rents. Rents differ even within single leases for different plots of land sown with the same crop, 
indicating that rents were set according to the condition and the likely yield of the land 
concerned.296 However, unlike land sales and, to some degree, the credit transactions which will be 
dealt with in later sections, land leases were often recurring, and were renewed between the same 
parties, which may have reduced the competitive nature of any negotiation. Land leases could also 
be inherited by tenants and passed down in the same family, providing stability to both parties. 
There was more geographical dispersal between principals than in the other financial transactions 
we have examined, and more inter-village activity where on occasion the tenant was obliged to farm 
land in a location away from his home village. There was more intermediation on the part of agents 
and managers, reflecting the concentration of private land ownership in the urban population. There 
was thus likely to be a power imbalance, whether power is defined in social or wealth terms, 
between the principals. This imbalance in power may have impacted the degree to which there was 
competition in the pricing of rents, since where a power imbalance exists it may, at an extreme, 
allow powerful landlords to set rents without reference to external market forces. However, the 
power imbalance in Roman Egypt is unlikely to have been as extreme as in societies where tenants 
 
294 Carrié 1997: 133 makes a calculation of the costs of labour, but he bases his calculation on one source from 
the Heroninos archives and includes only permanent worker costs.  
295 See Kelly forthcoming b for a consideration of the risks and returns faced by different types of farming 
families. 





were bound to a single landlord and dependent on him or her for not only the land they farmed, but 
also the buildings that they lived in. In Roman Egypt, tenants generally rented small parcels of land, 
possibly from different landlords and they might also be in possession of plots they owned 
personally.  They usually lived in villages in houses which were not connected to the land leased.   
Apart from the geographic dispersal of landlords and tenants, another significant point concerning 
the principals is the absence of women as tenants, though they did form a significant percentage of 
the landlords. This inability by women to farm land directly should, logically, have increased the 
liquidity and volume of the land leasing market.  The very high prevalence of minors as landlords has 
also been noted. Apart from any natural limitations on young landowners exploiting land directly, 
this may reflect that returns from direct exploitation of land could have been higher than leasing 
land, and thus as landowners matured and became able to farm their own land, direct exploitation 
was preferable to delegating responsibility to a tenant.  
Market cash rent rates seem to have increased in a similar fashion to general inflation. Rents in kind 
differed, particularly within the Arsinoite nome, based probably on the quality of the land, irrigation 
and crop rotation patterns which seem to have been more varied in that nome than in the 
Oxyrhynchite nome for instance. The clearest diachronic change is the increase in the length of 
leases into the second century followed by a sharp decline in the third century to shorter term leases 
which might reflect economic and social uncertainty. Perhaps neither landlord nor tenant wished to 
be tied to a long term agreement in difficult times. The variety of payment forms for fodder rents in 
the latter part of the period is a rare indicator of a demonetisation of the economy in the early 
fourth century. Furthermore, the variety of the arrangements used to pay rents for land under 
fodder could be taken to reflect the exercise of financial rationality on the part of landlords and an 
understanding of the risks of accepting future cash payments in inflationary periods. This innovation 
appears to pre-date equivalent developments in the credit markets which Blouin suggests ‘reflected 
the attempts of individuals to cope with the evolving economic contexts of their times through 
innovative strategies’.297  
The fourth century also sees a slump in the number of land sales, though leases continue to be 
common. I would suggest that this reflects a real reduction in the number of sales since even if 
papyrological habits or practices changed it is difficult to see why such an important transaction as a 
land sale would not have been recorded when land leases continued to be recorded in line with 
previous practice. Neither can it be explained by a change in registration practice since I have only 
included sale contracts in the comparative data, not requests for registration or other similar 
 




documents. This sharp decline in land sales could reflect a strong preference to retain land at all 
costs in a time of great uncertainty.  
In this context, Bagnall’s view of the development of the prevalence of leasing into the fourth 
century is worth considering and quoting in full.   
‘I cannot offer firm figures from an earlier time, but it is my impression that in the second-century 
Fayum the percentage of land leased out was larger. The reduction in leasing is to my mind a 
symptom of decline, for it makes the opportunities available to an entrepreneurial peasant minimal, 
and it prevents significant economic mobility on the part of such entrepreneurs. We have evidence 
of the activities of rather prosperous farmers who were principally lessees in the first and second 
centuries, but those who do not already own land are squeezed out in the much tighter land picture 
of the fourth century’.298  
Leaving aside for the moment any bias in the equation of a reduction in entrepreneurial 
opportunities with a ‘decline’, my interpretation of the larger data set, to which Bagnall did not have 
access, is that there was no decline in leasing but that the sales market did indeed ‘tighten’. Overall, 
the leases, from all the centuries considered, contain a balance of terms protecting both landlord 
and tenant and the exercise of some form of judgement in agreeing these terms is evident by their 
variability. The question of whether this judgement was financially rational will be returned to in 
section 7.4. 
 
3.2.22 Conclusions - Rates of Return 
It should be stressed that the returns that have been calculated are my best estimate of the likely 
returns, ‘after the event’, not necessarily the return expected by the landlord at the time of signing 
the lease. It will be noted however, that the returns calculated are very much above the average 
inflation for the period concerned implying that investment in land was a profitable exercise with a 
likely growth in real wealth.  
A number of scholars have also attempted to calculate returns on investment in land though as Kay 
shows there is considerable scope for misunderstanding as to the need to allow for the cost of 
capital and depreciation.299 My approach has been quite simple with regard to depreciation within 
an arable, non-intensive, farming environment, which is to assume that, with suitable crop rotation 
 
298 Bagnall 1985a: 307. 




and the requirement in many leases for the land to be returned in a good state, there would not 
have been any significant depreciation costs for the landlord. Similarly, I have not deducted any cost 
of capital since I am trying to address the return on capital already in the hands of the investor. I will 
compare, however, the likely returns on land to those from the credit market in chapter 6. 
We can compare the median return on Egyptian arable land calculated above of 9.5%, after taxes, 
with the previous attempts by scholars to calculate this return.300 Unfortunately none of Kehoe, 
Rathbone and Rowlandson, who have provided the most comprehensive and thoughtful 
monographs on the agricultural economy of Roman Egypt, ventured to suggest a range of rates of 
return.301 Carrié, however, addressed the question of returns from land leasing in Roman Egypt 
explicitly and arrived at a conclusion that in the first and second centuries the effective return on 
leased land varied between 11.7% and 15.8% and for the third century between 7.0% and 15.8%.302  
He accepted that for the years when the land is under fodder the return will be less than when 
under cereals and made a rough adjustment for this effect. Carrié was working from best estimate 
ranges for the values of land and rent rates only in wheat. His results are necessarily vague and I 
would contend that my approach which works from the primary sources, which takes full account of 
when land was sown in barley, fodder and wheat, and which allows averages, medians and 
distributions to be calculated, is preferable. 
The fact that landowners accepted very low returns when land was under fodder, even in one year 
leases when no direct compensation was available from higher returns in years when the land was 
sown in cereals within the same lease, shows financial rationality in their willingness to forego 
immediate returns on their capital in exchange for deferred gratification.  
A substantial difference in returns between the Arsinoite and Oxyrhynchite nome has been noted. If 
the Egyptian market was fully integrated in a geographic sense, and landowners acted in a financially 
rational way, then differences in returns between nomes should be minimal, as capital was 
employed across the country, and rents and land prices produced similar levels of return through 
forces of market supply and demand. Certainly, most financial activity was within a nome rather 
than being inter-nome, with the exception of some landlords from Alexandria active in the Arsinoite 
nome, which would suggest that the market was not geographically integrated. However, it should 
be remembered that differences in returns may reflect differences in the risks and variability in 
return from different types of land in different locations rather than any lack of market integration.  
 
300 For comparisons with returns on land from different parts of the empire see section 6.3. 
301 Kehoe 1992, Rathbone 1991 and Rowlandson 1996. 




Great care has been taken to ensure that the above results reflect my best view of the terms and 
general conditions applying to each lease but there are two significant factors which would impact 
the likely veracity of my best estimate returns. Firstly, the returns, particularly for arable land, are 
dependent on the accuracy of my assumption as to its value. There is great variability in the 
underlying data and this is not reflected in any way in my best estimate, nor is the likelihood that 
higher prices applied for the more fertile land. Secondly, the underlying assumption is that the 
landlord always received his rent in full. We know this was not the case as the Nile flood did fail from 
time to time and if there was a bad harvest the landlord risked losing his rent. A number of 
Oxyrhynchite leases also contained explicit provision for rent relief if the land was left dry and this 
has not been taken into account in the analysis above. These criticisms of my best estimate returns 
will be addressed however, in chapter 6 when the use of a stochastic methodology helps us address 
not only return but also risks. When both risks and returns are combined we can also consider the 






Chapter 4 Housing 
Section 4.1 The Housing Market 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This section has the same underlying purpose as section 3.1 on land sales in that it seeks to 
determine if patterns within the data can provide insights into how the property market functioned 
in Roman Egypt. As with sales of agricultural land, it was necessary to collect information directly 
from the primary sources using the systematic methodology described previously, since there is no 
up-to-date compilation of all the relevant documents.303 The transactions collected are of any type 
that involved the transfer of a house or associated property from one party or parties to another in 
return for a cash consideration, whether such transactions are technically considered as divisions of 
property, sales or cessions. Transactions which were of a mixed nature, where houses were sold 
along with another asset, are included. For convenience, vacant lots suitable for building are also 
dealt with in this section. Mortgage loans with houses acting as security are not considered in this 
section but are dealt with in the section on loans. Gifts and dowries are also not considered and 
neither are sales of property of a specialist or commercial nature such as mills or fixed presses.  
In total there are some 368 transactions attested within the 315 documents. Amongst these 
documents there are 11 which relate to houses which are being sold by the state having previously 
been confiscated.304 Another small sub-group of the data deals with sales of priests’ houses, 
particularly the bi-lingual Demotic/Greek texts from Soknopaiou Nesos published with admirable 
clarity in P.Dime III. The vast majority of documents are, however, simply sales between private 
individuals of general housing stock. This section has the following structure. Firstly, the 
geographical distribution of the data and other features of houses in Roman Egypt are analysed in 
order that the nature and limitations of the data are understood.  An analysis of the timing of the 
transactions within the year is undertaken and then the gender, ages and other characteristics of the 
participants in the transactions are reviewed to see if any patterns are apparent. Thereafter the data 
are examined to identify price developments over time and other elements. Finally, conclusions as 
to buyer and vendor motivations and other elements of the mechanics of the market are set out. 
 
303 See section 1.2. 
304 Cases involving the state occur in P.Amh. II 97 (AD 181), P.Oxy. III 513 (AD 182), P.Petaus 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 




4.1.2 Locations and Types of Houses 
The data by location of the transaction/documents by century are shown in Fig. 4.1.1. 
 
It can be seen that the number of Arsinoite transactions/documents decreases considerably over 
time, forming the vast majority in the first and second century but a small minority thereafter.305 
This partly reflects the decline of certain Arsinoite villages as was discussed in the previous sections. 
As with land sales, the above distributions cannot be used to indicate market volume trends without 
an adjustment.  House sale documents, as a proportion of all documentary papyri, follow a similar 
pattern to land sales and form a higher percentage in the first century than in later years: 4.8% in the 
first century, falling to 1.3% in the second, 1.3% in the third and 0.7% in the first half of the fourth. It 
would thus appear that market activity declined over time, but as with land sales there may be other 
reasons for this apparent trend. 
A significant proportion of the documents were found in city sites and the majority of these come 
from either Arsinoe or Oxyrhynchus.  However, documents may deal with houses in different 
locations to their find site and the distribution of house locations between villages and cities is given 




305 When looking at trends over time, it is probably better to examine the number of documents than 
transactions as this reduces, though does not entirely eliminate, the distortion caused by the concentration of 
sales in particular archives. 
306 Note that there are 111 transactions where the location of the property is not precisely known and which 












Fig. 4.1.1a Number of House 
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Fig. 4.1.2 Distribution of House Sales by City and Village 
Nome City Village 
Arsinoite 21 127 
Oxyrhynchite 41 12 
Other 26 7 
 
The nature of the properties varied in the number of storeys and the size of their footprint, but most 
houses were of mud-brick construction with timber used for framing and roof beams.307 Husson 
notes that there are only three cases where houses are stated to have been built in stone in the 
papyri from the Roman era.308 All of these were in Oxyrhynchus and are likely to have been 
considerably more expensive to build than the typical house and this is reflected in the higher price 
of the stone-built house in P.Oxy. XIV 1634 from AD 222, which at 21,600 drachmas is more than 10 
times the typical price of houses at that date. In general, only limited details are provided as to the 
nature of the housing being sold, including the location, a brief description and the proportion of the 
total property included in the transaction. Houses were occupied by relatively large numbers of 
people and often by more than one family grouping.309 The frequency of sales where only a fraction 
of the whole building was sold reflects this fractional ownership which was caused to a considerable 
degree by the partible inheritance system where multiple heirs would inherit a property. An example 
of this effect is given in P.Mich. V 276 from AD 47 when ‘Didymos and Herodes and Herakleides and 
Maron and Herakleides, also called Louris, all five sons of Herakleides, acknowledge that we have 
sold to Tamaron, daughter of Herakleides, from the present day, forever, the seventh share of the 
half of a house and yard and all the appurtenances, held in common and undivided by us and by 
Didymos, the brother of our dead father Herakleides’.310  
Fractional ownership and occupation of houses has implications for the ability to generate income 
from multiple tenants within one property and this will be returned to in section 4.2. However, when 
looking at sales and purchases the data show that the smallest fraction of a house sold is 1/42nd in 
P.Lond. II 334 (AD 166) but houses were also often sold in their entirety and the distribution is as 
shown in Fig. 4.1.3: 
 
307 Bagnall 1993c: 49, Alston 2002: 59. 
308 Husson 1983: 310 citing P.Oxy. III 489 l.7 and l.15 (AD 116-7) and P.Oxy. XIV 1634 (AD 222). 
309 Alston calculated an average number of occupants per house at 7.61 to 7.78 and an average number of 
people per family group or household at 5.40 to 5.52 based on 11 texts mostly from the Arsinoite nome 
ranging in date from the 1st to the 3rd century: Alston 2002: 70. 





Fig. 4.1.3 Distribution of House Sizes Sold 
Size of house sold Fraction of a house One house More than one house 
Number of transactions 159 116 8 
 
House prices will be examined later in this section but there is one feature of the price structure 
which is indicative of an important feature of the housing market. If all the prices, excluding outliers 
and fiduciary sales, are re-calibrated to ‘real’ values as at AD 150 then the distribution of prices is 
shown in Fig. 4.1.4:311 
 
I would interpret this pattern of price distribution as indicating that there are two distinct groups of 
house prices and thus houses: those under 800 drachmas and those more expensive houses which 
cost more than 1,000 drachmas. This dual distribution means that any attempt to analyse price 
trends will be very difficult without very large data sets which do not exist. As to the reason for this 
split distribution it could relate to the typology of houses and it is tempting to relate this to the 
structure of the house, for instance the number of storeys, but I can identify no such relationship 
within the descriptions of the transactions.  
When the data for city and village house prices, re-based to an equivalent “real” value as at AD 150 
allowing for general price inflation, are examined the patterns are shown in Fig. 4.1.5: 
 






Both the city and village data sets show a gap in prices in the 800 to 1,000 drachmas bracket with 
the bulk of houses selling for below 800 drachmas. There are “expensive” houses in both city and 
village contexts but the key difference is that the distribution of house prices in cities peaks around 
700 drachmas whilst house prices in villages are more typically around 300 drachmas. This pattern is 
reflected in the median prices of city and village prices which are around 680 and 400 drachmas 
respectively.312 Thus, as might be expected, prices for city houses were higher than those in villages, 
but in both contexts relatively expensive houses could be found.313 
 
4.1.3 Month of Transaction 
In 142 cases the month in which the transaction occurred has survived. The distribution by month is 
represented in Fig. 4.1.6. 
 
312 The overall median house price at AD 150 price levels is 600 drachmas. 



















Unit house price (dr.)
Fig. 4.1.5 House Prices from AD 1 to 270 






The transactions are fairly randomly spread across the year, but there are peaks in Pharmouthi and 
Mesore which, with 95% confidence, cannot be dismissed as random variations, though the reasons 
for these peaks are not clear to me. 
 
4.1.4 Transaction Participants – Gender, Ages and Locations 
In many cases the gender of the participants is in the document and the split between males and 
females is given in Fig. 4.1.7. 
Fig. 4.1.7 Number and Proportion of Parties 
  Buyer Vendor Total 
Males 185 203 388 
Females 108 135 243 
Total 293 338 631 
 
Males are generally more involved in buying and selling than females, forming 61% of all market 
principals. Hobson speculated that women appear more often as vendors rather than buyers for 
economic reasons: ‘this disparity indicates that women operate more conservatively on the property 
market than men; they may sell property they have inherited, but they are less likely than men to 
invest in new properties’.314 However, my larger data set shows no trend in this regard in that males 
and females form similar proportions of buyers and vendors. Although there are more female 
vendors than buyers, 135 to 108, this simply reflects that there are generally more vendors than 
 











buyers, 338 to 293, which in turn as noted above, reflects the partible inheritance system and shows 
that transactions tended to consolidate holdings. 
There is some evidence for a preference among both genders for transactions with their own 
gender.  The total percentage of female participants is 39% and if women were as likely to contract 
with men as counterparties as with other women, then it would be expected that 39% of their 
counterparties would be other women. However, some 45% of the counterparties where we can 
identify their gender were other women which means that women were more likely to contract with 
other women.315  A similar pattern appears for males with 66% of their counterparties being male 
compared to an ‘expected’ proportion of 61% and this also means that we can be confident that a 
preference for men to contract with other men existed. The size of this preference is, however, 
relatively small for both sexes though more marked for women than men.  
In 155 cases the age of the principal participants is given, presumably as an aid to future 
identification in the event of dispute and the data are shown in Fig. 4.1.8, but the medians show no 
significant differences between by type of principal or gender. The overall distribution of buyers and 
vendors by age is shown in Fig. 4.1.9. 
Fig. 4.1.8 Median Ages316 
Category 
(Number of Cases) 
Buyers (73) Vendors (82) Males (90) Females (63) 




315 If we examine the actions of adult women acting in a sole legal capacity only, a similar pattern emerges but 
it is not statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. 























In addition to noting the relatively low levels of activity of those aged under 30, it seems that 
individuals were particularly active in the housing market both as buyers and vendors at the 
relatively advanced ages of the mid-forties and early fifties. At these ages it is unlikely, as the data in 
appendix C show, that these market participants would have recently benefitted from parental 
inheritance and this is thus unlikely to be an explanation for this type of market activity. A possible 
explanation for these relatively aged market participants may have been that transactions resulted 
from the re-organisation of domestic space as children matured, married and had children of their 
own, but there is no concrete evidence to confirm this conjecture. 
Transactions were normally done face to face between the principals, assisted in some cases by 
signatories and guardians. Only rarely were agents, managers or representatives used to substitute 
for the principal buyer or vendor. I have identified only 14 agents, excluding guardians, within the 
sales. The face to face nature of the transaction means that counterparties were subject to 
geographical constraints and there is a very high proportion of counterparties who live in the same 
location, greater than that for sales of land.317  A depiction of the social networks involved in the 85 
transactions, where the location of both parties is known, is shown in Fig. 4.1.10 and summarised in 
Fig. 4.1.11 and Fig. 4.1.12. 
  
 




Fig. 4.1.10 Locations 














Alexandria   3     1           4 
Oxyrhynchus   22         2     1 25 
Arsinoe     7     1   2     10 
Hermopolis       9             9 
Other poleis         12           12 
Serving 
Military   1                 1 
Oxyrhynchite 
village   1     1           2 
Arsinoite 
village     1         15     16 
Hermopolite 
village       1             1 
Other village   1               4 5 





The distribution can be further summarised in Fig. 4.1.11 and Fig. 4.1.12. 
Fig. 4.1.11 Summary 
   
Landlord All cities Serving Military All villages 
Tenant 
All cities 54 1 5 
Serving Military 1 0 0 




There are some 32 house sale transactions where the buyer and vendor come from the same family, 




The data where the date of a transaction can be estimated to within a 50 year period and where a 
price for a whole house or a known portion is available are set out in appendix 4.1.1.319 All the data 
available for house sales are listed in appendix D.3. It has already been noted in this section that 
there appear to be two separate types of houses which have different price patterns, but the trend 
of prices over time for Roman Egypt as a whole are shown in Fig. 4.1.13. Prices for fraction of houses 
are converted into the equivalent for a whole house, there being no evidence to suggest that 
 
318 Transactions between family members are listed in appendix 4.1.3.  

























fractions were less valued than a whole house. There are two cases which are clearly outliers where 
the price paid is in excess of 20,000 drachmas. One of these, a sale of a house in Oxyrhynchus, P.Oxy. 
XIV 1634 (AD 222), is clearly exceptional since it is the only house with a known price that is explicitly 
stated to be stone built. The other case, P.Gen.2 44 (AD 260) from the Arsinoite nome, is also 
unusual in being the purchase of a 1/32nd share of two houses, one with two towers and a court, for 
in excess of 1,500 drachmas, which equates to a price per house of 24,800 drachmas. It would 
appear appropriate to exclude these atypical documents from the comparison but their presence 
should be noted as potentially meaning that in addition to the two price bands we identified earlier 
in this section there may be a third constituted by the houses of the rich at considerably higher 
prices, but for which we only have two examples.320  
A set of transactions which could influence the data relates to “fiduciary” sales. These are sales 
where a sale document is concluded along with a loan and where the price of the house is the same 
as the amount of the loan. Such sales are generally regarded as a method for providing security to 
the lender rather than a genuine sale at market value.321 Whilst the amount of the loan in these 
documents may well have a relationship to the true market price, since otherwise it would not have 
provided adequate security, it is theoretically preferable to ignore fiduciary sales in an analysis of 
market price trends since there is no direct link to the actual value of the house.322   
 
 
320 See Fig. 4.1.4. 
321 Lerouxel 2015: 169. 
322 The fiduciary or similar sales included in appendix 4.1.1 are P.Mich. V 328 (AD 29-30), P.Ryl. II 160c (AD 32), 
P.Mich. V 329 (AD 40-41), P.Ryl. II 160d (AD 42), PSI VIII 908 (AD 42-43), SB XII 10804 (AD 47), P.Mich. V 332 


























Fig. 4.1.13  All Egypt





The low R² coefficient reflects the great variety of prices at the same approximate date.  When the 
data were divided into separate groups for villages or cities they do not show any stronger trend of 
prices over time. A slightly clearer trend is, however, seen when the data for the Arsinoite nome are 
reviewed in isolation as Fig. 4.1.14 shows where the R² coefficient is somewhat higher than the chart 
for all Egyptian data. 
 
It will be noted that the Arsinoite prices show the now familiar picture of prices picking up around 
AD 150 and increasing through to AD 270. A further observation is that there is no indication of any 
substantial price changes in the first half of the first century. This is significant since in the data for 
other assets or commodities there are few data points for this period. A numerical comparison of 
the average price increases for different commodities and assets is shown in Fig. 4.1.15. 
Fig. 4.1.15 Average Price Increases per annum AD 50 to 270 
 Increase R²  Number of cases 
All Egypt Houses 0.7% 0.11 73 
Arsinoite Houses  1.4% 0.34 46 
All Egypt Private Arable Land  0.5% 0.16 66 
Wheat private prices 0.3% 0.42 40 



























Fig 4.1.14 Arsinoite Nome 




Given the poor R² coefficients and the heterogeneity of the data I believe that the only valid 
conclusion is that house price inflation was very broadly of the same order of magnitude as other 
goods and assets.323 
As regards sales after AD 274, prices do increase substantially with an average inflation rate which is 
in the order of 10% as shown in the logarithmic chart in Fig, 4.1.14, but the data which are set out in 
appendix 4.1.1 are too sparse to gain more than a general impression of house price increases: 
 
Whilst the natural heterogeneity of the data explains much of the variability of house prices I 
suspect that the reason for the difficulty in identifying coherent price trends could lie with the 
possibility discussed above that we are dealing with different types of houses which do not correlate 
with the location of the house concerned, whether it is defined by the nome in which it is situated or 
whether it is in a village or city.  
Finally with regard to prices it will be noted that, to an even greater degree than for land sales, 
prices are rounded to the nearest 100 drachmas. Some 70% of all sale prices between 100 and 1,000 
drachmas are rounded to 100 drachmas and 94% are rounded to a multiple of 10 or 100 drachmas. 
The relative absence of differentiated pricing may well indicate a lack of competition within the 
housing market. As a comparison to a competitive but by no means perfect market, recent 
equivalent figures for the housing market in England and Wales show that only 5% of all sale prices 
 
323 Alston 2002: 63-5 analysed prices by century and location and suggested that ‘more comparatively 
expensive houses were being sold in the second and third centuries, which in turn suggests significant 
investment in housing and the development of a more conspicuous and luxurious house-type’. Whilst the data 






























between 100k and 1,000k were rounded to 100k and 35% were rounded to a multiple of 10k or 
100k.324 
 
4.1.6 Vacant Lots  
We have 88 cases of the private purchase or valuation of a vacant lot (psilios topos). The documents 
are listed in appendix 4.1.2. The interpretation of the data is constrained by the fact that the 
measure of area most often cited in the documents for vacant lots, the bikos, does not have any 
generally agreed value. The data for vacant lots do not therefore provide much useable information 
as to values. However, as we would expect, a comparison of the median price of vacant lots with the 
median price of houses, without outliers and fiduciary sales, all figures re-calibrated to ‘real’ values 
at AD 150, shows that typically vacant lots were considerably cheaper than houses, with a median 
value of 202 drachmas for the 18 vacant lot prices we have, compared to 600 drachmas for the 
house data described above.325  This implies that despite the relatively simple construction 
techniques described above, the bulk of the value of the house was viewed to be in the physical 
building rather than the land upon which it was built, assuming that vacant lots were typically of a 
sufficient size to build at least one house. 
As regards the participants in vacant lot sales this is a much more male dominated domain than the 
markets for either houses or agricultural land. 75% of all participants are male, compared to 61% for 
houses and 62% for land, perhaps reflecting social constraints on women mobilising the tradesmen 
and other resources necessary to exploit a vacant lot.  
Fig. 4.1.17 Number of male and female principals 
  Buyer Vendor 
Males 59 (77%) 68 (73%) 
Females 18 (23%) 25 (27%) 
 
Women appear more frequently as vendors rather than buyers, but this is not a statistically 
significant conclusion. Similarly, there are only 36 ages of buyers or vendors available and no 
statistically significant conclusions can be drawn from such a small sample. Whilst the purpose for 
which a vacant lot was purchased cannot be determined from the information available, it seems 
 
324 Downloaded 6 September 2017 from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-
data-downloads#current-month-july-2017-data - Data produced by HM Land Registry © Crown copyright 
2017. The total number of Roman sales prices is 82. 




reasonable to suppose that these purchases could be considered as investments since capital or 
labour would need to be expended to make such a vacant lot useful, either by the construction of 
buildings or by its use in some agricultural or commercial fashion, such as a place to park your 
donkey. Finally, there is one point to be made in relation to these lots. These plots are described 
simply as empty lots and they will have been in a village or city. An empty lot could be used either 
for building or potentially for economic activities including gardening. However, the fact that we 
have no examples of the rental of a vacant lot would suggest that these are primarily building lots, 
rather than unused land which were used for urban gardening or other economic activity, since if 
the latter were the case some rental agreements would be expected to exist. 
 
4.1.7 Motivations and the Market 
Understanding the motivations for buyers and sellers within any market is key to understanding the 
institution of the market itself and the extent to which it was driven by financially rational actions by 
market participants. The key question is the extent to which houses were viewed as an investment 
which could provide financial gain through rental or rather were considered as a necessary, 
depreciating, asset for family occupation. The details of the transactions rarely provide explicit 
information on the intentions of participants and my analysis can only provide hints as to what drove 
individuals to engage in sales and purchases.  
The frequent division, re-use and re-organisation of housing units meant there was a flexible housing 
structure which would, in theory, have been suitable for letting and sub-letting and thus capable of 
providing investment income. However, the fact that it was relatively rare for transactions to involve 
principals in different locations would indicate that the housing market was highly localised. One 
indicator of an investment driven transaction would be if the transaction involved a number of 
houses in different locations although such cases would naturally be rare. It would be unlikely that 
the individual would have had a personal need for such a diverse portfolio and thus it might be 
expected that the purchaser was seeking to buy the houses as an investment. There are indeed a 
number of transactions where houses were sold as a portfolio in different locations which might 
indicate that the parties had or would in the future seek to create an income from renting.326 
 
326 These are P.Ryl. II 160d (AD 42), P.Fay. 31 (AD 125-30), P.Bagnall 31 (AD 138), P.Stras. VI 585 (AD 153), 
P.Petaus 13,14 and 16 (AD 182-7) confiscated houses, SB XXVI 16478 (1st half 3rd century), P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 




Housing might also provide the opportunity for a quick profit to be made by re-sale if the price and 
timing were right.327 
The cases noted above show that some market participants did view housing as an investment. 
However, in many cases the driver for the transaction will have been familial in nature and on 
balance these familial concerns show up more clearly within the corpus of house sales than for 
agricultural land sales. The ages of the market participants are not consistent with inheritance being 
a key trigger for immediate sale and purchase, but may indicate that family circumstances were 
driving some transactions as older participants bought and sold property to reflect their changing 
needs. The relatively large number of intra-family transactions would also indicate that practical 
personal housing considerations may have been stronger drivers than commercial ones. Other 
familial concerns can be seen in documents such as P.Oxy. XIV 1648 (late 2nd century) when a mother 
bought a house for her daughter, or CPR I 131 (first half of 3rd century) where the driver for one 
individual was his own geographical move to another city. 
Finally turning to how the market functioned, it was tightly geographically constrained and there is 
no evidence for auctions or other channels within the private market which might have facilitated 
competition. Most transactions were made with the principals meeting each other on a face to face 
basis and agents were rarely used.  Sales were made within gendered social networks and whilst 
there may have been some limited competition within these personal networks it is unlikely that this 
would have been an efficient mechanism to establish competitive pricing, given the heavily rounded 
prices.328 Overall, I would suggest that most of the participants may well have been driven by 
practical familial concerns rather than viewing the transaction as an investment and this question 
will be dealt with in the next section when the relative frequency of ownership and rental of houses 






327 See P.Lond. III 1164f (AD 212) and associated documents for an example. 
328 See Youtie 1967: 390 for discussion of PSI XII 1259 (AD 101-225) which is a letter altering an individual to 
the likelihood that another party was planning to make a pre-emptive offer to purchase a house. The letter 
shows two features of an imperfect market: the inefficiency of information exchange and the constraints 




Section 4.2 Housing Leases 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to consider whether housing stock was seen as an investment. We 
have fewer texts for house leases than for other transactions - only 97 documents which contain 157 
transactions. The Tebtunis grapheion archive alone accounts for 55 of these transactions.329  Their 
relative rarity is, perhaps, striking. 
The leasing of housing stock discussed excludes the rental of property solely for commercial use, or 
of multiple single rooms housing workers in an estate.330 The relevant documents are listed in 
appendix 4.2.1. This section also deals with the 40 antichretic loans, contained in 30 documents, 
where in lieu of interest the lender had the right to inhabit all or part of a house. Once again the 
Tebtunis grapheion archive provides 15 transactions, a disproportionate number of the total. All the 
transactions concerned are set out in appendix 4.2.2.331  
This section has the following structure. Following an analysis of the dates and provenance of the 
documents and a discussion of the location and types of houses concerned, the available 
information for the people who participated in the lease agreements is analysed including the 
gender and age of landlords and tenants. The duration and seasonality of the agreements are 
examined. Then the available information on landlord income and house prices is reviewed to see if 






329 I have included those entries in the register which state that this is an agreement to furnish lodging for a 
sum and which do not have an attaching loan agreement. However, see note to appendix 4.2.1 for the 
uncertainties in the interpretation of the truncated entries. For some reason Hobson ignored these entries and 
stated that there are only two possible housing rental agreements and further stated that these are incorrectly 
restored: Hobson 1985: 225.  
330 These cases are relatively few, but for an example of a lease of real-estate that can be considered as solely 
commercial see P.Aberd. 181 (AD 41-56) relating to a lease of an oil factory and for estate workers see SB VIII 
9898 (AD 240). 
331 Note that antichretic loans where the lender has the right to use or exploit a different form of asset, such as 




4.2.2 Dates and Provenance of the Documents 
The number and provenance of the transactions, including both antichretic housing loans and rental 
agreements, is shown in Fig. 4.2.1.   
 
The low number of transactions and the distortion caused by the preponderance of data from the 
first-century Tebtunis grapheion archive make it difficult to come to any conclusions as to overall 
trends over time. However, the data for antichretic housing loans and rental agreements can be 
disaggregated, excluding the Tebtunis grapheion archive transactions where the nature of the 
transaction is not clear, and a clear trend is shown in Fig. 4.2.2.332 










Loans 33 6 1 0 
Rents 5 39 39 19 
 
The number of antichretic loans declines sharply after the first century and they disappear in the 
later part of the period considered to be replaced by simple rental agreements. As to why this 
happens, I would argue that loans were inefficient instruments in that the cost of recording them 
was disproportionate to the size of the transaction. The implicit annual interest on the loans, 
assuming the ‘standard’ rate of 12% per annum, which represents the financial gain to the borrower 
 








1st C (n=93) 2nd C (n=45) 3rd C (n=40) 300-350 (n=19)
Fig. 4.2.1 - Number of Antichretic Housing and Rental 
Transactions by Nome and Date




or landlord, had a median value of 13 drachmas. The cost for the scribe for completing these 
agreements, as evidenced by the Tebtunis grapheion fees, was high and ranged from two to eight 
drachmas.333 In addition, as seen in SB XXII 15850 (AD 126), antichretic loans also attracted taxes 
when first established and renewed. With these high frictional costs for loan documentation it may 
well have been more effective to record these arrangements informally, perhaps verbally, or to use a 
simple rental agreement which was less expensive to record and did not attract taxes.   
 
4.2.3 Location and Types of Houses  
The location of the house rental agreements is shown in Fig. 4.2.3 and is similar, but not identical, to 
the distribution seen for house sales, with a predominance of Arsinoite village and Oxyrhynchus 
transactions.334  




Generally we have no useful information on the types of houses being let other than their location, 
but where we have information on the fraction of the house from rental agreements, 32 out of 44 
rental agreements are for whole houses and renting of fractions of houses is thus apparently rare. 
The comparable figures for house sales shown in Fig. 4.1.3 have more fractions of houses being sold 
than whole houses. I suspect that this pattern partly reflects the fact it was not economic, given the 
frictional costs, and not legally or practically necessary for either party, to record lodging agreements 
where a fraction of a house would be let out. However, it could also reflect the difficulties of defining 
and commoditising ill-defined spaces expressed as fractions of a house, generally acquired through 
the system of partible inheritance. If you were the inheritor of a fraction of a house, such as the five 
brothers who each inherited a fifth share of a seventh share of half a house and courtyard in Arsinoe 
in the first half of the first century, you could possibly find a modus vivendi to share living space with 
other family members. However, to seek to rent out or sell such a small and ill-defined portion to a 
 
333 See P.Mich. II 123. 
334 See Fig. 4.1.2 for the comparable numbers for house sales. 
335 The total number of agreements that can be split between city and village properties (175) is less than the 
overall total of leases and loans (157+40=197), given that some agreements cannot be identified as relating to 
city or village property. 
Nome City Village 
Arsinoite 7 104 
Oxyrhynchite 50 0 




third party would be highly problematic.336 It would also have been unattractive for a third party to 
have rented an ill-defined living space. What would one seventh of one half of a house and 
courtyard mean in practice? Which rooms and what activities could be undertaken there? What 
would the neighbours be like? Better therefore for heirs to consolidate and sell their small portions 
to neighbours or family than seek to rent them out and this alone would explain the higher 
proportions of fractional house sales than leases. 
Bagnall and Frier noted that according to the census returns, just under one sixth of families reside 
in houses they do not own, and that renting was far more common in cities than in villages.337  
Unfortunately I cannot use the data I have collected to confirm or question these conclusions in any 
valid statistical fashion given the small number of cases concerned, but the rarity of house rental 
agreements in cities is surprising if we believe, as the census documents appear to show, that 
around 30% of city families were renting. We also know from the census declarations that it was 
common to take in lodgers, who might share an undefined space within the house, but this rental 
activity is not evident in our documents.338 
 
4.2.4 Landlords and Tenants – Locations, Ages and Gender 
There are also too few data to make statistically valid comments on the typical locations and ages of 
landlords and tenants. However, looking at gender, as shown in Fig. 4.2.4, most landlords and 
tenants were men. The low percentages of female activity in leasing or purchasing houses compared 
to the higher percentages when leasing or purchasing land would strengthen an argument against 
any particular trend to female stewardship and activity in managing the domestic space.339 When 
houses were leased this was mostly a male activity.  
Fig. 4.2.4 Distribution of Antichretic Housing Loan and Rental Agreements by Gender 
  Landlord n=183 Tenant n=172 
Male n=273 70% 84% 
Female n=82 30% 16% 
 
There are also few transactions involving intermediaries or between family members.   
 
336 In P.Mich. V 276 (AD 47) the solution that the five brothers came upon was to combine their portions into a 
share of one seventh of half a house, which they sold to their sister.  
337 Bagnall & Frier 2006: 69, see also Hobson 1985: 224-5 on infrequency of house leases in villages. 
338 Bagnall & Frier 2006: 65-6, 70. 





4.2.5 Rental Terms and Returns 
Turning to the duration of rental agreements, the median length of house leases, at three years, is 
somewhat longer than land leases. With only 40 transactions where we have the length of the 
contract, we cannot make any statements as to the trend over time. Similarly there are insufficient 
data to make any strong statements as to the seasonality of entering into rental agreements, but the 
two months when the largest number of contracts were contracted, Mesore and Thoth, lie on either 
side of the end of the calendar year end.340   
As might be expected there is a great variability in the level of rents, which is likely to reflect the 
location of property and the quality of the housing. Fig. 4.2.5 presents the income figures in 
drachmas for rents and, for loans, assuming a 12% interest rate and assessing the benefit to the 
landlord as the interest he would otherwise have paid to obtain the loan. Figures are re-calibrated 
for general inflation to AD 150 levels.341 
 
The median figure for rents is 43 drachmas and that for loans is 13 drachmas. However, these figures 
are unadjusted for the size of the housing concerned. When the figures are adjusted to include only 
those transactions where we know the fraction of the house concerned and the rent or capital 
 
340 This is consistent with Haslam’s comment that ‘most property leases take effect from the new year, 
whether the contract was drawn up before the period began…or after’: P.Oxy. XLIV 3200 (2nd to 3rd century) 
note to line 6-7. 
341 Only rental agreements prior to AD 274, when general prices jumped considerably, have been taken into 
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Fig. 4.2.5 Landlord Income from Rental and Antichretic 
Loan




loaned, then the median income to the landlord from an antichretic loan would be 49 drachmas per 
house per annum (n=19). The comparable median rent would be 44 drachmas per house (n=24). The 
closeness of these two figures would suggest that antichretic loan amounts and rents were set 
within a similar value framework. Whether this value framework was financially rational, in the 
terms I have defined, will be discussed in the conclusion to this section. 
I noted in section 4.1 that there are two distinct groups of house prices and thus houses: those sold 
for under 800 drachmas and those more expensive houses which cost more than 1,000 drachmas. If 
we plot the house rents and income from antichretic loans we can see a similar split in the 
distribution. 
 
There are many rents of less than 80 drachmas, but there are also a few where the annual landlord 
income of a house is above 140 drachmas.342 The median rental income shows the same pattern as 
purchase price with higher amounts in the cities compared to the villages.343 
 
342 The nine cases where landlord income exceeds 140 dr. per annum are - five rental agreements: P.Worp. 20, 
Antinoopolis (AD 155) a house with workshops; P.Yale. inv. 685, Oxyrhynchus (AD 157-88), P.Oxy. III 502, 
Oxyrhynchus (AD 164); BGU XI 2034, Arsinoe (Start 3rd century) which has an enormous monthly rent of 200 to 
300 dr.; and P.Turner 37, Arsinoe (AD 270) which is a house with some commercial premises attached and - 
four antichretic loans: P.Lond. III 1168, Hermopolis (AD 44); P.Mich. XII 635, Bacchias (AD 71), P.Mich. X 585, 
Bacchias (AD 87) and P.Hamb. I 30, Philadelphia (AD 89). 
343 The median rental income for village houses is 40 dr., where the median house price is 400 dr. The median 
rental income for city houses is 84 dr. where the median house price is 680 dr. For all houses the median rental 




The landlord income per house can be plotted over time and is presented in Fig. 4.2.7.344 
 
 
The trend in rents shows the familiar flat shape to AD 150 when rents start to pick up and increase 
to AD 274. The average increase in rents from AD 50 to 270 is 0.6% per annum which is the same as 
general price inflation.345 There are too few data to attempt to plot landlord income after AD 274 
though a clear and substantial increase in rents is apparent from the figures presented in appendix 
4.2.1.  
Given the two distinct groups of house prices and rents, and the differences between city and village 
properties, it is difficult to model returns in the same way as in the previous section for land leases. 
However, the median rents and house prices outlined above can give some indication of a typical 
return from leases overall. The return on a house investment based on these medians is 8.2% per 
annum assuming no ongoing frictional costs to the landlord. This is similar to the returns achievable 
for investment in land derived in the previous section, but the landlord would in reality also face 
 
344 Excluding leases for confiscated houses - P.Marm.r (AD 190-1) and SB XX 14281 (AD 142); outliers with very 
high rents greater than the typical purchase price - BGU XI 2034 (Start 3rd century) and P.Turner 37 (AD 270); 
and a document with a very wide dating - P.Oxy. XLIV 3200 (2nd to 3rd century). 






































significant depreciation costs over time as the fabric of the building would need renewal.346 Also the 
landlord could be subject to taxes even when the house was leased as is the case in P.Oxy. III 502 
(AD 164) when the police and brick taxes are still at the landlord’s expense, or water tax as appears 
to be the case in P.Marm. r (AD 190-1). However, whether a general tax applied to house ownership, 
or there was a tax on income on house leases, is currently unknown.347 In addition, whilst if land 
could not be leased to a third party, it could be made productive by direct farming. A house that 
could not be leased was a wasting asset and thus the risks to the landlord were higher than 
investment in land. 
In general, whilst there are more uncertainties as to additional costs, and my estimate of the capital 
employed in owning a house is more uncertain than for the other financial transactions dealt with in 
this thesis, I believe it can be concluded that the net return on capital from house leasing was 
somewhat lower than that likely from leasing of land or making cash loans. 
 
4.2.6 Nature of the Market – Houses as Investments or for Owner-occupation?  
The key question that this section seeks to answer is whether people bought housing to lease it out  
as a ‘buy to let’? This is important because it has a fundamental impact on the nature of the 
marketplace. Tenants would have been driven by the simple need to find somewhere to live but the 
behaviour of houseowners in their attitude to setting rent levels will have been influenced by how 
and why they had acquired the house in the first place. ‘Accidental landlords’ who had acquired 
housing from inheritance or those who were renting out a vacant portion of the family home, would 
have different pricing strategies to those ‘buy to let’ landlords who had purchased a house or a 
portion thereof with a specific view to make a financial return. It may be proposed that the first 
group would be more willing to accept a ‘satisficing’ rent, whereas the second would be driven to 
maximise profit. This sub-section therefore builds on the initial discussion of motivations for house 
purchases examined in sub-section 4.1.7, where it was concluded that the evidence for investment-
driven purchases was rare. 
There are a number of points which would, however, support the ‘investment’ view. Firstly the 
census records suggests that in a city context around 30% of families rented housing from landlords, 
 
346 Though tenants were sometimes required to ensure the house was in a clean state at the end of the lease 
as in P.Erl. 72 (4th century), most houses were relatively insubstantial mud-brick constructions with a relatively 
short lifetime. 




though the proportion in villages is much lower.348 Such a large percentage would tend to support 
the proposition that city houses were indeed considered as an investment, since it is difficult to see 
how a large rental sector could have evolved and been sustained without commercial renting. It also 
should be remembered that we lack information for Alexandria where different practices may have 
existed. 
Indeed, some individuals were definitely interested in becoming a ‘professional’ landlord, as is 
demonstrated when antichretic loans allow for sub-letting. This makes it clear that the person who 
was lending the money in an antichretic loan was not doing so to obtain residence for their own 
immediate family but was looking to make a profit by sub-letting the residence rights received. The 
right of residence often extends to anyone who the lender wishes to reside therein. In P.Mich. XII 
635 (AD 71) the lender, Maron, obtains a commitment from the borrowers that ’they will see that no 
one hinders Maron or his representatives from living in this property, lodging others therein, 
collecting the rents, and using all the appurtenances of the house and courtyard in common’. Note 
the expectation that Maron will sub-let the property through an agent. 
On the other hand, one of my findings is that the typical monetary return to the landlord in cash by 
transaction is small. Letting houses is by definition constrained by the size of the family to whom a 
house is rented and to the size of housing stock.349 The median annual gross income from house 
leasing per transaction, re-calibrated to AD 150 values, was 49 drachmas, which is much smaller than 
that for the land leases dealt with in the previous section which is 280 drachmas.350 Thus to secure 
the same level of income, an investor would on average have to engage in five or more house leases 
for every land lease. This would be time consuming and whilst a substantial investor could employ a 
manager or agent to act on his behalf, the costs of employing the agent would increase expenses. 
The second reason why housing may not have been attractive to an investor is the considerable 
expenses, maintenance/depreciation and frictional costs associated with housing stock which acted 
as a drag on returns on the investment, which even before these costs I have estimated to be only in 
the region of 8% per annum. Also antichretic loans, with their very high frictional costs, cannot be 
considered as financially rational instruments. 
 
348 Bagnall & Frier 2006: 69, but note the evidence from P.Oslo III 111 (AD 235) which has lower proportions of 
rented houses. In the Western District of the Hermaion quarter of Oxyrhynchus 14% of houses are let out. 
However, the editor points out that there were many houses uninhabited, more than half in the same quarter. 
349 Note Bagnall & Frier’s suggestion that the larger the household, the lower the likelihood of renting 
compared to owner-occupation: Bagnall & Frier 2006: 69.  
350 The figures for median land lease income are derived from the information set out in appendices 3.2.1, 




It should also be remembered that owning houses for leasing had the risk of not finding tenants. In 
P.Oslo III 111 (AD 235) in a high status quarter of Oxyrhynchus we have the example of Alexander 
Serenus who is the owner of four houses: two contiguous houses where he houses his family, 
another one blocked up and one uninhabited, and there are other similar cases such as Theon who 
also has four houses, two let out but two uninhabited.351  Whilst a similar risk may apply to finding a 
tenant for land bought as an investment, there is always the alternative of farming the land yourself 
or with hired labour. Such an alternative does not apply to a vacant house which was not needed for 
owner occupation. 
Another reason why, in my opinion, commercial, investment-driven house leasing was not common, 
is that the absolute numbers of house leases that have survived compared to documents relating to 
other transactions is small. We only have 157 housing lease transactions compared to 1,273 land 
leases and 1,999 loans. The absence of house leasing documents can be explained if the bulk of 
agreements were informal leases of rooms which were surplus to the landlord’s personal 
requirements. However, a commercial landlord seeking profit would surely have looked for similar 
levels of documentation and security for an investment in a house as he did for other transactions, 
and the paucity of the numbers of house leases is very telling.  The ratio of the number of house 
leases compared to house sales at 0.4 is also very considerably less than the comparable ratio for 
land leases to land sales at 2.6.352 The lower this ratio, the more likely is owner-occupation 
compared to leasing. 
I believe that the balance of the evidence points clearly to only a limited involvement of commercial 
investment-driven activity in the housing market of the Arsinoite and Oxyrhynchite nomes.353 In 
neoclassical economic terms the market was inefficient in both the exchange of information and the 
exercise of rationality. Exchange of information was hampered by the difficulties of defining, and 
thus commoditising, occupation and associated rights, particularly for fractions of shared-occupancy 
houses.  The market involved large numbers of landlords who had accidentally acquired fractions of 
houses through inheritance, and those who informally rented out rooms within the family home, 
who were not likely to have been driven by pure profit maximisation. The prevalence of these 
landlords who would have been satisfied to achieve a limited profit from an otherwise useless asset 
would have tended to lower investment returns in the marketplace and made it more difficult for 
the commercial landlord to turn a substantial profit. The typical returns from house leasing or 
 
351 P.Oslo III 111 (AD 235): Alexander Serenus l.169, 172 and 215 and Theon l.154, 156, 264 and 277. 
352 157 house leasing transactions compared to 368 house sales and 1,273 land leases compared to 482 land 
sales. 
353 In this I disagree partly with Rathbone’s statement that ‘I believe that much elite wealth came from 




antichretic loans are certainly not particularly attractive compared to the credit and land markets 
once frictional costs and the risks of non-occupancy are taken into account, and this hierarchy of 





Chapter 5 Credit 
Section 5.1 The Credit Market  
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to draw conclusions as to the structure of the credit market in Roman 
Egypt and the motivations of market participants. The types of transactions dealt with in this section 
are those where a debt is formalised in a deliberate manner by both principals. They include both 
deposits, where the lender may require the repayment of the loan at any time at their sole option, 
and loans, where lender and borrower agree on a fixed timing for repayment. Also considered as 
loans are mortgages, sales on credit, pledges related to debts, pawns, maritime loans and letters of 
credit.  
Advance sales, where a buyer of goods makes a payment in advance in return for a delivery of goods 
at some point in the future can be considered as containing a loan from buyer to vendor of the 
purchase price. However, they do not lend themselves to financial analysis since they include not 
only the loan but also some potential adjustment to the price and we lack the price data to identify 
the effective terms of the transaction. Similar considerations apply to ‘the large-scale use of credit 
arrangements’ within large estates and evidenced with their accounts.354 Neither of these two types 
of transaction have been included. Neither have debts of an accidental nature which have not been 
formalised into loans or deposits. An example of this type of debt would be the failure to make a 
rental payment. Loans of seed by the state are not dealt with nor fiscal debts to the state, although 
cash loans from public bodies are addressed. Finally, the body of loans on ostraca from Mons 
Claudianus have not been included in the quantitative analysis as these relate to a quite separate 
geographical and social context from the civilian, agrarian provenance of the bulk of the data.  
There is a much larger body of documents related to loans than to land or housing sales indicating  
that loans were a more common transaction than real-estate sales, despite the fact that the 
generally smaller size of the loan transactions would have made them less likely to be formalised in 
writing than real-estate sales, which were generally larger in size. In total I have collected 1,229 
 




documents containing 1,999 transactions involving more than 4,000 individuals.355 This is a larger 
body of data than the 432 transactions considered in Lerouxel’s recent monograph on credit.356  
This section deals with the practicalities of the credit market, including features such as the 
counterparties, the amounts loaned and their timing. It does not deal with the details of the legal 
structures and the documentation by which loans were granted. Taubenschlag remains useful for 
the legal aspects of the credit market including the methodologies used to secure creditors’ rights in 
the event of default, and broader aspects of the credit market have been addressed more recently 
by Haklai, Lerouxel and Tenger.357  
As noted above, loans of seed to farmers by the state are not dealt with in this section since they 
served a different purpose to loans between private individuals. However, apart from establishing 
the institutions that provided the legal framework, organs of the state did interact with the private 
credit market by acting as a lender in certain very limited circumstances.358 In common with the rest 
of the Roman Empire there is no evidence of public borrowing, although this had been a feature of 
ancient Greek city state finances.359  
Loans could also vary in the interest rate payable to the lender including: nil interest, cash expressed 
as a fraction of the capital, interest in kind, services or work in lieu of interest, referred to as 
paramone loans, and the use of real-estate or other fixed assets in lieu of interest, referred to as 
‘antichretic’ loans. Paramone loans are examined in section 5.2 and, in the case of antichretic loans, 
within section 4.2 which dealt with house rental since the most common form of antichretic loan 
was to grant the lender the right to inhabit a house in lieu of interest.360 Finally it should be noted 
 
355 All credit documents are listed in appendix D.4 and the transactions where interest rates can be identified 
are set out in appendices 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. 
356 Lerouxel 2016: 7. This is partly because in this thesis more types of documents, including contract registers 
containing extracts or receipts for repayment, have been included, whereas Lerouxel’s primary focus was on 
loan contracts themselves, though he does include consideration of other evidence within the body of his 
work. Lerouxel also includes documents only from Arsinoe, Hermopolis, Oxyrhynchus, Soknopaiou Nesos and 
Tebtunis and his date range only extends to AD 275, which further explains the smaller numbers of documents 
within his database.  
357 Taubenschlag 1955, Haklai forthcoming, Lerouxel 2016, Tenger 1993. 
358 See for instance P.Tebt. II 387 (AD 73) for a small deposit coming from state funds, P.Oxy. XII 1501 (early 3rd 
century) where a senator of Oxyrhynchus has borrowed from city funds as well as P.Oxy. XLIII 3146 (AD 347). 
359 Migeotte 1984. 
360 Note that there are many entries within the abbreviated contract lists in the Tebtunis grapheion registers 
which state that a transaction was a paramone or a housing agreement which may have been an antichretic 
loan. I have not included these transactions within the credit database unless there is a specific reference to a 
loan existing, thus taking a more conservative approach than Samuel who assumed all references to paramone 
transactions were loans – Samuel 1965: 253 and 304. See note to appendix 4.2.1 for a discussion of the 




that we are no doubt missing a large number of small informal loans based on verbal agreements 
which did not warrant the expense of recording their terms on papyri.  
This section has the following structure. Firstly, the dates and provenances of the documents are 
examined, then the typology of the transactions including their nature, duration, size and seasonality 
are set out, then the profile of the participants in the market is described and finally conclusions are 
drawn as to the individual motivations of these participants and the nature of the market.  
 
5.1.2 Dates and Provenance 
The number of documents and transactions can be subdivided by provenance and by date as shown 
in Fig. 5.1.1. 
 
Documents attesting credit transactions survive from the second century in large numbers but, as 
with other financial transactions, the above distributions cannot be used to indicate market volume 
trends without an adjustment.  Credit documents as a proportion of all private documentary papyri 
within the normative database described in sub-section 1.2.2, form a higher percentage in the first 
century than in later years: 10.7% in the first century, falling to 7.0% in the second and 4.5% in the 
third. The trend in the proportion of these documents, per decade, is shown in more detail in Fig. 
5.1.2 where there is a relatively strong R² coefficient of 0.57, and where perhaps somewhere around 
AD 150 may be suggested as a watershed after which credit transactions decline in number.361 
 



















Fig. 5.1.1a Number of 
Credit Transactions 
by Nome and Date



















Fig. 5.1.1b Number of 
Credit Documents 
by Nome and Date





We can contrast the above diachronic development of credit transactions with those related to real-
estate and the equivalent best-fit lines are shown in Fig. 5.1.3. 362   
 
The R² coefficients for land transactions are low which contrasts with the clear strong trend in credit 
transactions. It should of course be remembered that there may be other changes in the 
composition of the underlying data, or in the channels through which credit flowed, which would 
explain these changes, but it would appear that credit activity declined substantially in the mid-
 
362 There is one clear outlier in the data points above where documents referencing loans or deposits 
constitute a surprisingly large percentage of all documentary papyri: AD 101 to 110 at around 18%. This high 
percentage in the first decade of the second century is partly due to the coincidence of a number of archives: 
those of Epagathos, Kronion, Philosarapis, Sarapion and Soter, each containing more than one loan, in this 
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second century through the third century and that, despite this being a period of high inflation, 
there was still significant activity in the credit market in the fourth century.  
 
5.1.3 Types of Transaction 
Turning to the type of transactions, loans for a fixed term constitute 90% of the 1,999 transactions. 
Deposits, where the term is not pre-determined, are 10% of the data. Credit transactions, both loans 
and deposits, can be further subdivided according to the type of capital as follows: cash; kind, which 
were typically cereals; and mixed where both cash and kind capital is loaned.  The vast bulk of 
transactions, 83%, were in cash, with 11% in kind and 6% mixed. So cash loans of a fixed term are 
the most common type of credit transaction.  
One question that arises is the degree to which the proportion of loans in cash and kind changed 
over time, particularly during the period of high inflation after AD 274. A preference for loans in 
kind, which would keep their ‘real’ value in times of high inflation as opposed to coins of dubious 
purchasing power when repaid, would be a financially rational approach for lenders. The percentage 
distribution between cash, kind and mixed transactions over time shows some changes in practice as 
the table in Fig. 5.1.4 shows:  






n=774.5 200-273 n=282 274-350 n=160 
Cash 88% 81% 80% 78% 
Kind 5% 13% 15% 20% 
Mixed 7% 6% 4% 2% 
 
There is an increase in the prevalence of loans in kind rather than in cash but it predates the jump in 
prices in AD 274 and the high inflation period that followed as described in section 2.2. Thus there is 
no indication of any immediate loss of confidence in coinage despite the inflationary conditions then 
prevailing and the bulk of loans continued to be in cash rather than kind.364 This feature of the credit 
market will be explored further in section 5.2 of this thesis.  
 
363 In some cases the form of the capital cannot be determined and thus the total number of transactions in 
this table is less than the total number of transactions of 1,999. The total percentage may not be 100% given 
rounding.  
364 A trend for repayment in total in kind or ‘sales on delivery’ or for interest to be paid in kind on loans 
originally made in cash, largely post-dates the end of the period under consideration. The earliest dated 




It has been proposed that during the Roman period there was a trend towards deposits rather than 
loans.365 This proposition can be tested by considering the proportion of loans compared to deposits 
as shown in Fig. 5.1.5, over the same time periods as in Fig. 5.1.4, but there is no clear trend. 
Fig. 5.1.5 Proportion of Deposits and Loans 
Date n= number 1st C n=610 2nd C n=893 200-273 n=318 274-350 n=178 
Loans 82% 94% 97% 91% 
Deposits 18% 6% 3% 9% 
 
Credit transactions varied also as to the security that was provided to the lender in case of default by 
the borrower.366 In simple loans, typically for small amounts, no security was specified within the 
loan document. However, it was common amongst loans of a more formal nature for the lender to 
have rights over the general assets of the borrower when seeking to enforce a debt and a term 
meaning ‘as if by a court order’ often provided the legal background to assist the lender. However, 
the strongest form of security, then as now, was to provide the lender with the rights to seize, or to 
keep in their possession, a specific asset. Portable items such as clothes or jewellery could be 
pawned, or fixed assets such as real-estate could be pledged through some form of mortgage.  
The formal legal structure of a mortgage, in either the hypotheke, hypallagma or mesiteia forms, 
does not, as Lerouxel notes, appear within our transactions until around AD 69 when the bibliotheke 
enkteseon was established and provided the necessary institutional structure to establish and 
monitor ownership of real-estate.367 Prior to this date specific security was sometimes provided 
through simultaneous loans and fiduciary sales where in the event of default the lender had already 
established legal title over the real-estate through the fiduciary sale. Lerouxel believes that the   
enhanced ability to monitor and prove real-estate ownership provided by this new institution 
encouraged the use of secured loans and points to the increase in the median size of loans to 
support his proposition. This proposition is tested in the next sub-section.  
Contrary to Morley’s view, bills of exchange, which can alternatively be referred to as letters of 
credit, where an individual is able to obtain credit when away from their normal place of residence, 
through the use of a document stating that they had the funds at their disposal at home, did exist 
 
finding only partially confirms Carrié’s impression that there was a trend to kind rather than cash loans: Carrié 
2003: 266.  Note that Carrié’s statement that in the Roman period 80% of loans were in kind is clearly wrong: 
Carrié 2003: 278. 
365 Haklai (forthcoming). 
366 See Lerouxel 2016: 245-92 for a comparison of the guarantees which provided the lender with security in 
Roman Egypt and Campania.  




and would have been helpful in conducting commerce.368  Loans could also become tradeable 
securities in that they could be exchanged and sold on to a third party.369  
 
5.1.4 Size and Diachronic Trend 
The median size of cash loans prior to AD 274, re-calibrated for general inflation to AD 150 prices, 
was 160 drachmas. To put this in context this sum was a considerable one for an ordinary person in 
Roman Egypt as it represented the better part of half a year’s wages for a labourer.370  Lerouxel’s 
proposition that the size of loans increased after the establishment of the bibliotheke enkteseon is 
supported, but no causal link is proved, by the larger data set at our disposal as the median size of 
cash loans is 102 drachmas in the period AD 1 to 70, 200 drachmas in AD 71 to 170 and 304 
drachmas in AD 171 to 273.371  However, if loans became larger and more complex, there is, as Fig. 
5.1.2 showed, no growth in the number of loan documents after the establishment of the 
bibliotheke enkteseon and indeed the proportion of credit transactions within the normative 
database and thus the likely number of transactions declines from around AD 75.  
This decline in the relative number of loan documents combined with the growth in the median size 
of transactions leads to the question of whether the total volume of the credit market was growing 
or decreasing. Howgego’s statement in this regard that ‘as there is no evidence on which to base 
quantification, it is difficult to trace changes in the level of monetary credit over time’ is correct in 
that it is difficult to trace trends, but incorrect in stating that there is no evidence.372 The total 
amount of loans cannot simply be added together for each time period since this is a function, as 
much of the number of documents found and published, as of the volume of business being 
transacted. Therefore we need to look at the development of both the typical size and relative 
number of loans over time and how this varied by location. The loan sizes set out in Fig. 5.1.6 show a 
 
368 Morley 2007: 587 ‘Romans lacked…bills of exchange’. For counter examples consider P.Oxy.Hels. 48 (2nd to 
3rd century) where a letter of credit would have facilitated the purchase of wool or P.Oxy. XLIII 3146 (AD 347) 
which is an advance from imperial funds, made in Oxyrhynchus but to be repaid in Alexandria. For a further 
discussion of letters of credit see Concannon 2010: 81-4. 
369 For instance see SB XVIII 13858 (AD 211-217) where a mortgage is ceded to another party or P.Oxy. III 508 
(AD 102) where a loan is sold on. 
370 Based on the mid second-century AD modal average daily wages for rural casual work in the Fayum quoted 
in Rathbone 2009a: 316. 
371 Loans post AD 150 have been re-calibrated to ‘real’ values as at AD 150 allowing for general inflation. 
372 Howgego 1992: 15. Note that the use of documents rather than transactions as the basis for the relative 
number of loans reduces, but does not eliminate, the bias due to the prominence of certain archives though it 




striking difference in the sizes of loans in cities compared to villages, with higher amounts reflecting 
the concentration of wealth in cities.   
Fig. 5.1.6 – Median cash transaction amounts in drachmas adjusted for inflation - by provenance373 
Date AD 1 to 70 AD 70 to 170 AD 170-273 
City n=313 200 415 517 
Village n=536 100 168 130 
Total n=1111 102 200 304 
 
The relative frequency of documents attesting loans can also be broken down by city and village 
provenance and the best-fit trendlines for relative frequency are shown in Fig. 5.1.7.374 
 
 
In the cities the relative number of documents, and thus the likely number of transactions, falls but 
the increase in typical size more than makes up for this. Thus, overall credit activity in cities is likely 
to have increased over time when measured in total monetary terms. In the villages the typical loan 
 
373 There are 395 transactions where the provenance cannot be attributed to either city or village and this 
explains why the numbers of city and village cases do not add up to the total of 1,229. 
374 The best-fit curves are third order polynomials and the R² coefficients are relatively strong for this type of 
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Fig. 5.1.7 Proportion of Documentary Papyri which are Credit 
Transactions in Cities, Villages and Overall




size is relatively stable but the relative number of cases declines throughout the second and the first 
half of the third century to almost zero, though it picks up in the fourth century. 
It would seem, in line with Lerouxel’s proposition, that financial activity was drawn to the city-based 
institutions such as the private banks.375 We will also see in sub-section 5.1.7 that the practice of 
city-dwellers lending to villagers was largely a second- and third-century practice which would also 
indicate a change in the credit market.  Whatever the reason, it would appear that there was a 
concentration of financial activity and wealth in cities in the second and third centuries, but no 
substantial increase in credit activity overall.  
From AD 274, as might be expected, after the jump in general prices and given the continued 
inflationary conditions in the fourth century, the size of cash loans increased.  This is shown in Fig. 
5.1.8 which uses a logarithmic scale and documents which cannot be dated to within a 50 year 
period, for instance those which can only be dated to the fourth century as a whole, have been 
ignored.  
 
The annual average increase of the trendline for the size of monetary loans from AD 5 to 350 is 9.6% 
compared to 13.7% for the blended inflation measure shown in Fig. 2.2.9. Loan sizes are a secondary 
indicator of inflation, since they need not necessarily track inflation in the same way as prices, and 
thus greater variability and thus a lower R² coefficient is likely. This is reflected in the R² coefficient 
 




















for loan amounts, which, although it is still a respectable 0.57, is lower than that for commodity 
prices for the same period which range from 0.70 to 0.94.376 
Turning to loans in kind, the median size of cereal loans was eight artabas. These loans were 
generally in wheat and the equivalent median value in cash at AD 150 prices of say 12 drachmas per 
artaba would be 96 drachmas. The cash component of mixed loans prior to AD 274 had a median 
value of 81 drachmas, after adjustment to AD 150 levels, and the kind component median was seven 
artabas. Mixed loans therefore had a similar median value of around 165 drachmas to pure cash 
loans, whose median value was 160 drachmas. Where mixed loans varied from other loans was their 
provenance. Loans which were purely in kind or cash have a similar distribution: 50% of kind loans 
come from villages and 56% of cash loans. Mixed loans were, however, largely a village 
phenomenon, and 58 out of 69 cases, or 84%, come from villages.  
 
5.1.5 Duration and Seasonality 
Whilst loans varied in the duration of their term, deposits were by their nature, indefinite in term, as 
the lender or depositor had the right to call in the capital at any time. Typically, examining all 
transactions over the period from AD 1 to 350, loans were of a short duration and 80% of all loans 
were for a duration of less than one year. Some 10% were for a year exactly, 9% for a period of 
between one and five years and only 1% were originally contracted for a duration of more than five 
years.377 
The seasonality of loans and deposits can be examined, and the trend in the month of grant of loans 
identified. The intended date of repayment can also be examined for loans, but not for deposits 
since these are for an indeterminate term.378 Note that the month of repayment referred to below is 
that originally intended in the loan document where available. Fig. 5.1.9 summarises the data for 
 
376 See Fig. 2.2.8. 
377 Although the effective duration could be longer if the borrower did not repay on time, with in an extreme 
case, P.Tebt.Wall 6 which dates from the reign of Hadrian (AD 117-38) and deals with the late repayment of a 
loan originally contracted in AD 84-5. In ignoring durations calculated from loan repayment receipts I follow 
Lerouxel’s approach contra Tenger, though perhaps for different reasons. I have excluded these primarily 
because I am interested in the reasoning and intention of both parties when the loan was made rather than 
the actual duration, which is a function of subsequent circumstances. Lerouxel 2016: 53-4 stated his view that 
the durations within loan reimbursements should be ignored since reimbursement receipts are made only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’. I can see no reason why reimbursement receipts should not have been made in 
the common course of events although the alternative approach of marking the original loan document as 
crossed out to signify that the loan had been repaid was certainly used on occasion as for instance in P.Duk. 
inv. 7 (AD 6). 




month of grant and repayment for all cash loans, excluding deposits, where some 470 transactions 
have a date for grant and 272 transactions have an intended date for repayment: 
 
The months of grant are fairly evenly spread across the year, other than small but statistically 
significant peaks, at a 95% confidence level, in Mecheir and Mesore, and a corresponding lower than 
average dip in Epeiph. There are however, much clearer peaks, both statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence level, in repayment date in Pauni after the main harvest and in Mesore at the end of the 
calendar year. The peak in Pauni suggests that for many borrowers repayment could only be made 
after the harvest. This has important ramifications for the risks that a lender faced. Not only was the 
lender dependent on the honesty and good faith of the borrower but he or she was also dependent 
on the quality of the harvest. The repayment peak in Mesore is of interest but, other than noting 
that it may reflect a preference for loans repayable within the calendar year, I cannot provide an 
explanation.379  
The pattern of dates within the data for loans in kind, where there are 59 months of grant and 64 
months of repayment, is shown in Fig. 5.1.10. 
 
379 It would be tempting to link the peak in activity in Mesore to the need to borrow to meet cash tax payment 
obligations due at the end or beginning of the calendar year. However, Wallace does not note any 







Fig. 5.1.9 Cash Loan Seasonality





The vast bulk of loans, more than 95%, are due to be repaid in Pauni or Epeiph, after the harvest as 
would be expected. The month of grant peaks in Hathyr, when planting of cereal crops was at its 
height and the majority of loan grants are between Hathyr and Tybi, and this suggests that these 
loans were more often needed by the borrower as seed rather than for personal consumption when 
baked as bread.380 The contrast with cash loans which show no similar patterns in months of grant, 
and hence potential borrower motivation, is of interest. Mixed loans show a similar pattern to loans 
purely in kind and presumably reflect the same motivations. 
 
5.1.6 Transaction Participants – Gender, Age and Intermediation 
To a much greater extent than in most other areas of financial activity the credit market was 
dominated by men. 84% of 1,331 lenders and 79% of 1,834 borrowers were male. 381 Overall males 
constituted 81% of all principals within credit transactions. As with real-estate transactions, there 
was a trend for females to transact with females and males with males. Some 87% of male 
 
380 See Bagnall 1993c: 21 and Rathbone 1991: 260-2 for descriptions of the agricultural year. 
381 Note that for most transactions the question of who was the lender and who was the borrower is clear. 
However, in contract registers the truncated description of deposit transactions requires an assumption to be 
made as to what role the scribe was associating with each party. As an example consider P.Mich. II 123r V 9 
where the editor’s English translation of ὁμο(λογία) Ἰσ̣̣χ̣υρίωνο(ς) καὶ ἄλλω(ν) πρὸ(ς) Γαλάτη(ν) παραθή(κης) 
ἀργ(υρίου) (δραχμῶν) σκ. (δραχμαὶ) δ is ‘Acknowledgment of deposit of 220 silver drachmai, (made) by 
Ischyrion and others to Galates. (Fee:) 4 drachmai’. At first sight the translation would seem to imply that 
Galates is in receipt of the 220 drachmas and is thus the ‘borrower’. Alternatively it could be that Galates is in 
receipt of the acknowledgement and is thus the ‘lender’. However, when we have both the full description of 
the deposit contract and the truncated description as in P.Mich. II 121r II iii and P.Mich. II 121v II 7 it is clear 
that the person to whom the deposit is said to be made in the truncated description is the lender and it is the 











Fig. 5.1.10 Kind Loan Seasonality




counterparties were male, and 26% of female counterparties were female, compared to an expected 
81% and 19% respectively, if there were no trend.382  
Lerouxel has looked in detail within his more restricted data set at the activity of women and sub-
divided their activity between women acting on their own behalf and those who acted with their 
husband or son. He saw increased lending by women acting singly over time, and noted that women 
had to supply specific security more frequently when borrowing than men.383 The general trend of 
women’s participation is shown in Fig. 5.1.11, but this does include female activity in consort with 
male relatives. 
Fig. 5.1.11 – Percentage of Female Principals of All Principals by Date Range 










Borrower 27% 21% 17% 12% 
Lender 9% 22% 18% 11% 
 
Turning to women lending or borrowing money solely in their own name, even if they needed a male 
guardian to execute the transaction, the proportions are shown in Fig. 5.1.12. 
Fig. 5.1.12 – Percentage of Female Principals of All Principals by Date Range Lending and Borrowing 
their own Capital 
% Female n=number of 
females 








Borrower 4% 14% 13% 8% 
Lender 8% 20% 15% 10% 
 
Lerouxel identified a trend for women to have greater access to the credit markets as borrowers 
after the establishment of the bibliotheke enkteseon and the more refined assessment of female 
activity shown in Fig. 5.1.12 would support the feature that Lerouxel identified.384 My data 
 
382 Lerouxel finds somewhat higher incidences of female to female transactions which I believe relates to 
differences in the geographic distribution of the data sample as described in sub-section 5.1.2. For instance for 
the period AD 70 to 170 he finds that out of 52 female borrowers, 46%, borrowed from other women: Lerouxel 
2016: 124. With my wider sample of 125 female borrowers for the same period I find that the proportion of 
women borrowing from women was 31%. Similar levels of female to female lending are seen if my sample is 
restricted to adult women acting in their own right, though they may have needed a male guardian, not jointly 
with another person, so as to reduce any bias from women acting in conjunction with their husbands. 
383 Lerouxel 2016: 73, 123. Whilst this could relate to a perceived difference in credit worthiness between the 
genders, but ‘it also points to the extent to which women’s economic role is directly linked to their ownership 
of real-estate’ - Hobson 1983: 317. 
384 Lerouxel 2012b: 962. The main reason for the change in the percentage of female participation in the 




additionally show a reduction in the numbers of females active, both as lenders and borrowers, in 
the period from AD 274.385 
In 207 cases we have the age of the lender and in 371 cases the age of the borrower. There are more 
borrower ages than lenders partly due to the fact that generally there are more multiple borrowers 
than lenders within the transactions, but also because it was more common to include a description, 
including age, of the borrower than the lender. This preference reflects that it was the lender who 
was at risk from default and the age of the borrower was an important part of the description which 
would enable the lender to identify and take action against a defaulting borrower. 
The distribution of ages of borrowers and lenders is as shown in Fig. 5.1.13. The distribution of ages 
of borrowers and lenders are similar, but overall the median age of lenders, at 35, is lower than the 
median age of borrowers at 38.386 In societies where individuals accumulate wealth over their 
lifetime one might expect lenders to be older than borrowers, but this does not appear to be the 
case in Roman Egypt. 
   
As Fig. 5.1.14 shows, median debt per transaction, for those age brackets with a sufficient number of 
cases, appears to increase with the age of the borrower, which contrasts strongly with typical 
modern day patterns in, say the UK, where median personal debt peaks in an individual’s thirties and 
 
are active, show husbands and wives acting in consort, though this may hide different types of activity. These 
cases are not included in Fig. 5.1.12. 
385 I lack the data to confirm or deny Hobson’s suggestion that women appear more frequently as borrowers in 
years of economic distress. Hobson 1984b: 389-90. The decline in activity of females in the market in the 
fourth century is statistically significant at a 95% level. 
386 Note that despite the relatively large data samples the difference in means/medians cannot be stated as 
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declines slowly thereafter.387 These two features reinforce the need to remove ourselves from our 
modern preconceptions of personal credit debt when seeking to understand the motivations that 
drove individuals to borrow and lend money in Roman Egypt. 











Median 76 82 174 300 
 
The distribution of lenders and borrowers as a percentage of the estimated population of Roman 
Egypt by age band which indicates when individuals were particularly active is provided in Fig. 7.4.1 
in the conclusion to this thesis. 
As with real-estate sales, credit transactions were normally done face to face between the principals, 
assisted in some cases by signatories and guardians. Agents, managers or representatives were 
occasionally used to substitute for the principal lender or borrower and I have identified only 57 
intermediaries excluding guardians, within loan documents, a lower level of participation than in 
real-estate sales and leases.388 However, in contrast to real-estate sales, where they are rarely 
active, banks did have a significant intermediary role in credit transactions. As Bogaert and Lerouxel 
noted, banks did not generally function as lenders but there are, according to Lerouxel, around 100 
documents in his sample where the bank acted as an intermediary.389 However, Lerouxel goes too 
far in stating that all lenders and borrowers were non-professional private individuals since we have 
clear instances of some professional activity.390 There were two types of professional counterparty 
who acted as lenders: moneylenders and pawnbrokers. In practice these two types of lenders 
probably overlapped, but the papyri permit us to identify a number of moneylenders who had a 




387 ONS 2016: Table 8. 
388 Note this number does not include intermediaries shown as involved in repayment receipts. Lerouxel sees 
an increase in the activities of agents of city-based wealthy landowners in the period after AD 170 in lending to 
villagers, but the number of cases he cites is relatively small: Lerouxel 2016: 322-36. 
389 Bogaert 2000: 265 but note his comments on the lack of documents from Alexandria, where banks may 
have lent more frequently. Also Lerouxel 2016: 340. Note that bank activity disappears in the second half of 
the third century: Andreau 1986. Since the limited role of banks has been the subject of considerable 
investigation in the past I have not undertaken any quantitative analysis of their activities since it is unlikely to 
reveal anything new. 




5.1.7 Transaction Participants – Locations 
Turning to geographical locations, in 312 cases we know where the lenders or borrowers lived. The 
pattern of the number of lenders and borrowers is shown in Fig. 5.1.15 which shows the numbers 
and relationships between lenders and borrowers. So for instance there are 20 cases where the 
lender is based in Oxyrhynchus and lends to someone in a village in the Oxyrhynchite nome but only 
three cases where the lender is in the village and the borrower is in Oxyrhynchus, whilst there are 86 





Fig. 5.1.15 Location Matrix – Lenders and Borrowers 














Alexandria 1 3 1   1         2 8 
Oxyrhynchus 4 86 1       3 2     96 
Arsinoe 1   19   2           22 
Hermopolis 2     26         1   29 
Other poleis 1 1     18 1   1   1 23 
Serving 
Military 1         13         14 
Oxyrhynchite 
village 1 20         6       27 
Arsinoite 
village 5   21   2 2   28 1 1 60 
Hermopolite 
village 1     7 2 1     5   16 
Other village   1     9 1   1   5 17 













All cities 167 1 10 
Serving 
Military 1 13 0 
All 




Fig. 5.1.15 shows that there was very little inter-city or inter-village lending but more frequently, city 
dwellers lent to village dwellers.391 At first sight there seems to be a particular concentration of 
lending activity within Oxyrhynchus as opposed to Arsinoe, Hermopolis or other cities, but this is 
largely due to the overall number of documents with an Oxyrhynchite provenance. For a comparison 
of the ‘density’ of the social networks within loans compared to other financial transactions see Fig. 
7.3.4 in the conclusion to this thesis, but it will be noted that the market for loans was more 
localised than the land leasing market for instance. Unlike other types of financial transactions 
where serving military personnel appear rarely, although veterans are more common, there are a 
 
391 This feature has been noted by a number of scholars including Bagnall 1993: 140, Schubert 2007: 15 and 
Temin 2013: 171. Lerouxel 2016: 341 suggested that this trend for villagers to borrow from city dwellers dates 
from AD 69 with the establishment of the bibliotheke enkteseon and that the sums available in this fashion 
were larger than would have been available in the village itself. Of the 69 transactions where a villager 
borrows from a city dweller all indeed do postdate AD mid-60’s but the median date of such loans is AD 221 
and these are largely second and third century loans, so there is little evidence that the bibliotheke enkteseon 
innovation caused an immediate impact. The typical size of city to village loans prior to AD 274, adjusted for 
inflation, is 275 drachmas, which as Lerouxel suggested, is higher than the usual village loan which has a 






















number of loans involving the serving military though most of these are internal to the army and do 
not involve civilians.  
Trends over time need to be examined, and Lerouxel believed that, in the period before the 
establishment of the bibliotheke enkteseon (30 BC to AD 68-72), that credit markets were ‘closed’ 
meaning that the principals did business mainly in the area where they lived, but that in the period 
after the establishment of this institution, up to AD 170 markets became more open, particularly in 
the Arsinoite nome.392 I can only test this proposition for the period from AD 1 to 70 and AD 71 to 
170, since I have not collated the data for the first 30 years of Roman rule. If the proportion of ‘open’ 
transactions is compared for the two periods for all Egypt, there is no significant increase in the 
proportion of these transactions overall, being only 3% of all transactions in both periods. If the 
Arsinoite nome is looked at in isolation, the number of ‘open’ transactions increases from one to 14 
in the two periods, but the proportion of all transactions only increases from 1.3% to 2.7%.393 
 
5.1.8 Individual Motivation – Why Did People Borrow? 
There are a number of scholars of the ancient world who have made the distinction between ’loans 
for consumption’ and ‘loans for production’ and discussed their likely proportions.394 As noted 
above, this is a key distinction since the two different types of loans had different impacts on the 
economy and the nature of the financial market. The greater the proportion of productive loans, the 
greater the likely positive effect on the development of the economy. The greater the number of 
consumption loans, the greater the likely power imbalance between borrowers who had urgent 
needs and lenders with capital to invest and this would be reflected in the nature of the market. The 
following paragraphs therefore seek to determine what drove borrowers to transact and the extent 
to which consumption and production loans can be identified.  
One marker of consumption loans within the data analysed is that on at least nine occasions a 
phrase is used in a document meaning the borrower had ‘fallen into need’, or a similar formulation 
relating to personal or private and immediate need is used to indicate the reason for the borrower 
 
392 Lerouxel 2012b: 961-2. 
393 The one ‘open’ transaction in the Arsinoite nome, outside the Tebtunis grapheion register, in the period AD 
1 to 70 is BGU XIII 2337. The 14 ‘open’ transactions in the period AD 71 to 170 are BGU III 888, BGU XI 2122, 
P.Fam.Tebt. 38, P.Fam.Tebt. 43, P.Heid. VII 399, P.Louvre II 110, P.Oxf. 11, P.Stras. V 437, PSI VIII 9211 l.10-3, 
SB VI 9247, SB X 10538, SB XII 10786, SB XII 10787 and SB XX 14970. 
394 Finley 1999: 198. Finley’s position is ‘almost wholly negative‘ on the role of moneylending in production and 




to seek a loan.395 These phrases only appear to come into use in papyri contracts in the fourth 
century for whatever reason. However, outside the body of data analysed quantitatively, more 
information as to the rationale for the borrower is provided within the ostraca found at Mons 
Claudianus. These date to the start of the second century and two different motivations are noted: 
‘pressing need’ and more directly, the need to eat.396 Despite these regionally and temporally 
isolated instances, for the vast bulk of the transactions there are no explanations offered as to why 
the borrower needed the cash or goods.  
In other cases the rationale for borrowing may be deduced from the context or contents of the 
papyrus and places the transaction within the consumption category, for instance: 
- There are two cases in military contexts, of ‘payday’ loans where the loan was to be repaid 
at the next receipt of pay.397 Such loans may reasonably I believe reflect the need of the 
borrower to meet short term consumption needs or liabilities rather than suggest that the 
money was to be invested in some productive exercise.  
- Some 63 paramone loans, which can be considered as advance wages and three documents 
which are explicitly stated to be advance wages are also likely to have been consumption 
rather than productive in nature.398 
- Very short term loans which would presumably also have been required to meet some 
pressing need. There are some 72 loans of three months or less which would fall into this 
category. A period of three months or less could not typically cover the planting, growing 
and harvesting season and thus these loans are unlikely to have been directly productive in 
an agricultural sense. 
- 12 loans made to scribes to cover short term expenses in P.Mich. II 123 (AD 45-6). 
- 65 loans where personal items were pawned, a number of which were at high interest rates 
which would have made them unsuitable transactions to fund a productive exercise.399 
- Seven documents where the purpose is specifically stated to relate to consumption such as 
expenses, pre-existing debts or taxes falling due.400 
 
395 P.Hamb. IV 270 – not a loan contract as such (2nd to 3rd century?), P.Kellis I 49 (AD 304) a loan of oil for 
personal needs, P.Kellis I 40 (AD 306-7),  P.Cair.Isid. 76 (AD 318), P.Col. VII 169 (AD 318), SB VI 9270 (AD 337), 
P.Kellis I 18 (c.AD 350), P.Fouad I 53 (4th century) a standard formula to acknowledge receipt of a cash loan and 
thus indicating the expected common reason for seeking a loan and P.Leid. Inst. 17 (4th century). 
396 For a list of the motives used in the Mons Claudianus ostraca see O.Claud. 2000: 84. 
397 C.Ep.Lat. 13 (AD 27) and C.Ep.Lat. 154 (AD 140). 
398 The paramone loans and are listed in appendix 5.2.2. 
399 The transactions concerned are contained within the documents referenced in appendix 5.1.1. There are 
more transactions than documents since some of the documents contain details of multiple loans. 
400 P.Oxy. III 511 (AD 103) a loan to meet the tax on an earlier mortgage, P.Mil.Vogl. III 188 (AD 125?) where 




In total therefore more than 230 loans can be identified as being likely to have been for 
consumption rather than production which is around 12% of the total number of transactions. 
Whilst a significant percentage of loans can thus be identified as being for consumption it is certainly 
the case that there are many more consumption loans where the motivation of the borrower is not 
visible. The lack of any pattern to cash loan grant timing during the year would suggest that the bulk 
of cash loans would not be of a productive agricultural nature since there is no peak in the year at 
planting time as seen in kind loans, but of course non-agricultural productive loans would not 
necessarily have been driven by the rhythms of the farming year. Overall, the large number of 
consumption loans is consistent with an agrarian economy where peasant debt was endemic and 
this was certainly the case in later periods in Egypt.401 
There are a number of types of loan which cannot, with confidence, be placed into either category of 
consumption or production. Some loans will have been driven by familial considerations but there 
are only 58 cases within the 1,999 transactions, where the lender and borrower are clearly 
connected by familial ties. However, the rationale for borrowing the money cannot be determined 
simply from the presence of family relationships. The money or goods being borrowed from a family 
member could have been used for productive or consumption purposes.  Monies received on 
deposit also pose a problem, given that if the borrower tied up the money in a productive enterprise 
or spent it on consumption it would not be available for repayment which was at the demand of the 
lender. Perhaps ‘borrowers’ in deposit transactions are best considered as deposit-takers who 
possibly, in turn, provided some non-financial benefit to the lender. 
Large loans, beyond the immediate personal needs of an individual or family could have been driven 
by the borrower’s desire to invest, but they could equally have been required by the borrower in 
order to meet financial or other obligations, such as tax demands, arrears of rent or in order to 
provide funds for dowries or divorce settlements. So no direct correlation between a large loan size 
and an investment motivation can be inferred. Similarly longer term loans could as easily have been 
motivated by a need to pay off consumption debts as opposed to a desire to invest and the term 
may simply reflect the time needed to pay off the debt.  
Turning to productive loans, Finley took the view that a mortgage was a short term personal loan 
occasioned by personal disaster and certainly not a ‘deliberate device for raising money at a low rate 
 
pay land tax, P.Oxy. III 530 (2nd century) borrowing to pay off an existing debt, P.Harr. II 227 (AD 221) where 
the loan relates to shared expenses, P.Tebt. II 418 (3rd century) where a man borrows money from a friend to 
meet his wife’s travel expenses and P.Lond. VI 1915 (c.AD 330-40) where the borrower needs to meet tax 
demands. 
401 In early twentieth-century Egypt 37% of smallholders were in debt - Richards 1982: Fig. 3.15. The exposure 




in order to invest at a higher rate’.402 There are indeed no loans which demonstrate explicit interest 
rate ‘arbitrage’ or ‘gearing’, and this would support Finley’s supposition. However, loans where the 
money was to be invested in productive exercises do exist. The clearest examples are the two 
maritime loans.403 There are also nine loans from landlord to tenant which are embedded within or 
connected to leasing contracts for land and which presumably provided the seed capital in cash and 
kind to enable the tenant to farm the land and to allow both parties to recoup their investment in 
time.404 P.Oxy. III 507 (AD 146) also explicitly states that the borrower was using the money to invest 
in hay which in turn was used as security against the loan. Another rare example of a loan associated 
with an investment is from P.Gen. II 100 (before AD 128) where a loan is directly associated with a 
land transaction on the same day.  
We have almost no examples of people borrowing to finance small businesses but there is one 
delightful third-century Arsinoite case where a father, Sempronius, loans 320 drachmas cash to his 
son, Cephalon, to assist in his son’s shipping business. The father obviously has little faith in his son’s 
business acumen since he opens his letter with ‘to my mind you're not the man your father was..’ 
and continues to berate him throughout the letter in what I hope is a light-hearted manner.405 
Cephalon has, in turn, lent wheat to an employee of theirs in whom his father has even less faith  
than his son and Sempronius suggests that Cephalon retains the loan from the employee’s salary 
writing,  ‘No, if something's owing to you, grab it and take your due - bearing in mind that you too 
are repaying the 320 drachmas you owe me’. This is a clear example of loans oiling the wheels of the 
Roman economy: by loaning the money, the father ensures that the son can run his business: by 
loaning the employee wheat the son keeps the employee alive and the net result is reduced 
frictional costs within the economy by the establishment of a shipping business aiding other market 
participants to speed up the exchange of goods. 
There is also a category of loan where the item being borrowed cannot be consumed by the 
individual concerned and which can therefore be placed into the productive category: P.Mich. II 128 
(AD 46) is a loan of reeds which were presumably to be put to some productive purpose or BGU I 77 
(AD 169-75) which is a loan of a very large amount of grain. However, the largest category which can 
be assigned for productive purposes are the loans in kind and mixed, kind and cash, which as has 
been demonstrated above were largely granted prior to planting and repaid after the harvest. There 
 
402 Finley 1999: 117. 
403 The two maritime loans are SB XIV 11850 (AD 149?) and SB XVIII 13167 (Middle 2nd century).  
404 The documents containing these loans are SPP XX 1 (AD 83-4), SB X 10274 (AD 98), P.Mil.Vogl. II 104 (AD 
127), P.Mich. IX 572 (AD 131),SB XVI 13010 (AD 144), P.Oxy. VIII 1125 (2nd century), P.Kron. 46 (AD 153), 
P.Fouad I 43a (AD 189-90) and P.Oxy.Desc. 13 (3rd century). 




are 305 kind or mixed loans in the data and as shown in Fig. 5.1.10 typically around half of these 
loans were granted in the three months close to the season for cereal planting near Hathyr so 
perhaps around 150 of these loans can be expected to have been of a productive nature.  
One feature which may reflect the purposes they served and shed light on productive loans, is the 
relative numbers of lenders and borrowers. In general, it is rare, with only 3% of transactions, for 
there to be more lenders than borrowers. Most loans, 73%, have the same number of lenders and 
borrowers and 24% have more borrowers than lenders. This pattern could be explained by the 
cooperative needs of individuals. Whilst some of the multiple lenders or borrowers are related by 
marriage or blood ties, there are also many unrelated individuals who either loan or borrow in a 
communal way.  Coming together to borrow money or kind could potentially relate to individuals 
who need literally ‘seed’ capital to farm the land or set up some form of productive exercise. It is 
unlikely to be a consumption loan, since each individual would have their own specific needs.  
Overall therefore borrowers’ motivations, in the limited number of cases where they can be 
inferred, are balanced between consumption and production but we have no significant evidence for 
long term investment or indeed for loans which finance non-agricultural commercial activity.  
 
5.1.9 Individual Motivation – Why Did People Lend? 
The above paragraphs have focussed on what may have driven an individual to borrow, but lender 
motivations also need to be examined. Rather than identifying productive or consumption loans 
which are concepts appropriate for the borrower, we can seek to split the loans between those 
where the lender was seeking to gain financial profit and those where the lender had other motives.  
Turning to the loans where the lender appears explicitly to have been driven by the profit motive, 
the 63 paramone loans where the loan allowed services to be provided to the lender, 30 loans to 
tenants and 15 where usufruct of land or another commercial asset such as a loom were granted to 
the borrower in lieu of interest can be assumed to indicate that the lender was commercially driven 
to seek financial profit even if it was not directly in cash.406 Loans with interest payments would also 
indicate a profit motivation and we will return to this subject in section 5.2 on interest rates but it 
should be noted that there are just over 600 transactions where an interest rate is explicitly charged. 
 





So in total there are more than 700 transactions where we know the lender had a clear profit 
motive. 
There are, however, some categories of loan where the motivation to lend may reasonably be 
assumed not to have been directly related to maximising profit. There are 40 antichretic loans where 
the lender received accommodation of some form. Deposits do not generally contain interest 
provisions and they are repayable at will and thus the interest amount cannot be pre-determined 
and deducted up-front.407 It is my belief that most deposits were non-interest-bearing and if this is 
accepted, it appears reasonable to assume that deposits were made to provide security or for some 
other form of social or other benefit to the depositor/lender rather than direct financial gain. There 
are 192 deposit transactions within the data. As will be noted in the section 5.2 on interest rates 
there are many zero interest loans, and some may well have been for mutual assistance but we 
cannot be sure these do not hide an interest payment.408 Thus in total there are at least 230 
transactions, even excluding all familial loans which may not have been profit-driven, or around 12% 
of the total and thus a substantial body of loans, where profit is unlikely to have been the main 
driver for the lender and this will have had a significant impact on the mechanics of the market. 409 
Though strictly speaking outside the body of evidence that I have examined, in that the sources date 
from the late first century BC, there is, however, explicit evidence for lending for mutual support, 
from Alexandrian documents relating to loan clubs.410 In BGU IV 1133 for instance an arrangement 
similar to that of a modern Credit Union can be seen to operate, where members receive small loans 
to be repaid to the club in instalments. 
One final point concerning lender motivations relates to the practicalities involved in placing 
substantial sums into the credit market. The median size of land purchases, adjusted for inflation 
was 600 drachmas, compared to the median loan size of 160 drachmas. If an individual was seeking 
to invest a substantial sum of, say, in excess of 500 drachmas, then given the loan sizes shown in Fig. 
 
407 It is not inconceivable that a fee was demanded by the depositor upon lending the money, or indeed by the 
borrower for taking responsibility of the safe-keeping and that these fees would not be visible within the 
documentation since there was no reason to document them. However, fees charged by the lender/depositor 
are unlikely to have been common since the lender/depositor could demand repayment the day after the 
deposit had been made and the borrower/deposit-taker would have had no effective benefit from the deposit 
to offset the fee that they had paid. For a discussion of the proposition that deposits were interest-bearing see 
sub-section 5.2.4 of this thesis, Haklai (forthcoming), Roth 1970: 53-6, Tenger 1993: 64-7. 
408 Pestman 1971. 
409 Although many familial loans may well have been made on preferential terms, familial ties did not on 
occasion stop very formal loan contracting being used and of the 27 familial loans where it is stated whether 
interest applied, 13 require interest payments, generally at 12%, though there is one, P.Flor. I 48 (AD 222), at a 
lower rate of 6%.  Loans between family members are listed in appendix 5.1.3. 




5.1.6, they would probably either have to build a portfolio of village loans and effectively become a 
moneylender or seek a single counterparty in a city, possibly using a bank as an intermediary.  
 
5.1.10 Initial Conclusions as to the Nature of the Market 
The discussion above has shown that the credit market in Roman Egypt was not a pure neoclassical 
one. There were significant numbers of ‘distressed’ borrowers seeking consumption loans to meet 
pressing personal needs and lenders who were not driven by a pure profit motive. As with other 
types of financial transactions there were relatively low levels of intermediation by agents and no 
evidence for commercial broking of transactions, although banks often did facilitate loans even if 
they did not generally act as principals. Whilst most market participants were private individuals, 
there were professional principals in the marketplace, namely moneylenders and pawnbrokers. The 
marketplace was largely dominated by men and borrowers were, on average, somewhat older than 
lenders.  
As Lerouxel noted, one innovation of the Roman system was the introduction of institutions 
designed to keep records of real-estate, which facilitated lending secured by specific assets. This 
would have assisted the market to develop in sophistication by providing greater security to lenders 
and improving the information available to a lender. The market was, however, heavily localised 
with little inter-village or inter-city activity. The localised nature of the market may have inhibited 
market competition and geographic integration, but would have improved the information exchange 
between lender and borrower since they may well have known each other personally or have been 
part of the same social network. City to village lending only developed strongly from the second 
century onwards when the size of loans in the cities increased considerably compared to those in 
villages. Although the typical size of loans increased in the second and third centuries there was no 
substantial overall increase in the size of the credit market as the number of transactions decreased, 
particularly in the villages. If Lerouxel is correct in suggesting that the efficiency of the market 
improved with the introduction of institutions that reduced the information deficit in the credit 
market, it was the cities that prospered at the expense of the villages and no significant increase in 
productivity can be inferred. In the period after the jump in prices in AD 274 through to AD 350 cash 
loan sizes showed similar increases to general inflation, and cash loans continued to dominate the 
market even if there was a general increase of the proportion of loans in kind throughout the period 
from the first century to AD 350. The general nature of the market will be discussed further in the 




Section 5.2 Credit Interest Rates  
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to examine the financial return from credit transactions to see 
whether any patterns can be determined. If interest rates within transactions vary according to the 
circumstances of the borrower and lender, rather than being set by custom, then this indicates the 
action of a real marketplace. Furthermore, the circumstances and terms of the transaction may 
imply an understanding, amongst participants within that marketplace, of concepts such as risk and 
return. This section looks at the interest rates, where available, which apply to the 1,999 credit 
transactions which were discussed in section 5.1, with the exclusion of the antichretic housing loans 
which were dealt with in section 4.2. Loans where interest was payable in cash or kind are examined, 
as are deposits.  The 261 cash loans where we know the interest rate charged, other than when it 
appears to be zero, are listed in appendix 5.2.1, the 63 paramone loans where services were 
provided in lieu of interest in appendix 5.2.2, and the 30 loans in kind where interest amounts are 
known in appendix 5.2.3.  
In general, interest was defined in the same medium as the capital lent, so that when the amount 
loaned was in cash, then the interest was also in cash and similarly for loans in kind. The distribution 






Fig. 5.2.1 Proportion of Loans by Type of 
Interest




The gradual trend towards interest in kind as opposed to cash over time is the same as that for the 
principal loaned and this has already been set out in Fig. 5.1.4. 
This section has the following structure. Firstly, paramone loans are discussed and then the 
terminology used within the documents to describe interest payments is explained and institutional 
constraints on interest rates are discussed. Deposits and loans in kind are considered. Then interest 
rates on loans in cash, pre- and post- AD 274, are examined.411 Finally, the financial outcome for 
lenders after allowance for frictional costs and taxes is calculated and conclusions as to interest rate 
structures and patterns are drawn. 
 
5.2.2 Paramone Loans 
Paramone loans were generally framed as a loan of a sum of money together with a contract of 
employment made on the same day between the same parties. The lender was the employer and 
borrower was the employee or a relative who was obliged to remain in service of the employer for a 
set period. An associated type of loans are wet nurse or nursing loans which have somewhat 
different characteristics from other paramones proper since the employment concerned may not be 
full-time in nature and does not require the physical presence of the nurse.412 Some of the loans are 
related to apprenticeship contracts. The 63 loans concerned are listed in appendix 5.2.2 where it will 
be seen that a disproportionate number of the nursing contracts come from the Tebtunis grapheion 
archive. 
Overall these loans range in size from 12 to 654 drachmas, with a median size, re-calibrated to AD 
150 terms, of 100 drachmas. On a 100 drachma loan the financial benefit to the borrower at 12% per 
annum is around one quarter of a drachma per week.  This can be compared with the typical 
unskilled male earnings at AD 150 prices of around five drachmas per week.413 For those contracts 
related to apprenticeships this may not be an entirely unreasonable benefit allowing for the fact that 
the apprentice would be learning a trade.  However, even allowing that some employments such as 
wet-nursing might allow other employment or tasks to be undertaken, the financial benefit from the 
 
411 The date of AD 274 is chosen as a breakpoint since this is the date when prices jumped considerably and 
higher inflation began (see sub-section 2.2.5), which may be expected to have had a significant impact on 
interest rates.  
412 The standard work on these nursing contracts is Montevecchi 1984, but also see Lerouxel 2016: 61-3 and 
Ratzan 2015: 203-8. 




perspective of the employee seems very low. It may well be that some of these loans should be 
understood to be salary advances even though this is not stated in the documentation. 
Turning to the effective financial gain from the lender’s perspective, if these truly were loans rather 
than salary advances, then, in contrast, the effective gain appears to be considerable. For instance, 
the net financial benefit for a lender who took an abandoned infant and had it reared by a wet nurse 
would be a slave of some value. Appendix 2.1.6 details the prices of slaves where, for instance, a 
slave aged around three years is sold for 300 drachmas.414 It would be possible to estimate the net 
profit to the slave owner but this calculation lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Lerouxel saw the proportion of paramone loans decreasing over time and viewed this as a sign of 
increasing monetisation particularly in the villages.415  The data from my database would not 
necessarily support this conclusion since although there are relatively few paramone loans overall, if 
the exceptional nursing loans of the Tebtunis grapheion are not included, they continue to appear 
with similar frequency throughout the period from AD 1 to 350. 
 
5.2.3 Interest Rate Terminology and Constraints 
Interest rates were defined in monthly terms and, as will be seen, the most commonly cited interest 
rate is one drachma per mina per month. As a mina was 100 drachmas and the interest was typically 
stated to be payable on the repayment of the capital, this would mean that if you borrowed 100 
drachmas for a year, the amount repayable would be 112 drachmas and the annualised interest rate 
would be 12% in modern terms.416 It was therefore possible, since all loans, as opposed to deposits, 
were for a fixed period, for both lender and borrower to understand exactly how much would be 
repaid, from the outset, and there was no need for either party to be able to multiply or divide or 
use percentages to understand the financial impact of the transaction.417  
Many individuals were perfectly familiar with the details of calculating interest and were able to 
compare different loans to see which were more, or less, favourable. The ability to compare loans of 
different terms, durations and amounts is a critical pre-condition for the exercise of financial 
 
414 BGU III 859 (AD 161-3). 
415 Lerouxel 2016: 59. 
416 Note that one drachma per mina per month is not exactly equivalent to 12% when the term is not exactly a 
year but for the sake of simplicity, all loans which have interest payable at a drachma per mina per month are 
treated as being at 12% irrespective of the term, and a similar approach is taken for loans at other rates of 
interest. 





rationality, within a credit market, as I have defined it in sub-section 1.1. See P.Kellis I 90 (4th 
century) for a school exercise on interest calculations which I suspect would stump most adults in 
modern-day UK. In another example, the student is asked to determine the amount of a missing 
feature of a loan if the other elements are known:  
 ‘The monthly interest on 100 drachmas is two drachmas three obols; let four months pass, and the 
principal be 200 drachmas; how much is the interest?’418 
The concept of compound interest is not mentioned explicitly in the loans, but some individuals 
were aware of the impact on risk and return when interest is payable only on repayment.  Examples 
include P.Oxy. III 506 (AD 143) where a relatively long-term loan includes the provision that interest 
is payable at the end of each year and O.Stras. II 902 (AD 205) where there are recalculations of 
interest and principal when partial repayments are made, ensuring that the interest is fair for both 
parties. Another example is P.Genova II 62 (AD 98) where the lender insists on repayment of interest 
but not capital on a monthly basis broadly achieving the same financial result as charging compound 
interest, assuming interest is reinvested, and with a lower risk as to default. We also have examples 
of loans being ‘rolled over’ at the end of a term where the new capital includes the interest accrued, 
for instance P.Sarap. 14 (AD 103) where 107 drachmas is the amount of the new loan which is rolled 
over from an original loan documented in P.Sarap. 13 (AD 102) of 100 drachmas some  months 
previously.419 By rolling over loans into a new transaction rather than by simply extending the 
original loan, the lender achieves some of the benefits of compound interest. At 12% this would 
mean in this example 1.07 drachmas of interest for each month rather than one drachma as per the 
original loan if it had simply been extended. 
The Gnomon of the Idios Logos, an official document providing guidance as to fiscal practice in 
Roman Egypt, had a provision with regard to the maximum interest on cash loans which was legally 
allowable. This rate was 12% and lower than the 24% applicable in Ptolemaic Egypt.420 This 12% rate 
probably dates back to the later republic and the cap on interest rates evidenced by the decrees of 
the senate and the tribunes in 51 or 50 BC.421  There was a long-standing concern of viewing usury at 
higher rates as undesirable, as evidenced in Cicero’s prosecution of Verres.422 In Roman Egypt, there 
was also a requirement that the total interest payable should not exceed the principal loaned which 
is attested in a petition of AD 158-9, P.Fouad I 26, and in the reduction in interest payments, taken 
 
418 P. Mich. III 145 (early 2nd century). 
419 See Rathbone & Temin 2008: 377 for evidence of this practice in the wider Roman world. 
420 Taubenschlag 1955: 260. For a discussion of the evidence for Roman Italy see Andreau 2000. 
421 See Cic. Att. 5.21 and Dio. Cass. 41.37.2 for the evidence for the decrees. See Kay 2014: 114, 255-6, 260 for 
discussion of limits and usury.  




by the lender in SB VIII 9923 (AD 175-6) or P.Tebt. II 397 (AD 198), to ensure that the interest did not 
exceed the principal.423  Measures which protected borrowers made sound economic sense from the 
perspective of the Roman state, since excessive interest rates would typically result in more failures 
of smallholders and tenants and a consequent reduction in agricultural output and tax take.424 There 




A deposit, paratheke, differed from a loan in that it generally did not have a set date for repayment, 
but rather was to be repaid at the demand of the lender. The paratheke in Roman Egypt had some 
similarities to the Latin depositum but it was a contractual formula rather than a contract purely for 
safekeeping and therefore it could be used in a wider set of circumstances.425 Haklai and Roth both 
suggest that interest applied on deposits but I would adopt a contrary view, more aligned with 
Tenger.426 Firstly there are no mentions of interest applying in deposit contracts. Secondly, interest 
cannot have been included upfront since a deposit is repayable at the demand of the lender and 
thus if it were included and the lender demanded repayment immediately, then the borrower would 
have made an immediate and irretrievable loss of the amount of the interest. Therefore, interest can 
only have been payable at the repayment of the deposit. But we have no examples of deposit 
repayment documents mentioning interest. Also, because the term is unknown, the financial liability 
in drachmas of the borrower is impossible to calculate at the outset, something which is always 
known for fixed term loans. This open-ended liability, whose calculation may have been beyond the 
mathematical skills of the borrower, would make accepting an interest-bearing deposit unattractive. 
For the above reasons I believe that deposits should be taken as they are recorded, a financial 
transaction where one party places a financial asset in the care of another without expectation of 




423 See SB XX 14401 (AD 147) as described in sub-section 5.2.10 for further evidence of legal constraints. 
424 See Kelly forthcoming b which models the impact of interest rate levels on farming families in Roman Egypt.  
425 See Haklai (forthcoming). 




5.2.5 Interest Rates on Loans in Kind427  
There is a difficulty of interpretation for loans in kind which is related to how the interest, which is 
typically defined as being part of the capital lent, is described and scholars have differed in their 
interpretation of the description.428 Sometimes interest is described as ‘the extra half’ and 
sometimes ‘the extra third’. In the first case, this could be interpreted as that the interest is half of 
the capital lent, for instance, that if four artabas are lent, that the ‘extra half’ is two and thus six 
artabas are the stated amount of the loan and the amount to be repaid and thus the interest rate is 
50%. It could, however, also be considered that the ‘extra half’ relates to the amount repaid and that 
thus, if the amount repaid is six artabas, the interest is three artabas and the interest rate in the case 
above is thus 100%. Similarly, when the description refers to the extra third, then the rate could be 
interpreted as 33%, following the first logic or 50% following the second. Luckily, we have a number 
of cases where the scribe has been specific in identifying the proportion and the actual amount of 
the interest element of the loan and these are set out in appendix 5.2.3. Where the amount of the 
loan is not explicit, or cannot be deduced from the context of the loan, as in P.Lond. III 1215, I have 
adopted the first approach interpreting ‘extra half’ as 50% and ‘extra third’ as 33% since this seems 
more consistent with the evidence from those loans where the amount lent and repaid is explicitly 
stated. 
The data on interest rates in loans in kind are set out in appendix 5.2.3. Loans in kind without 
interest have not been included in this appendix, but these did exist and the same issues as to the 
real nature of zero interest loans as will be discussed below for cash loans apply.429 Interest rates 
over the duration of the loan have a median rate of 50%, with 17 of the 26 loans being at 50%, eight 
at 33% and the remainder at other rates. Since loans were almost universally repayable after the 
harvest it would appear likely that for any available capital in kind a lender would only have one 
opportunity to make a loan in kind per year. Therefore these interest rates can be regarded as 
annual rates when any comparison is made with other opportunities to obtain a return on capital 
employed.430 Pestman, in what may have been an attempt at simplification to suit his ‘primer’ 
audience, states that ‘Interest on loan in kind is always 50 per cent’, but the data in the appendix 
show this is not always the case.431 Lerouxel adopts a contrary position and states that it is not 
 
427 I have not included any examples of sales on delivery/advance sales since although they may include what 
Bagnall describes as ‘loans in cash with repayment in kind’, this is by no means clear in most cases. Bagnall 
1977: 94-5.  
428 For an example of a difference in interpretation see Johnson 1936: 448-9 re: P.Lond. III 1215. 
429 See Foraboschi & Gara 1981: 336 and Lerouxel 2016: 303. 
430 Contra Lerouxel who preferred not to speak of interest rates on loans in kind but rather of supplements: 
Lerouxel 2016: 302. 




possible to define a ‘standard’ rate of interest. I believe that the reality lies somewhere between 
these two extremes but that typically the effective annual interest rate on loans in kind was either 
33% or 50%. 
The higher rate of interest payable on loans in kind compared to cash reflects the risk that the lender 
is taking when he lends what is typically seed to provide the next year’s harvest and the repayment 
of the loan. There is a significant likelihood that the harvest will fail and the borrower will be unable 
to repay the loan and this concentrated risk, linked to a specific event, makes the requirement to 
pay a higher interest rate than general cash loans perfectly rational.432 However, we cannot assess 
whether it is a ‘better’ investment to lend kind rather than cash without numerically assessing the 
risks concerned and this is done in chapter 6. Over time the proportion of loans in kind increases as a 
share of all loans increases as was shown in Fig. 5.1.4, however, I can see no particular trend as to 
the level of interest rates. Note that it is entirely rational that the interest rates on loans in kind do 
not follow the trend we will see in cash loans to increase in the fourth century given that loans in 
kind are protected against inflation since the capital and interest retain their real value. Finally, we 
have too few mixed loans to analyse these in any detail, but the different elements of the loans 
seem generally to attract the same interest rates as in separate cash and kind loans.  
    
5.2.6 Cash Interest Rates over Time 
The documents used are the same as those described in section 5.1 and which are listed in appendix 
D.4. The split of this data by interest rate for cash loans is shown in Fig. 5.2.2, split pre- and post- AD 
274 to reflect different inflationary conditions. The 0% category only includes loans where the 
capital to be returned is explicitly that borrowed and no mention is made of interest.  The category 
of loans bearing interest at an unknown rate includes those where the interest rate is unclear due to 
the state of preservation of the text, and those where the loan is stated to be interest-bearing but 
no interest rate is stated. The loans where interest rates are explicitly stated, or can be calculated, 




432 The risk may be mitigated if the state of the Nile flood is known at the time of the loan. From the 
borrower’s perspective the high interest rate payable is affordable if the harvest is good, and repayment is 
probably irrelevant if the harvest fails since the farmer will struggle to feed their family. See Kelly forthcoming 










0% 71 19 90 
6% or less 16 1 17 
6% to 12% 21 0 21 
12% 194 4 198 
Above 12% 25 6 31 
Bearing interest at unknown 
rate 268 23 291 
 
After AD 274, low interest rate loans disappear, and a relative increase in the numbers of seemingly 
zero interest loans could indicate an increased tendency to disguise interest rates which were above 
the legal maximum of 12%, by deducting interest up-front. This would be consistent with the 
predominance of high interest rates in this period and is discussed further in the next sub-section. 
 
5.2.7 Interest Rates by Size, Duration, Location, Security and Intermediation 
It is clear from Fig. 5.2.2 that interest rates were sometimes negotiable and varied according to 
circumstances even if in the majority of cases the stated interest rate was 12%. The question as to 
whether interest rates differed according to the size of the loan is addressed in Fig.5.2.3, all loan 
amounts having been re-calibrated to AD 150 real values allowing for general inflation. 
Fig. 5.2.3 Pre-AD 274 Size of Loan by Interest Rate 
Interest Rate Average loan (dr.) Median loan (dr.) 
Under 12% n=34 2,488  1,547  
12% n=162 1,166  274  
Over 12% n=24 308  111  
 
There is a clear inverse relationship between the size of the loans concerned and the interest rate 
chargeable. One further question that can be posed is whether interest rates varied according to the 
duration of the loan. Worp posed a specific question in 1995 as ‘nowadays short terms e.g. for 
bridging finance are usually at a higher % annualised than long term loans. Was the same practised 
in Antiquity?’433 In posing this question he conflated the duration of a loan and its relative security. 
At the beginning of the year when this question was posed, US treasury yields were 5.95% over 
 




three months, 7.91% over five years and 8.07% over 20 years.434 This increasing ‘yield curve’ 
relationship is still the norm applicable today in modern economies: the longer the duration of the 
loan, the higher the rate of interest. For a borrower of the same reliability, who provides the same 
security, lenders acting as investors typically demand a higher interest rate for tying up their money 
for a longer period.435 However, in the Egyptian data there is no evidence that higher interest rates 
were demanded for longer loans, indeed as will be noted below, it is the loans with low interest 
rates which tend to be of a longer duration.  
Turning to the analysis of loans by location for those loans where the interest rate is not either zero 
or 12%, that is loans where a pricing decision was made within some form of financial market, there 
is a concentration of loans in the cities rather than villages. Some 37 loans of this type can be 
identified in the period up to AD 274 but only two can be given a secure village provenance, which is 
particularly striking given that most of our dataset is from villages rather than cities.  This, combined 
with the data on relative sizes of loans, would suggest that financial transactions of a market nature, 
which did not rely on the conventional rate of 12%, were concentrated in the cities rather than the 
villages. We do have five examples of nuanced higher interest rates of different dates from villages, 
however three of the cases are from the early first century, at 18%, and as discussed in sub-section 
5.2.10 below are likely to simply be hangovers from Ptolemaic practice.436 
Turning to the impact of the provision of specific security on financial behaviour, this is an area that 
can provide some clues as to any understanding of risk. An indicator of a considered approach to 
these issues would be if we could discern whether loans with security provided on a specific asset, 
rather than a general lien against the assets of the borrower or reliance on the law on deposits, 
varied by either the size of the loan or the interest rate charged. Dealing first with the size of the 
loan, if the requirement for specific security was more common for larger loans than smaller ones 
then this would indicate an understanding among lenders of the size of their risk and of the need for 
suitable mitigation of such risk through the enhanced ability to seize specific assets. An 
understanding of the risk of a borrower defaulting on the loan is clear from the evidence shown in 
appendix 5.2.1. Loans without security have a median size, re-calibrated for general inflation to AD 
150 levels, of 195 drachmas, yet for the loans where specific security was provided the average size 
is 675 drachmas. 
 
434 US Treasury Department, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=1995, (accessed 19 November 2018). 
435 Though this is by no means an immutable law, and the yield curve can invert, dependent on economic 
conditions and expectations, see Homer 1977: 386, chart 41 for US yield curves over the first 70 years of the 
20th century. 




As regards a relationship between the provision of specific security and the interest rate charged, we 
have already noted above that loans at low interest rates are more commonly secured by a specific 
asset and although this effect is somewhat swamped by the number of 12% loans present in both 
categories, the average interest rate for mortgages is lower than that for unsecured loans. Thus, it 
would appear that when specific security was supplied by the borrower this may have allowed them 
to negotiate a lower interest rate. 
For the rate of interest charged when intermediaries are involved there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest any pattern for loans involving agents and managers. I have not examined the position of 
banks however. A special case of intermediation is that of pawnbrokers where the lender had the 
security of the physical possession of a pledged item. Here, despite the additional security, as we will 
see the interest rate charged was generally very high, presumably reflecting the need of the 
individual for cash. It may also reflect either a reluctance to lend to the individual at ‘legal’ rates by 
the professional lender, based on their assessment of the counterparty risk and a desire to maximise 
profit, or a general shortage in the supply of capital available to lend. 
 
5.2.8 Zero Interest Loans to AD 274 
Loans with apparently no interest applying can be sub-divided into those which genuinely had no 
interest payable, and those which had interest which was hidden, for instance by the amount stated 
as lent being smaller than the loan actually provided, the difference being the interest charged.  
Occasionally interest is stated to be included in the amount lent, for example in P.Oslo II 39 (AD 146), 
or the opposite is explicitly noted to be the case by use of the phrase that ‘nothing had been added’ 
to the capital as in P.Ups.Frid. 3 (AD 122). I would take this phrase to refer to the fact that the 
amount of the loan stated in the document was equal to that actually provided and no interest 
figure had been added to the stated loan amount.437 The fact that the scribe sometimes felt it 
necessary to state that nothing was added at source lends weight to the view that the deduction of 
interest at the outset was a well-known practice.  
Dealing with loans where it is explicitly stated that there is no interest applying by inclusion of the 
term atokou, or without interest, Pestman has examined loans from the Ptolemaic period for 
evidence of goodwill but concludes that the data are ‘too light in weight to give credence to the view 
that all ἀτ̣όκου loans were always made out of goodwill’.438 Whether in the Ptolemaic or Roman 
 
437 I am not convinced by Lerouxel’s arguments that loans which state that nothing has been added and where 
there is no interest mentioned should be considered as loans with interest – Lerouxel 2012a: 167-8. 




period, there are, however, many reasons why a loan with no interest should have been made for 
goodwill purposes, and it should be noted that ‘goodwill’ in modern accounting terms is an 
intangible, often substantial, asset within corporate accounts. A loan at zero interest may have been 
made not only because of family or friendship ties but also because of other past or future mutual 
obligations, including those related to social or prestige capital. In general, I would agree with 
Andreau that there is no need to assume that all zero interest loans hid high interest rates, though 
as noted in sub-section 5.2.6 this practice may have been more common after AD 274.439  
It is worth looking in a little more detail at the nature of the 0% loans and deposits in comparison 
with those loans where we know interest rates applied. The pre-AD 274 distributions by loan size, 
with loan amounts re-calibrated to AD 150 values, are shown in Fig. 5.2.4 and Fig. 5.2.5. The first 
figure compares the distribution of 0% loans and deposits and they have a very similar distribution 
which would support a proposition that they had common features, especially when the distribution 
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Zero interest transactions, whether loans or deposits, are largely of a small size of under 250 
drachmas with many under 100 drachmas. However, as shown in Fig. 5.2.5, the peak in loans which 
we know include interest is in large loans above 700 drachmas. In short, the 0% transactions, 
whether loans or deposits, constitute a fundamentally different typology of transaction and thus 
probably serve a different purpose than those which have an interest rate. 
 
5.2.9 Low Interest Loans to AD 274 
Loans at low interest rates share four characteristics in that they: are generally for large amounts, 
have a longer duration than normal, more frequently require specific security to be pledged and 
tend to be contracted in cities. The median size of pre-AD 274 loans is 160 drachmas, compared to 
the 1,547 drachmas shown in Fig. 5.2.3.440 These loans tend to be of a longer duration than loans 
generally. Six of the 17 transactions where the duration is known, or around 35%, have durations of 
greater than one year, compared to the overall proportion of longer loans which is 9%.441  The bulk 
of the low interest loans where we know whether or not security was provided are secured against 
specific property: 77% or 17 out of 22. This was achieved either through the pawning of relatively 
valuable portable goods or through the pledging or mortgaging of real-estate. This proportion is 
somewhat higher than the proportion of all loans where we know the interest rate and which are 
secured against specific property, which is 58%. The final feature of these loans is that they are 
 
440 See sub-section 5.1.4. 
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almost universally contracted in cities. Of the 20 loans where the location of the principals can be 
deduced, either since it is explicitly stated or because of the provenance of the document, 17 solely 
involve individuals from cities, one is a loan from someone resident in Oxyrhynchus to a villager, one 
is a pawnbroker loan from Philadelphia at just below 12% and the last is between two military 
colleagues.442  So low interest rate loans tend to be for large amounts, secured against specific 
property, for longer than typical duration and are a phenomenon of the city not the village. 
Lewis has claimed that the lower interest rate, generally 6% to 8%, that I have identified for larger 
amount city-based loans, may be considered as ‘an accommodation between friends’.443 Contracting 
with a known counter-party for a long period, with specific security and for a large amount is an 
attractive proposition. When compared to placing numerous small unsecured, short term, loans with 
possibly distant, village-based, unknown counterparties a lender may well have been happy to 
sacrifice some interest to obtain a more secure and stable return. The features identified for these 
loans is consistent with the conclusion that they were commercial arrangements within a relatively 
sophisticated financial market and, an argument against Lewis’s proposal is that ‘favours’ between 
friends would not require specific security. 
 
5.2.10 12% Interest Loans to AD 274  
Turning to loans at 12%, it may be reasonable to assume, as Lerouxel did for certain periods, that 
12% was the rate applying to those loans where a loan is explicitly stated as being entokou or 
‘interest bearing’ but despite the source being relatively complete, there is no rate given, as for 
example in BGU XI 2045 (AD 215), since the relatively commonplace rate of 12% would be 
understood by all parties to apply. This was described by Pestman as the ‘customary’ rate of 
interest.444  However, there is no certainty that 12% always applied to these cases. 
Also, it does not seem reasonable to assume, as Claytor did, that when the word entokou appears in 
an entry in abstracts of contracts in an official register, not the full document, that 12% is likely to 
apply.445 Indeed, in the case that Claytor analysed, P.Fay. 344 (2nd century), we have six examples 
where the loan is described as entokou but only one where a 12% interest rate is explicitly cited and 
the fact that this loan was differentiated from the others would suggest that the 12% rate did not 
apply to the other six. There is also a tendency amongst scholars to overstate the prevalence of the 
 
442 P.Oxy. III 506 (AD 143), SB VIII 9834 (AD 200-229) and C.Ep.Lat. 13 (AD 27) respectively. 
443 Lewis 1983: 45. 
444 Lerouxel 2012a: 171, Pestman 1971: 16. 




12% rate.446 For instance, Nelson stated that 12% ‘is the regular rate of interest, as specified in 
paragraph 15 of the Gnomon of the Idios Logos and as attested in hundreds of loan agreements’.447 
12% is not the ‘regular’ rate of interest in the Gnomon, but the maximum rate above which legal 
penalties would apply and there are fewer than 200 cash loans where a 12% rate is stated.448 In 
A.H.M. Jones’ view, the chief evidential value of a law is proving ‘that the abuses which they were 
intended to remove were known to the central government’.449  In this context it would imply that 
rates were above 12% for a considerable time, since this law appears to have been in place 
throughout the first 300 years of Roman rule in Egypt. Nor does it appear reasonable to me to 
suppose as Schwartz did, for P.Sarap. 13 to 21, that in all cases if there is no interest stated that 
interest at 12% was deducted at outset.450  
It will also be noted that the application of a 12% interest rate to small amounts of money would 
have been impossible in practice. Consider P.Fay. 344g, a loan of 12 drachmas where the interest 
rate is unknown and a duration from Tybi to Pauni - a period of five months. Using percentages and 
decimals it is relatively easy for us to calculate the amount payable, assuming simple interest, at 
Pauni as 12+ 5*12/100= 12.6, but there was no equivalent to 12.6 in the fractional world of 
drachmas, obols where there were six or seven to the drachma, and chalci where there were eight 
to an obol. There is no mathematical way of paying the interest, 0.6 drachmas, using obols and 
chalci, and thus the rate for this and similar loans cannot have been exactly 12%, though an 
approximate payment can, of course, be made. In summary, 12% is certainly the most common cash 
rate we can identify, but its ubiquity can be overstated. 
 
5.2.11 High Interest Loans to AD 274 
Turning to high interest rates, those in excess of 12%, as shown in fig. 5.2.5 these loans are smaller 
than average in size. Looking at these loans in more detail, there are five loans in the earlier part of 
the period, all before AD 30, where the interest rate is 18%. It has been suggested that these are 
 
446 Most recently, Lerouxel viewed the absence of variation in interest rates as one of the major features of the 
credit market in Roman Egypt. Lerouxel 2016: 340.  
447 Nelson 1999: 19. 
448 Homer 1977: 51. 
449 Jones 1964: I, viii. 




‘hang-overs’ from Ptolemaic practice, where the maximum legal interest rate was 24%, and this 
could indeed be the case.451 The other high interest loans are as follows:452 
- P.Oxy. LXXV 5052 (AD 86-7) which is a loan of 40 drachmas for two years at 15%. 
- P.Sarap. 13 (AD 102) a loan of 100 drachmas where the editor assumes that this loan is at 12% but 
since the loan rolls over into a new loan of 107 drachmas in P.Sarap. 14 (AD 103) the interest 
payable is seven drachmas for a period of around five and a half months which equates to an 
interest rate of 15%. 
- P.Lond. II 202 (AD 98-117) which is a moneylender’s account with details of three loans: 1,500 
drachmas at 12%, 1,000 drachmas at 18% and 260 drachmas at 22%. 
- P.Mil.Vogl. III 188 (AD 125?) which is an account of priests’ expenses where the editor states that 
the interest is 3% or ‘half the normal’. However, in line 20 to 21 the text reads that the interest for 
three months on 300 drachmas is six drachmas per month which is 18 drachmas in total. This would 
imply that the interest rate is 24%. 
- PSI XVII 1689 (2nd century) a petition including evidence for lending at 36%.  
- SB XVI 12421 (2nd century) which is a pawnbroker’s account with a number of entries and where 
the interest rate on two of the loans can be identified: 40% on a loan of eight drachmas for three 
months in line 20 and 22% on a loan of 11 drachmas for an unknown period in lines 22 and 27. A 
further interest rate of 19% is possible if the payment of eight obols in relation to a period of three 
months in line 15 is interpreted as concerning a previously mentioned loan of 28 drachmas. 
- P.Fouad I 26 (AD 158-9) where a moneylender provides at least two loans at 48%. 
- P.Oxy. VIII 1132 (c.AD 162) which relates to a loan of 600 drachmas at 24% being paid off in 
advance of its original term.453 
- P.Mert. I 23 (late 2nd century) a letter which mentions a loan of 500 drachmas at 48% in a 
transaction connected to a sale of two arouras of land.  
- P.Oxy. I 114 (2nd or 3rd century) a letter which mentions a loan of 200 drachmas from a pawnbroker 
at a rate of a ‘stater’ or 48%. 
 
451 See Finckh 1962: 28-9. SB I 5243 (AD 7), BGU I 189 (AD 7), P.Corn. 6 (AD 17), P.Mich. V 336 (AD 27), P.Lond. 
III 1273 (AD 28-9) are the loans concerned.  
452 Excluded from this list is P.Flor. I 72 (AD 128-9), a mixed loan of 16 drachmas and one and one third artabas 
of barley, where the editor believes that an additional one third was payable on both elements of the loan. 
Since the loan was only for around nine months this would equate to an annualised interest rate on the cash 
element of 44% in simple terms. However, I cannot see that the evidence for the editor’s interpretation is 
sufficiently strong to include this transaction. 
453 Note that Bogaert stated that given the interest rate that this loan would originally have been for a short 





- P.Prag. III 214 (2nd or 3rd century) a moneylender’s account where one of the loans is for 40 
drachmas at an interest rate of 45%. 
- PSI XVII 1707 (3rd century) a pawnbroker’s accounts where the editor identifies interest rates for 
four loans: line 7 - 28 drachmas at 24.5%, line 8 – 40 drachmas at 21.4% or 42.9%, line 16 – 100 
drachmas at 13.7% and line 19 – 40 drachmas at 35.7%. The fractional and varied nature of the 
interest rates from one lender is striking, but the uncertainty of the estimates due to the 
fragmentary nature of the text should be borne in mind. 
 
Another document which implies the existence of higher interest loans is P.Mich. III 145 (early 2nd 
century) which is a school exercise involving interest at 18%. As noted above, it is probable that 
there were other loans where interest at rates above 12% was deducted from the original capital, 
given the illegality of the practice, but the highest visible interest rates seem to be associated with 
pawnbroker or moneylender activity although stated interest rates between individuals do 
occasionally exceed 12%. Evidence for moneylender activity can also be seen within SB XX 14401, a 
petition from AD 147, where Ptolemaios complains about the illegal activities of his namesake: 
‘Ptolemaios, son of a certain Pappus ex-gymnasiarch, from the same Arsinoite nome, reckless in his 
conduct and violent, leading the life of a moneylender and committing every impious and forbidden 
act, by demanding interest at the rate of a stater per mina per month by virtue of the power he has 
in the nome, in disregard of the prefects' decisions and the ordinances of the emperors…. by 
descending into the villages with a gang and committing very many acts of outrage against those he 
lights upon….if ever we want to make an approach to the strategus about his violence, up until now 
he has been dragging the present matters before the office of the strategus and it is they who sit in 
council with the judge. As a result of this we are not getting legal satisfaction. And I shall lay 
evidence how having made a loan in one village, by successively getting three and a half obols as 
interest at a stater per mina per month, he is collecting annually half as much again. You will also 
find from others that he has got eight times the capital from someone else in a few years, although it 
is forbidden for anyone to exact more interest than the sum of the capital over the whole period of 
the loan….’ 
Ptolemaios requests the Epistrategus to whom the petition is addressed ‘that you may order written 
instructions to be sent to the strategus of the meris of Heracleides so that I may be kept free from 
threats and acts of outrage by Ptolemaios, and that the interest (which) I have paid in excess of a 
drachma per mina per month be credited for me against the principal, and if it is apparent that I owe 




Whilst the figures in the petition above may be unreliable in that the petitioner is making the 
strongest case he can, this petition shows that high interest moneylending existed and that it was 
also possible to seek legal redress even against those of relatively high local social status. Other than 
pawnbroker loans, where portable items came into possession of the lender as security, there are no 
high interest loans where real-estate is provided as a specific security or mortgage. The high interest 
loans are spread fairly evenly over the period and among the Arsinoite, Oxyrhynchite and other 
nomes in both cities and villages and thus this seems to be a limited but widespread practice in 
Roman Egypt. It should be noted that many of the individuals who needed to use pawnbrokers and 
pay high interest rates were female.454 
When looking at the loans at rates above 12% across the Empire, Andreau states, and Temin 
supports him, that ‘one hardly ever comes across loans at 15, 16 or 18...If the rate rose above 12…., 
it soared straight to 24, 48 or even 60 percent’.455 However, when we move away from the elite 
sources relied upon by Andreau, we find more loans at between 12% and 23% than at 24%. In both 
high and low interest loans although there is a preference for multiples of 12 and simple fractions, 
e.g. 6%, 8%, 18%, 24%, we also find more nuanced rates such as 3% (P.Oxy. I 98), 7% (P.IFAO I 12) 
and 22% (P.Lond. II 202). Overall, given the number of loans which are not at 12%, I cannot therefore 
agree with Lerouxel that up until AD 275 the interest rate almost never varied and was 12%.456 
 
5.2.12 Cash Interest Rates after AD 274 
When we look at the period after the jump in prices in AD 274 it is clear from the limited data in 
appendix 5.2.1 that interest rates in the fourth century increased substantially, as did the amounts 
of the loans themselves. I have not included the interest rates deduced by Worp in the introduction 
to P.Kellis 40 to 47 since the methodology is highly questionable as it is based on a number of 
debatable assumptions, one of which is that the interest was deducted from the initial amount in all 
cases. 
The last firmly dated loan at 12% comes from AD 286-7 which might suggest that individuals took a 
little time to adjust to the new financial realities of high inflation, or that there was a brief period of 
price stability.457 In the first half of the fourth century we have only three cash loans with specified 
 
454 See for instance SB XVI 12421 (2nd century) for a pawnbroker’s book of loans where all the borrowers are 
female. 
455 Andreau 1999: 94, Temin 2001: 15. 
456 Lerouxel 2012b: 949. 




interest rates which vary from 20% to 97% per annum, and there is an increased prevalence of zero 
interest loans which could hide higher interest rates. The fourth-century school exercise, P.Kellis. I 
90, mentioned above, uses an interest rate of 72%, which compares with the equivalent early 
second-century exercise, P.Mich. III 145 when interest rates of 18% were being modelled. Economic 
conditions had moved on and so had practice and even though we have relatively few examples of 
interest rates they clearly show a substantial and financially rational change in practice reflecting 
inflationary conditions.  
 
5.2.13 Modelling Financial Outcomes  
Modelling of financial outcomes for cash loans is only reasonably secure for the period prior to AD 
274 when prices are relatively stable. We are also constrained by the availability of data and by the 
uncertainty of the actual interest rates potentially hidden within loans seemingly at zero interest or 
where the interest rate is not specified. There are three types of loan, where we know both the 
amount and where the interest rate is explicitly stated and is not zero, that are capable of being 
modelled: cash mortgages, unsecured cash loans and loans in kind. One other category of loan that 
could be modelled is loans backed by fiduciary sales, but the uncertainty as regards the applicability 
of sales tax of 10% and who would be responsible for any such tax payments, is too great to come to 
firm conclusions.458 
Modelling requires assumptions and the most important set of assumptions for all types of 
transaction are frictional transaction costs. Lerouxel separates transaction costs in credit markets 
into three types: type 1 – initial costs on recording and registering and taxation; type 2 – the cost of 
intermediation or the ‘search costs associated with creditors and debtors finding each other’; and 
type 3 – the costs associated with a debtor’s default.459  Type 2 search costs are not capable of 
quantification and may be zero when the parties are known to each other as the analysis in sub-
section 5.1.7 would suggest. I would agree with Lerouxel that it is difficult to know whether 
intermediation occurred and the costs associated with any intermediation but there is no direct 
evidence for these costs existing.460  Type 3 costs will be dealt with in chapter 6.  
Type 1 costs certainly did exist and varied by category of loan. When a mortgage was agreed, there 
were three costs arising: scribe costs, registration costs and taxes. As regards scribe and registration 
 
458 Johnson 1936: 558. The sales tax issue is of considerably greater importance than when assessing returns 
on real-estate investment since there is no ability to amortise these costs over a significant period. 
459 Lerouxel 2015: 165. 




costs, Lerouxel suggests that since both parties were likely to have ‘received a copy of the contract, 
it is reasonable to assume that the fee…was split and paid jointly’. I follow this assumption and 
assume that the fee was split 50/50 between lender and borrower.461  I have assumed that on 
average the scribe and registration costs were 12 drachmas, as is the case in P.Mich. V 238 l.17-8 (AD 
46), but noting that the costs will have depended on how many copies were required and that 
having the mortgage registered was only an option for the lender, as shown in P.Oxy. III 506 (AD 
143). The other type 1 costs associated with a mortgage are taxes, and a conveyancing tax 
amounting to 2% of the value of the loan applied and I have assumed that this is a cost for the 
lender.462 The mortgage conveyancing tax was renewable and paid each year for longer duration 
loans and I have assumed that the full 2% tax was payable even if the term of the loan was less than 
one year.463 For unsecured cash loans and loans in kind, I have assumed that the scribe costs were 
somewhat less, at four drachmas, than for mortgages, reflecting the fact that the documentation 
was simpler.464 I have assumed that these were also split 50/50 between lender and borrower. I do 
not believe that there would have been any obligatory registration fees payable or taxes. I have 
assumed that for loans in kind, any transportation costs were met by the borrower since the loans 
usually contain provisions for the repayment to be made by the borrower at a specified place. 
Since I have only modelled transactions where the interest rate is known, no assumption needs to be 
made for this or other known elements such as the level of security provided and the amount of the 
loan. 465 In most cases we also know the term of the transaction. Where the interest rate and 
amount are known but the term is unknown, I have assumed it is one year. Where the term is known 
to be under a year but where the exact number of months is unknown, I have assumed six months. 
Where it is necessary to model the cash value of barley and wheat in loans in kind, to compare with 
type 1 cash costs, the same assumptions as to values per artaba over time as in sub-section 3.2.15 
have been made. 
The distribution of returns based on the mortgage cash transactions, the unsecured cash loans and 
the in-kind loans which pre-date AD 274, where we have sufficient data to model outcomes, is 
shown in Fig. 5.2.6. The data which underlie these returns are listed in appendices 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. 
 
461 Lerouxel 2015: 166. 
462 Lerouxel stated that it is certain that the lender alone paid this tax: Lerouxel 2015: 167 and that is the 
general impression that the papyri present but there is at least one exception: P.Oxy. II 348 (late 1st century) 
where the debtor pays the tax. 
463 Lerouxel 2015: 167. 
464 Based on the median calculated from the Tebtunis grapheion register: Yitfach 2015a: 155, n37.   
465 Where we know the interest rate but not the amount loaned I have assumed that the small frictional costs 





The effective rate of return on mortgage loans is essentially the stated interest rate, typically 12%, 
less 2% for tax and the amortised value of scribe costs. It cannot therefore typically exceed 10%. For 
unsecured loans, and all the loans in kind are unsecured, the effective rate of return does not have a 
reduction for tax and scribe costs are less. The returns for unsecured loans appear higher, but it 
should be remembered that there is no allowance for debtor default or for the variability in the cash 
values of cereals in the above comparison, although these issues are addressed in chapter 6. 
 
5.2.14 Conclusions 
We have seen in this section that, despite the lack of clarity caused by potentially hidden interest 
payments in zero interest loans, an interest rate of 12% seems to have acted as a handy, 
conventional, easily understood, largely affordable, ‘standard’ for most loans. However, the frequent 
statements as to the ubiquity of a 12% rate understate the subtlety of the marketplace and the 
financial sophistication of some of its participants even within the essentially agrarian economy of 
rural Graeco-Roman Egypt. 
A hierarchy of interest rates existed which was based on the circumstances of the transactions. 
Whilst the 12% interest rate was certainly the ‘standard’ rate for cash payments, there were 
circumstances where judgement was exercised. Rates could vary according to individual 
circumstances with very high rates being charged to distressed borrowers by pawnbrokers and 
moneylenders. At the other extreme, a market, based in the cities rather than the villages, existed 
where for larger loans, interest rates varied according to circumstances. Consider a second-century 
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rates at different times. Initially there was a loan of 10,400 drachmas with an additional mortgage of 
3,400 drachmas making a total of 13,800 drachmas which was concluded at an interest rate of 10%. 
When another secured loan for 7,200 drachmas between the same parties was concluded shortly 
thereafter, the existing loans still not yet repaid, the interest rate charged increased to 12%. This 
change in interest rate shows the action of the market and presumably reflects either changes in the 
level of supply and demand within this market or changes in the individual circumstances and risk 
assessment of the principals.466  
Interest rates which were lower than 12% were generally only available to city borrowers who were 
able to offer security and where the term was generally longer than normal and the size of the loan 
was larger. The acceptance of a lower headline rate of return by investors in exchange for greater 
security and stability of return is entirely rational. As Lerouxel noted, the existence of institutions 
which reduced information deficits between principals and encouraged secured mortgages seems to 
have facilitated these larger loans. However, we have no evidence to suggest that the total volume 
of the credit market increased as a result of these institutional developments. The increase in cash 
interest rates in the first half of the fourth century when inflation was high is another indicator of 
financial rationality. However, one question which threatens the rationality of this hierarchy of 
interest rates has been posed by Bagnall: ‘Why should one lend money at 12 per cent when one 
could buy wheat and lend it at 50 per cent?’467 This question is addressed in the next chapter when 
we will also consider how returns from the credit markets compare to investment in real-estate. 
   
 
466 This is directly comparable to the interest rate change identified by Bransbourg within the Sulpicii archives, 
which he describes as being potentially the only example of a primary source from Greco-Roman history which 
shows that an individual’s actions reflected sensitivity to financial risk. In the case identified by Bransbourg the 
interest rates between the same parties increase from between 7 and 7.5% to between 9% and 10%. 
Bransbourg 2014: 133. 




Chapter 6 Rates of Return Compared 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the investment returns available from different types of financial transactions will be 
compared. Firstly, I need to address the suggestion that investment in land was effectively the only 
option available, as otherwise any comparison would be pointless.468 In my view, the credit market 
provided a credible alternative to investment in land. Section 5.1 showed that loans were frequent 
and, in city contexts, individual transactions could be of a similar size to a typical transaction in land. 
The total volume of loans, house and land purchases in the period AD 1 to 274, market ‘turnover’ in 
modern terms, re-calibrated to AD 150 values after adjusting for inflation, is shown in Fig. 6.1. 
Fig. 6.1 Total volume of transactions469 
Transaction type Credit House Purchases 
Agricultural Land 
Purchases 
Total capital invested 
(dr.) 995,000  74,000  204,000  
 
It is clear that, in terms of turnover, the credit market was bigger than that for real-estate.  I would 
suggest that when capital was invested, agricultural land was certainly an important investment 
option, but investors had alternatives which included loans, speculation in commodities, housing 
rental, commerce and long-distance trade. This chapter seeks to assess, in a quantitative way, the 
risks and returns for the options where we have sufficient data to complete this analysis, in the 
credit and agricultural land markets. To do this I need to move away from the deterministic ‘best 
estimate’ approach, adopted in chapters 3 to 5, to one which can illustrate the risk of an investment. 
This means a stochastic approach needs to be adopted, which is the only way of allowing for the 
natural variability of inputs, including the risk of Nile flood failure, the quality of the harvest and the 
resultant price of wheat. 
 
468 See for example Kehoe 1992: 10, who stated in the introduction to his study of estates in Roman Egypt: 
‘land did not represent one possibility within a range of investments, but rather the pre-eminent form of 
economic security’. See also Bagnall 1993a: 128 n.5 ‘Kehoe argues … that land was the only option for a safe, 
long-term income. This is certainly not true from an economic point of view; a diversified portfolio of loans, or 
participation in loans, was certainly possible’. 
469 The Muziris maritime loan is not included in the above figures since it is of a different order of magnitude 




This chapter therefore has the following structure. Firstly, the returns which were calculated in the 
preceding chapters on a deterministic basis are compared with each other. Then the assumptions 
needed to undertake the stochastic analysis are outlined. Finally, the results of the stochastic 
modelling are presented, the possible benefits of investment diversification are considered and 
conclusions reached. 
 
6.2 Comparison of Returns on a Deterministic Basis 
The return from land leasing, cash mortgages, unsecured cash loans and loans in kind on a best 
estimate basis is shown in Fig. 6.2, with return per annum along the horizontal axis and the 
percentage of investors enjoying this return on the vertical axis. 
 
Land leasing has a broader distribution of returns than cash loans, although it should be noted that 
some of this feature will be due to our assumption that land prices per aroura within a nome were 
constant, and this distortion of the results will be discussed further below. Fig. 6.2 suggests that the 
best investment would be to buy commodities and lend them at the prevalent high interest rates. A 
second best would be to lend money on an unsecured basis. However, Fig. 6.2 does not allow for the 
risk of default by the borrower and their failure to return the capital loaned, as well as the interest, 
or for the risk that the tenant does not pay his rent. Neither are other risks, including the movement 











Fig. 6.2 - Deterministic Return Comparison
Land Leasing n=105 Mortgages n=67




returns from each of the investment options are shown for reference, and later comparison with the 
equivalent stochastic results, in Fig. 6.3. 
Fig. 6.3 Median and Average Deterministic Returns p.a. by Investment Type 
  Median Average 
Land Leasing n=105 9.5% 10.9% 
Mortgages n=67 8.0% 7.3% 
Unsecured cash loans n=66 10.3% 8.7% 
Loans in kind n=27 44.2% 40.1% 
 
 
6.3 Stochastic Modelling – the Input Assumptions 
The only way of determining, in a numerical way, the probable risk/return relationships of different 
investment types is to model them in a stochastic analysis. I have chosen the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique described in appendix B which is one that has been used recently to study other problems 
in ancient history and is frequently used by modern financial institutions.470  Having chosen the 
modelling technique, the next decision to be made in designing a model is to determine which 
assumptions should form the inputs to the model. In previous sections, I defined the profit from any 
investment as equal to the income received less the frictional costs less taxation less other costs, 
and this final item should include the costs of the counterparty defaulting on the deal. The return is 
equal to this profit divided by the capital employed. Assumptions need to be made for each of the 
elements of the calculation. Not all of these assumptions need to be stochastic variables, some can 
be a single best estimate, if the assumption is either relatively immaterial or there is no variability to 
model. 
When determining the best approach for each assumption I need to distinguish between genuine 
aleatory variability in inputs which relate to conditions in Roman Egypt, including the price of wheat 
after good or bad harvests, the chance of harvests failing and rents not being paid, from epistemic 
variability in inputs, which is caused by our lack of knowledge. The variations which I believe are part 
of the uncertainty of day-to-day life should be accepted and modelled. The uncertainties which are 
caused by our lack of knowledge should be called out and where appropriate used to challenge the 
model’s conclusions.  The first input to the calculation is the income from the investment. The model 
uses the terms of the individual transactions to determine this income, which is stated in the 
transaction as the amount of rent or the interest to be received. There would therefore not appear 
 




to be any need for an assumption to be made. However, in order to make comparisons between 
different types of transaction I need all income to be translated into cash. The rent received in kind 
or the interest and capital gain/loss in a loan in kind is a function of the price of the commodity, and 
this is an important element of the likely return in cash terms. Therefore, assumptions need to be 
made as to the price, and the variability of that price, for barley and wheat. 
In determining the assumptions related to the price and variability of barley and wheat I have used 
the same price curves over time as were outlined in section 2.1. What is now needed is to make an 
additional assumption about the variability of these best estimates. Were prices relatively narrowly 
constrained or did they vary considerably according to harvest quality and other market factors? The 
latter is closer to our available evidence as is demonstrated by the figures in the appendices to 
section 2.1 and Fig. 6.4. I have assumed that the minimum value of wheat after the harvest is 50% of 
the most likely value and the maximum value is 140% of the most likely value. Thus, if at the end of 
the first century the best-fit price of wheat is eight drachmas, I assume that the minimum market 
value is four drachmas and the maximum value is 11.2 drachmas. These assumptions can be tested 
by examining the distribution of wheat prices over time, with the lower and upper bounds and best-
fit lines, as shown in Fig. 6.4. 
 
It can be seen that with few exceptions the prices for wheat over this period lie within the lower and 
upper bounds.  A similar assumption as to the variability of the price of barley needs to be made and 






















Fig. 6.4 - Lower, Median and Upper Bound 




150% of the most likely value. These variability assumptions can be tested by examining the 
distribution of barley prices over time, as shown in Fig. 6.5. 
 
As with wheat it can be seen that, with few exceptions, the barley prices over this period lie within 
the lower and upper bounds. I have also assumed that the prices of wheat and barley move in 
tandem, based on the logic that, in any particular year, good growing conditions for wheat would 
also generally mean good conditions for barley, although barley is somewhat more drought resistant 
than wheat. 
In their assessment of the interest rates on loans in kind and in cash, Foraboschi and Gara took 
account of the likelihood of the value of cereals being lower after the harvest than just prior to the 
next sowing but concluded that, if the lender could afford to wait until the opportune time to realise 
profit, this had little impact on the attractiveness of loans in kind to a lender.471 I have, however, 
assumed that the value of cereals loaned and repaid is based on the price just after the harvest in 
order to model the return over a full year. This has the benefit of not having to make an additional 
assumption that all lenders could afford to wait for the most opportune time to sell. 
Turning to frictional costs, we saw in previous sections that ‘in modern terms, transaction costs were 
low’.472 Thus, although I need to allow for these costs, on a best estimate basis, it is not appropriate 
 
471 Foraboschi & Gara 1981: 339-40. See also Bang 2008: 158-69 for a discussion of cereal price variability in 
fourth- and fifth-century Egypt. 























Fig. 6.5- Lower, Median and Upper Bound




to model variability in frictional costs, since this will not substantially impact the results. Taxes are, 
however, a significant element of some transactions. In principle, there were rules determining the 
level of taxes and although these may have varied by nome and date, the regular land taxes and 
transaction taxes are capable of inclusion in our model as deterministic assumptions without 
allowing for any variability. However, our knowledge is not perfect, particularly with regard to the 
level and date of application of the crown tax on land and the imposition of exceptional demands or 
levies in times of crisis. No such exceptional demands have been included in the model and thus it 
may be considered as being relevant to a relatively benign period of social stability. For frictional 
costs and taxation, I have used the same best estimate assumptions as in the deterministic 
calculations set out in chapters 3 to 5 and assumed that land taxes would be payable in every year, 
whatever the state of the Nile flood.473 
The fourth element that completes the calculation of the profit on any transaction are the other 
costs, which primarily relate to counterparty default on the deal. For a cash mortgage the lender is 
protected from adverse default costs by his right to seize the property concerned and there are 
many examples in the papyri of lenders exercising this right. When the right was exercised it may be 
that the property provided as security would have been of higher value than the loan made, as in the 
case of P.Ryl. II 119 (AD 62-66) which describes a dispute between the principals, where the creditor 
refuses to give up the highly profitable usufruct of some mortgaged land despite the offer of 
repayment of the capital by the debtors. In view of the enforceable and potentially profitable ability 
to seize the mortgaged property, modelling of the likelihood of default on a secured loan does not 
seem a worthwhile activity. However, in the case of an unsecured cash or kind loan, default would 
have a severe impact on the return from the loan, particularly since both capital and interest are at 
risk. We are fortunate to have good information on the Nile floods and that Bonneau has classified 
the level of the flood for each year where information is available for the period from AD 1 to 274 
into a number of categories ranging from bad (‘mauvaise’) to strong (‘forte’).474 The chance of the 
flood being in the bad category was 8% or roughly once in every 12 years. The probability of default 
on loans in kind was very dependent on the success or failure of the harvest, which in turn was 
dependent on the risk of a failure of the Nile flood. I have therefore made the assumption that the 
 
473 A case for allowing for tax relief for unflooded private land could be made, given the evidence from 
unwatered land declarations, but I have adopted a conservative approach in assuming that this relief would 
not always be available or effective. 
474 Bonneau 1971: 219. Although Bonneau’s categorisations contain some inconsistencies, and are currently 
the subject of new research by a multi-disciplinary team at the University of Basel, they are the best indicators 
currently available as to the likelihood of Nile flood failure. At a frequency of 8%, this is consistent with an 
event which is not habitual, but is foreseeable and which requires clauses within lease contracts which deal 
with its possible occurrence. Note that according to Blouin 2014: 16 n22, Tristant calculated that on the basis 




chance of a poor harvest that would not permit the return of the capital and interest of a loan in 
kind is 8%, in line with the assumed chance of Nile flood failure. Also, it was noted in sub-section 
5.1.5 that many cash loans could only be repaid after the harvest, and I have assumed that the 
chance of default on cash loans was also 8%.  Our knowledge of the likelihood of default is far from 
perfect however, and the model needed to be tested to see how the results vary according to our 
assumptions.  
The risk of default is also important when modelling the return on leasing land, though here the 
impact of the risk is less severe, since the land which constitutes the capital employed remains the 
property of the investor.  For land leasing default it would seem logical to assume that the main 
reason for non-payment of rent was the failure of the harvest which in turn would be linked to the 
Nile flood and I have taken 8% as the probability that the harvest failed or was so poor as to mean 
that the rent could not be paid.475 If the flood was too great it would be likely that the harvest would 
be late or reduced in size but it would be unlikely that it failed entirely and the rent could well have 
been paid. I have assumed that the chance of non-payment of rent is inversely correlated with the 
price of cereals, based on the logic that when harvests fail, crop prices rise. Finally, for land leasing 
but not loans, there are the costs of depreciation, maintenance and transport of the harvest. In 
general, the responsibility for these costs is defined within the leases concerned and often lies with 
the tenant rather than the landlord, in which case they do not impact on the calculation of the 
return to the landlord. 
Having dealt with the elements that make up the calculation of the profit on the transaction I need 
to consider whether the capital employed was subject to any variability that should be modelled. For 
loans in cash, whether secured or unsecured, the capital employed is known from the loan 
document. For loans in kind, the capital employed in cash terms is a function of the value, at the 
date of the grant, of the cereals loaned and the assumptions used are as described above. For land 
leasing the capital employed is the value of the land. Given that the purpose of the comparison is to 
consider the generic risk return characteristics of different types of investment I believe that it is not 
appropriate to model the variability of land prices within the market but have rather made a best 
estimate assumption. The question I am seeking to answer is what is the likely sustainable return an 
investor can expect to achieve over the longue durée from holding positions in the credit or land 
markets, and my assumption is that the investor already holds the land and gets a return from 
leasing. The short-term fluctuations of land prices due to market conditions are not relevant to the 
question since the investor is not expecting to sell the land. If I were modelling the likely returns 
 




from short-term speculation in land then land price variability would be relevant, but this is not the 
investment strategy that I am dealing with here. 
 
6.4 Stochastic Results – Comparison 
1,000 simulations have been undertaken for each of the individual transactions concerned. These 
were then added together to produce the likely distribution of the return for each type of 
investment. So, for instance, 66,000 simulations were undertaken to determine the distribution of 
return overall for loaning cash on an unsecured basis: that is 66 individual transactions, each with 
1,000 simulations. The results are as follows, and dealing first with the unsecured cash loans, the 
distribution of returns is shown in Fig. 6.6. 
 
As is to be expected, the 8% borrower default assumption is fully reflected in the stochastic 
distribution. The median return at 9.7% on a stochastic basis is only marginally lower than the 
deterministic median at 10.3%. However, the significant difference lies in the average return which 
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Fig. 6.6 Unsecured Cash Loans 





The median return is 28.7% on a stochastic basis and is considerably lower than the deterministic 
median at 44.2%. There is also a significant reduction in the average return which falls from 40.1% to 
24.4%. The reason for this reduction is not only that the stochastic distribution makes allowance for 
the chance of borrower default, but also that the profit is reduced in good harvest years when the 
price of cereals is likely to be lower when the loan is repaid. A loan in kind is clearly a transaction 
where the average return is attractive, but this return has a price in the risk taken, since not only is 
there an 8% chance of losing the whole amount loaned, but also a further 16% chance of losing 
money on the deal because of reductions in the market price of barley or wheat. It should be noted 
that the scale of the horizontal axis is larger and the range of returns is much wider than in the 
charts for other investments. 
The last case to be modelled is that of leasing land and the results are provided in Fig. 6.8, which 
show the results of 1,000 simulations for an individual lease, Fig. 6.9, which are the aggregated 
results formed by adding together all the 105,000 results for the 105 available individual leases and 

























Fig. 6.7 Loans in Kind 











Fig. 6.11 Median and Average Stochastic Returns p.a. per Nome 
Nome Median Average 
Arsinoite 11.0% 10.8% 
Oxyrhynchite 7.4% 7.2% 
All 8.9% 9.6% 
 
The median and average returns are somewhat lower than the deterministic returns set out in Fig. 
3.2.33, which reflects the introduction of the chance of non-payment of rent.476 The impact of 
default in this case is much less than in an unsecured loan, since the landlord still retains ownership 
of the land, unlike the lender who loses their capital. The tighter and lower distribution of returns for 
the Oxyrhynchite nome compared to the Arsinoite nome is also clear.  
In general, I believe that the Oxyrhynchite nome may be a better indicator of the return from leasing 
land in Roman Egypt than that derived from using the larger data set from all nomes, for two 
 

















































Fig. 6.10 Land Leasing 





reasons. Firstly, the Oxyrhynchite nome lies in the Nile valley itself, as does much of the exploitable 
land of Roman Egypt, and is therefore more typical than the Arsinoite nome with its peculiarities of 
geographical position and irrigation techniques. Secondly, I have made a necessary assumption that 
the price of land per aroura is the same within any particular nome at a given date. This is clearly 
untrue, since land prices are likely to have varied according to their quality, and although it might 
not impact significantly on the medians and averages, it will tend to widen the distribution of both 
deterministic and stochastic results. In the model, the lower the assumed value of land, the higher 
the calculated return. Thus, the return on fertile plots is exaggerated, since the value of land used is 
probably too low, and vice versa for poor quality land. The greater the variability in the land in the 
nome concerned, the greater this effect. Land prices are less variable than in the Oxyrhynchite nome 
than elsewhere and thus the impact of this effect is less pronounced.477  I will therefore generally use 
the Oxyrhynchite leasing results for comparison purposes from this point forward. 
In Fig. 6.2 the returns for the various investment options were compared on a deterministic basis 
and I can do the same for the stochastic returns and these are shown in Fig. 6.12.478 
 
 
477 See Fig. 3.1.19 which shows the R2 coefficient for Oxyrhynchite nome prices is much higher than for other 
nomes, indicating that the typical price of land is more tightly distributed than elsewhere. 











































Fig. 6.12 Stochastic Return Distributions
Mortgages Unsecured Cash Loans




The use of the same scale for the horizontal axis for all types of investment clearly shows the wide 
and unpredictable nature of the returns from loans in kind.479 The average and median returns for 
each investment type are summarised in Fig. 6.13. 
Fig. 6.13 Stochastic Returns p.a. 
  Median Average 
Mortgages 8.0% 7.3% 
Unsecured Cash Loans 9.7% 0.2% 
Loans in kind 28.7% 24.4% 
Oxyrhynchite Land 
leases 7.4% 7.2% 
 
6.5 Modelling Different Default Rates 
We are fortunate to have very good data as to most of the assumptions that underlie our 
calculations. However, as noted above, the assumptions as to default for unsecured loans and land 
leases are perhaps the most debatable and I have run the model on different assumptions and the 
results for the averages concerned are shown in Fig. 6.14.  
Fig. 6.14 – Average Yearly Returns per Investment Type480  
Default rate 0% 2% 4% 8% 12% 16% 
Unsecured Cash Loans 8.8% 6.6% 6.0% 0.2% -4.3% -8.5% 
Loans in kind 39.2% 35.4% 31.5% 24.4% 17.0% 9.9% 
Oxyrhynchite Land leases 7.6% 7.4% 7.3% 7.2% 6.8% 6.5% 
 
The comparison between secured mortgages and unsecured loans shows that in order to achieve 
the same average return on an unsecured loan, compared to a mortgage, then the loan would have 
to be repaid in more than 98% of the cases, which is equivalent to a default rate of less than 2%. This 
is because the expected return on mortgages is 7.3%, and even if only two percent of unsecured 
borrowers default, you expect to earn a lower, 6.6%, return from unsecured lending. To put this 
another way, lending money without specific security would only make rational financial sense if you 
were more than 98% sure of getting your money back. This stresses the need for the lender to have 
good information on the credit worthiness of the borrower, and I believe this would make most 
 
479 For the mathematically minded reader, the degree of variation can be shown by the standard deviations for 
each of these return ranges which are: mortgages 2%, unsecured cash loans 30%, loans in kind 62% and 
Oxyrhynchite land leases 5%. 





unsecured loans between strangers too risky to have been a rational proposition for the lender. Even 
if the borrower is well known to the lender, this is a highly risky transaction. Loans in kind show good 
prospective average returns, even if one in six borrowers default, but the risk of total loss is 
substantial.  
 
6.6 Reducing Risk by Diversification 
We have seen in the preceding sub-section that whatever reasonable assumption is made as to 
borrower default, unsecured loans are very risky. There are two ways in which the risk to an investor 
could have been reduced from these volatile investments. Firstly, the lender may split their 
investment among a number of transactions of the same type. This tactic will not change the 
expected average return but will, if it is possible to find and manage a sufficient number of 
borrowers, possibly reduce the risk of an extreme outcome. For instance, if an investor provides a 
loan in kind to one individual then the risk of them losing all their money in any particular year is 8% 
according to my assumptions, whereas if they split the loan between two independent parties, the 
risk of losing all their money is reduced to 0.64%, 8% times 8%, in normal circumstances. However, 
this only applies if the actions of the two borrowers are independent. In my model, and in real life, 
the likelihood of the default of both parties is dependent on whether that year’s harvest has failed, 
which means that if one defaults the other is likely also to default, meaning that our risk is not 
substantially reduced by simply splitting a large loan into smaller amounts, although it does reduce 
the concentration risk related to the assessment of the credit-worthiness of a particular borrower. 
The other way in which an investor can reduce risk is to diversify among the different investment 
types, choosing to build a portfolio which balances high risk investments with others which have 
lower risk characteristics. However, portfolio diversification works best if the values of different 
investment types move in different, and preferably opposite, ways when there is an outside stimulus 
such as the general quality of the harvest. Unsecured cash and kind loans and land leasing returns all 
have a relationship with the quality of the harvest, but one which varies both in the size and nature 
of the response. Consider for instance a Nile flood which is low but not wholly inadequate so that 
harvest yields are below average, but not disastrous. This is unlikely to impact on the unsecured cash 
loan which should still be repaid, and the mortgage holder will similarly receive payment, but there 
is no upside to the lender. The lender of an unsecured loan in kind should still get paid, but the price 
of cereals is likely to be higher than normal given the lower harvest yield and the lender will get a 
higher than normal return in cash terms. Similarly, the landlord of a leased plot should receive their 




have different impacts. For instance, a total failure will have disastrous consequences for the return 
on unsecured loans, but relatively little impact on returns from mortgages and returns from land 
leasing will be low, but the value of the land itself is not altered. Therefore, given the fact that 
different investment types react differently to external events, it makes sense to diversify a portfolio 
of wealth among these types.  
Do we have evidence for investment diversification in Roman Egypt? We can look for evidence in the 
wills of individuals where one might expect to see a portfolio of different investments which needed 
to be described and assigned. A systematic review of the evidence from wills from Roman Egypt is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but although houses and land are frequently described, loans are 
rarely mentioned as assets in the wills, perhaps because of their typically very short-term nature 
which would mean that the information concerned could be out of date by the time of death.481 
Without any other evidence I do not believe, therefore, that I can make any firm conclusions as to 
the practice of diversification of assets among investment types by large investors, but families did 
diversify their economic activity. Evidence from family archives shows that families diversified their 
economic activity in ways which would have mitigated the risk of financial ruin, acting at the same 
time as landlords, tenants, lenders and borrowers.482 
It should be stressed that the above discussion of risks and their mitigation is based on the tacit 
assumption that the risk the individual fears is to lose money in capital terms. This is most likely the 
key risk in the period under consideration from AD 1 to 274, but there are other potential risks that 
an individual faced and could have driven behaviour. Though probably of more relevance to the 
fourth century, an investor may fear the effects of inflation and be satisfied if their assets do not lose 
real value. An investor may also have specific investment targets that they are aiming to meet, for 
instance, the accumulation of sufficient wealth to provide a dowry. They may have lost confidence in 
the value of coinage and would thus favour investments in land and commodities.  We can only 
rarely see what risks investors were willing to take and which they feared, but I believe that capital 
loss was still probably the main concern of investors in the period to AD 274. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
In the introduction to this thesis I defined the exercise of financial rationality as the use of reason to 
make a comparative decision, seeking to achieve financial goals, having due regard to maximising 
 
481 See Nowak 2015 for a comprehensive description of the contents of wills in Roman Egypt and elsewhere in 
the empire. 




return and minimising risk. To exercise financial rationality would thus, of necessity, require a 
comparative assessment of the returns, and risks, expected to be achieved from different 
investment types. I have modelled what I believe are plausible actual returns and risks, but I cannot 
model those expected since this is a function of the mentality of the investors concerned. 
Unfortunately, it is usually only in the Italian elite sources, do we have direct evidence for the 
motives of investors in the Roman world.483  Despite the shortcomings of examining probable actual 
risks and returns rather than expected ones, I believe that the risk/return distributions shown above 
can provide information as to whether the outcomes are consistent with financially rational 
decisions. Outcomes that are consistent with financially rational behaviour cannot prove that this 
behaviour was actually present, but when combined with other evidence, a case can be made, and 
this will be addressed in chapter 7. However, if the outcome is not financially rational, then this 
proves that the decision was not based on a financially rational judgement.  
When we look at the outcomes, firstly we can observe a hierarchy of risk and return. Investment in 
land in the Oxyrhynchite nome in the Nile valley produced a relatively low but stable average return 
which I have estimated at 7.2% per annum. The higher returns in the geographically atypical 
Arsinoite region could reflect possibly a different risk profile, given the reliance on artificial 
irrigation. Investment in mortgage-backed secured loans, with the associated low risks, provided 
similar estimated average returns to that of land at 7.3%. Secured lending and investment in land for 
leasing thus show similar risk characteristics in that their returns have low volatility and similar 
levels. However, loans in kind provided totally unpredictable returns in cash terms being so 
dependent on the Nile flood, the resulting harvests and the consequent price levels of cereals. 
However, the average return on loans in kind was exceptionally high reflecting the greater risks. The 
one type of investment which does not fit comfortably within this hierarchy of risk and return is an 
unsecured loan. With a typical headline rate of 12% per annum, after allowing for expenses, if even 
one in 50 borrowers defaulted, and I have to believe this is an understatement of default rates given 
the dependency on the harvest for borrowers to return cash, the average annual return is only 6.6%. 
The risks are much higher than mortgages which returned on average 7.3%. It is difficult to make a 
rational case for a lender to lend to any third party on an unsecured basis at interest rates which 
were within the legal limit of 12% per annum.484  
 
483 See Kehoe 1997: 71-5 for a summary of the literary evidence, including Columella, Pliny the Elder and 
Seneca, for this type of investment. See Kay 2014: 151-2 for discussion of Cato’s views in De Agricultura. 
484 It may be that, in some cases, there was some other obligation, work or benefit accruing to the lender from 
an unsecured loan which is not visible to us from the documentation. However, given the very large number of 
unsecured loans I do not believe this is a viable explanation for the rationality of the bulk of these loans. 




I believe that modern institutional investors act in a financially rational way, though not always 
successfully.  A comparison of risk/return characteristics of Roman and current US asset classes can 
help illustrate both the risk/return hierarchy and the irrationality of Roman unsecured lending and 
this is shown in Fig. 6.15.485 
 
Fig. 6.15 shows the average annual return on the x-axis against the risk of volatility of return on the 
y-axis, which is the standard deviation. It illustrates a number of points. The hierarchy of returns is 
illustrated by the best-fit line which shows how return by asset class usually increases in line with 
risk, going from the ‘riskless’ asset of US cash in government securities in the lower left hand corner, 
for which there is no direct Roman comparator, to the high return/high risk of Roman loans in kind 
in the upper right hand corner. The extreme volatility of Roman loans in kind is demonstrated by its 
distance from the other points in the graph, showing more than three times the volatility of 
investing in today’s roller-coaster stock market. Nevertheless, an investor was rewarded 
appropriately for taking this extreme risk. The clear outlier is the Roman unsecured cash loan, which 
provides a close to zero return but with a high risk and cannot, if there were other alternatives, 
therefore be the result of financial rationality. 
 
be no other alternative home for the money, given that even with relatively low default rates of 1 borrower in 
10 defaulting, the expected return is negative. Better bury the money than lend it to an unknown risky 
borrower.  
485 The US data cover the 15 years from 2004 to 2018, a period of relatively low inflation and the sources of the 
data are US cash: US 3 month Treasury Bond rates, US high grade bonds: Barclay's US Aggregate Bond Index, 
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It will be noted that if inflation averaged around 1% per annum in the period to AD 274, a secure 
income of around 7% per annum from mortgages or from leasing land is very attractive, and a 
‘better’ investment than the modern day equivalent comparator of high yield bonds, which also 
have some default risk. Investing in land or mortgages in Roman Egypt would, on average, effectively 
double the real value of an investment over a period of 12 years. There is another consequence of 
the hierarchy of risk and return that I have outlined above. Foraboschi and Gara noted that if 
interest rates are higher than the rates of return on productive enterprises then this could lead to 
economic stagnation.486 This proposition and my other conclusions from this chapter are addressed 
further in the final chapter. 
  
 




Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Section 7.1 Macroeconomic Conclusions - Quantification of 
the Economy  
This chapter brings together the conclusions from the body of the thesis to address the issues raised 
in the introduction. The salient points from the previous chapters are summarised and original 
findings emphasised. In the introduction to this thesis, three areas were identified as being of 
particular interest within academic debates on the Roman economy: the quantification of its size, its 
impact on society including the quality of life, and the nature of the markets it contained. Whilst the 
nature of the financial markets is the core subject of this thesis, I have some conclusions to suggest 
with regard to the other two areas and these are described in sections 7.1 and 7.2 before I move on 
to the nature of the markets. The suggestions as to the quantification of the economy in section 7.1 
are largely macroeconomic, and those in 7.2, relating to the quality of life, microeconomic. My initial 
conclusions as to the nature of the markets, specifically frictional costs and to information exchange, 
are covered in section 7.3. Finally, the key question posed in this thesis - is there evidence for 
financial rationality driving the financial markets in Roman Egypt? - is answered in section 7.4.  In 
this section 7.1 therefore, conclusions of a macroeconomic nature that relate to the quantification 
of the economy of Roman Egypt are drawn. The following areas are dealt with in turn: inflation, 
indicators of growth and decline of the economy, interest rates structures, the contribution of 
financial sectors to the economy, and the influence of the state.  
Perhaps the most important finding within this thesis which can assist in our attempts to quantify 
the Roman economy was set out in section 2.1.  This finding is that, in general, prices for most 
goods, after a period of stability from the middle of the first century to around AD 160, grew in the 
period to AD 274 at an annual average rate of close to 1%, which means that prices more than 
trebled over this period. This contradicts the accepted view that a doubling of prices between AD 
160 and 190 was the only significant change between AD 45 and 274.487 Without a clear 
understanding of inflationary conditions, attempts to quantify gross product or to consider specific 
questions as to the nature of the economy in the third century are unlikely to produce reliable 
answers. However, up to AD 274, average annual inflation was still low, and such inflationary 
conditions can provide a suitable economic environment for moderate economic growth.  Section 
 
487 Although wheat prices seem to have followed the pattern suggested by Rathbone with a levelling off of 




2.2 examined the levels of inflation in the period from AD 274 to 350 and  Rathbone’s proposal that 
there was a sharp increase in prices around AD 274 was confirmed.488 Inflation averaged at around 
15% per annum during the first half of the fourth century but we lack sufficient data to conclude 
whether this average rate hides greater short-term price variations. In the higher inflation and 
monetary unstable conditions from AD 274 to 350 different forms of payment for fodder rents were 
used as people sought an alternative medium to cash.489 
 
There is no way that the data I have collected can be used to provide direct proxies of the size of the 
economy and its development over time. However, some clues as to economic activity can be 
derived from data for land leases and credit transactions to provide indicators of economic growth 
or decline. A number of scholars have suggested that rents for agricultural land declined in the latter 
part of the period considered, with the resultant implications for economic prosperity and activity.490 
Duncan-Jones also suggested that, over a shorter timeframe, a reduction in average plot size 
provides evidence of the immediate economic impact of the Antonine plague.491 My own 
investigation, using bigger data, does not provide any support for these propositions, and suggests 
that the apparent decline in attested rents is more likely to be due to regional rather than diachronic 
differences. By contrast, in the credit markets, the increase in transaction size, recently identified by 
Lerouxel as a positive economic impact of the establishment of the bibliotheke enkteseon is 
confirmed. However, I would suggest that this was largely a city-based elite phenomenon and was 
accompanied by a collapse in the village credit market, and that there is no evidence that an 
increase in typical loan size would have had any significant macroeconomic benefit.492  
 
The social implications of the collapse in the village credit market are considered in the next section, 
but the macroeconomic implications of interest rate structures needs to be dealt with here. A few 
concepts need to be defined before considering my interpretation of the evidence for Roman Egypt. 
A key concept in defining any interest rate structure is the risk-free interest rate within the market, 
where a lender is sure that they will be able to secure both the capital and interest at the end of the 
loan. In the modern world, this ‘risk-free’ interest rate is normally determined by the interest 
applicable to sovereign state borrowing. Higher interest rates are charged by lenders for other 
 
488 Rathbone 1997: 215. 
489 See sub-section 3.2.8. 
490 See sub-section 3.2.11 for consideration and rebuttal of Muth’s and Scheidel’s proposals as to declines in 
land rents and sub-section 3.2.21 for rebuttal of Bagnall’s suggested decline in the amount of land leased from 
the second to the fourth century. 
491 See sub-section 3.2.6. 




borrowers who may have a greater chance of default to compensate the lender for the higher risk. 
The difference, or ‘spread’, between these higher interest rates and the ‘risk-free’ interest rate is 
normally referred to as a risk premium. In Roman Egypt we cannot define the ‘risk-free’ interest rate 
by reference to the state’s borrowing since we have no evidence that this occurred or that it would 
have been ‘risk-free’. Rather the proxy for a risk-free rate may be considered to be the median 
interest rate for secured mortgages which I have estimated at 8%.493 This 8% may be considered 
therefore as the minimum cost of capital rate for any investor and thus any riskier investment would 
require a return well in excess of this cost of borrowing if it were to be expected to be profitable, 
such as investment in a productive concern, like developing land. This borrowing to invest to 
increase wealth is known as ‘gearing’. We have little direct evidence for gearing, despite the very 
large number of transactions in the databases.494 This may well reflect the fact that if borrowing 
rates were around 8% and returns on investment in land for leasing were at similar or lower levels, 
as my analysis suggests, there would not have been any financial incentive to borrow money to 
invest in land.495 Foraboschi and Gara suggested that this could lead to economic stagnation.496 
Finally, neoclassical economic theory states that loans used for productive activity, as compared to 
consumption loans, support economic growth and wealth creation and thus the apparent absence of 
such loans is important.497  
 
Turning to the contribution of the financial sectors of the economy, the first point to note is that the 
credit market was much larger than the real-estate markets. In Fig. 6.1 we saw that for every one 
drachma of turnover in housing, roughly three drachmas were invested in land and 13 drachmas 
were placed in the credit market. This financial activity did not typically involve any development of 
a secondary service sector related to financial transactions since, as shown in each of the sub-
sections dealing with agents and intermediaries, professional remunerated intermediation was rare. 
Banks were active in parts of the credit market but their form of remuneration is unclear and I do 
not believe that income from their activity formed a significant part of the GDP of Roman Egypt. 
Although banks appear to have taken a position only rarely as a principal in the credit market, their 
intervention has been taken to imply an increase in the money supply through a ‘credit multiplier’ or 
 
493 See Fig. 6.13. 
494 See sub-section 3.1.8. 
495 Even allowing for the relatively high taxes on land. See chapter 6 for the supporting evidence. 
496 Foraboschi & Gara 1981: 342. 
497 See von Reden 2010: 94-5 for a discussion of the impact of credit on ancient economies and Cumming et al 
2017: 8-9 for consideration of the impacts of microfinance in today’s developing countries. Also Bange 2014: 




‘money multiplier’ effect.498   This multiplier effect is generally viewed as being positive for the 
economy in that it increases the liquidity of markets and facilitates productive loans. However, I 
believe that the potentially positive effects on the economy of the multiplier from banking would 
have been relatively limited since banks generally only acted as credit transferors rather than 
lending capital for investment.499  
Finally, when we consider the macroeconomic features of the Roman economy we must, of course, 
recognise the influence of the state. It is common for scholars of the ancient Roman economy to 
emphasise the impact of state institutions, given the NIE framework within which many of them 
work, but that the Roman state was central to the Roman economy is clear. The state dictated prices 
for certain goods and influenced markets in more subtle ways. The clearest evidence for state 
activity is in the wheat market, where the state’s actions and pricing structures seem to have 
dampened price volatility and kept price increases lower than those which applied to other goods. 
This new evidence of differential pricing argues for a middle ground view of the commodities 
market, reflecting a ‘two-tier’ economy with certain sectors of activity where the key actor is the 
state, and others subject to a greater degree to neoclassical market forces.500 The state also 
impacted on the real-estate market, through the confiscation of private land in the event of fiscal 
default or other offence against the state, and the sale of the land it owned. These actions had a 
significant impact on the real-estate markets by altering supply and demand. 
 
In the credit markets, as well as introducing new institutions which facilitated secured lending, the 
Roman state intervened in the first instance by reducing the maximum allowable interest rate on 
cash loans from the 24% allowable in Ptolemaic times to 12% per annum.501 This action would have 
been likely to have increased the stability of the economy by reducing the risk of financial ruin for 
borrowers and in particular for smallholders and tenants. Another major economic element of the 
state was the army, for between 11,000 and 16,000 troops were stationed in Egypt throughout the 
 
498 Harris 2008: 187. As to whether individual lending may be considered to have increased the money supply, 
Harris took the view that it would not, since one of his pre-conditions for such a result, the capacity of the 
lender to recover the debt, is not met: Harris 2008: 180. He stated that ‘the costs of recovering them would 
have been prohibitive’ but I believe he underestimated both the social constraints on debt default which he 
mentioned earlier in the article and the effectiveness of debt recovery as evidenced within the papyri dealing 
with petitions: Harris 2008: 189, 191. Although it would be impossible to prove, in my view, given that only a 
relatively small proportion of credit transactions involved banks, the increase in the money supply from person 
to person lending may well have been of greater significance than that which arose from banking 
intermediation. 
499 In this I would agree with Harris that within the context of the Roman empire the availability of 
entrepreneurial borrowing is of greater importance than the actual size of the money supply: Harris 2008:202-
3. 
500 See sub-section 2.1.9. 




majority of this period. 502  The military must have had a significant influence on the economy, both 
through their demands for supplies and more subtly through the permeation of ideas and attitudes 
absorbed by local recruits during their service. In the database of real-estate transactions there are 
few examples of serving soldiers involved as buyers, sellers, landlords or tenants, although veterans 
are more common. There are a larger number of credit transactions involving serving military 
personnel. However, the bulk of those involving serving military personnel were internal to the army 
and did not involve civilians. As Rathbone stated ‘the sizeable Roman army presence in Egypt 
introduced to its many local recruits, and the surrounding population, …. the Roman economic 
mentality’ but this evidence might indicate that more of this interaction occurred once soldiers had 
retired as veterans rather than during their active service.503 Finally, the key interaction in everyday 
life between people and the state was taxation. I have suggested a typical marginal tax take from 
agricultural activity for landowners of 25%, in the first two centuries AD, rising potentially to around 
41% if crown tax became annual in the third century.504 This is much higher than that which has 
been proposed for the empire as a whole, and is closer perhaps to ‘skinning’ than ‘shearing’ the 
sheep.505 The microeconomic effects of differing tax rates for different strata of society will be dealt 
with in the next section. 
  
 
502 Alston 1995: 31. 
503 Rathbone 2007c: 718. 
504 See sub-section 3.2.19. 
505 See Cassius Dio 57: 10, 5 describing Tiberius: ‘when Aemilius Rectus once sent him from Egypt, which he 





Section 7.2 Microeconomic Conclusions – Social Implications 
 
 
This section deals with the conclusions of a microeconomic nature which can be drawn as to the 
quality of life enjoyed, or the challenges faced, by the people of Roman Egypt. My conclusions for 
the following areas are set out: the tax burden borne by individuals, the role of women in the 
markets, financial needs by age group, the impact of the availability of credit and investment returns 
for those with capital. Finally, the implications of these conclusions for the accumulation and 
concentration of wealth are considered. 
 
I have proposed that the normal tax burden on the income of individuals who held land was 
substantial, with marginal tax rates on rents from leased land estimated at 25% and additional 
obligations or demands in times of fiscal or social stress.506 However, for those without substantial 
land ownership the tax burden would appear to have been relatively low. In a good year, a tenant of 
a private landlord would be subject to a tax rate which would have been around 5% of their gross 
income after rent. Typically rents paid by tenants of state land are considered as taxation, and, if so 
considered, then the tax rates would have been substantially higher than for private tenants. 
However, I would question whether the rent paid by a tenant of state land should be classified as a 
tax. It certainly is part of the state’s revenue, but unlike other receipts, the payer gains some direct 
economic advantage from the payment through their exploitation of the land and thus it is not a tax 
when viewed from a microeconomic perspective. In summary therefore, contrary to the normal view 
of Roman taxation I believe that the tax system in Roman Egypt may be considered as ‘progressive’, 
in that lower tax rates applied to low income groups than to higher ones. 
 
No assessment of the impact of the economy on society would be complete without a consideration 
of the gender-related aspects. Transactions clearly passed through social networks and there is a 
tendency in all the transaction types for women to prefer transacting with other women, men with 
other men. The social networks which helped create markets were thus gendered. The proportions 
of women acting within the various markets are shown in Fig. 7.2.1, where the most striking feature 
is that women were essentially unable to act as tenants of agricultural land. There is no known legal 
barrier to women acting in this way and the reason for this feature is thus likely to be that it was 
 




socially unacceptable for women either to farm the land solely with their own labour, or to be seen 
to direct males to do so. Thus, in the context of the three dimensions of female financial 
empowerment defined by Kabeer, women had access to the resources necessary and could use 
these resources to achieve a limited degree of well-being, but lacked the agency to exploit these 
resources fully.507 
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The relatively low proportion of females acting as landlords or lenders would also seem to indicate 
that it was socially difficult for a man to be financially subservient to a woman. These features 
should logically have had the following impacts.  The liquidity within the land leasing market would 
have decreased, by excluding a significant proportion of the population from acting as tenants, and 
to a lesser extent, landlords, thus reducing the competitive nature of the market. In contrast, the 
liquidity of the land sales market might have been expected to increase if women sought to sell 
inherited land they could not farm themselves, or would find difficulty in leasing, but we do not see 
this in the evidence. Indeed, women form a larger proportion of the buyers of land than vendors and 
their overall participation in the market is greater than is apparent from the land register 
evidence.508 Turning from land to loans, the percentage of women who had access to credit 
compared to their proportion of the population was low. There is a parallel here with the modern 
developing world, where there has been considerable debate as to the impacts on women of 
increasing their access to relatively affordable credit. In the modern world this has been achieved by 
microfinance lending institutions, rather than lending between individuals which was the norm in 
Roman Egypt.509 Providing women access to affordable credit is currently seen as encouraging 
‘virtual spirals’ which are viewed as positive from a socio-economic perspective by not only reducing 
poverty and increasing financial stability, but also providing women with economic empowerment 
 
507 Kabeer 1999: 2-4. 
508 See sub-section 3.1.4 for a description of the relevant evidence which also does not find statistically 
significant evidence that, as Tacoma suggested, women preferred vineyards or other intensively cultivated 
types of land and no evidence that overall female ownership of land decreased over time. Tacoma 2006: 110. 




which can then increase their political empowerment and help address gender inequality.510 
However, some scholars have questioned whether, in today’s developing economies, providing 
proportionally greater access to credit for women, whilst maintaining the same overall level of 
lending, really is beneficial for society. Studies have shown that when women borrow money it is 
often their husband who benefits.511 This can be referred to as the ‘feminisation of debt’, since the 
legal burden falls on the woman, but she gains no tangible advantage.  Also, simply changing the 
gender balance of borrowers may not address wider social inequality issues since as Kabeer pointed 
out ‘many feminists recognize that poor men are almost as powerless as poor women in access to 
material resources in the public domain, but remain privileged within the patriarchal structure of the 
family’.512  The position of the genders within the patriarchal society of Roman Egypt may have been 
similar, but for women this would have been modified by the Roman dowry and inheritance systems 
which separated ownership and maintained continued female control over specific assets, even 
within the marital sphere. 
Finally in the discussion about gender, whilst the statistics shown in Fig. 7.2.1 are generally valid,  it 
is important, as Bagnall noted, to be clear about which women we are talking about, rather than 
always treating women as a single homogenous group.513 It is difficult to split the data by the social 
strata, ethnicity or location of women, but in the sub-section on credit transactions, I drew a 
distinction between women acting jointly with another co-owner family member, usually a husband, 
and women using their own personal assets, even if a guardian may have been required.514  The data 
appear to show a short-lived period at the end of the first century AD and into the second century, 
when women had relatively good access to the credit markets in their own right, though never to 
the same extent as men, but this access declines in the third and fourth centuries. We can therefore 
think of both the credit and land tenant markets as being ‘limited access’ institutions. Ogilvie 
explained this concept as follows: 
 
‘The pre-industrial economy in particular was characterized by 'limited-access' institutions that 
coercively limited economic entry…... Limiting access not only affects distribution. It also affects 
efficiency, because it creates incentives for the excluded to violate institutional rules by moving into 
the informal sector. Informal economic activity is better than none at all, but typically imposes 
 
510 Mayoux & Hartl 2009: 8. 
511 Kulkarni 2011: 20-1. Similar patterns of husbands’ controlling and benefitting from their wives’ loans have 
been seen in India, Pakistan and Latin America. 
512 Kabeer 1999: 13. 
513 Bagnall 1995a: 85. 




higher costs and risks than if the same agents could do the same things through formal 
institutions.’515  
 
As women were at least partly excluded from financial markets, they did turn to informal sector 
alternatives, as is seen in the frequency in which women used pawnbrokers to gain access to credit 
and the higher price they paid in interest rates compared to the more prevalent personal village 
credit market.516 
 
If the markets were gendered, they were also influenced by the ages of the participants. The median 
age of borrowers was higher, at 38, than that of lenders, at 35.517 Indeed, in their forties and fifties, 
people were more likely to be borrowers than lenders. If individuals tended to accumulate capital 
over their lifetime, we would expect that there would be more lending than borrowing by older 
people and that borrowers might be more likely to be younger than lenders. This pattern of older 
lenders, and younger borrowers, is certainly present in most modern developed economies.518 
However, the evidence from Roman Egypt is that older people continued to need to borrow and did 
not typically have spare capital to lend to younger individuals. This lack of any significant inter-
generational lending, with the older generation lending to the younger, can be interpreted as 
indicating that typically there was no significant accumulation of even moderate savings over a 
lifetime for ordinary people, with all this implies for social mobility and economic growth.519 
But the need to borrow was not restricted to older people. Based on the data that Bonneau 
presented the chance of the Nile flood failing can be estimated at around one year in 12.520  If a 
family had not built up sufficient savings to meet subsistence and tax demands then their only 
recourse would have been to borrow and this risk of falling into debt is reflected in the fact that 
borrowing was the most common financial transaction in Roman Egypt. There was also a strong 
tendency within the credit markets, both those in cash and those in kind, to have a peak in 
scheduled repayments after the harvest. This demonstrates that many borrowers were dependent 
on the harvest to be able to make repayment, and if the harvest failed, the borrower would be in a 
precarious position and the lender might not receive repayment of the loan.  
 
515 Ogilvie 2007: 671. 
516 See sub-section 5.2.10. 
517 See sub-section 5.1.6. 
518 See ONS 2016: 16, for debt by age group in the UK. 
519 This conclusion is confirmed by the modelling of tenant farmer prosperity and financial risk in Kelly 
forthcoming b. 




Briggs, in his review of the changing views of credit in the European pre-industrial economy, stated 
that ‘most current research on European pre-industrial credit adopts an “optimistic” position and 
sees lending and borrowing as an important and dynamic element of agrarian societies in the period, 
frequently used for innovation and investment….It contrasts with an older “pessimistic” position 
which saw little sign of credit structures, and tended to view those that did exist as merely one of 
several forces leading to poverty cycles and subsistence crises.’521 
 
I believe that the credit market in Roman Egypt fell between these two extremes. It had the volume 
of the ‘optimistic’ view, but credit was rarely used for innovation and investment. However, I also 
believe that even if our evidence suggests that, for rural markets, credit was largely used for 
consumption, to tide over family needs in times of shortage, this was an essential feature of agrarian 
society, increasing social stability. I have demonstrated this by modelling the expected chance of 
‘ruin’ for a tenant farmer in first- or second-century Roman Egypt, over a generation, using the data 
gathered for this thesis.522 If access to a relatively cheap credit market is assumed, with an interest 
rate on cash of 12%, then the model predicts that only 4% of families would face financial ruin. If 
credit is less easily available and this is simulated by increasing interest rates to 24%, then the 
chance of ruin rises substantially to 9%.  Therefore, the rural credit market, just like efficient 
granaries, was a key contributor to social stability by acting as a resource, particularly for the poorer 
classes, which could be accessed when times were hard. Thus, as my data show a sharp decline in 
the vibrancy of the village credit market over time, this is likely to have significantly impacted on 
social resilience and stability in the countryside in the later Roman period.523   
 
Turning from those who needed to borrow to those who had capital to spare, I have demonstrated  
that those investors with larger sums available for investment and who were able to take advantage 
of the institutions that secured their investment through mortgages or land registers, could expect 
to achieve a very good return net of tax which was well above inflation in the period up to AD 274.524 
However, for those with small sums of money, purchasing land would potentially have been beyond 
their means. There were also considerable barriers to villagers accessing the mortgage market, 
including differential literacy rates, scribe fees and geographical access to the mortgage registers 
which were held in the cities. Thus the credit and land markets can be considered as being ‘limited 
access’ institutions, not just for women as was proposed above, but also for men of limited means. 
 
521 Briggs 2009: 4-5. 
522 Kelly forthcoming a. 
523 See sub-section 5.1.4. 




Villagers with small sums could therefore have been constrained to investing by lending on an 
unsecured basis, where the likely investment return was close to zero in real terms and where their 
capital was at considerable risk.  
 
The preceding conclusions lead naturally to the social impacts of attractive, relatively low risk, 
returns in the hands of those who already had capital. This has been addressed by Piketty for more 
recent historical periods, and his suggestion that if the return on capital, ‘r’ exceeds gross product 
growth ‘g’ then this would typically lead to a concentration of wealth is equally applicable to ancient 
economies.525 My best estimate of the rate of return on capital, ‘r’, is that available from the leasing 
of agricultural land, which for the Oxyrhynchite nome for the period prior to AD 274 has a median 
value of 7.4%.526 Gross product ‘g’ is constructed of two elements: general price inflation and real 
economic growth. I have estimated annual average general price inflation for the period from AD 50 
to 270 at 0.6%.527  I would argue that real economic growth in an essentially agrarian economy, 
would have been relatively low, and certainly below 2% per annum, meaning that ‘g’ would in all 
likelihood have been less than 3% per annum. Thus In Piketty’s terms, ‘r’ was certainly greater than 
‘g’ and, all other things being equal, the rich were getting richer and the poor received a smaller slice 
of the economic pie. The ‘limited access’ nature of the financial markets would have further 
accentuated this impact. It will also be noted that some institutions introduced by the Romans, such 
as the bibliotheke enkteseon, contributed to this trend, but other changes, for instance the reduction 
in the maximum cash interest rate from 24% to 12%, will have had the opposite effect. As Ogilvie 
stated, the distributional implications of institutions are just as important as their impact on 
‘efficiency’.528 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider whether we have independent evidence for the 
actual, rather than the predicted, concentration of wealth over the period concerned and we should 
be aware of a number of counter-factors that would have acted to disperse rather than concentrate 
wealth in Roman Egypt.529 Firstly, wealthier families could afford to have more children and 
therefore inherited wealth would have dispersed. Secondly, wealthier families would also have been 
likely to have better nutrition and lower mortality rates which again would increase the number of 
survivors from their class into the next generation when compared to poorer families. Finally, war, 
 
525 Piketty 2014: 25-7. 
526 See Fig. 6.11. 
527 See Fig. 2.1.19. 
528 Ogilvie 2007: 667-8. 
529 However, note the increase in size of city-based credit transactions compared to village transactions shown 




plagues and rebellions, and Roman Egypt had its share of these events over the period, could act in 
different ways to re-distribute wealth between the state and the people and within the people 
themselves. Overall, I believe however, the economic and institutional conditions that this thesis has 
tried to analyse, are more likely to have led to greater social inequality.  It is probable that, all other 
things being equal, despite the progressive tax system, the economic conditions would have 









This section deals with two of the three elements which determine the nature of the market 
according to neoclassical economics, but which are still of relevance within a New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) framework: frictional costs and information exchange.530 The term ‘frictional’ is 
preferred to the more common ‘transactional,’ given that costs which affect the financial outcome 
of a transaction can arise beyond the initial transaction date, such as renewal taxes for mortgages or 
the legal costs of seizing property after a default on a loan.  It focuses firstly on intermediation and 
the resultant frictional costs and then the evidence for the efficiency of information exchange is 
outlined. Conclusions are then drawn as to whether the markets were sufficiently efficient to allow 





The subject of frictional costs in the ancient world has been one of considerable recent scholarly 
interest.531 This sub-section concentrates on frictional costs arising from intermediation since this is 
the chief area which can be analysed from the data examined. For each of the financial activities 
discussed in earlier sections I have determined the percentage of all transactions which definitely 
involved a third party such as an agent or manager, and these ranged between 4% and 14%.532 These 
percentages are perhaps of more use for comparative rather than absolute analysis purposes, since 
they must be regarded as minimum levels of intermediation. Some transactions may have involved 
intermediaries but the evidence for their activity has been lost, or it was not recorded when the 
document was drawn up. None of the intermediaries concerned appear to have been professional 
brokers.  Overall, I would suggest that these levels are low and that the vast majority of transactions 
were carried out directly, face to face, between the principals. 
 
530 See Williamson 2000 for a useful review as to where these concepts fit within NIE. 
531 See Kehoe et al 2015 for a recent study on transaction costs and the ancient economy, Lerouxel 2015: 165 
for a description of the different categories of transactional costs and Rathbone & Temin 2008 for a 
consideration of financial intermediation in Rome itself. 
532 The proportions of transactions involving intermediaries are 4% (loans), 4% (house sales), 7% (house 





The highest levels of intermediation are for land leases and this reflects the geographical dispersion 
of landlord and tenant and the tendency for the landlord to delegate leasing to estate managers. It 
should also be noted that we have no evidence that any of these intermediaries received a 
remuneration that was directly linked to the transaction. The remuneration of banks within the 
credit market is also far from clear and we have no evidence for substantial charges. Finally, we have 
no evidence for the activities of auctioneers in the private real-estate markets. This lack of 
intermediary activity will have kept frictional costs low but will not have helped the second 
prerequisite for an efficient market, that of good quality information exchange. 
 
Before dealing with information exchange, one final point as to frictional costs needs to be 
considered. Although I have concluded that frictional costs from intermediation were low, if other 
frictional costs were high, they may have precluded the exercise of financial rationality since they 
would have impacted on profit to a disproportionate extent. In general, taxes on transactions were 
sufficiently low to allow financial rationality to be exercised.533 The relatively high tax on the 
acquisition of housing, at 10%, could have been amortized over the financial lifetime of the house 
through personal occupancy or leasing. The 2% tax on mortgages, though high enough to impact 
significantly the return on a short-term investment, could be considered a rational price to pay for 
the lender to have greater security. In the commodities market, frictional costs were low enough to 
allow short-term speculation.534 However, there are two market sub-sectors where frictional costs 
may have made it impossible to exercise financial rationality as I have defined it, within the formal, 
recorded, economy. These two sub-sectors are very small loans and housing leases where the cost of 
the scribe fees would have been disproportionate, if formal recording was required. I would suggest 
that in the main part, activity in these sectors would have been informal. 
   
 
Information Exchange 
Turning to information exchange, the patterns identified within the analysis of the data in the 
previous chapters can provide insights as to the nature and efficiency of this process. These insights 
can come from prices, intermediary activity, social networks and the role of state institutions. 
 
533 Not that the state was not even-handed in its approach. It discriminated against certain groups, including 
women, in its tax demands when land transactions were completed. However, even for those groups where 
frictional costs were heaviest, a financially rational approach to investment was still possible. 
534 When the frictional costs of transactions are high, this tends to discourage short-term speculation, since 
costs of both buying and selling may impact severely on profit. Frictional costs on long-term investments are 




‘Prices’ in this context can also be extended to include rents as the price of occupation and cash 
interest rates as the price of credit.  
Dealing first with price number formats, I would draw a distinction between ‘conventional’ and 
‘marginal’ pricing. In conventional pricing, prices are rounded, which may reflect institutional 
constraints or market inefficiency. In marginal pricing, the number format is not rounded and this 
can be considered as evidence for negotiation and competition. Another associated aspect of prices 
is the degree to which they are variable, since as Temin noted, ‘variable prices then can be used as 
markers for the presence of market exchange’.535 Certainly, a relatively small degree of variability in 
prices would be an indicator of the presence of market forces, but a very high degree of variability 
may indicate a failure in the pricing mechanism within the market, where participants lack the 
comparative data to make a rational decision. 
The rounding and variability of prices, within a low inflation economy, are thus indicators of market 
behaviours. Four different situations can be identified by these indicators: market failure, free 
market, constrained market and fixed prices.   These are displayed in the schematic Fig. 7.3.1. Along 
the x-axis, the degree to which rounding is present in the market is shown. Along the y-axis the 
variability of prices is shown. Where there is very high variability, this indicates that the market 
struggled to find a consensus for prices which in turn implies a failure in the pricing mechanism, 
most likely due to poor information availability and exchange. In short, the market fails to operate 
efficiently. All markets where exchange value is present, particularly those which are seasonal, or 
which are examined over a period of time, should show price variability. However, exchange value 
markets will differ in the degree to which prices are rounded. If there is low rounding then, as noted 
above, marginal pricing is an indicator of free market exchange. If there is high rounding, exchange 
value market mechanisms may still operate but they are ‘constrained’. There are two reasons why 
this may occur: either the market is constrained by ‘convention’ or by market inefficiency. 
Convention in this context can result from institutional constraints due to state action, coinage 
unavailability or social factors. Markets may also be constrained by their inefficient nature, 
particularly with regard to information. If there is insufficient information to enable a debate on 
price to evolve within the market, participants’ opening positions will be far apart and even a 
negotiated price is likely to be rounded. Finally, where there is no price variability then prices are 
 
535 Temin 2013: 8. See also Rathbone 2013a: 136-7 ‘the more expensive goods and those bought in quantity 
were subject to fluctuations in price which imply the operation of a free local market’. And for an excellent 




fixed. This can be as the intended result of state action such as Diocletian’s price edict or in more 
recent times the attempts of communist regimes to fix uniform prices for goods.  
Fig. 7.3.1 Price rounding and variability in a low inflation economy 
 
This theoretical context can be applied to Roman Egypt, but each market needs to be examined 
separately since the degree to which prices were variable, and/or rounded, differs by market. For 
instance, in the commodities market, the price of wheat was much more heavily rounded than other 
similar goods such as barley or wine.536 I have proposed that the reason for this difference relates to 
the higher degree to which the state intervened in the strategically important wheat market 
compared to other sectors of the market. The wheat market is thus an example of a conventionally 
constrained market.  ‘Prices’ within the credit market, that is interest rates, also showed the features 
of a constrained market, given that they were heavily rounded to monthly payments defined as a 
multiple of one per hundred of loaned capital, or 12%, but variability is moderate, since when they 
do differ from 12% there is often a substantial difference. In the land rental market, prices were 
variable, with rent levels for different plots within the same leases differing according possibly to the 
level of expected yield.537 Rounding in this market is more difficult to assess given the rates per 
aroura are relatively low, but some rounding does occur. Both parties would have been able to 
 
536 See sub-section 2.1.9. 




assess the rent for individual plots given their local knowledge of the geographic conditions and 
previous harvests or rents. Even absentee landlords could rely on their estate manager or agent to 
provide this local knowledge. The fact that rents in the Arsinoite nome are much more variable than 
in the Oxyrhynchite nome logically reflects, I believe, the greater geographic diversity in the 
Arsinoite nome, and the exchange of information when agreeing rents. By contrast, house rents 
appear extremely variable, although the diversity of housing stock will have been a factor. 
 
Real-estate sales were much less frequent than rental agreements and in these sectors of the 
financial markets, for sales of houses, prices were rounded very frequently, and for land sales, to a 
lesser extent.538 I do not believe that this reflects any state intervention nor can I see any evidence 
for conventional pricing driven by a ‘standard’ price level, since although prices are rounded, they do 
differ according to circumstances. Rather I believe that the infrequency of these transactions and the 
consequent lack of available information meant that meaningful, reasoned negotiation was very 
difficult. If neither side had sufficient data upon which to base their negotiating position it is more 
likely that prices would have been rounded. It might be asked whether larger landowners had an 
advantage in having better information on prices and likely profitability of a purchase or sale. 
However, land markets show no difference in average pricing per aroura for large or small deals, 
which suggests participants across the wealth spectrum used similar, inefficient, pricing 
mechanisms.  
I have re-drawn Fig. 7.3.1 to include the market sectors discussed above, with wine acting as a proxy 
for commodities other than wheat, and this is shown in Fig. 7.3.2. Along the x-axis my assessment of 
the degree to which rounding is present in the market is shown.539 Along the y-axis the calculated 
variability of prices is used.540 
 
538 See sub-sections 4.1.5 and 3.1.7 respectively. 
539 This assessment is based on the degree of rounding to tetradrachmas in the wheat and wine unit prices 
(67% and 39% respectively) and the fodder per aroura and house rents (57% and 88%). For the capital 
acquisitions of housing and land the assessment is based on the number of land and housing transactions 
between 100 drachmas and 1,000 drachmas that were rounded to the nearest 100 (47% and 70% 
respectively). For credit transactions, the definition of rounding I have used is the proportion of transactions at 
1 drachma per mina interest rates, that is 12% (80%) or a multiple of this rate. Since the measures for rounding 
differ according to the size of the transaction, the comparison cannot be exactly mathematical, but has some 
subjectivity and hence this is my assessment of rounding rather than an exact figure. The data examined are 
that from AD 1 to 274 to avoid any distortion from the inflationary period after AD 274.   
540 The relative standard deviation, which is explained in appendix B, for each of the points is as follows: house 
prices 132%, house rents 99%, land prices 40%, land rents 65%, wheat prices 38%, wine prices 39% and 
interest rates 49%. In order to reduce heterogeneity and thus distortion caused by geographical factors, the 
land rents used are from the Oxyrhynchite nome only, and the house rents are those for village properties 




Fig. 7.3.2 Price rounding and variability for different financial sectors in Roman Egypt 
 
In my view, for the housing markets, the presence in the top right quadrant of high, indeed 
excessive, variability and high levels of rounding indicates that there was insufficient information for 
individuals to make a reasoned judgement as to prices in these markets. Despite the high rounding, 
there is no need to assume that this is a result of any specific institutional constraints in the market, 
and I believe this results from a combination of constraints on competition caused by housing stock 
fragmentation and associated familial considerations, together with the information deficit. This 
seems to apply to both the purchase and sale of housing stock and any subsequent lease. Whilst the 
high variability in prices and rents might be partly explainable by the heterogeneity of the housing 
stock, I have sought to reduce this impact by the use of ‘unit’ prices and rents per house and only 
considering village properties. Heterogeneity in the underlying data cannot, however, explain the 
high rounding which applies in the housing market, which suggests that prices and rents were set 
without substantive negotiation given the information deficit. The only datapoint firmly in the ‘free 
market’ area, showing moderate volatility and low rounding of prices, which would indicate the 
operation of an unconstrained market with good exchange of information, is wine. This presumably 
reflects the relative frequency of these transactions which provided pricing points for reference and 
the homogeneity of the product. By contrast, the wheat price datapoint shows high rounding but 
moderate variability, the variability being consistent with the free market in wine, whilst the 




we find the agricultural land markets, showing some variability which may be attributable to the 
heterogeneity of the underlying asset as well as the action of the marketplaces. 
The above discussion has concerned the period of relatively low annual average inflation to AD 274. 
However, the final significant point revealed as regards the efficiency of information exchange in the 
markets, concerns the pricing for goods in the high inflationary period of the first half of the fourth 
century. The market seems to have coped with the pricing of simple, frequently traded goods such 
as cereals, but the excessively wide variety of pricing of a complex good, donkeys, would indicate 
that people struggled to price these goods at this time, probably due to inefficiencies in the pricing 
mechanism of the market which in turn was due to inefficiencies in information exchange.541 At the 
risk of being accused of anachronism, buying a donkey in the fourth century would have been like 
purchasing a second-hand car today without the benefit of price comparison web sites. Not only was 
the buyer at a disadvantage since he could not know the character of the donkey but both parties, in 
a time of high inflation, will have lacked the reference points as to pricing levels that shared 
experience would have provided in times of more stable prices. 
Returning to intermediaries, one of their typical functions in the financial markets is not only to bring 
counterparties together, but also to help bridge the information gap between counterparties by 
providing information to one or both parties. However, as we have seen there is little evidence for 
professional intermediation. In the capital markets for real-estate, the lack of evidence for auctions, 
broking, professional agents, marketing, advertising or competitive bidding in the private sector, as 
opposed to the state sector, has been noted. The lack of these institutions in the marketplace will 
not have helped price transparency and information exchange. Other markets such as the credit and 
rental markets were also hindered not only by the lack of brokers who could bring principals 
together, but also by the absence of professional market makers who could take positions 
themselves using their own capital. Banks, for instance, although assisting in bringing parties 
together, did not generally act as principals by lending their own money. 
Most transactions occurred within social networks and the nature of these networks is key to 
information exchange. The social networks concerned were gendered and localised. Principals were 
sometimes linked by family or military ties, or social obligations, which occurred for instance when 
loans were granted from landlord to tenant, but these were relatively rare. The proportions of 
transactions that we know occurred between family members, military colleagues and 
landlords/tenants are shown in Fig. 7.3.3. 
 




Fig. 7.3.3 Family and other Connections - Percentage of Transaction by Type 
 




Family 3% 6% 9% 0% 1% 
Tenants 2% 0% 0% NA NA 
Military 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
 
Whilst these figures represent the minimum percentage of transactions that can be seen to be 
between closely connected parties, given that we do not have the full details of the parties for all the 
transactions, they do look low. The exception is perhaps that of house sales, where the partible 
inheritance system would have led to fragmentation of house ownership and with an asset that as 
we have seen was difficult to price or lease formally, it may have been preferable to sell to a family 
member than a third party.  The proportion of intra-family sales for houses is thus much higher than 
other transaction types. Most transactions must, however, have occurred between people who were 
not part of the same family, which will have made information exchange more difficult, even if it did 
mean that transactions were not commonly, directly influenced by familial considerations. 
Although in some markets asset owners tended to be based in the cities, and tenants or borrowers 
in the villages, managers employed by the asset owner could bridge this gap and ensure some parity 
of information. The vast majority of transactions were local, between counterparties from the same 
village or city, as has been shown by Lerouxel for the credit market for the initial period of Roman 
rule.542 I cannot demonstrate the localised nature of the markets with as much conviction as 
Lerouxel since I have not made the assumption he makes, that when locations are not mentioned 
then they are the same, but I would agree with his conclusion as to the credit markets and believe 
that similarly localised features applied to other markets with the exception of leasing of land. This 
can be seen in the proportion of ‘closed’ transactions which are known to have occurred between 
people in the same location compared to the proportion of those ‘open’ transactions known to have 










Fig. 7.3.4 Localisation Ratios 







Proportion of 'closed' to 'open' 
transactions 1.8 1.3 3.7 0.5 1.9 
 
In all cases except land leasing, it was more common for people to transact with people within their 
immediate geographic circle, than to seek to strike a deal in a geographically wider network. This is 
particularly marked in the housing markets. The exception is land leases, which reflects the 
concentration of ownership of land, available for leasing, in the city elites.543 It should be noted that 
the numbers shown in Fig. 7.3.4 are likely to be lower bound estimates. This is because the number 
of ‘closed’ transactions are probably underestimated, since when principals came from the same 
locality, their locations are unlikely to have been recorded, as they would be known to all parties as 
a given. 
Thus the markets operated on a face to face basis, and people generally transacted with other 
people known to them or to their social circle but outside their immediate family, with absentee 
landlords represented by agents and managers. The localised nature of the markets may have 
inhibited market competition and geographic integration, but would have improved the information 
exchange between principals since they may well have known each other personally or have been 
part of the same social network. Finally, transactions clearly passed through gendered networks and 
there is a clear tendency in all the transaction types for women to prefer transacting with other 
women, men with other men, which will also have impacted the efficiency of information exchange. 
The final point on information exchange relates to the role of the state in enabling or obstructing the 
free exchange of information between private parties. I can see little evidence for the state 
obstructing the exchange of information and I would agree with Lerouxel that the Roman state, by 
the establishment and maintenance of property registers and the bibliotheke enkteseon, would 
certainly have encouraged the higher value end of the credit and, indeed the real-estate, markets 
through the exchange of information which confirmed ownership or pledging of assets.544 The active 
nature of the state’s intervention in the commodities markets, particularly wheat, through 
requisitions, sales and purchases, will have impacted on the ability of an individual to take rational 
 
543 See sub-section 3.2.4. 
544 The state did hinder competition in the real-estate markets somewhat by insisting that neighbouring 




financial decisions. However, I believe that the actions of the state would have been a constraint on 
rational behaviour, rather than a disabling factor. 
Overall, I believe that, within the credit and land markets, two of the key pre-conditions for the 
exercise of financial rationality, low frictional costs and sufficient information exchange, existed. In 
the housing markets of rural Roman Egypt however, it would have been difficult to exercise financial 





Section 7.4 Market Conclusions – Financial Rationality 
 
Introduction 
This section answers the central question of this thesis: were markets in Roman Egypt driven by 
financial rationality? Financially rational behaviour has been taken to mean the use of reason to 
make a comparative decision, seeking to achieve financial goals, having due regard to maximising 
return and minimising risk. Financial rationality contrasts with other drivers of markets which are 
directly embedded in wider society and which include reciprocity and redistribution. This section of 
the thesis therefore examines firstly, whether the pre-conditions for the exercise of financial 
rationality existed, building on the conclusions of the preceding section. Then the evidence we have 
for the behaviour of the participants in the marketplaces is set out, using anecdotal, demographic 
and contractual sources. Financial outcomes are then discussed, along with the validity of their use 
in determining behaviours. Finally, the evidence for and against financial rationality for each of the 
sectors of the markets is outlined and conclusions reached.  
 
 
Pre-conditions for the exercise of Financial Rationality 
There are certain key pre-conditions for the exercise of financial rationality in markets. These are: 
sufficient information, reasonable frictional costs, mathematical skills and sufficient trade volumes. 
Although financially rational behaviour can exist in a barter economy, sufficient monetisation to 
allow cash transactions to crystallise financial return, would be a strong enabling factor, if not a strict 
pre-condition. Finally, the state, and society more broadly, must provide a sufficiently ‘laissez-faire’ 
institutional structure, without over-riding power imbalances between transactional partners which 
would force one party to enter into an unfavourable transaction, and societal mores need to allow 
for the pursuit of financial goals.  
 
Firstly, the parties undertaking the transaction need to have sufficient information to be able to 
make a judgement.  The previous section has shown that in most financial sectors the necessary 
‘institutions’ existed to ensure that sufficient information exchange could take place. Secondly, 
frictional costs need to be low enough to ensure that for any asset holder, and my definition is one 
that looks explicitly at rationality from their perspective, the costs of the transaction were not so 
high that they would absorb any profit. In all sectors, for large transactions, there were relatively low 




that scribe costs would have been disproportionate, which would have increased the tendency to 
use lower cost, informal, transaction methods. 
 
Another important pre-condition for the exercise of financial rationality is the ability to use 
mathematical skills to allow the use of reason to make a comparative judgement. The mathematical 
skills were certainly in existence as is evidenced by the school exercises that have survived, some of 
which specifically look at questions related to financial transactions.545 It should be stressed that the 
mathematical skills necessary to assess profit are relatively simple: addition, subtraction, division 
and multiplication. There is no need for any knowledge of double entry book-keeping to satisfy the 
criterion. Constructing accounts is, as Rathbone showed, an indicator of the exercise of financial 
rationality but it is not a necessary pre-condition for the exercise of rationality.546 Assessment of risk 
may today involve more complicated mathematics, but in Roman times it could have been on a 
qualitative basis and it would still meet my definition of rational financial behaviour. However, the 
existence within society of these mathematical abilities is no guarantee that they extended across 
the whole social strata and thus that all market participants had access to these skills. 
 
Markets must also be sufficiently liquid, in the sense that there is sufficient trade volume to support 
competitive activity, to allow comparative judgements to be made. The previous sections have 
shown that the volume of transactions varies by market, and credit transactions are particularly 
frequent. Despite the evidence for the endemic nature of the rural credit market some scholars have 
viewed economic life in the Egyptian village as essentially a ‘natural, or barter, economy’ and that 
farmers such as ‘Kronion and his likes were chronically short of cash and constantly going into short-
term debt’. 547  However, this argument fails to distinguish between an economy-wide systemic 
shortage of cash and a farmer’s individual need for cash as the harvest varied according to the 
quality of the Nile flood and other environmental factors. More recently, scholars have viewed rural 
Roman Egypt as being heavily monetised, and the data from the credit market would support this 
conclusion.548 
 
Finally, when we consider the pre-conditions for the exercise of financial rationality we must 
recognise the influence of the state and wider society. If the state dictates prices and terms, or 
 
545 See sub-section 5.2.3. 
546 Rathbone 1991: 383-6. 
547 Lewis 1983: 71. See Kelly forthcoming b for a discussion of the frequency, and reasons, for farmers falling 
into debt. 




influences markets in more subtle ways, then participants, even if they wished to take actions based 
on financial rationality, may not be able to do so. The clearest evidence for state activity is in the 
wheat market, where the state’s actions and pricing structures seem to have dampened price 
volatility and kept price increases lower than those which applied to other goods. This new evidence 
of differential pricing argues for a middle ground view of the commodities market as reflecting a 
‘two-tier’ economy with certain sectors of activity where the key actor is the state, and others 
subject to a greater degree to neoclassical market forces. The unpredictability of state actions, 
notably its demands for additional taxation or requisitioning of goods, will have complicated the 
assessment of risk. In general, though, there was a sufficiently laissez-faire economic institutional 
framework to allow financial rationality to be exercised in all the related economic sectors, and 
there were no over-riding societal mores or power imbalances which would have precluded the 
adoption of this behaviour. 
 
 
Anecdotal, Demographic and Contractual Evidence  
Anecdotal evidence which would help us understand how people thought about financial decisions, 
is an appropriate area to examine to help answer the question posed.  However, as may be expected 
in any dry collection of financial documents, the insights into how people thought, and possibly 
rationalised, their views on financial transactions are rare. Perhaps the clearest example of the 
exercise of financial rationality, which encompasses both a desire to maximise profit and an 
understanding of risk, is a letter where the size of the vintage is said to be affecting not just the price 
of wine but also the price of vineyards as long-term investments.549 This meets our definition as the 
potential purchaser is seeking to maximise profit by purchasing the land at the most beneficial time, 
and there is an understanding of the risk of both poor and excessive harvests. Another example of a 
case where motives are attributed to an investor concerns a lender who has obtained use of a large 
area of land, seized as a result of failure to repay the loan, and who is receiving rents and refuses to 
accept the repayment of the loan and prefers to retain the rents on the land ‘having grown covetous 
of it owing to its great yearly productivity’.550 This case shows that the decision as to which of two 
alternative financial transactions was preferable was likely to have been made on the basis of the 
expected profit, although there is no evidence of consideration of risk. There are other examples 
where the profit motive is clear. One document provides evidence of speculative activity, where a 
house is purchased and then immediately sold at a profit, but evidence for risk or for the relative 
 
549 P.Giss. 79 (c. AD 117). 




assessment of the level of profit of one investment compared to another is more difficult to 
identify.551 As to the actual assessment of the amount of profit for an investment this is also rare, 
other than in the school exercises referred to above, but in one case the ‘trustees’ of a minor’s 
estate calculate not only the gross income from the child’s investments but also the net income after 
costs and taxes.552 However, despite these partial and rare anecdotal examples of aspects of 
financial rationality it must be said that these examples are generally outnumbered by examples 
which show that individuals often acted for reasons which had no clear relation to financial 
rationality, although the balance of evidence for motives varies from market to market.553 Thus if we 
are to find substantive evidence for financial rationality it must be derived by indirect means and 
possible avenues are examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
The demographics underlying financial behaviour might provide us with clues as to the motivations 
of those who participated in the financial markets. In the previous sections the demographics of the 
market participants have been reviewed for different types of financial activity. These can now be 
brought together and compared with the estimated population structure for both age and gender.554  
These are shown in Fig. 7.4.1, for those types of transactions where we have more than 60 cases, 
where the green cells show where the age group concerned is more active than would be expected 
compared to the general adult population, and the red cells, where the activity is less or equal to the 
proportion in that population. 
Fig. 7.4.1 Distribution of Financially Active Population by Age 
Age Comparison 23-32 33-42 43-52 53-62 63-72 73+ 
Percentage of adult 
population555 33% 26% 20% 13% 6% 2% 
Lenders n=174 27% 33% 24% 9% 6% 2% 
Borrowers n=340 31% 26% 27% 11% 3% 1% 
Land Landlords n=66 30% 21% 23% 23% 3% 0% 
Land Tenants n=129 36% 25% 24% 10% 5% 1% 
 
 
551 P.Lond. III 1164f (AD 212). 
552 See Kraut 1984: 167-78. 
553 See sub-section 3.1.8 for land sales, where investment motives appear to outnumber familial motives, but 
sub-sections 4.1.7 and 5.1.9 for house sales and loans respectively where the apparent balance is the opposite. 
554 See appendix C for the derivation of the population distribution. 
555 Percentage of population over age 22. Activity by people below this age is well below the proportion of the 




It can be seen that relative financial activity peaks in late maturity, from the mid-forties to the early 
fifties. It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from this pattern but I suspect it reflects the age 
when an individual became the head of a wider family unit and had need to access the financial 
markets, either to support their family or to dispose of inherited capital or assets. There is a relative 
peak in individuals leasing land in their twenties, which may similarly reflect the need to expand 
farming to meet the requirements of a young family, either within a wider family unit or 
independently established. There is a corresponding peak in land leasing for older groups in their 
late fifties and early sixties, which may reflect a declining physical ability in this age group to farm 
the land themselves, but the total number of available ages is low. This linkage to family events 
would tend to reduce the likelihood that financial rationality was key to a decision, since the drivers 
for the decision may well not have been purely financial and redistribution may have been more 
important. The demographics as to gender may also be examined and, as was seen in sub-section 
5.1.6, the inability of women to act in certain transactions may have distorted the marketplace to 
some degree, but from an investment perspective both men and women would have been capable 
of exercising financial rationality in making decisions, though the options for women may have been 
constrained and their access limited. 
Turning to the legal structure of the underlying contracts, this is perhaps the most compelling 
evidence of rational consideration of the risks that faced each party. The assignment of these risks 
between the parties and protection against the financial consequences of these risks is often the 
main object of the clauses of the document. These documents may be considered to be ‘relational 
contracts’ with both parties having an interest in a successful conclusion. Consideration, in any 
detail, of the terms of these documents lies outside the scope of this thesis but some comments may 
be made. Some of the most complex documents tend to relate to the sale of real-estate and in many 
ways they typically resemble modern commercial sale and purchase agreements. As one might 
imagine, the parties are detailed, the price is provided and the property described. However, there 
may well be warranties provided by the vendor as to the legal validity of their ownership, the fact 
that the property is unencumbered by debt and that all taxes have been paid to date. The rights of 
the buyer and vendor to revenues, in this case usually harvests, are specified from a certain date. 
The penalties for breach of any warranty are also specified. Finally, the obligations for registering the 
document and the scope of its validity are laid out. This structure provides some additional security 
to the buyer, who generally has less information, even after conducting due diligence, than the 





Contracts for leasing real-estate are often more complicated than sales and tend to be more 
balanced since both parties are at risk. They impose obligations on the tenant to maintain the 
property and to return it in a good state at the end of the lease. However, there may also be 
obligations on the landlord to, for instance, provide oxen for ploughing.  Again, this balanced 
approach to risks is a typical feature of modern leases. The balance between landlord’s and tenant’s 
interests is also shown in the rent relief clauses in the case of the Nile not flooding which are 
common in Oxyrhynchite leases. These clauses ensured that the lease did not make unreasonable 
and unenforceable demands on the tenant in times when the Nile did not flood, and also would have 
made the lease a more sustainable and stable transaction for the landlord.556 Finally on the 
contractual content, as noted in the previous section, depending on the type of transaction, the 
prices or rents paid may exhibit ‘conventional’ or ‘fractional’ pricing. This will be discussed further 
below when each market sector is examined. 
 
Using Outcomes as an indicator of rationality 
Much of the body of this thesis has been concerned with the outcomes from financial transactions. 
What was the likely return to an investor and how did those returns relate to the risk that the 
investor was taking? Did the outcome maximise return for a given risk? It is tempting to link an 
outcome where return is maximised for a given degree of risk, with the exercise of financial 
rationality, but this must be considered as circumstantial, rather than definitive, evidence.  
 
A financially rational outcome does not necessarily imply the use of financial rationality in its 
derivation. A financially rational outcome could arise, not from the exercise of deliberate financial 
thought and action, but either by chance or from conventional actions which have evolved within 
society. These patterns of actions can arise in an economically evolutionary fashion within society. 
Consider a tenant who accepts a financially irrational transaction by leasing land at a high rent. This 
type of tenant will not survive since they cannot feed their family and prosper financially if they are 
paying too high a rent. The tenant who rents at a more reasonable rent, providing an equilibrium 
between landlord and tenant, will survive and prosper, whilst landlords renting at rates below the 
equilibrium level will tend to disappear and low rents will not be available for tenants. The 
establishment of this equilibrium level does not necessarily require, at any point, the exercise of 
 
556 For a consideration of the balance of risks between landlords and tenants within the context of wider 
Roman law see Kehoe 2015: 239-43, and for a wider consider of the economics behind different forms of land 




financial rationality on the part of the principals. This proposition is part of the evolutionary 
efficiency school within economic theory.557 
  
Conversely, outcomes which consistently do not meet the requirements of maximising return for a 
given risk, cannot arise from the exercise of financial rationality and thus our central question can be 
answered in the negative, at least for the type of transaction examined. These outcomes, though 
financially irrational, can still be socially rational if other drivers are important such as family ties and 
needs, mutual support/reciprocity or social status. Bearing in mind these constraints, the analysis of 
the different types of financial markets is set out below. 
 
 
Financial Rationality in which markets? 
The first market to examine is the credit market, or rather, the credit markets, since this market had 
a number of sub-sectors where different rules appear to have applied. The credit market can be split 
into three sub-sectors: the intra-village cash loan, the generally larger loans involving city-dwellers 
and loans in kind. Dealing with the intra-village loan, these loans were relatively small in size.558 They 
were generally unsecured and presumably in many cases lender and borrower were personally 
known to each other. Our best evidence as to interest rates suggests that 12% was the typical 
interest rate and the analysis of expected returns has shown that a lender would need to be 98% 
confident that a borrower would not default to show even a small return.559 Also the timing of the 
months of repayment show that these loans could typically only be payable after the harvest, and 
with a chance of the Nile not flooding sufficiently in perhaps one year in 12, this implies that many of 
the borrowers would have defaulted. Thus an unsecured loan at 12% interest, even to someone 
known personally by the lender, cannot be considered financially rational. Neither could a deposit 
which I have suggested would typically not have attracted any interest.560  In any event, there is 
anecdotal evidence that there were also significant numbers of lenders who were not driven by a 
pure profit motive and the demographic evidence examined above provides confirmation of this 
view. 
 
Turning to the second sub-sector of the credit market, cash loans involving city-dwellers were 
generally of a larger size and were more often secured on specific property than the village 
 
557 See Ogilvie 2007: 656-8, for a discussion of evolutionary efficiency and economic institutions. 
558 See Fig. 5.1.6. 
559 See section 6.5. 




transactions. Here we can analyse the outcomes and show that the outcomes were indeed 
financially rational for the lender. There is a clear hierarchy of risk and return which indicates this 
financially rational nature. Lenders were willing, if the loan were to be secured, to accept a lower 
return on their investment than an unsecured loan, at a higher, yet irrational rate. Pawnbrokers 
operated at interest rates similar to those which apply today, and presumably made a good profit.  
Larger loans with a single counterparty attracted lower interest rates than the smaller loans. Finally, 
the economic system was not de-stabilised by loans at rates of 12% per annum or less. These loans 
were affordable to the borrower and thus from the lender’s perspective this was a sustainable and 
repeatable investment.  All the pre-conditions for the exercise of financial rationality were met in 
these loans, with the lender able to calculate the profit and even with a 2% of the capital tax on 
mortgages, large loans had relatively low transaction costs. The detailed clauses within the 
documentation of secured loans show that the lenders were aware of their risks and took action to 
mitigate them and although compound interest was not explicitly provided for, lenders could, and 
did, effectively obtain the same result by rolling over loans or demanding the payment of interest at 
year or month end. We have little evidence for gearing, by which is meant borrowing money in order 
to invest in more productive exercises such as land exploitation, despite the very large number of 
transactions in the databases. However, this is entirely rational if economic conditions meant that a 
higher return could not be expected in land investment, and the average returns on land leasing are 
not sufficiently high to support borrowing costs. Finally, the market reacted rationally to the higher 
inflationary conditions of the late third or fourth centuries by increasing interest rates accordingly.  
However, there was no strong trend to lending in kind, partly reflecting the very unpredictable 
nature of financial outcomes as I have modelled in chapter 6. The very unpredictable nature of the 
returns from lending in kind, means that it was like a highly risky bet rather than an investment from 
the perspective of the lender. I would therefore suggest that this sub-sector of the credit market, 
along with the small village-based loan market is unlikely to have been driven by financial rationality, 
although the very high interest rates do reflect a value framework with a consistent risk/return 
hierarchy. 
 
Turning to the housing market I believe that the evidence shows that the pre-conditions for the 
exercise of financial rationality did not exist. The relatively high frictional costs would have made 
housing leasing a less attractive investment proposition than leasing land. In addition, we have 
noted the difficulties with regard to information exchange, notably the intangible variability of the 
experience of sharing living spaces, would have made it difficult to commoditise a portion of a house 




slim. House rents were heavily rounded and look conventional in structure. The liquidity in the 
market, at least that recorded in the papyri, was low compared to other financial transactions.  
When we consider the relatively high level of intra-familial transactions and lack of formal leasing 
documentation, this seems to point to a market which was not primarily driven by financial 
rationality but rather by familial concerns. Of course, it should be noted that the data come from the 
rural nomes of Roman Egypt and it may well be that in Alexandria there was scope for 
commoditisation of the housing market with a larger peripatetic population and larger housing units 
which could be broken down into standard units and thus commoditised more easily than in the 
smaller urban sites in the rural nomes. However, the evidence suggests that the housing market, like 
some sub-sectors of the credit market, was not driven by financial rationality. 
In contrast to the housing market, the markets for buying and renting land seem to have all the 
necessary pre-conditions for the exercise of financial rationality to take place, with relatively low 
frictional costs and sufficient information exchange. There are clear indications of financial 
rationality. Land sale and purchase documents and leases are complex documents. The land sale 
contracts go some way to protect the buyer against any information deficits they may have as to the 
nature of the land they are buying, whereas land leases are more balanced between the two parties. 
These contractual features indicate an understanding of the risks faced by the parties and try to 
mitigate these risks in a fashion that is entirely consistent with the exercise of financial rationality. 
This impression of rational behaviour is reinforced by the rational diversification of crops and plots 
seen within lease documents. There are no signs of conventional pricing in either land sales or 
leases, and within both types of documents we can see the exercise of judgement by the fact that in 
some cases the price of land or the rent applicable may vary for different plots of land within a single 
lease. Outcomes are financially rational and land ownership is an attractive financial proposition 
which produces returns which are comparable to those within the only other market available for 
investment with a similar risk profile, the secured credit market. Land sales show no seasonality of 
activity, suggesting that buyers and sellers were not driven to transact by poor or good harvests. This 
would have allowed the exercise of financial rationality after due consideration, rather than the 
principals being rushed into a decision. However, as may be expected, land leases follow the farming 
year and leases were generally contracted prior to sowing and rents paid after the harvest. This is 
also entirely financially rational from the perspective of both the landlord and the tenant. There are 
relatively few intra-familial transactions which might have been transacted on terms which were 
financially irrational if family ties and needs played a part. There is also evidence for the symbiotic 
relationship of landlords and tenants in the frequent instances of landlords dealing sympathetically 




housing and land. This was thus not a society where there was typically a large power imbalance 
between landlord and tenant, which might otherwise have impeded the exercise of financial 
rationality by both parties.  Finally, the land markets reacted to changing conditions in a manner 
which appears financially rational. In times of instability, such as the later third century, the term of 
leases decreases as individuals seek to ensure that they have greater flexibility to deal with 
potentially fast changing circumstances. In times of high inflation, there is a shift away from payment 
of rents for fodder land in cash towards other more inflation-proof commodities including cereals. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has concentrated on the question of using financial rationality as an indicator of how 
people thought and to provide insights into the economy of Roman Egypt. The first conclusion of 
note is that we must think not of a single market but of a series of sectors and sub-sectors. To talk of 
‘the’ Roman ‘market economy’ or ‘bazaar’ is inappropriate. In the commodities markets we saw that 
wheat prices exhibited very different formats and developments over time compared to other 
goods. I have attributed this difference to reflect a two-tier market where the action of the state 
dampened price movements for the strategically important commodity of wheat whilst leaving other 
commodities to move more freely 
Turning to the nature of the markets themselves, in general, except for transactions at small 
amounts, the frictional costs were relatively low and would not have impeded the exercise of 
financial rationality by making transactions too costly to undertake. Information exchange would 
have been influenced and perhaps aided by the fact that most markets were strictly local, gendered 
and based on social networks. However, in turn, this localised nature and the fact that there is no 
evidence for professional intermediaries who could have assisted in matching principals and bridging 
information deficits, would have reduced the competitive nature of the markets. 
The nature of the various markets can be presented in the schematic shown in Fig. 7.4.2, where the 
size of the circles represents the volume of the market, which is determined by the number of 
transactions. Along the horizontal axis the geographic scope of the market is plotted which is based 
on the localisation ratio set out in Fig. 7.3.4. The vertical axis is based on my assessment of whether 
pricing was driven by exchange value, determined by the degree of conventional/fractional and 
inter-family pricing shown in Fig. 7.3.2. The size of the circles reflects the size of the markets 
concerned, based on the volume of turnover. A plot for a ‘modern’ geographically dispersed but 





In general, large circles in the upper right quadrant, could be regarded as relatively efficient, 
geographically integrated, liquid markets. Small circles in the lower left quadrant would suggest 
inefficient, localised, illiquid markets. 
I have little or no direct evidence of the thoughts of market participants, so my assessment of 
whether the markets were driven by financial rationality must be derived from other data. My 
assessment is therefore subjective, and dependent on the emphasis I choose to give on my 
interpretations of that data. When I started to research the financial markets, reflecting my own life 
experience, I fully expected to see evidence of financial rationality in all sectors and at all levels of 
society. However, I have come to the conclusion that the evidence relating to the unsecured loan 
market, of generally small, village-based, cash loans cannot be considered as a sector driven by 
financial rationality given the financially sub-optimal outcomes for a lender. Similarly, lending of 
commodities has such a wide variability in outcomes, that it can only be considered financially 
rational for a professional gambler. The rural housing market, with its poor liquidity, conventional 
pricing patterns and the importance of intra-family transactions, is also not likely to have been 
driven by financial rationality. However, although I cannot prove this indisputably, the secured cash 
loan and the agricultural land markets show all the features of market sectors driven by financial 
rationality. In conclusion, I believe that it is highly probable that the agricultural land and the 
secured credit markets were driven by financial rationality, whilst the housing and unsecured credit 
markets were driven by reciprocity and redistribution. I hope that these conclusions will assist in 
answering the central question as to the nature of the markets which Scheidel described as vital to 




























   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









decline’, particularly since the conditions and institutions that supported the markets of Roman 
Egypt also existed in many other provinces. 561   
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Appendix 2.1.1 Private Wheat Prices pre-AD 274 
Date Amounts in dr./art. Nature of price Nome Reference 
45 
4.36, 5.71, 8, 7.27, 
7.62, 8 A range of prices in private account. Arsinoite 
P.Mich. II 127 i.8, i.12, i.13-6, i.17, 
i.37, i.38 
46 8.73 Price in private account. Arsinoite P.Mich. II 123 v.xi.26-7 
46-7 6 Price in expenditure account. Arsinoite SB XX 14576 l.34 
78 10 Price in expenditure account. Other SB VIII 9699 l.177-8, 181 
79 11, 11 Two prices in expenditure account. Other SB VIII 9699 l.360-2, 454-5 





Within a land lease an alternative to paying rent of 2 
artabas per aroura is given at 24 dr. per aroura implying a 
notional value of 12 dr.  Other P.Oxy. XXII 2351 l.18-20 
124 9 Price in estate account. Other P.Sarap. 60 l.10 
c.100-30 7 General price in estate letter. Other P.Sarap. 92 l.18-9 
c.128(?) 12 Price in estate account. Other P.Sarap. 79b i.13 
138-9 5.6(?) Price for 'grain' in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite PSI IV 281 l.7-9 
160 
5.52(?) or 3.68(?). 
Assumed to be 5.52 Price in private account. Arsinoite P.Berl.Leihg. II 39 r l.64 
c.160 11 Price in private account. Arsinoite P.Stras. IX 847 l.42 
192 
 
18, 20, 18 A range of prices in estate account. Arsinoite 
P.Cair.Goodsp. 30 xiii.10-13, xv.24, 
xx.22-3 
215(?) 28 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Louvre I 51 l.5, 10 
216(?) 
 
28 Price in estate account. Arsinoite 




10, <8(?), 8 A range of prices in estate account. Arsinoite 
P.Louvre I 51 l.90, 94, 104, 118-9, 
126, 128-9 
202-31(?) 20 Price in temple account. Arsinoite P.Lund. IV 11 i.25-6 
202-32(?) 16 Price in estate account. Oxyrhynchite(?) P.NYU VIII 8 l.9 
217(?) 10, 10, 12 A range of prices in estate account. Arsinoite P.Louvre I 54 l.8, 11, 12 




Date Amounts in dr./art. Nature of price Nome Reference 
226-42 12 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Laur. I 11 A l.10-1 
249 24 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Flor. I 9b 
250 20 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag.Varcl. II 2 l.12 
250 
 
20 Price in estate account. Arsinoite 
P.Prag. III 240 l.29, 31, 33, 57, 78, 
81, 99-100, 122 
251 20 Price in estate account. Arsinoite SB XX 14645 l.10 
252 24 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag.Varcl. II 4 l.8 
253 16 Price in estate account. Arsinoite SB XX 14197 r l.9 
254 12 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Lond. III 1226 l.10 
255 16 Price in estate account. Other BGU I 14 ii.14 
255-9 12 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Flor. III 321 l.9 
255-60 16 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Sorb.inv. 2186 ined. 
259 16 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag. III 236 l.11 
260 16 Price in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIX 3513 
260 16 Price in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIX 3516 
260 16 Price in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIX 3518 
260 16 Price in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIX 3519 
260 12 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag.Varcl. II 6 l.10 
263 12 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag. III 238 l.85 






Appendix 2.1.2 State Wheat Prices pre-AD 274 
Date Amounts in dr./art. Description Nome Reference 
33 3 Adaeratio. Other O.Wilck. 1372 
56 4 dr. 3.5 ob.(?) Adaeratio.  Other O.Wilck. 1558 
65 2 dr. 1 ob. Probably adaeratio. Other O.Petr. 210 
79 8 Annona. Other SB VIII 9699 l.456-7 
99 16 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2958  
99 16 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLVII 3335  
100 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2960 
101 10 Frumentum emptum receipt. Other PSI XVII 1681 
125 7 dr. 1 ob. Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite BGU III 834 l.22-3 
c.100-50 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Arsinoite P.Iand. VII 138 
128 8 Probably pyros synagoristikos. Other SB VIII 9732.III l.11-3 
137 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite PSI XII 1262 
149 7 Pyros synagoristikos. Arsinoite P.Tebt. II 394 
153 6(?) Payment of bath tax in wheat: 6(?). Other O.Wilck. 1587 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2961 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2962 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2963 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2964 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2965 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2966 
154 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLI 2967 
154-5 8 Pyros synagoristikos. Other P.Oxy. IX 4056 
154-5 8 Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite SB XVI 13060 
155 8 Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Berl.Frisk. 1 
155 8 Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Col. II 1r l.4 
155 8 Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Graux. IV 30 
162 8 dr. 2 ob. Customs duty on wheat. Arsinoite P.Ryl. II 197a 
183 8 Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite BGU I 200 




Date Amounts in dr./art. Description Nome Reference 
216 8 Adaeratio. Other(?) O.Amst. 58 







Appendix 2.1.3 Barley Prices pre-AD 274 
Date Amounts in dr./art. Nature of price Nome Reference 
3 3 Penalty price in loan. Arsinoite(?) SB IV 7341 
45 3.33, 4 Prices in personal expenditure account. Arsinoite P.Mich. II 127 ii.1, ii.44 
c.75-125 3 dr. 3 ob. General price in conversion of private(?) rent payments. Arsinoite(?) P.Louvre II 102 l.16 
c.75-125(?) 16 Price in private letter between soldiers. Other SB VI 9017 l.8 
c.128(?) 8(?) Price in estate account. Other P.Sarap. 79b ii.12 
138-9 5.6(?) Price for 'grain' in estate letter. Oxyrhynchite PSI IV 281 l.7-9 
c.138-61 5 Price in private account. Arsinoite P.Fay. 333v descr. 
155 4 dr. 2 ob./3 ob. Cash equivalent for barley allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Berl.Frisk. 1 i, iv 
155 4 dr. 2 ob./3 ob. Cash equivalent for barley allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Col. II 1 r l.4 
155 4.8 Cash equivalent for barley allowance to liturgists. Arsinoite P.Graux. IV 30 ii-iii, x 
157 5.96(?) Price in private note of payment. Oxyrhynchite P.Wisc. II 82 
160 3.03 Price in private account. Arsinoite P.Berl.Leihg. II 39 r l.58 
c.160 
4.83, 4.83, 4.83, 4.83, 
4.83, 4.83, 4.21, 4.21, 4, 4 A range of prices in private account. Arsinoite 
P.Stras. IX 847 l.1, 4, 5, 6, 
17, 26 
162-3 6 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Mil.Vogl. I 28 l.68 
168 6 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Mil.Vogl. IV 215 l.8-9 
192 
 
10+ Price in estate account. Arsinoite 
P.Cair.Goodsp. 30 
xxxiii.21 
200 4 Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Prag. III 242 l.14 
209 5 State compulsory purchase. Arsinoite P.Bingen 106 l.11 
216(?) 15 dr. 5 ob. Price in estate account. Arsinoite P.Louvre I 51 l.37 
217(?) 6 dr. 5 ob., 9 dr. 4 ob. Prices in estate account. Arsinoite P.Louvre I 51 l.110, 127 
217(?) 6 dr. 6 ob., 8 dr. 4 ob. Prices in estate account.  Arsinoite P.Louvre I 54 l.6-7, 14 
218(?) 
10 dr. 2 ob., 11 dr. 3 ob., 
12 Prices in estate account. Arsinoite P.Louvre I 54 l.26, 31, 43 
c.190-225 8 Price in estate letter where agent told to sell if price reaches 8 dr. Other(?) P.Muench. III 121 
c.250-70 16 Price in estate letter. Arsinoite P.Gron. 16 l.19-20 









Description (amount in purchase in ker.mon. @ rate per 
ker.mon. in dr.) Nome Reference 
c.1 6 Purchase of 65 @ 6. Arsinoite(?) P.Oxy. IV 745 l.2 





Purchase of 32 choes for 5 dr. which Rathbone interprets as 

















A range of purchases: 4 @ 2.5, (1  plus 1)  @ 2.67, (1 plus 1) @ 
2.83, [4(?)] @ 3(?), 1 @ 3.5(?), 1 @ 4, (1) @ 4.58, 2 @ 2.83, (a 






P.Mich II 123 r i(b).20,  i(a).14, 
i(b).21, i(a).5, i(a).9, i(d).4, i(d).12-
13, i(d) 20 and P.Mich II 127 i.5, 
i.19, i.21, i.26, i.27, i.30, i.42, ii.8, 











A range of purchases: 1 @ 3.25, 1 @ 5, 1 @ 4, 2 @ 4.83(?), (a 





P.Mich. II 123 v ii.7, vi.13, viii.10-
13, viii.28, vii.28, vii.29, vii.32, 
vii.34, vii.36, viii.37, viii.35 and 







Expenses for wine: 4, 7, 22 ob., 4. Note that the reference to 
wine in l.18 has not been included since this is as likely to be the 













Purchase of (2+1(?)) units of wine at a rate of 4 dr. (the unit is 
not specified so these were presumably obvious units and thus 






P.Wash. II 90 iv.16, v.12 









Purchase of tetrachous jars which are assumed equivalent to 
1.5 ker.mon. and 28 obols to the tetradrachm is assumed. 
Purchases in tetrachous are: 1(?) @ 9 dr 1 ob.(?), 1(?) @ 10(?) 








SB XVI 12515 i.1, ii.16, ii.37 







Purchase of tetrachous jars which are assumed equivalent to 
1.5 ker.mon. Purchases in tetrachous are: 1 @ 4 dr and 1 @ 4 dr 













Description (amount in purchase in ker.mon. @ rate per 















10 keramion valued at 50 in a land rental record. Two other 




P.Brem. 45 l.10 















A range of purchases: 1 @ 6 dr. 4 ob., 1 @ 6, 1 @ 6 dr. 4 ob.,1 




SB XVI 12314 l.15, 26, 60, 72 
125(?) 4 Purchase of 50 @ 4 within temple account. Arsinoite P.Mil.Vogl. III 188 l.4 





150 ker. wine paid as interest on loan of 1 talent which at 12% 














P.Stras. I 53 
138 5 Purchase of (5+4) @ 5. Arsinoite P.Mil.Vogl. II 52 l.39, 42 
Mid-2nd C 4 Purchase of 1(?) @ 4. Arsinoite P.Stras. VIII 767 
Mid-2nd C 5.12 Purchase of 257 @ 5.12(?) dr. Arsinoite P.Mil.Vogl. VII 307 l.99-101 
Late 2nd C 8.46 (median) Purchase of (50+40) @ 8 dr. 1.5 ob. and (80+28) @ 8 dr. 4 ob. Arsinoite SB I 4425 v l.14, 15, 17, 18 
c.184-5 8 Purchase of 2 @ <8 dr.(?)>. Arsinoite P.Petaus 39 l.26 





Purchase of 40 tetrachoa for 120 dr. Price used assumes that 














A range of purchases:  4 @ 8, 76 @ 7 dr. 1 ob., (2+2+8+20) @ 8, 
(4+2+3(?)) @ 8, (320+50(?)) @ 7dr. 1 ob., (6+2+14) @ 8, 





P.Cair.Goodsp. 30 xv.14-5, xix.2, 
xvii.15, xviii.8, xxiv.15, 18-19, 
xxvii.23-24, xxxii.7, 10, xxxv.22-3, 

















Description (amount in purchase in ker.mon. @ rate per 









General prices within a grapheion(?) account, 16, 16,  16, 16, 
16, 16 dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 ob., 16 
dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 ob., 36(?) dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 ob., 16 dr. 16 






CPR VII 9 l.5, 7, 16, 109, 112, 125, 
128, 148, 150, 160, 183, 202, 219, 
229, 238, 281  





General price or purchase of 4 dr. 20 ob., price used assumes 7 














A range of purchases:  [.]8 @ 10 dr. 2 ob.,  (4+6+4) @ 12, 58 @ 
16, 30 @ 10 dr. 2 ob., 36 @ 16, ([?]+[?]) @ 10 dr. 2 ob., ([?]+[?]) 







BGU III 712 i.10, i.5-9, i.4, i.13-4, 









A range of purchases:  (22+[?]+[.]2) @ 14 dr. 2 ob, ([?]+[?]) @ 
16, [.]2 @ 14 dr. 2ob., [?] @ 16, ([1]7+20) @ 18, 8 @ 20, 
(40+24+40+46) @ 20, [?] @ 20, (20+20+40) @ 20, (80+40) @ 






BGU III 712 ii.5-7, ii.8-9, ii.11, ii.10, 
ii.13-4, ii.15, ii.17-9, ii.21, iii.1,iii.3-
5, iii.8, iii.10, iiii.7, iii.12 
202-31 12 Purchase of 4 @ 12. Arsinoite P.Lund. IV 11 i.4 
247 10.29 General price or purchase of total of 22 @ 10 dr. 2 ob. Arsinoite SB VI 9406 l.284-99 





General price or purchase of (2+1+4) @ 9 dr. 1 ob. and general 









General price or purchase of total of 16 @ 9 dr. 1 ob. and 












General prices or a range of purchases: 2 @ 9 dr 1ob., (2+1) @ 
10 dr. 2 ob., (2+1) @ 10 dr.2 ob., 1 @ 10 dr. 6 ob., (1+1+1) @ 10 













General prices or a range of purchases: (1+2) @ 10 dr. 2(?) ob., 
4 @ 10 dr. 6 ob., 1 @ 10 dr. 6 ob., (2+1) @ 10 dr. 6 ob., (a total 














Description (amount in purchase in ker.mon. @ rate per 
ker.mon. in dr.) Nome Reference 
250 9.14 General price or purchase of 200 @ 9 dr. 1 ob. Arsinoite SB VI 9408 l.7-8 
251 10.29 General price or purchase of 200 @ 10 dr. 2 ob. Arsinoite SB VI 9409 l.6-7 
250-4 12 General price or purchase of 200 @ 12. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 196 
252 12 General price or purchase of 128 @ 12. Arsinoite SB VI 9409 l.5 
253 12 General price or purchase of 225 @ 12. Arsinoite SB VI 9408 l.6-7 










BGU I 14 ii.11-2, ii.7-8, ii.9-10 
255-9 9.71 General price or purchase of 300 @ 9 dr. 5 ob. Arsinoite P.Flor. III 321 l.6-7 
250-68 8 General price of 8 dr. per ker.mon. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 160 
250-68 10 General price or purchase of 2 @ 10(?). Arsinoite SB VI 9415 l.17 





Estate letters recording general price or purchases of 16, 104.5, 
46, 8 and 25 ker.mon. @ 12. 
 
Oxyrhynchite 






Estate letters recording general price or purchases of 8, 50 and 




P.Oxy. XLIX 3515; 3520; 3521 
260 18 General price or purchase of 150 @ 18. Arsinoite SB VI 9409 3 l.8-9 
261(?) 16 Purchase of (100+100) @ 16. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 123; 124 
262 21 General price or purchase of 24 @ 21. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 135 
263 18 General price or purchase of 150 @ 18. Arsinoite P.Prag. III 238(c) l.83-4. 
264 12 General price or purchase of 150 @ 12. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 202 
264 14 General price or purchase of 50 @ 14. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 143 
264 18 General price or purchase of 100 @ 18. Arsinoite P.Flor. II 146 
267 11 Purchase of 303 @ 11. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. VII 1055 










(dr.) Nature of price Nome Reference 
33 120 Purchase of one adult female for 120 dr. with hire purchase contract. Arsinoite BGU III 912 l.11-2 
33 48 Purchase of one male c.2 year old for 48 dr. with hire purchase contract. Arsinoite BGU III 912 l.12-3 




Purchase of two adults (one female, one c.2 year old) for a total price between 38 and 98 
dr. Arsinoite P.Stras. IV 251 
c.50-100 
 
36 Purchase of one adult male between 52 and 92 dr. Oxyrhynchite 
P.Oxy. XXXVIII 
2846 
98 108 Purchase of one adult male for 108 dr. Unknown BGU IV 1066 
101 306 Purchase of one adult(?) male for 306 dr. Other PSI I 38 
103 280 Purchase of one male c.1 year old for 280 dr. Arsinoite P.Mich. IX 551 
106 270 Purchase of one male 2+ year old for 270 dr. Arsinoite P.Stras. VI 504 
109 
 
106 Purchase of two 2 year olds for 212 dr. within estate account. Arsinoite 
P.Mil.Vogl. IV 212 
r xi.4 
111 208 Purchase of one adult male for 208 dr. Arsinoite SB XVIII 13897 
120(?) 100 Purchase of one male 2+ year old for 100+ dr. Arsinoite BGU XV 2480 
126 56 Purchase of one female 2+ year old for 56 dr. Arsinoite P.Fay. 92 
117-38 60 Purchase of one adult female for 60 dr. Arsinoite P.Aberd. 55 
131 48 Purchase of one male c.1 year old for 48 dr. Arsinoite P.Mich. IX 552 
137 106 Purchase of one adult female for 106 dr. Arsinoite P.Grenf. II 46 
137 176 Purchase of one male 5 year old for 176 dr. Arsinoite P.Mich. inv. 778 
138 54 Purchase of one male for between 14 and 94 dr. Arsinoite P.Ryl. II 158 
139 280 Purchase of one adult male for 280 dr. Unknown P.Louvre I 15 
141 148 Purchase of one adult male for 148 dr. Arsinoite P.Bas. 4 
141 340 Purchase of one male 2+ year old for 340 dr. Arsinoite P.Meyer 13 
142 148 Purchase of one adult male for 148 dr. Arsinoite P.Lond. II 303 
142 184 Purchase of one adult male for 184 dr. Arsinoite P.Munch. III 181 
142 244 Purchase of one female 2+ year old for 244 dr. Arsinoite SPP XXII 22 







(dr.) Nature of price Nome Reference 
144 44 Purchase of one adult female and one male c.2 year old for 88 dr. Arsinoite CPR VI 2 
145 108 Purchase of one adult female for 108 dr. Arsinoite SPP XXII 170 
148 64 Purchase of one adult female for 64 dr. Arsinoite P.Lond. II 313 
Mid 2nd C 
or 155(?) 
 




Purchase of one male c.1 year old for between 200 and 299 dr. of bronze, equivalent to a 
smaller total in silver dr., probably 180 to 240 dr. Arsinoite PSA.Athen 27 
148-58 120 Purchase of one adult(?) female for 120 dr. Unknown SB XX 14461 




140 Purchase of one donkey for 140 dr. Other P.Genova II 80 
166 188 Purchase of one adult female for 188 dr. Arsinoite SB XVIII 13259 




Purchase of one female for 128 dr. The type of animal is in lacuna but the price is too low 
for a camel. Arsinoite BGU II 541 
178 172 Purchase of one adult female for 172 dr. Other P.Col. X 263 
178 235 Purchase of one female for 230 to 239 dr. Other P.Col. X 264 
179 160 Purchase of one adult male for 160 dr. Arsinoite SB III 6001 
179 80 Purchase of one adult female and one female c.2 year old for 160 dr. Other P.Lond. II 339 




Purchase of one female for 240 dr. The type of animal is in lacuna, but the price is too low 
for a camel. Arsinoite P.Prag. II 145 
Later 2nd C 113 Purchase of one female 2+ year old for 113 dr. Arsinoite CPR XV 48 
190 240 Purchase of one 5 year old female for 240 dr. Arsinoite P.Berl.Cohen 8 
193 209 Purchase of one male for 209 dr.  Arsinoite P,Berl.Cohen 9 
197 300 Purchase of one male 2 year old for 300 dr. Arsinoite BGU II 527 
198 320 Purchase of one 5 year old female for 320 dr. Oxyrhynchite NYU II 13 
198 348 Purchase of one adult female for 348 dr. Arsinoite BGU III 758 







(dr.) Nature of price Nome Reference 
204 
 
600 Purchase of one female 2+ year old for 600 dr. Oxyrhynchite 





Purchase of one male(?) 2 year old for 120 dr. Type of animal in lacuna, but price and 
colour, and perhaps place of sale, imply a donkey not a camel. Arsinoite BGU XIII 2336 
216-7 750 Purchase of two females 4+ year olds for 1,500 dr. Oxyrhynchite PSI I 79 
217 400 Purchase of one adult(?) female for 400 dr. Arsinoite SPP XXII 16 
219 500 Purchase of one adult male for 500 dr. Arsinoite BGU II 413 
223 600 Purchase of one adult(?) female for 600 dr. Arsinoite P.Diog. 28 
217-67 
 
1300 Purchase of one male for 1300 dr.  Other 
P.Lond. III 1128 
desc. 











(dr.) Nature of price Nome Reference 
19(?)-45(?) Not used Purchase of a female slave aged c. 4(?) years for at least 1,000 dr. Arsinoite BGU III 987 
38 Not used Purchase of a female slave and her daughter for 1,100 dr. Other P.Gen.2 I 22 
2nd Half 1st C 600 Purchase of a one third of a female slave aged c.27 years for 200 dr. Oxyrhynchite P.Select 23 l.8-10 
2nd Half 1st C 
 
600 Purchase of a female slave aged c.18 years for 600 dr. Oxyrhynchite P.Select 23 l.11-5 




Purchase of a female slave aged c.35 years and 2(?) children, one a one year old, for 




Purchase of a male slave aged c. 32 years for 900 silver dr. equal to 10 talents and 
2,000 bronze dr. Oxyrhynchite 
P.Oxy. XXXVIII 
2856 
107-15 500 Purchase of a home raised male slave for 500 dr. Arsinoite(?) P.Stras. VI 505 
Start 2nd C 700 Purchase of a female slave aged c.24 years for 700 dr. Arsinoite BGU XI 2111 
125-6 700 Purchase of two prisoners of war, one aged 38 years for at least 1,400 dr. Other(?) P.Hamb. 63 
127 1,200 Purchase of a female slave for 1,200 dr. Oxyrhynchite P.Bour. 16 
117-38 700 Letter relating to a purchase of a male slave for a maximum of 700 dr. Oxyrhynchite(?) SB XVI 13058 
129 1,200 Purchase of a female slave aged c.25 years for 1,200 dr. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. I 95 
136 Not used Purchase of a home raised male slave aged c.8 years for 700 dr. Arsinoite BGU I 193 
138 1,500 Purchase of a female slave aged c.24 years for 1,500 dr. Arsinoite BGU III 805 




Purchase of two-thirds of two Alexandrian slaves (one male aged c.8 years, one 
female aged c.15 years) for 1,500 dr. Other SB III 6291 
151 4,200 Surrender of ownership of one-fifth of female slave for 840 dr. Arsinoite SPP XXII 43 
154 2,800 Purchase of a home raised male slave aged c.17 years for 2,800 dr. Other SB V 7555 




Purchase of a home raised male slave aged c.25 years for 1,300 silver dr. or 10 
talents 3000 bronze dr. Oxyrhynchite P.Col. VIII 222 
161-3 Not used Purchase of a home raised male slave aged c.3 years for 300 dr. Arsinoite BGU III 859 







(dr.) Nature of price Nome Reference 
184-92 2,600 Purchase of a female slave aged c.13 years for 2,600 dr. Other SB VI 9145 
188 Not used Purchase of half of a female slave aged 2+ years for 320 dr. Other PSI XII 1228 
211-2 
 
1,600 Purchase of a home raised male slave aged  c.19 years for 1,600 dr. Oxyrhynchite 
P.Oxy. XXXVI 
2777 
After 221 800 Purchase of a male slave aged c.30-39 years for 800+ dr. Oxyrhynchite(?) P.Mich. XV 707 
After 221 2,960 Purchase of a slave for a minimum of 2(?),960 dr. Assumed to be 2,960 dr. Unknown CPR I 40 
221 2,200 Purchase of a female slave aged 14 years for 2,200 dr. Other P.Vind.Bosw. 7 
225 Not used Purchase of a female slave aged c.9 years for 1,600 dr. Other SB XIV 11277 




Valuation of a slave at 2 talents (= 12,000 dr.) Not included in analysis since not a 




Purchase of a slave aged c.21 years and her infant son for 2,000 dr. Price assumed 
to be for mother alone. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. IX 1209 
246-66(?) 
 
3,000 Purchase of a female slave for 3,000 dr. Other 
P.Coll.Youtie II 
75 




Purchase of a female slave aged c.13 years for at least 5,000 dr. Assumed to be 






Appendix 2.2.1 Wheat prices post-AD 274 
Date 
Amounts per art. 
in drachmas 









O.Mich. I 157 with TAPhA 
76 (1945) 144-146 
c.275-295(?) 240(?) Price in private letter where name of crop is in lacuna. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. LXXXV 5063 l.2 
293(?) 300 Compulsory(?) purchase for annona. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XVII 2142 
 
294 
216, 220, 208(?), 
232 
 
Cash equivalent for wheat allowance to liturgists. 
 
Oxyrhynchite(?) 
P.Harr. I 93.v l.5, v l.3-4, v 
l.2, r ii.13 
301 640 Private receipt. Other CPR VI 75 
c.300-10 852 Official(?) account. Other SB XX 14657 l.18 
304-5 1,200 Private receipt. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XXXVI 2798 
c.305-10(?) 1,200 Private notice of payment. Unknown SB XVI 12666 
311 1,200 Wheat tax equivalence. Arsinoite P.Cair.Isid. 11 l.50 










CPR VIII 22 l.16, 18, 27-9 





Estate Account: 2,000 given for wheat, 5,000 for barley: wrong way 











Official account (adaeratio?). Note Bagnall’s (1985b: 57) 
assumption that the later date range is correct is not adopted since 






P.Oxy. XXIV 2421 l.2, 4-8 
c.310-30 6,000 Fiscal account (adaeratio?). Arsinoite P.Cair.Isid. 28 
c.310-30 7,000 Private account. Arsinoite(?) P.Stras. VI 559 l.7-9 
327 17,333 State compulsory purchase. Oxyrhynchite PSI IV 309 
335 14 talents Private letter. Other(?) P.Lond. VI 1914 l.51 
338 24 talents Price declaration by traders. Oxyrhynchite SB XVI 12648 l.64-5 
c.340 26 talents Account of official expenditure. Other SB XIV 11593 l.14, 21 





Amounts per art. 
in drachmas 
unless stated Nature of price Nome Reference 
 
c.340 
45, 45, 46, 50, 50, 
45, 40 talents 
 




P.Oxy. LIV 3773 






Appendix 2.2.2 Barley Prices post-AD 274 
 
Date 
Amounts per art. in 
drachmas unless stated Nature of price Nome Reference 
c.275- 95(?) 160 and 140 Estate Account. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XIV 1733 l.1, 7, 13 
c.300-10 54[0] Official(?) account. Other SB XX 14657 l.19 
315 1,000 State compulsory purchase. Arsinoite P.Cair.Isid. 58 







 Estate Account: 2,000 given for wheat, 


















Official account (adaeratio?). Note 
Bagnall’s (1985b: 57) assumption that the 
later date range is correct is not adopted 
since Bagnall proposes these dates on 








P.Oxy. XXIV 2421 l.1, 3-6, 8 
c.330 (or 315) 
 
11 and 2/3rds talents 
 
Private account. Arsinoite P.Bodl. I 143.7-8 with BL XI 48 
338 13 and 1/3rd talents Price declaration by traders. Oxyrhynchite SB XVI 12648 l.96 




20 talents, 25 talents, 
120,000, 150,000, 15 talents, 
90,000, 20 talents, 22 talents 
 
Prices from declarations by traders. 
Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. LIV 3773 







Appendix 2.2.3 Wine Prices post-AD 274 
 
Date 
Rate equivalent in 
dr./ker.mon., median 
if multiple prices Description Nome Reference 
Late 3rd C 160  
Price of 160 dr. per keramion monochoron in an estate 
account.  Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XIV 1733 l.8-9 
300-1 300  Purchase of 4 keramia for 300 dr. each. Other CPR VI 12 l.9-10 
 
 
303-4 500  
Purchase of 2 keramia at a price of 600? dr. and 1 keramion at 
a price of 500 dr. for a previous year's vintage and 1 keramion 






CPR VI 23 l.8-10 
 
 
c.308-12 950  
In a private letter 900 to 1,000 dr. is described as a current but 
very low price for wine (the unit is not specified but editor 






P.Oxy. XLIX 3507 
 
 
314 6,750  
From account of income and expenditure a purchase of 30 
knidia an unknown commodity which the editor suggests is 






CPR VIII 22 l.26 
 
 
316 3,900  
Official letter containing order that wine 'in old produce or 







P.Oxy. XVII 2114 
 
c.312-8 2,125  





P.Oxy. XXXIV 2728 
c.312-8 7,125  From a set of accounts, a purchase of 4 knidia for 7,600 dr. Unknown P.Strasb. VI 559 l.5 
 
 
c.312-8 5,063  
Letter in which prices of 13 or 14 nummi for a knidion of wine 
are mentioned. Bagnall 1985b: 57 assumes this is equivalent 













Purchase of 12 knidia at a price of 2,500 dr. per knidion. Note 
that editor of CPR VI is in error in his summary on page 65 of 
CPR VI in stating that this is per keramion and this error is 











Rate equivalent in 
dr./ker.mon., median 
if multiple prices Description Nome Reference 
 
322 3,000  
List of payments including one where wine is valued at 3,000 




P.Oxy. VIII 1139r 
322? 12,750  Purchase of 20 knidia at a price of 3,400 dr. per knidion. Other CPR VI 45 l.3 
 
 
c.322 13,875  
Purchase of 4 knidia of wine at a price of 3,700 dr. which the 







P.Charite 36 ii.6 
 
c.318-23 14,000  





P.Oxy. X 1288 l.35 
 
c. 324-30 18,000  
Order for delivery of wine with price for 4 keramia equivalent 




P.Oslo III 146 l.10-2 
c.330 52,500  Private letter with a price of 7 talents per spathion. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. X 1298 




c.338-41 112,500  
Accounts with a price for 10 knidia (not sextarii as stated by 
Bagnall 1985b: 66) at a price of 3 talents and 2,000 dr. each 
and an unnamed commodity which the editor suggests is wine 







SB XIV 11593 l.17, 18, 
23, 25 
 
c.338-41 274,688  






Bagnall 1985b: 66. 180,000  
Report with prices of 4 talents, 2,000 dr. per sextarius, 8 
talents per knidion and 20 talents per spathion. 
 
Other 
SPP XX 75 l.2.5-6,12-
4, 22-3  
 
340 150,000  
Official accounts with prices of 3 talents per sextarius and 15 
and 20 talents per spathion. 
 
Other 





336-48 165,000  
Price of 22 talents per spathion of unknown commodity of 
first quality within a business letter. Note within Bagnall's list 
which pre-dated the edition of P.Hamb. IV this is shown under 








P.Hamb. IV 267 
 
c.337-48 288,000  
List of payments including 120 sextarii sold at a rate of 3 
















Rate equivalent in 
dr./ker.mon., median 
if multiple prices Description Nome Reference 
Building account with wine prices of 5 talents per knidion, 24 
talents per spathion. 







Appendix 2.2.4 Donkey Prices post-AD 274 
 
Date Price used per donkey  Description Nome Reference 
276 3,800 dr. Purchase of one adult female. Arsinoite(?) P.Stras. III 139 
c.272-86 2 talents Purchase of two adult males for 2 talents each. Oxyrhynchite SB VIII 9829 
c.275-96 4,000 dr. Purchase of one adult? male. Oxyrhynchite P.Mert. III 106 
c. 275-96 2,500 dr. 
Purchase of one female for 2,000(+?) dr. Type of animal is in 
lacuna but price too low for a camel Arsinoite SB XXII 15328 
290-1 1 talent Purchase of one adult female. Oxyrhynchite PSI XIV 1417 
305 15 talents Purchase of one 2 year old male. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIII 3143 
Early 4th C 12 talents Purchase of one 5 year old male. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIII 3145 
307 2 talents and 3,000 dr. Purchase of half share in a female. Other SB I 5679 
307 5 talents and 1,000 dr. 
Purchase of one male in a marketplace in the Upper 
Cynopolite nome. Other P.Oxy. XLIX 4748 
307 5 talents and 4,000 dr. Purchase of one 2 year old male. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. XLIX 4750 
309 6 talents and 3,500 dr. 
Purchase of one male in a marketplace in the Upper 
Cynopolite nome. Other P.Berl.Leihg. I 21 
309 2 talents and 3,000 dr. Purchase of one female. Arsinoite SB VI 9179 
310 8 talents Purchase of one male. Oxyrhynchite P.Oxy. LXIX 4751 
311 
10 talents and 4,000 
dr. 
Purchase of one 2 year old male in a marketplace in the Upper 
Cynopolite nome. Other P.Oxy. XIV 1708 
311 6 talents and 3,000 dr. Purchase of one male. Oxyrhynchite SB VI 9214 
311 10 talents 
Purchase of one 1 year old male in a marketplace in the Upper 
Cynopolite nome. Other P.Corn. 13 
311 9 talents and 3,000 dr. 
Purchase of female in a marketplace in the Upper Cynopolite 
nome.  Other P.Oxy. LXIX 4752 
314 20 talents 
From a petition to the prefect in relation to a purchase of two 
females. Arsinoite P.Cair.Isid. 72 
314 27 talents 
From a petition to the prefect in relation to a purchase of one 
female. Arsinoite P.Cair.Isid. 72 




Date Price used per donkey  Description Nome Reference 
315 2 talents and 3,000 dr. Purchase of a half share of a male(?). Other P.Kellis I 34 
316 39 talents Purchase of one male. Oxyrhynchite SB XIV 11278 
331 40 talents Purchase of one 1 year old. Other CPR VII 36 






Appendix 3.1.1 Land Sale Data with Prices per Aroura 
Private Sales with dates within 50 year range 
Date Nome Description Reference 
37-40 Arsinoite Sale of 2 arouras of catoecic land for 700 dr. P.Lips. II 133 
42 Arsinoite Sale of 10 arouras of catoecic land for 1,540 dr. P.Mich. II 121r II.ix 
70 Oxyrhynchite Valuation of land for liturgical purposes at 6,000 dr. for 15 arouras. P.Oxy. XLIX 3508 
70 Oxyrhynchite Valuation of land for liturgical purposes at 2,500 dr. for 8 arouras. P.Oxy. XLIX 3508 
81 Arsinoite Sale of 2 arouras of catoecic land for 800 dr. SB XVI 16213 
83-4 Arsinoite 
Sale of 3 arouras of catoecic land for 900 dr. The land had been previously confiscated by the 
state and sold to the vendor. 
SPP XX 1 
85-6 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 1 and 1/48th of an aroura of catoecic land for 500 dr. P.Oxy. IV 794 
81-96 Arsinoite 
Sale of 1+(?) aroura of catoecic land for 200+ dr. A plot size of 1.5 arouras and a price of 250 
dr. is assumed for the purpose of estimating the price per aroura. 
P.Ross.Georg. II 14 
88 Arsinoite Sale of 2 and 1/20th arouras of land for 200 dr. P.Lond. II 143 
93 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 5 arouras of catoecic land for 1200 dr. PSI VIII 897 pg1 
93 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 3 arouras of catoecic land for 2400 dr. PSI VIII 897 pg2 
99 Arsinoite Sale of 1 and a half arouras of land including epibole for 700 dr. P.Mil.Vogl. III 186 
91-108 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 1 and 17/36th of an aroura of catoecic land for 900 dr. SB XX 14336 
101 Arsinoite 
Sale of 6 and 3/4 arouras of catoecic land for 800 dr. In the same sale, 2 arouras of private land 
is sold for 100 dr. and also included 7/16ths of an aroura of epibole. 
SB XVIII 13238 
101 Arsinoite 
Sale of 2 arouras of private land for 100 dr. In same sale, 6 and three quarters of catoecic land 
for 800 dr. and also included 7/16ths of an aroura of epibole. 
SB XVIII 13238 
102 Arsinoite Sale of 10 arouras of land for 360 dr. SB XIV 11533 co.l I 
104 Arsinoite 
Sale of 10 arouras of land for 300 dr. and 60 artabas of wheat. The wheat is to be paid to the 
Treasury and is the "assessed rents". A price of 8 dr. to the artaba is assumed when assessing 
the price per aroura. 
SB XIV 11533 col. II 
and III 
105 Other 
Sale of 20 and 1/4 arouras of land for 1,500 dr. This document relates to the partial settlement 
of a portion of the total sale to one of the heirs of the vendor who died before payment was 
made. 
P.Stras. I 19 




Date Nome Description Reference 
107 Arsinoite 
Sale of 6 and a half arouras of catoecic land for 600 to 699 dr. Price is assumed to be 650 dr. 
for purpose of assessing price per aroura. 
BGU XI 2050 
107-8? Arsinoite 
Sale of 3 and 1/8th arouras of catoecic land for 1,000 dr. according to transcription. Note error 
in editor's description which states 2,000 dr. 
P.Narm.2006 6 
109 Other Sale of 10 arouras of catoecic land for 2,500 dr. P.Amh. II 95 
109 Other Sale of 5 arouras of catoecic land for 1,000 dr. P.Rein. II 98 
Early 2nd C Oxyrhynchite Sale of 6 and 2/3rds arouras of catoecic land for 1000 dr. P.Oxy. III 504 
90-133 Other 
List of land with drachma figures against them which shows for a man with partners: 1/8 and 
1/16 and 1/32 aroura against 86 dr. This is assumed to be a valuation of the land concerned.  
P.Sarap. 77 
123 Arsinoite 
Sale of 5 and 41/64ths arouras of catoecic land and a quarter share of a tower for 2,000 dr. 
The quarter share of the tower is ignored in assessing the price per aroura. 
P.Fam.Tebt XVI 23 
127-8 Arsinoite Sale of 38 and 3/4 arouras of catoecic cereal land irrigated by canals and drains for 5 talents. P.Mil.Vogl. I 26 
123-37 Arsinoite Sale of 3(?) arouras of catoecic land for 1,600 dr. P.Louvre II 109 
129 Arsinoite Sale of 4 arouras of catoecic land for 2,400 dr. P.Lond. II 300 
136 Arsinoite Creditor receives one half aroura of catoecic land in settlement of a debt of 290 dr. P.Batav. 10 
139 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 7 arouras of catoecic land for 4,500 dr. P.Oxy. LII 3690 
140 Other Sale of 1 and 7/8 arouras of catoecic land for 480 dr. P.Ryl. II 163 
142-3 Other Sale of 4 +1/4+1/64(?) arouras of catoecic land for 1,000+ dr. Price is assumed to be 1,500 dr. P.Giss. I 28 
148 Arsinoite Sale of half share of 3 arouras of catoecic land for 160 dr. BGU III 959 
156 Other 
Sale of 6 arouras of private wheat land to settle a loan of 155 dr. The buyer pays 300 dr. in 
addition. 
P.Ross.Georg. II 23 
157-61 Arsinoite Sale of two-thirds of 7 arouras of land for 1,000+ dr. A price of 1,500 dr. is assumed. PSI III 189 
159 Oxyrhynchite Petition in relation to sale of 1/6th of an aroura of catoecic land for 106 dr. P.Oxy. X 1270 
161-9 Arsinoite Sale of 4 arouras of catoecic land for 800+ dr. A price of 850 dr. is assumed. BGU I 233 
167-9 Arsinoite 
Sale of 2 and 15/16ths arouras of catoecic land in exchange for earnest money for 1,400 dr.  
The earnest money is assumed to be close to the full price. 
BGU I 240 
161-79 Oxyrhynchite 
Sale of 5 (?) or 2 and a half (?) arouras of land for 1,500 dr. The size is assumed to be 2.5 
arouras. 
SB XII 11229 
177-8 Arsinoite Sale of 5 arouras land under cultivation for 200 dr. P.Princ. III 149 




Date Nome Description Reference 
181-2 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 3 arouras of catoecic land for 2,000 dr. P.Matr. 2 
183 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 9 and 17/96ths of an aroura of land for 4,000 dr. P.Wisc. I 9 
Late 2nd C Oxyrhynchite Letter containing instruction for sale of 2 arouras of land for 500 dr. P.Mert. I 23 
192 Arsinoite Sale of 5 and a half arouras of catoecic land for 3,100 dr. SB VI 9618 
203-4 Other Sale of 13 and 5/6ths arouras of catoecic land for 1,500 dr. P.Flor. III 380 
213 Other Sale of 4 arouras of catoecic land for 4,000 dr. P.Amh. II 96 
1st Half 3rd C Other Sale of 1 aroura of land for 250 dr. CPR I 108 
1st Half 3rd C Other Sale of 2 and a half arouras of land for 1,000 dr. CPR I 133 
1st Half 3rd C Oxyrhynchite 
Sale of 10 and a half arouras of land and a vacant lot of half a bikon for one talent of silver 
(6,000 dr.). When assessing the price per aroura, the vacant lot is ignored. 
PSI XV 1533 
1st Half 3rd C Oxyrhynchite Sale of 6 arouras of catoecic cereal land for 4,000 dr. PSI XV 1550 
1st Half 3rd C Other 
Sale of 8 arouras of catoecic land for 1,000 and unknown hundred dr. The price is assumed to 
be 1,500 dr. 
CPR I 141 
227 Other Sale of 9 and a half arouras of land for 600 dr. CPR I 64 
238 Other Sale of 2 and 1/8th arouras of catoecic land for 600 dr. SB I 5283 
245 Other Sale of 1 and a half arouras of catoecic land for 2,000(?) dr. P.Stras. III 144 
249 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 1/3rd aroura of corn land, overgrown with rushes, for 400 dr. P.Oxy. XIV 1636 
250 Other Sale of 3 arouras of catoecic land for 1,000 dr. P.Vind.Bosw. 6 
257 Unknown Sale of 7 and 1/4 arouras of land for 1,000 dr. P.Fuad.Univ. 21 
250-70 Other Sale of 9(?) arouras of land for 10,000+ dr. The price is assumed to be 10,000 dr. CPR I 126 
266 Other Sale of 4 arouras of land in good condition for sowing for 1,600 dr. P.Ryl. II 165 
267 Oxyrhynchite 
Sale of 11 arouras of arable land with irrigation equipment and a dry orchard of 13/16th of an 
aroura and houses and vacant lots for 9,700 dr. Houses and vacant lots ignored in assumed 
price per aroura. 




Private sales with wide dates  
 
2nd C Other Sale of 1 and 1/4 arouras of land for 200 dr. P.Ross.Georg. II 38 




Date Nome Description Reference 
2nd C Unknown Sale of 4+(?) arouras of land for 550 dr.  CPR I 139 
2nd C Arsinoite Sale of 2 arouras of land for 500, 700 or 800 dr. Price assumed to be 667 dr. SPP XXII 79 
2nd to 3rd C Arsinoite Sale of 1 and 3/4 arouras of land for 1,100 dr. P.Diog. 36 
3rd C Arsinoite Sale of 29 arouras of land in seven parcels for 4,000 dr. PSI X 1126 
3rd C Other 
Sale of 2 and a half arouras of land for 370 dr. For unstated reasons the editor assigns this 
document to the later 3rd century but the price concerned is likely to have pre-dated the 
general leap in prices in AD 274 and therefore this document has been assigned to the 3rd 
century, probably after the Antonine Constitution of AD 212, given that all three named 
parties are called Aurelius. 
SB XIV 11703 
  
  
Post AD 273   
  
3rd C Other 
Sale of 5 arouras of private wheat land for 21,000 dr. Although assigned by the editor to the 
3rd century, given the level of prices this text is likely to post-date AD 273. 
P.Mich. XV 719 
274 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 12 and 27/32nds arouras of arable land with irrigation equipment for 30,000 dr. P.Oxy. XLIX 3498 
291 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 4/5ths of an aroura of land for 9,000 dr.  P.Oxy. IX 1208 
303 Other Petition in relation to sale of 4 and 1/4 and 1/16 and 1/32nd of land for 77,000 dr. CPR VII 14 
306 Other Sale of 1 and 1/6th arouras of catoecic land for 3 talents. P.Lips. I 6 
319 Other Sale of 13 arouras of land for 22 talents. SB VI 9219 
321 Other Sale of 7 arouras of land for 20 talents. CPR XVIIA 17a 
342 Arsinoite Sale of 9 and a half arouras of private land for 50 talents. P.Col. VII 181 





    
State sales 
      
13-4 Oxyrhynchite A bid of 12 dr. per aroura for 19 arouras of unproductive land. P.Oxy. IV 721 
57-8 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 25 arouras of land at 12 drachma per aroura. P.Koeln III 141 
60 Other Sale of 10 arouras of dry land which had formerly been planted in wheat for 200 dr. P.Amh. II 68 




Date Nome Description Reference 
139-40 Arsinoite Sale of 1 aroura of land for 28 dr. BGU II 422 
147 Other 
Offer to purchase 12 arouras of land at 40 dr. per aroura. For this land a certain Isidorus had 
previously bid and paid 20 dr. per aroura. The present bidder will recompense Isidorus for the 
amount paid if the higher bid is accepted. SB I 5673 
148-54 Oxyrhynchite A bid of 3,200 dr. of 16 arouras of catoecic land. P.Turner 24 
151-2 Arsinoite Valuation of 5 arouras of land at 1,500 dr. Bidder had offered more than this price. SB X 10527 
170-1 Arsinoite 
Bid of 92 dr. for 1 and a half arouras of land. The bid price was based on the 
comogrammateus's valuation. 
SB X 10757 
178 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 19 arouras of grain land plus embankment with 41 acacia trees for 19,000 dr. P.Oxy. LXII 4337 
184-5 Arsinoite 
Sale of 5 and a half arouras of confiscated land, which had provided no income for the state 
for the last five years, for 200 dr. P.Petaus 14 
184 Ars Sale of 2 arouras of unproductive wine land for 56 dr. per aroura. P.Petaus 17 
185 Ars Sale of 3/32 arouras of unproductive wine land for 52 dr. per aroura. P.Petaus 18 
185 Ars Sale of 1 and 5/16th arouras of unproductive wine land for 56 dr. per aroura. P.Petaus 22 
201 Ars Sale of 1 and a half arouras of grain land for 1,200 dr. plus costs, totaling 1,496 dr. BGU I 156 
246 Other Sale of 12 arouras of unproductive land for 240 dr. P.Lond. III 1157v 
275 Oxyrhynchite Sale of 11 arouras of land for 800 dr. P.Oxy. XIV 1633 
 
State sales  - wide dates    





Appendix 3.1.2 State Land Sales – Ordered by Date of Document 
Date Reference Date  Reference Date  Reference 
13-4 P.Oxy. IV 721 185 P.Petaus 18 224 P.Bub. I 2 V 
14 SB I 5236 185 P.Petaus 20 224 P.Bub. I 2 VII 
14-6 P.Oxy. IV 835 185 P.Petaus 22 246 P.Lond. III 1157v 
46-7 W.Chr. 365 185-6 P.Petaus 23 226-275 P.Oxy. XX 2278 
57-8 P.Koeln III 141 201 BGU I 156 3rd C P.Ross.Georg. V 25 
60 P.Amh. II 68 214-25 SB XX 14292 275 P.Oxy. XIV 1633 
83-4 SPP XX 1  221 SB XXII 15625 col.II 
 
86-7 P.Münch. III 64 221 SB XXII 15625 col.III 
95 SB V 7599 221 SB XXII 15625 col.V 
131 P.Mich. IX 572 221 SB XXII 15625 col.VI 
131 P.Turner 21 221 SB XXII 15625 col.X 
139-40 BGU II 422 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XII 
144 P.Stras. IV 236 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XX 
147 SB I 5673 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XXI 
148-54 P.Turner 24 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XXIII 
151-2 SB X 10527 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XXV 
163 SB XXIV 14652 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XXVII 
163 SB XXIV 16252 221 SB XXII 15625 col.XLIV-XLV 
170-1 SB X 10757 221 SB XXII 15625 col.L 
178 P.Oxy. LXII 4337 l.1-14 221 SB XXII 15625 col.LIV 
178 P.Oxy. LXII 4337 l.15-8 221 SB XXII 15625 col.LV 
184 P.Petaus 11 l.25-6 221 SB XXII 15625 col.LXIX 
184 P.Petaus 11 l.27-9 221 SB XXII 15625 col.LXX 
184 P.Petaus 11 l.32-3 221 P.Bub. I 1 XVII-XIX 
184 P.Petaus 17 224 P.Bub. I 1 XIX-XX 





Appendix 3.1.3 Private Land Sales – Intensive Cultivation – Ordered by Date of Document 
Date  Reference Date  Reference 
32-3 P.Mich. V 258 2nd C SB XIV 11399 
38 P.Mich. V 266 177 BGU II 666 
39 PSI VIII 918 177 P.Brook. 8 
42 P.Mich. II 121v I 4 175-80 BGU I 282 
45-6 P.Mich. V 272 182 BGU II 622 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.138 184-92 BGU XI 2054 
46 P.Mich. V 239 l.9-11 Before 191 SB XVI 12333 b 
47 BGU I 177 189-93 SB XVI 12333 a 
46-8 P.Mich. V 274 193-4 SB VIII 9906 
1-125 P.Fay. 154 1st to 4th C SB I 5167 l.27-32 
88 P.Lond. II 141 2nd to 3rd C SB XVI 12553 
92 P.Fam.Tebt. 3 211 P.Lond. III 933 
1st to 2nd C O.Petr. 306 213-4 SPP XX 65 l.1-9 
104-5 P.Hamb. I 97 219-21 CPR I 61 
103-14 P.Fam.Tebt. 8 220 P.Oxy. LI 3638 
112-3 PSI X 1153 1st half 3rd C P.Oxy. XXXIV 2723 
115 BGU I 50 3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.5-10 
115-6 P.Stras. VI 583 3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.10-4 
117 P.Rein. I 44 h 212-99 SB VI 9069 
131 P.Athen. 43r l.1-4 257 CPR I 176 
138 P.Mich. VI 427 257-8 P.Oxy. LXXV 5058 
2nd C BGU II 567 l.12 Late 3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1700 
2nd C BGU II 602  1st half 4th C P.Cair.Salem 7 
2nd C CPR I 117 342 BGU IV 1049 





Appendix 3.1.4 Large Land Sales 
Date/Detail Reference Date/Detail Reference Date/Detail Reference 
44 P.Coll.Youtie I 19 140-50 P.Oxy. IV 716 274 P.Oxy. XLIX 3498 
48 P.Mich. V 353 2nd C BGU XI 2052 279-80 SB XVI 12242 
25-75 BGU XIX 2801 l.18-23 162-3 P.Flor. I 97 l.27-8 306-7 (two large sales) P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.30 
70 P.Oxy. XLIX 3508 196 SB XVI 12642 312 SB VI 9219 
81 P.Oxy.Desc. 3 2nd to 3rd C CPR I 200  
84 P.Flor. I 92 200 P.Koeln II 88 
88 P.Oxy.Desc. 6 203-4 P.Flor. III 380 
92 P.Harr. I 138 1 l.11-8 215 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.25 
92 P.Harr. I 138 3 l.11-29 229 P.Oxy. XXVII 2473 
75-125 P.Bagnall 47 235-9 P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 
100 P.Oxy. II 346 239-41 (two large sales) P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.35 
105 P.Stras. I 19 245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.26 
113-7 SB XIV 11381 247 P.Gen. II 116 
128 (history of four 
large sales) 
 
P.Mil.Vogl. I 126 
3rd C PSI X 1126 







Appendix 3.1.5 Land Sales between Family Members 
Date Reference Date Reference Date Reference 
34-6 P.Mich. V 262 119 P.Phil. 11 2nd C P.Mich. VIII 492 
42 P.Mich. II 123r IV 10 100-50 P.Münch III 85 220 P.Oxy. LI 3638 
100 P.Oxy. I 46 139 P.Oxy. LII 3690 227 SPP XX 29r 
1st to 2nd C PSI VIII 875 139 P.Oxy. LII 3691 257 CPR I 176 
107-8 P.Narm.2006 6 143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 l.12-20  








Appendix 3.2.1 Cash Rent Leases – Single Year or Unknown Duration up to AD 299 
Date Nome Description Duration Crop (Rate) Reference 
42 Arsinoite Lease of 7 arouras for total rent of 40 dr. Crop not specified. Unknown NA P.Mich. II 121r IV x 
89 Arsinoite  Lease of 1 aroura to be sown in whatever the lease chooses at a rent of 
56 dr. 
1 NA P.Warr. 11 
90 Arsinoite Receipt for chortos and chlora for between 500 and 600 dr., 550 dr. is 
assumed, which the editor describes as ‘apparently for the produce 
(probably by way of rent) of some grass-land’ of an area of 96 arouras. 
Unknown F (5.70 dr.) P.Lond. II 287 
121 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 10.5 arouras to be sown in chortos for an annual rent of 36 dr. 
per aroura. 
1 F (36 dr.) P.Oxy. III 499 
123 Other Lease of 4 arouras to be sown in chortos and other rest crops for an 
annual rent of 31 dr. per aroura. 
1 F (31 dr.) P.Sarap. 24 
124 Other Lease of 8.667 arouras to be sown in aracus for an annual rent of 27 dr. 
per aroura. 
1 F (27 dr.) P.Sarap. 25 
124 Other Lease of 1.75 arouras to be sown in aracus for an annual rent of 24 dr. 
per aroura.  
1 F (24 dr.) P.Sarap. 48b 
125 Other Lease of 8 arouras to be sown in aracus for an annual rent of 26 dr. per 
aroura. 
1 F (26 dr.) P.Sarap. 26 
125 Other Lease of 27.5 arouras to be sown in aracus and other crop for an annual 
rent of 19 dr. per aroura. 
1 F (19 dr.) P.Sarap. 28 
128 Oxyrhynchite Rent receipt for 51.375 arouras in unstated crop at a rent per aroura of 
28 dr. per aroura plus an additional payment of 8 dr. 
Unknown NA P.Oxy. LXII 4335 
130 Oxyrhynchite Sub-lease of 5 arouras of domain land to be sown with chortos at a total 
annual rent of 120 dr. and a libation of 4 dr. 
1 F (24.80 
dr.) 
P.Oxy. IV 730 
134-5 Oxyrhynchite Sub-lease of 3 arouras of domain land to be sown with chortos at a total 
annual rent of 120 dr. 
1 F (40 dr.) P.Oxy. IV 810 
145 Unknown Undertaking to make payment of 120 dr. in relation to land to be sown 
in chortos for an area of 2 arouras. 
1 F (60 dr.) P.Lond. III 1229 
2nd C Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2 arouras to be sown in anything except woad and coriander at 
a total annual rent of 80 dr. 




158 Oxyrhynchite Lease of two parcels to be sown in anything except woad and coriander, 
one of 12 arouras at a rent of 44 dr. per aroura and one of 3 arouras at a 
rent of 12 dr. per aroura. 
1 NA P.Mert. I 17 
179-80 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 12 arouras to be sown in chortos at an annual rent of 432 dr. Unknown F (36 dr.) SB VIII 9918 
192 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 3 arouras to be sown in any crop other than woad and 
coriander at an annual rent of 420 dr. 
1 NA PSI IX 1036 
209-11 Unknown Rent receipt for 2 arouras in chortos for an amount of 200 dr. for 2? 
years. 
Unknown F (100 dr.) SB XX 14201 
Early 
3rd C 
Oxyrhynchite Lease of 4 arouras to be sown in chlora at an annual rent of 240 dr. 1 F (60 dr.) BGU XIII 2340 
226 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 22 arouras to be sown in chlora at an annual rent of 44? dr. per 
aroura. 
1 F (44 dr.) P.Oxy. XVII 2137 
247-8 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 3 arouras to be sown in chlora at a total rent of 60 dr. 1 F (20 dr.) PSI IX 1069 
269 Oxyrhynchite Rent receipt for 7.5 arouras sown in chlora for an amount of 375 dr. Unknown F (50 dr.) P.Oxy. XIV 1646 
296 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown in chortos at a total rent of 7,800 dr. 1 NA (post-
AD 274) 







Appendix 3.2.2 Cereal Rent Leases – Single Year or Unknown Duration up to AD 299562 
Date Nome Description Duration Crop 
(Rate)563 
Reference 
25-6 Arsinoite Lease of 7 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 40 artabas of wheat. 1 W (5.71 
artabas) 
P.Mich. XII 634 
26 Arsinoite Lease of 26 arouras to be sown partly in barley and wheat. 16 arouras are 
to be sown in wheat at a rent of 105 artabas of wheat including 16 
arouras of wheat as seed. Rent of 10 arouras of barley unknown. 
Landlord provides oxen and tenant provides one artaba of bread. 
1 W (5.56 
artabas) 
SB VI 9110 
62-6 Other Petition relating to 83.25 arouras which is leased at a rent of 10 artabas 
of wheat per aroura. 
Unknown NA P.Ryl. II 119 
Mid 1st 
C 
Other Lease of 12 arouras at a rent of 34 artabas of wheat. Unknown NA BGU XIX 2801 l.1-10 
1st to 2nd 
C 
Other Lease of 10 arouras at a rate of 10 artabas of wheat per aroura. Unknown NA P.Flor. III 354 
 
98 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2.25? arouras at a rate of 5.5 artabas of wheat per aroura. Unknown NA SB X 10274 
92-108 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras at a rent of 37.5 artabas of wheat in total. 1 NA SB XIV 12192  
102 Other Lease of 18.5 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in lentils at a rent 
of 5.67 artabas of wheat and lentils per aroura. 
Unknown W (5.67 
artabas) 
P.Sarap. 22a 
110 Oxyrhynchite Acknowledgement of rent owing for lease of 3 arouras at a rent of 2 
artabas of barley, 2 of lentils and 2 of barley, with an additional payment 
of 1 artaba of wheat and 1 of barley for seed(?).  
Unknown NA – crop 
unclear 
P.Oxy. III 575 
113 Unknown Accounts with entries for rent of 12.5 arouras for 55 artabas, 1.5 arouras 
for 12 artabas and 16.5 arouras for 107.333 artabas of wheat(?). 
Unknown W (4.40, 8 
and 6.51 
artabas) 
P.Flor. III 379 l.36-43 
122 Other Lease of land including reference to rate of 5.5 artabas of wheat per 
aroura. 
Unknown W (5.5 
artabas) 
P.Sarap. 28 bis 
123 Other Lease of land to be sown in barley at rate of 8.333 artabas per aroura. Unknown B (8.33 
artabas) 
P.Sarap. 48 bis 
 
562 CPR I 239 (AD 212) is not included in this table since it relates to submerged land which is likely to have had an atypical rent. 




Date Nome Description Duration Crop 
(Rate)563 
Reference 
129 Other Lease of 2.5 arouras at a rent of 25.5 artabas of wheat. 1 NA P.Sarap. 47 
133-4 Arsinoite Contained within a list of rents, a rent of 80 artabas of wheat for 11 
arouras and one for 45 artabas of wheat for 3 arouras. 
Unknown NA P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 l.15-7, 
21-3. 
139 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 180 artabas of wheat for 12 arouras. Unknown NA P.Kron. 39 
145 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 72 artabas of wheat for 5 arouras. Unknown NA P.Mil.Vogl. IV 221 
149 Oxyrhynchite Lease of land to be sown in barley at a rates of 4 and 6 
 artabas of barley per aroura. 
1 B (4  and 
6 artabas) 
P.Berl.Leihg. I XX  
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 1.5 arouras for a rent of 5 artabas of wheat. Unknown NA BGU XIII 2341 
1st to 3rd 
C 
Arsinoite Rent receipt for 16 artabas of wheat for 2 arouras. Unknown NA SB  XVIII 13859 
158-9 Arsinoite Lease of 4 arouras for a rent of 20 artabas of wheat. Unknown NA BGU XIII 2345 
163 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 0.667 arouras to be sown in wheat at a rent of 6.75 artabas and 
2 choenices of wheat. 
1 W (10.20 
artabas) 
PSI VII 739 
165 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 3 arouras under chortos for 21 artabas of wheat. Unknown NA BGU III 708 
189 Arsinoite Offer to lease 5 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 25 artabas of 
wheat, including 5 artabas of seed. Additional payment of 30 cow-
cheeses. 
1 W (4 
artabas) 
P.Fam.Tebt. 44 
175-225 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 15.625 artabas of barley for 5.25 arouras. Unknown NA SB XX 14237 
202-3 Oxyrhynchite Rent recorded in estate account of 36 artabas of wheat, 6 artabas of seed 
and 2? artabas of interest on seed loan(?) for 6.75 arouras of land. 
Unknown W (4.74 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.8 
204 Arsinoite Lease of 4 arouras for rent of 20 artabas of wheat. Unknown NA P.Diog. 33 
212 Oxyrhynchite Lease of unknown number of arouras to be sown partly in wheat at a rent 
of 2 artabas per aroura and partly in barley at a rate of 2.5 artabas per 
aroura. 




P.Koeln 3 149 
200-29 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 3.5 artabas of wheat for 4.25 arouras. The tenant is also 
responsible for the land tax.  
Unknown NA P.Wisc. II 57 
215-6 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 15 artabas of wheat for 4 arouras. Unknown NA CPR I 46 
216-7 Other Lease of 6 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 20 artabas of wheat. 1 W (3.33 
artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Crop 
(Rate)563 
Reference 
218 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 32 artabas of wheat for 9 arouras. Unknown NA SB VI 9243 
218 Arsinoite Lease of 0.75 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 2 artabas of wheat. 1 W (2.67 
artabas) 
SB XVI 12323 
223 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 9 artabas of wheat. Unknown W (3 
artabas) 
BGU XI 2040 
225 Other Lease of 1 aroura to be sown in barley. Rent of 5 artabas of barley. 1 B (5 
artabas) 
CPR I 36 
222-31 Arsinoite Rent receipt for 40 artabas of barley for 3 arouras. Unknown NA P.Diog. 34 
228 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 7 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 15 artabas of wheat.  1 W (2.14 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. LXVII 4594 
229 Arsinoite Lease of 21 arouras. Rent of 64 artabas of wheat excluding seed of 8 
artabas. 
Unknown NA P.Stras. V 459 
231 Arsinoite Lease of 11 arouras. Rent of 66 artabas of wheat excluding seed of 11 
artabas. 
Unknown W 6 
artabas) 
P.Stras. V 460 
250 Other Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 32 artabas of wheat. 1 W (6.40 
artabas) 
SPP XX 55 
3rd C Arsinoite Rent receipt for 8 artabas of barley for 1.5 arouras Unknown NA P.Lond. II 157 b 
250 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in wheat. Rent of 21 artabas of wheat. 1 W (4.20 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. XXXVI 2795 
257 Oxyrhynchite Contained within a contract for labour are leases at a rate of 4 artabas of 
wheat per aroura and 5 artabas of barley per aroura. 
1 NA P.Oxy. XLVII 3354 
272-9 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown in any crop, wheat assumed. Rent of 24 
artabas of wheat. 
1 W (4 
artabas) 
P.Coll.Youtie II 70 
288 Arsinoite Lease of 2.5 arouras, with no crop stated. Rent of 5 artabas of wheat. 
Land to be returned in fallow state. 
1 W (2 
artabas) 








Appendix 3.2.3 Multiple Year or Mixed Rent Cereal Crop Leases up to AD 299.564 
Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
17 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras one share-cropping basis with landlord 
taking two-thirds of the crop. 
2 0 in 2 NA BGU I 197 
21 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras, in first and second years at an annual 
rent of 30 artabas of barley, including 3 artabas of seed, 
and in the third year, when the land is to be sown in 
chortos, of 9 artabas of wheat. 
3 1 in 3 B (9 artabas), 
F (3 artabas 
W), M 
P.Mert. I 10 
22 Arsinoite Lease of 4.75 arouras to be sown in the first and second 
year in wheat and to be pasture for third year. Rent in first 
year is 53 artabas of wheat including 4.75 artabas of seed, 
in second year it is 43 artabas of wheat and in third year, 
25 artabas of wheat. An additional payment of 1 artaba of 
bread is made per year. 
3 1 in 3 F (5.26 artabas 
W), M, W 
(9.61 artabas) 
P.Athen. 14 
26 Arsinoite Contract admitting one person into partnership of tenants 
who have leased 40 arouras of land to be sown 35 arouras 
in wheat and 5 arouras in barley at an annual rent 
including seed at a rate of 1 artaba per aroura of 197.5 
artabas of wheat and 50 artabas of barley. An additional 
payment of 2 artabas of bread and 5 dr. is made per year. 
4 0 in 4 B (9 artabas), 
M, W (4.64 
artabas) 
P.Mich. V 348 
26 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras for an annual rent of 6.5 artabas of 
wheat per aroura, including 1 artaba as seed. Additional 
2 0 in 2 M P.Ryl. II 166 
 
564 Excluding those leases which have no information on crop rates or rotation, sub-leases and land leased by the state. Texts such as P. Tebt. II 378 (AD 265) have also been 
excluded since the land concerned is specifically stated to be in a dry condition and that paid work is required to the land back into a productive state as have texts dealing 
with plots which are to be planted in non-arable crops such as palm or olive groves or vineyards.  Excludes P.Cair.Isid 98 (AD 291-2) since amount and nature of rent 
unknown and only feature known is that it was payable in advance for five years. 
565 This column shows where the rent rate per aroura is included in the crop rate calculation results listed in appendices 4.1.5 to 4.1.7 where B=Barley F=Fodder and 
W=Wheat and M=Mixed. “NA” means not included. A mixed crop rate is calculated when either a lease is for more than one year or when a lease of one year or unknown 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
yearly payments of 2 artabas of wheat for every 100 
artabas, and 1 artaba of wheat and 1 cock are to be made. 
26 Arsinoite Lease of 4 arouras with, in the first year of the lease, the 
landlord retaining the harvest and thus there is no rent or 
charges; in the second and last years to be sown in wheat 
at an annual rent of 56 artabas of wheat including 4 
artabas of seed. In the third year any crop other than 
wheat may be sown, with the rent, including seed, being 
28 artabas of the crop chosen and one keramion of wine. 
4 1 in 3 W (13 artabas) SB XVI 12539 
27 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in first and third year in 
wheat at a rent of 5 artabas of wheat per aroura including 
seed and to be sown in chortos in the second year at an 
unknown rent. 
3 1 in 3 W (4 artabas 
assuming 1 
artaba seed) 
P.IFAO I 1 
30 Arsinoite Lease of 13 arouras, 8 of which are to be sown in the first 
year in grass and aracus and in the second in wheat.  No 
rent is payable for the first year and the rent in the second 
is 100 artabas of wheat including 8 artabas of seed. The 
other parcel of 5 arouras is to be sown in wheat for both 
years. The annual rent for this parcel is 40 artabas of 
wheat less 2.5 artabas of wheat seed plus 0.5 artaba of 
bread. 
2 1 in 2 F (nil), M, W 
(11.50 
artabas) 
P.Mich. XII 633 
32 Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras, where land is 
currently one third in light crops and where the land is to 
be returned with one third sown in light crops. 
3 1 in 3  NA P.Wisc. II 52 
32-3 Arsinoite Lease of 20 arouras to be sown in the first and third year 
in wheat at an annual rent of 260 artabas of wheat 
including 20 artabas of seed. In the second year the land is 
to be sown in chortos for grazing at a rent of 160 dr. 
Transportation charges of 3 artabas of wheat are payable 
3 1 in 3 F (8 dr.), M, W 
(12 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
by the landlord and a further 2 artabas of wheat which is 
also possibly payable by the landlord. 
42 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras with two year deferral. To be sown in 
barley or wheat at choice of tenant. Rent paid in advance. 
5 0 in 5 NA P.Mich. II 121r II i 
42 Arsinoite Lease of 10.09 arouras to be sown with wheat and rent in 
years 1 and 3 of 110 artabas of wheat including 10 artabas 
of seed. Rent in years 2 and 4 is 72 dr. when it is assumed 
that the land was under fodder. 
4 1 in 3 F (7.14 dr.), M, 
W (9.91 
artabas) 
P.Mich. II 121r IV ii 
44 Arsinoite Lease of 6 arouras. Rent per aroura in the first year is 5 
artabas of wheat including 1 artaba of seed then 6 artabas 
per aroura rent including 1 artaba of seed in the 
remaining 3 years, also 1 artaba of bread. Half of the land 
is to be sown in fodder or left for grazing each year. 
4 1 in 2 (by 
area) 
M SB XIV 11279 
44-5 Arsinoite Lease of 2.5 arouras to be sown in anything that tenant 
wishes. In year 1 and 3, cash rent 24 dr. and 0.5 artaba of 
lentils. In year 2 and 4, rent is 15 artabas of wheat 
including 2.5 artabas of seed. 
4 0 in 4 M and F 
(10.60 dr. 
assuming 
value of 1 
artaba lentils 





P.Mich. V 315 
52-3 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 23.75 arouras to be sown in wheat for 16.25 
arouras, barley for 1.5 arouras and aracus for 6 arouras. 
The rent per aroura for the wheat arouras is 7 artabas of 
wheat for 8 arouras and 6 artabas of wheat for 8.25 
arouras, that for the barley arouras is 5 artabas of barley 
and that for the aracus arouras is 2 artabas of wheat. 
1 1 in 4 (by 
area) 
B (5 artabas),F 
(2 artabas W), 
M, W (7 and 6 
artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
69 Arsinoite Lease of 20 arouras at a rent of 2 or 3? artabas of wheat 
per aroura. 
3 0 in 3 M assuming 3 
artabas per 
aroura. 
BGU II 644 
70 Oxyrhynchite Lease of two plots, one of 10 arouras and one of 5.125 
arouras both to be sown in wheat and aracus in alternate 
years. The annual rent for the 10 aroura plot is 55 artabas 
of wheat when under wheat and 7.5 artabas of wheat 
when under aracus. For the 5.125 aroura plot it is 20 
artabas of wheat when under wheat and 10 artabas of 
wheat when under aracus. 
2 1 in 2 F (0.75 and 
1.95 artabas 
W), M, W 
(5.50 and 3.90 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
71 Other Lease of 27 arouras, to be sown half in aracus at an annual 
rent of 7 artabas of barley per aroura and half in wheat at 
an annual rent of 10 artabas of wheat per aroura. Tenant 
delivers rent free of charges for transport and cleaning. 
1 1 in 2 (by 
area) 
F (7 artabas 
B), M, W (10 
artabas) 
P.Lond. III 1225 
72 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in wheat and aracus in 
alternate years. The annual rent is 35 artabas of wheat 
when under wheat and 11.25 artabas of wheat when 
under aracus.  
2 1 in 2 F (2.25 artabas 
W), M, W (7 
artabas)  




Arsinoite Lease of 13 arouras for rent in wheat and cash. In years 1 
and 2 rent for that under wheat including 13 artabas of 
seed is 69 artabas of wheat. Other rents unknown. 
4 Unknown W (4.31 
artabas) 
P.IFAO I 10 
82 Other Lease of 14 arouras at an annual rent of 75 artabas of 
wheat and landlord is to return 18 artabas of wheat at 
expiry of lease. 
6 0 in 4 M PSI I 30 
88-9 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes other than woad in the first three years and half in 
wheat and half in aracus in the fourth year. Rent in each 
of the years is 17 artabas of wheat. 
4 1 in 8 (by 
area) 
M P.Oxy. II 280 
89-90 Arsinoite Lease of 9.5 arouras of vineyard and farmland. The 
vineyard rent is on share-cropping basis whilst the rent of 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
the farmland is 8 artabas of wheat per aroura including 1 
artaba of seed. 
100 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras with annual rent of 72.5 artabas of 
wheat including 10 artabas of seed. Additional payment of 
one half of an artaba of bread. 
3 0 in 3 M BGU II 538 
1st to 
2nd C 
Other Lease of unknown number of arouras with rent in 
vegetables and wheat. When sown in wheat the annual 
rent is 9.5 artabas of wheat per aroura. 
4? Unknown W (9.50 
artabas) 
P.Flor. III 356 
 
103 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 1.75 arouras for rent of 12 artabas of wheat 
which was received in advance. Tenant is responsible for 
land taxes. 
2 0 in 2 M P.Oxy. XLI 2973 
103 Arsinoite Lease of 6 arouras at a rent of 55 artabas of wheat in the 
first year and 42 artabas of wheat in the subsequent 
years. All rents inclusive of 6 artabas of wheat as seed. In 
the final year the land is to be sown half in wheat and a 
quarter in chortos and a quarter left fallow. 
5 1 in 9 (by 
area) 
M P.Hamb. I 64 
107 Oxyrhynchite Lease of unknown number of arouras with rent in first 
year of 2 artabas of wheat per aroura and in second and 
third years it is 10 artabas of wheat per aroura. 
3 1 in 3 F (assumed 
crop in year 1, 
2 artabas W), 
M, W 
(assumed crop 
in years 2 and 
3, 10 artabas) 
P.Oxy. XVIII 2188 
108 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 24 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
chortos. Rent in the first year is 139 artabas of wheat and 
134 artabas of wheat plus half the chaff produced in 
subsequent years. Since it is not possible to make an 
estimate of the value of the chaff annual rent of 139 
artabas of wheat is assumed when assessing the return on 
investment. 
4 1 in 2 
 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
110-1 Arsinoite Lease of 8 arouras for an annual rent of 34 artabas of 
wheat including 8 artabas of seed. 
4 
 
0 in 4 
 
M BGU III 918 
112 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 24 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
aracus. When under wheat the rent is 8.5 artabas of 
wheat per aroura. The tenant has an option to pay rent of 
2 artabas of wheat per aroura for that area sown with 
aracus or 24 dr. An additional payment of 1 artaba of 
bread and 0.5 artaba to the slaves is made annually. 
4 1 in 2 F (24 dr.), M, 
W (8.50 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. XXII 2351 
119 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 9.5 arouras to be sown in aracus in the first year 
at a rent of 2 artabas of wheat per aroura and in the 
second year in wheat at a rent of 10 artabas of wheat per 
aroura. 
2 1 in 2 
 
F (2 artabas 
W), M, W (10 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 
119 Oxyrhynchite Lease of a number of plots including grain-bearing land 
with payment of rent in advance and no stipulation of 
crops by landlord. 
3 0 in 3 
 
NA P.Mich. IX 562 
121 Arsinoite Lease of 4.5 arouras for rent of 20 artabas of wheat 
including 4.5 artabas of seed. 
4 0 in 4 
 
M P.Mich. III 184 
122 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras for rent of 25 artabas of barley 
including 5 artabas of seed. In years 1 to 3 to be sown in 
any crop and year 4 in chortos.  Crop in year 2 is unknown. 
4 1 in 3 M P.Mich. III 185 
123 Unknown Lease of 19 arouras to be sown in part in wheat and 
aracus. One plot of 10 arouras has rent of 110 artabas of 
wheat. 
1 Unknown W (11 artabas) P.Lond. III 838 
125 Other Lease of 12.667 arouras to be sown in alternate years in 
wheat and aracus. Rent for year when sown in aracus is 
250 dr. and when in wheat 85.5 artabas of wheat. 
2 1 in 2 
 
F (19.74 dr.), 
M, W (6.75 
artabas) 
P.Sarap. 27 
125 Other Lease of 11 arouras, 8 to be sown in wheat, 2 in 
vegetables and 1 in aracus and chortos. The annual rent 
for the land in wheat is 9 artabas of wheat per aroura, for 
that in vegetables 5 artabas of vegetables per aroura and 
Unknown 3 in 11 (by 
area) 
F (28 dr.), W 
(9 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
that in aracus and chortos it is 28 dr. per aroura. 
Additional payments of 1 kermamion of wine and 0.5 
artaba of wheat for the slaves are made. 
125-6 Arsinoite Lease of 19.375 arouras for an annual rent of 121.5 
artabas of wheat, including 8.667 artabas of seed, and 14 
artabas of barley including 1 artaba of seed. Also paid 
annually are 0.5 artaba of wheat and 2 hens with a value 
of 2 dr. each. 
6 0 in 6 M P.Mil.Vogl. VI 267  
126 Arsinoite Lease of 6.5 arouras for an annual rent of 30 artabas of 
wheat including 6.5 artabas of seed. 
3 0 in 3 
 
M CPR I 240 
127 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 10.833 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half 
in chlora. Annual rent of 91 artabas of wheat and an 
additional payment of 20 choenices of bread is made. 
6 1 in 2 
 
M P.Oxy. LXIX 4739 
127 Other Lease of 12.667 arouras to be sown in first year in 
unspecified crop, which is assumed to be fodder and in 
second year in wheat. In first year the rent is 20 dr. per 
aroura. In the second year the rent for 6.667 arouras is 7 
artabas of wheat per aroura and the rent for the 
remaining 6 arouras it is 6 artabas of wheat per aroura.  
2 1 in 2 F (20 dr.), M, 
W (7 and 6 
artabas) 
P.Vind.Sijp. 8 
118-38 Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras for unknown rent to 
be sown in chortos for 2 years and sown in barley for the 
other 2 years. 
4 1 in 2 NA P.Mil.Vogl. IV 240 
128-9 Arsinoite Lease of 1.5 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes for a cash rent of 140 dr. received in advance for 
the 2 years’ period. 
2 0 in 2 M P.Mich. IX 563 
132 Other Lease of 6.5 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
barley. Rent is at a rate of 5.5 artabas per aroura for that 
sown in wheat and 2.75 artabas of lentils and 2.75 artabas 
of barley per aroura sown in barley. An additional 
2 0 in 2 
 
B (2.75 
artabas B and 
13.75 dr. 
assuming 
value of 1 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
payment of 4 dr. each year and 0.167 artabas of wheat is 
made.  
artaba lentils 
is 5 dr.), W 
(5.5 artabas)  
132-3 Arsinoite  Lease of 3 arouras to be sown in alternate years sown in 
chortos and wheat, with annually respectively, an 
unknown cash rent, and 30 artabas of wheat including 3 
artabas of seed. 
6 1 in 2 
 
W (9 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. IV 220 
134 Arsinoite Lease of 12.5 arouras. In years 1, 3 and 5 the rent is 78 
artabas of wheat including 12.5 artabas of wheat seed.  In 
years 2, 4 and 6, 8.5 arouras are to be sown in chortos and 
4 in vegetables for an unknown rent. 
6 1 in 2 W (5.24 
artabas) 
P.Mil.Vogl. II 106 
135 Arsinoite Lease of 25 arouras split 12.5 arouras cereal land and 12.5 
arouras ktamia. In years 1,3,5 and 7 the land is to be sown 
in chortos with no rent, although the tenant pays the 
artabia and naubion. In years 2,4 and 6 the rent is 80 
artabas of wheat with no allowance for seed and a cash 
rent of 240 dr.  and 2 hens each valued at 4 dr. and 1 
metron of cumin. 
7 1 in 2 F (1.125 
artabas W and 





136-7 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 19.25 arouras to be sown in chlora in years 1 and 
3 at a rent of 22 dr. per aroura and in years 2 and 4 at a 
rent of 7 artabas of wheat per aroura. 
4 1 in 2 F (22 dr.), M, 
W (7 artabas) 
PSI IV 315 
136 Arsinoite Lease of 7.75 arouras to be sown in years 1 and 3 in wheat 
for 5.375 arouras and 2.375 arouras in chortos and in 
years 2 and 4 in wheat for 2.375 arouras and chortos for 
5.375 arouras. The rent in years 1 and 3 is an unknown 
number of artabas of wheat including 5 artabas of seed 
and 8 dr. In years 2 and 4 it is 24 artabas of wheat 
including 2.5 artabas of seed and an unknown cash 
payment. 
4 1 in 2 F (3.4 dr.),W 
(9.05 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
139 Arsinoite Lease of 5.5 arouras to be sown in alternate years in 
wheat and chortos. When sown in wheat a rent of 71.5 
artabas of wheat including 5.5 artabas of wheat seed is 
payable. When sown in chortos an unknown cash rent is 
payable. 
4 1 in 2 W (12 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. VI 286 
140 Arsinoite Lease of 10.5 arouras in 2 parcels of 6.5 and 4 arouras. 
The first parcel is to be sown with whatever the tenant 
chooses except barley and cnecus, and the tenant chose 
to cultivate them with chortos in the first year and with 
wheat in the second. The rent for this parcel is 160 dr. in 
the first year and 106.5 artabas of wheat, including 6.5 
artabas of seed, in the second. For the other parcel of land 
the crop to be sown is not specified but the rent for both 
years is 25 artabas of barley. 




crop for the 4 
aroura parcel, 
rate = 6.25 
artabas), F 
(24.62 dr.), M, 
W (15.38 
artabas) 
P.Tebt. II 375 
140 Arsinoite Lease of same land as P.Kron. 34 but at somewhat 
reduced rent. In years 2,4 and 6 the land is to be sown in 
chortos with no rent, although the tenant pays the artabia 
and naubion. In years 1,3 and 5 the rent is 60 artabas of 
wheat with no allowance for seed. For all years an 
additional payment of 2 hens each valued at 4 dr. and 2 
metra of cumin is paid. 
6 1 in 2 F (1.125 
artabas W and 





140 Arsinoite Lease of 12 arouras which in the second year is to be sown 
half in wheat and half in chortos. For the first year the rent 
per aroura for one plot of 8 arouras is 6 artabas of wheat 
and for the remaining 4 arouras it is 4 artabas. In the 
second year the rent per aroura is 4 artabas for that under 
wheat and 16 dr. for that under chortos. 
2 1 in 4 (by 
area) 
F (16 dr.), M, 
W (6 and 4 
artabas) 
P.Flor. I 41 
141 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras which for the first five years is to be 
sown half in wheat and barley and half in whatever the 
tenant chooses. In the last year the land is to be sown half 
6 1 in 10 (by 
area) 
though note 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
in wheat and barley and half in pasture.  Rent annually of 
19.5 artabas wheat, 5 artabas barley and 130 dr. 
tenant may 
have chosen 
to sow rest 
crops in 
some years. 
141-2 Other Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in first year in wheat at a 
rent of 10.5 artabas of wheat per aroura and 36 dr. per 
aroura when presumably in fodder. 
2 1 in 2 (by 
area) 
F (36 dr.), M, 
W (10.50 
artabas) 
P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.10-
3 
141-2 Other Lease of 8 arouras in two parcels of 5 and 3 arouras. In the 
first year the 5 arouras are to be sown in vegetables at a 
rent of 3 artabas of vegetables per aroura and the 3 
arouras are to be sown in barley at a rent of 10 artabas 
per aroura. In the second year the 5 arouras are to be 
sown in wheat and barley at a rent of 10.5 artabas of 
wheat per aroura and the 3 arouras are to be sown in 
vegetables at a rent of 3 artabas of vegetables per aroura. 
2 0 in 2 B (10 artabas) P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.14-
8. 
142 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 38 arouras to be sown in whatever lease chooses 
for first 5 years other than woad or coriander. Sowing is 
constrained to unknown crops in last year. Annual rent of 
190 artabas of wheat and 12 dr. Tenant pays transport 
costs and land taxes, but the taxes are deducted from 
rent. 






M P.Oxy. I 101 
143-4 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras which are to be sown in the first and 
third year half in wheat and half in barley for an annual 
rent of 50 artabas wheat and 90 artabas barley, including 
5 artabas of wheat and 5 of barley seed. In the second and 
fourth year a cash rent of 100 dr. is payable and a hen of 
value of 2 dr. is provided in addition. 
4 1 in 2 B (17 artabas), 
F (10.20 dr.), 
M, W (9 
artabas) 
P.Mil.Vogl. IV 238 
144 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras to be sown in the first and second year 
with whatever tenant chooses except safflower and in the 
3 0 in 3 
 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
last with barley at an annual rent for each year of 9 
artabas of barley. 
145 Arsinoite Lease of 3.25 arouras and 0.75 arouras of epibole to be 
sown in whatever the tenant wishes with advance 
payment of rent. 
3 0 in 3 NA P.Kron. 19 
145-6 Arsinoite Lease of same land as P.Kron 19 for a further period to be 
sown in whatever the tenant wishes and wheat with 
advance payment of rent. 
9 0 in 9 NA P.Kron. 19a 
149-50 Arsinoite Offer to participate in existing lease where rent is 60 
artabas of wheat for 13.75 arouras. 
2 Unknown, 
but in last 
year at least 
half must be 
in chortos. 
M P.Stras. V 362 
150 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in first year in barley and in 
second in chortos. In the first year the rent is 90 artabas of 
barley including 5 artabas of seed and in the second year 
it is 82 dr.  An additional payment of a hen worth 2 dr. is 
made. 
2 1 in 2 B (17 artabas), 
F (16.8 dr.), M 
PSI X 1124 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of four parcels where the details are not fully clear 
but does include one parcel where a parcel of 3 arouras 
has a rent of 36 artabas of barley including seed.  
4 Unknown B (11 artabas) P.Mert. III 107 l.6-10 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of an unclear number of arouras to be sown in 
wheat and chortos. The rent for the portion sown in 
wheat is 18 artabas of wheat including 3 artabas of seed. 
The size of the portion to be sown in chortos is 3 arouras 
and the rent is 120 dr. The total number of arouras is 
probably 6 given the number of artabas of wheat seed 
and since this number would be consistent with a pattern 
of half and half/wheat and chortos.  
Unknown 1 in 2 F (40 dr.), M, 
W (5 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 11 arouras to be sown in wheat and left to 
pasture in alternate years. No rent when in pasture and 
rent when in wheat of 66 artabas, including 11 artabas of 
wheat seed.  
4 1 in 2 F (nil), M, W (5 
artabas) 
P.Mil.Vogl. VI 289 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown in barley, wheat and 
chortos.  In years 1 and 3, 4 arouras to be sown in wheat 
with a rent of 56 artabas, including 4 artabas of seed, and 
2 arouras in barley with a rent of an unknown number of 
artabas of barley including 2 artabas of seed. In years 2 
and 4 a cash rent of at least 100 dr. is payable annually. A 
supplementary payment in years 1 and 3 of a hen of value 
4 dr. and 0.5 artaba of barley is made. 
4 1 in 2 W (13 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. VI 290 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras with land to be 
sown in alternate years in unknown crop and then 
anything tenant wishes except wheat and another 
unknown crop. Rents unknown 
4 1 in 2 NA P.Mil. Vogl. VI 291 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras with land to be 
sown in alternate years in wheat/barley and then in 
chortos. Rents unknown. 
6 
 
1 in 2 NA P.Mil. Vogl. VI 292 
 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 5.5 arouras with land to be sown in alternate 
years in wheat and then in chortos. Rents unknown. 
4 
 
1 in 2 NA P.Mil. Vogl. VI 293 
 
 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras, of which 5 are to be 
sown in barley and in certain years the rent for this 
portion will be 90 artabas, including 5 artabas of seed. 
6 Unknown B (17 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. VI 294 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 4 arouras, to be sown in alternate years in wheat 
and in chortos. When sown in wheat the rent will be 40 
artabas of wheat, including 4 artabas of seed and when in 
chortos the rent will be 36 dr. An additional payment of 
value 4 dr. is made in years when under chortos. 
6 1 in 2 F (10 dr.), M, 
W (9 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
2nd C Oxyrhynchite Lease of 8 arouras for an annual rent of 52 artabas of 
wheat. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Oxy. L 3589 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of 23 arouras at an annual rent of 60 artabas of 
wheat plus an additional payment of 2 artabas of wheat. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Ryl. II 322 
2nd C Arsinoite In list of rents an area of 2.25 arouras has a total annual 
rent of 6.75 artabas of barley and 4.79 artabas of wheat. 
Unknown Unknown NA P.Tebt. II 526r 
2nd C Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras to be sown in 
alternate years in chortos and probably cereals. 
4 2 in 4 NA SB XIV 11282 
151 Arsinoite Lease of 1 aroura at an annual rent of 6 artabas of wheat 
including 1 artaba of seed. 
3 0 in 3 M BGU I 227 
153 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras at an annual rent of 10 artabas of 
wheat and 23 choenices of bread. 
6 0 in 6 M CPR I 31 
153-4 Other Lease of unknown number of arouras for which at least 
part has an annual rent of 7.5 artabas of wheat per 
aroura. 
2 Unknown W (7.50 
artabas) 
P.Lond. III 858a 
155 Arsinoite Lease of 13 arouras split into two parcels of 8 and 5 
arouras to be sown in alternate years in wheat and 
chortos. Annual rent per aroura when in chortos is 20 dr. 
and when in wheat 8 artabas including 1 artaba of wheat 
seed. 
4 1 in 2 F (20 dr.), M, 
W (7 artaba) 
P.Mil.Vogl. VI 288 
155 Arsinoite Lease of 15 arouras. In first year rent is 125 artabas of 
wheat including 15 artabas of seed. In second and 
subsequent years rent is 135 artabas of wheat including 
15 artabas of seed. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Phil. 14 
158 Arsinoite Lease of 6 arouras for an annual rent of 10 artabas of 
wheat. Tenant also pays taxes on 8 arouras and provides 




Unknown M P.Diog. 26 
157-9 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras with unspecified crop for a rent of 15 
artabas of wheat in the first year and 14 artabas in 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
subsequent years, inclusive of seed of 1 artaba, which 
implies 50/50 wheat and rest crops. 
159 Arsinoite Lease of 8 arouras with total annual rent of 32 artabas in 
first year and 40 artabas in second year. In the second 
year the land is to be sown half and half in wheat and 
chortos. Landlord and tenant share transport costs. 
2 1 in 4 M P.Amh. II 90 
159 Arsinoite Lease of 11 arouras to be sown in the first year with 
anything but safflower and in the 2nd year half fallow, half 
wheat. Annual rent of 40 artabas of wheat. 
2 1 in 4 M P.Amh. II 91 
159-60 Other Lease of 28 arouras. In the first year 10 arouras are to be 
sown in wheat with a rent of 75 artabas 8 choenices, free 
of tax?, 1 aroura to be sown in barley with a rent of 7 
artabas of barley and 17 arouras in aracus at a rent of 360 
dr. In the second year 16 (or 17) arouras are to be sown 
with wheat, free of tax?, with a rent of 126 artabas and 8 
choenices, 1 aroura to be sown in barley with a rent of 7 
artabas of barley and 11 (or 10) arouras in aracus for 
cattle-food at an unknown cash rent. Total return on lease 
assumes 17 arouras under wheat in second year and same 
per aroura rate as first year for land under aracus. 
2 1 in 2 B (7 artabas), 
F (21.18 dr.), 




160-1 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 8 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat and 
chlora for an annual rent of 30 artabas of wheat and 120 
dr. 
4 1 in 2 F (30 dr.), M, 
W (7.50 
artabas) 
 P.Lips. I 118 
163 Arsinoite Lease of 6.5 arouras with unspecified crop at an annual 
rent of 42 artabas of wheat including 6.5 artabas of seed. 
3 0 in 3 M PSI I 31 
164 Arsinoite Lease of 3.5 arouras at an annual rent of 12.5 artabas of 
wheat. 
3 0 in 3 M P.Cair.Mich. II 21 
165 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras to be sown in barley in years 1, 3 and 5 
and whatever lease chooses except barley, wheat and 
safflower in years 2, 4 and 6.  The annual rent when sown 
6 1 in 2 B (9.33 
artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
in barley is 30 artabas of barley including 2 artabas of 
seed. In the other years the annual rent is 2 artabas of 
vegetable seed, together with a cock of value 4 dr. 
165 Arsinoite Lease of 21 arouras. In years 1 and 3, 10 arouras are to be 
sown in wheat and 11 in chortos. In years 2 and 4, 11 
arouras are to be sown in wheat and 10 arouras in 
another crop which in the fourth year is definitely chortos. 
In the first year the rent is 110 artabas of wheat including 
10 artabas of seed. In the second year it is 140 artabas of 
wheat including 11 artabas of seed. In the third year 130 
artabas of wheat including 10 artabas of seed is payable 
and in the fourth year 143 artabas of wheat including 11 
artabas of seed. 
4 1 in 2 M P.Mil.Vogl. III 130 
165 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras in two plots, one of 3, or possibly 3.5, 
arouras and the other of 7, or possibly 7.5, arouras. The 
first plot is to be sown in years 1 and 3 in whatever the 
lease wishes except wheat at a rent of 140 dr. and the 
second in chortos at a rent of 150 dr. In years 2 and 4 both 
plots are to be sown in wheat, with a rent of 52.5 artabas 
of wheat including 3.5 artabas of wheat seed for the first 
plot and 90.5 artabas of wheat including 7.5 artabas of 
wheat seed. An additional payment of 2 cheeses is to be 
made.  
4 1 in 2 F (20 dr.), M, 
W (14 and 
11.07 artabas) 
P.Mil.Vogl. III 132 
165 Arsinoite Lease of 2.5 arouras to be sown in years 1 and 3 in chortos 
and in years 2 and 4 in barley. When sown in chortos the 
total rent is 24 dr. and when sown in barley an unknown 
number of artabas of barley, 
4 1 in 2 
 
F (9.60 dr.) P.Mil.Vogl. III 134 
165-6 Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras to be sown for 2 
years in chortos and 2 years in wheat. 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
165-6 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 10 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
chortos or vegetables. Rent to be 15 artabas of wheat and 
an unknown cash payment. 
4 1 in 2 
 
W (3 artabas) P.Oxy. XIV 1686 
161-9 Arsinoite Lease of 11 arouras to be sown half and half in chortos 
and wheat in final year for an annual rent of 70 artabas of 
wheat and an unknown number of cheeses. 
3 1 in 6 
 
M SB XVI 12983 
165-6 Arsinoite Lease of 6.25 arouras to be sown in alternate years in 
barley and chortos. When sown in barley an annual rent of 
81.25 artabas is payable including seed of 6.25 artabas. 
When sown in chortos the tenant is paid for his work.  
4 1 in 2 
 
B (12 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. III 137 
166 Arsinoite Lease of 2.5 arouras to be sown in chortos and barley in 
alternate years. In years when under chortos the rent is 60 
dr. When under barley the rent is 45 artabas of barley. 
4 1 in 2 B (18 artabas), 
M, F (24 dr.) 
P.Mil.Vogl. III 144 
169 Arsinoite Lease of 8 arouras to be sown in chortos and wheat in 
alternate years. In years when under chortos it will be 
used for animal feed. and when under wheat 120 artabas 
of wheat including 8 artabas of wheat seed. 
4 1 in 2 W (12 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. III 139 
170 Arsinoite Lease of 8 arouras to be sown in chortos and wheat in 
alternate years. In years when under chortos annual rent 
of 64 dr. and when under wheat 107 artabas including 8 
artabas of seed.  
6 1 in 2 F (8 dr.), M, W 
(12.38 
artabas) 
P.Mil.Vogl. II 63 
160-80 Arsinoite Complex lease of 4 arouras to be sown half and half in 
wheat and chortos with information on rents but also 
wages to be paid to the tenant which makes it difficult to 
interpret securely the terms and thus ignored. 
4 1 in 2 NA P.Mil.Vogl. II 65 
170 Arsinoite Lease of unknown number of arouras and one half aroura, 
but assumed to be 1.5 given seed, to be sown in alternate 
years in chortos and barley. In first and third years when 
under chortos, rent is 24 and 28 dr. respectively. In second 
4 1 in 2 B (15 artabas 
and 0.40 dr.), 
F (24 and 28 
dr.), M 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
and fourth years, rent is 24 artabas of barley including 1.5 
artabas of seed.   
158-82 Arsinoite Lease of 2 parcels with 7 arouras in total. In years 1 and 3 
both parcels are to be sown in barley with annual rent for 
the 4 aroura parcel of 64 artabas of barley, including 4 
artabas of barley seed. For the 3 aroura parcel the rent is 
to be 20 artabas of barley including 3 artabas of seed. For 
years 2 and 4 neither the rent nor the crop is unknown. 
4 Unknown B (15 and 5.67 
artabas) 
SB XIV 11595 
172-3 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2 arouras to be sown in anything the lease 
chooses except woad and coriander. The annual rent is 8 
artabas of wheat and 32 dr. 
4 0 in 4 M SB XII 10780 
173 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 10 arouras to be sown in alternate years in chlora 
and wheat. When sown in wheat the total annual rent is 
31.5 artabas of wheat and when sown in chlora it is 200 
dr. 
4 1 in 2 M P.Oxy. LXXI 4827 
176 Arsinoite Lease of 3.5 arouras to be sown in wheat and chortos in 
alternate years. When sown in wheat the rent is 52.5 
artabas of wheat including 3.5 artabas of wheat seed.  
4 1 in 2 W (14 artabas) P.Mil.Vogl. III 140 
184-5 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5.5 arouras, 1 aroura to be sown in barley at 
unknown rent and the remainder, probably sown in 
chortos at rent of 180 dr. 
1 Unknown F (40 dr.) P.Oxy. XIV 1687 
186 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras at an annual rent of 22.5 artabas of 
wheat. 
3 0 in 3 M BGU I 39 
187 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2.5 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
chlora. Annual rent of 8 artabas of wheat and 40 dr. 
4 1 in 2 F (32 dr.), M, 
W (6.40 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. III 501 
187-8 Other Lease of 2.667 arouras assumed to be sown half in wheat 
and half in fodder. Rent per aroura of 6 artabas of wheat 
for that sown in wheat and 24 dr. per aroura for that in 
fodder. 
Unknown 1 in 2 F (24 dr.), M, 
W (6 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
188-9 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras at an annual rent of 18 artabas of 
wheat including 3 artabas of seed. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Oslo II 34 
189-90 
 
Oxyrhynchite Lease of 12.25 arouras in two plots of 8 and 4.25 arouras 
to be sown in barley, wheat and chlora. The rent for the 8 
aroura plot for the first year when sown in chlora is 24 dr. 
per aroura and when sown in barley in the second year it 
is 8 artabas of barley per aroura. For the 4.25 aroura plot 
for the first year when the land is to be sown in barley and 
wheat the total rent is 14 artabas of barley and 12 artabas 
of wheat. It is assumed that the plot is sown half and half 
in barley and wheat. In the second year when the plot is 
to be sown in chlora the rent is 60 dr. per aroura.  
2 1 in 2 B (8 and 6.59 
artabas), F (24 
and 60 dr.), M, 
W (5.65 
artabas) 
P.Fouad I 43 
192 Arsinoite Lease of 16 arouras to be sown half and half in barley and 
chortos for an annual rent of 128 dr. in years 1 and 3 and 
120 artabas of barley in years 2 and 4. 
4 1 in 2 B (7.50 
artabas), F (8 
dr.), M 
P.Lips. II 148 
194-5 Arsinoite Lease of 14 arouras to be sown in alternate years in wheat 
and chortos. In years 1,3 and 5 when sown in wheat the 
rent is 136 artabas wheat, including 10 artabas of seed.  In 
years 2,4 and 6 when the land is under chortos the rent is 
260 dr. and 1.5 artabas of bread and 1 artaba of yeast and 
100 cows’ cheeses.566 
6 1 in 2 F (27.50 dr. 
when 
including 1.50 
dr. for bread), 
M, W (9 
artabas) 
PSI XV 1531 
195 Arsinoite Lease of 3 arouras at an annual rent of 13.5 artabas of 
wheat to be sown in any crop other than safflower. In final 
year to be sown half in wheat and half in chortos. 
4 1 in 8 (by 
area) 
M P.Fam.Tebt. 47 
196-7 Other Lease of 22 arouras to be sown in anything that lease 
wishes at an annual rent of 28 dr. per aroura plus 0.5 of an 
artaba of flat bread for the whole 2 year period. 
2 0 in 2 M P.Ryl. II 169 
 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
197 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5 arouras. In years 1 and 3, the land is to be sown 
with wheat at a rent of 6 artabas per aroura, in years 2 
and 4 it is to be sown in chlora at a rent of 32 dr. per 
aroura. 
4 1 in 2 F (32 dr.), M, 
W (6 artabas) 
P.Oxy. VI 910 
199 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 9.5 arouras in two parcels to be sown in chlora in 
the first year and wheat in the second. The annual rent 
per aroura when in wheat for the parcel of 5.5 arouras is 
6.5 artabas of wheat and that for the remaining 4 arouras 
is 5.5 artabas of wheat per aroura. The rent per aroura 
when in chlora is 20 dr. for one parcel and 24 dr. for the 
other.  
2 1 in 2 F (20 and 24 
dr.), M, W 
(6.50 and 5.50 
artabas) 




Oxyrhynchite Lease of 30 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat and 
chlora. The annual rent for the half sown in wheat was 
140 artabas of wheat and is to be 145(?) artabas. The rent 
for the half sown in chlora is unknown, as are the rents for 
two further areas, one low-lying to be sown in chlora, and 
the other consisting of higher ground to be sown in 
barley. 
2 1 in 2 W (9.33 and 
9.67 artabas) 
P.Harr. II 224 
2nd to 
3rd C 
Other Lease of 0.5 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes in the first year at a total annual rent of 5 artabas 
of barley and to be sown in chortos in the second year at a 
total rent of 16 dr. 
2 1 in 2 B (10 artabas), 
F (32 dr.), M 
BGU XI 2125 
2nd to 
3rd C 
Oxyrhynchite Lease of 22.83 arouras to be sown in alternate years in 
wheat and anything but woad and coriander (assumed left 
in fodder). Rents unknown. 
4 1 in 2 NA BGU IV 1017 
202 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 1 aroura to be sown in chlora in the first year at 
an annual rent of 64 dr. and in wheat in the second year 
for a rent of 8 artabas of wheat. 
2 1 in 2 F (64 dr.), M, 
W (8 artabas) 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
204 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2.375 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes except woad and coriander at a total annual rent 
of 14 artabas of wheat. 
2 0 in 2 M SB X 10263 
210 Arsinoite Lease of two-thirds of 5 arouras to be sown in years 1 and 
3 with chortos, at an annual rent of 28 dr. and in years 2 
and 4 to be sown with barley, at an annual rent, including 
3.333 artabas of barley for seed, of 24 artabas. 
4 1 in 2 B (6.20 
artabas), F 
(8.40 dr.),M 
P.Tebt. II 377 
211 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
chooses except woad and coriander for a total rent for the 
five years paid in advance of 200 dr per year. Given the 
unusual nature of the upfront payment no return has 
been included in the comparison. Tenant responsible for 
taxes. 
5 0 in 5 NA P.Oxy. XXXI 2584 
211 Arsinoite Rent receipt of 10 arouras of land with 30 artabas of 
wheat for that sown in wheat and 10 artabas of wheat for 
that sown in chortos. 
Unknown Unknown F (2 artabas of 
W), M, W (6 
artabas) 
assuming 
sown half and 
half in wheat 
and chortos. 
SB XIV 12197 
212 Arsinoite Lease of 3.75 arouras at a total annual rent of 8 artabas of 
wheat. 
4 0 in 4 M BGU III 920 
212-3 Arsinoite Lease of 5.5 arouras at a rent of 31 artabas of wheat 
including 5 artabas of seed. At the expiration of the lease 
the lease will surrender 4 arouras lying fallow in grass and 
the remainder after the harvest in stubble. 
2 4 in 11 M P.Mich. XVIII 791 
214 Arsinoite Lease of 8 arouras at an annual rent of 72 artabas of 
barley including 8 artabas of barley seed. 
4 0 in 4 M SB VI 9562 
215 Arsinoite Lease of 1.5 arouras with no crop specified for a total 
annual rent of 3 artabas of wheat. 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
217 Other Lease of 7 arouras to be sown in chortos. The rent in the 
first year is 15 artabas of wheat and 100 dr. and in the 
subsequent years 10.5 artabas of wheat and 80 dr. A rent 
fee of 1 keramion of wine is to be paid assumed to be of 
value 10 dr. 
4 4 in 4 F (2.14 artabas 
W and 15.29 
dr., 1.50 
artabas W and 
11.42 dr.) 
P.Stras. I 2 
219 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 10 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat and 
chlora. The annual rent for the portion under wheat is 27 
artabas of wheat. The rent for the portion under chlora is 
208 dr. 
4 1 in 2 F (41.60 dr.), 
M, W (5.40 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. L 3591 
219 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat and 
chlora. When under wheat the rent is 8 artabas of wheat 
per aroura. When under chlora the rent is 44 dr. per 
aroura. 
4 1 in 2 F (44 dr.), M, 
W (8 artabas) 
P.Oxy. LV 3800 
220 Arsinoite Lease of 5 arouras at an annual total rent of 18 artabas of 
wheat. 
2 0 in 2 M P.Bour. 17 
221 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras at an annual total rent of 10 artabas of 
wheat. 
3 0 in 3 M BGU II 633 
221-6 Arsinoite Lease of 6 arouras at an annual rent of 24 artabas of 
wheat, with an additional payment of 1 keramion of 
cheese. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Berl.Leihg. I 19 
223 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 22 arouras for an annual rent of 145 artabas of 
wheat, 10 artabas of vegetable seed and 300 dr. for rent 
of water wheel. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Oxy.Hels. 41 
225 Arsinoite Lease of 7 arouras to be sown in unspecified crop at a rate 
of 4 artabas of wheat per aroura.  
2 0 in 2 M SB V 7665 
225-6 Arsinoite Lease of 8.5 arouras at an annual rent of 27.125 artabas of 
wheat.  
3 0 in 3 M P.Diog. 29 
230 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras for an annual rent of 25 artabas of 
wheat. 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
230 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2 arouras to be sown in wheat and chortos? The 
total annual rent when sown in wheat is 12 artabas of 
wheat and when in chortos it is 80 dr. A leasing fee of a 
keramion of wine is also payable. 
4 1 in 2 F (40 dr.), M, 
W (6 artabas) 
PSI I 73 
218-61 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5.75 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat 
and chlora at an annual rent of 24 artabas of wheat and 
96 dr. 
4 1 in 2 F (34.09 dr.), 
M ,W (8.38 
artabas) 
P.Oxy. L 3592 
220-60 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 1.25 or 1.75? arouras be to sown half and half in 
wheat and chlora. For the portion sown in chlora the 
annual rent is 40 dr. 
Unknown 1 in 2 F (53.33 dr.) 
assuming size 
of land under 
fodder is 0.75 
arouras. 
SB XX 14983 
249 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 9 arouras to be sown in wheat, chlora and 
vegetables. Annual rent for that sown in wheat is 8 
artabas of wheat per aroura.  
4 Unknown W (8 artabas) P.Harr. I 80 
 
3rd C Arsinoite Lease of 4.25 arouras for an annual rent of 15 artabas of 
wheat including 2 artabas of seed and 40 dr. for land 
under chlora. 
2 Unknown F (18.82 dr.), 
M, W (6.12 
artabas) 
assuming half 
and half in 
wheat and 
chlora. 
BGU IV 1018 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Lease of unknown number of arouras, with cereal land at 
9.75 artabas and 6.5 artabas of wheat per aroura and 2.5 
arouras of barley land at total of 25 artabas of barley. 
Unknown Unknown B (10 artabas), 
W (9.75 and 
6.50 artabas) 
PSI IX 1072 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Lease of unknown number of arouras to be sown half in 
wheat and half in fodder.567 
1 1 in 2 NA SB XX 14290 
 
567 Willis translates ξυλαμῆσαι as meaning that half the land is to be sown in vegetables but I have followed LSJ translation as this meaning specifically that the land is to be 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
259-60 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 2 arouras to be sown in the first year in chlora 
and in the second year in wheat. The rent in the first year 
is 100 dr. and in the second is 12 artabas of wheat. 
2 1 in 2 F (50 dr.), M, 
W (6 artabas) 
P.Wisc. I 7 
261 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 1.75 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes at a total annual rent of 8 artabas of wheat. 
4 0 in 4 M P.Oxy. LXVII 4595 
263 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras at an annual rent of 6 artabas of wheat 
in total. 
2 0 in 2 M SPP XX 57 
266 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in whatever the tenants 
wish except woad and coriander at an annual rent of 10 
artabas of wheat and 10 artabas of lentils. 
2 0 in 2 NA P.Oxy. XIV 1689 
268 Other Lease of 11 arouras to be sown partly in wheat and 
chortos. For the part sown in wheat the rent is 5 artabas 
per aroura. For the part sown in chortos a cash rent of 
unknown amount is payable. 
1 Unknown W (5 artabas) P.Stras. I 10 
272 Unknown Rent receipt for 4 years’ rent in wheat for 1 aroura. 
Annual rent is 2 artabas of wheat. 
Unknown 0 in 4 M P.Cair.Isid. 108 
250-
300 
Other Lease of 15 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
fodder for unknown rent. 
4 1 in 2 NA BGU XII 2133 
285 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 1 aroura to be sown in whatever the tenant 
wishes for a yearly rent of 10 artabas of barley. 
2 0 in 2 NA SB IV 7443 
291 Other Lease of 3.75 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
chortos. Rents per aroura are 8 artabas of wheat and 40 
dr. in ’ptolemaic’ currency respectively. 
4 1 in 2 W (8 artabas) P. Stras. VI 557 
294 Arsinoite Lease of 1 aroura with no crop specified for an annual rent 
of 2 artabas of wheat. 
2 0 in 2 NA BGU VII 1644 
296 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6.125 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat 
and chortos for an annual rent of more than 20 artabas of 
wheat. 
2 1 in 2 NA P.Oxy. LXIX 4747 
297 Arsinoite Lease of 10 arouras with no crop specified for an annual 
rent of 20 artabas of wheat. 




Date Nome Description Duration Required 
rotation to 
rest crop 
Crop (Rate)565 Reference 
297 Arsinoite Lease of 4 arouras with no crop specified for an annual 
rent of 9.5 artabas of wheat. 
3 0 in 3 NA P.Cair.Isid. 100 
 
 
Appendix 3.2.4 Leases where Lease is for Multiple Years or the Land is under Fodder Crop - AD 300 to 350 
Date Nome Description Duration Fodder rental form Reference 
300 Other Lease of 50 arouras for sheep pasture and chortos at a 
rent of 12,500 dr. 
1 Cash. CPR I 40 
276-
325 
Other Lease of 0.1667 arouras for a rent of 0.25 artabas of 
wheat and 6,000 dr. 
Unknown Unknown. P.Flor. I 64 l.27-30 
276-
325 
Other Lease of 1 aroura for a rent of 1 artaba of wheat and 
3,000 dr. The lease also pays the land taxes.  
Unknown Unknown. P.Flor. I 64 l.34-8 
276-
325 
Other Lease of 10 arouras for a rent of 10 artabas of wheat 
and 20,000 dr. The lease also pays the land taxes.  
Unknown Unknown. P.Flor. I 64 l.39-42 
3rd to 
4th C 
Oxyrhynchite Lease of 4 arouras at a share-cropping rent of half the 
crop to be sown as pasture. 
1 Kind – Chortos. SB X 10216 
304 Arsinoite 
 
Lease of 5 arouras at a total annual rent of 10 artabas 
of wheat. 
2 Unknown – since crop 
rotation in 2 year leases by 
no means certain. 
SB VI 9269 
305 Oxyrhynchite Lease of unknown number of arouras to be planted in 
chortos with rent of unknown artabas of chortos. 
Unknown Kind – Chortos. P.Laur. IV 165 
308 Other Lease with mixed rent in kind and cash. The land under 
chortos has an annual rent of 1,200 dr. per aroura. 
2 Cash. P.Lips. I 18 
313 Arsinoite Lease of 2 arouras at a total annual rent of 4 artabas of 
unknown crop. 
2 Unknown – since crop 
rotation in 2 year leases by 
no means certain. 




Date Nome Description Duration Fodder rental form Reference 
317(?) Other Lease of unknown number of arouras at rent of 4 
artabas wheat per aroura and 3,000 dr. per aroura – to 
be sown half and half wheat and fodder. 
1 Cash. P.Charite 3 
320 Other Lease of 7 arouras at a share-cropping rent of one-third 
the crop to be sown in chortos. 
2 Kind - Chortos. CPR XVIIA 11 
328 Unknown Lease of 44 arouras to be sown half in wheat and half in 
chortos. For the arouras sown in wheat the annual rent 
is 5 artabas of wheat per aroura and for that is chortos 
the rent is 1 artaba of lentils per aroura.  
2 Kind – Lentils. SPP II pg3-4 
331 Arsinoite Lease of 16 arouras for an annual rent of 30 artabas of 
wheat. 
5 Kind – Wheat, assuming crop 
rotation would have been 
required in such a long lease. 
P.Sakaon. 69 
335 Other Lease of 5 arouras to be sown in chortos at an annual 
rent of 100 talents. 
1 Cash. CPR I 247 
341 Other Lease of 5 arouras at a share-cropping rent of half the 
crop with the land to be sown in chortos. 
1 Kind – Chortos. P.Flor. I 17 
341 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 8.5 arouras to be sown half and half wheat and 
chortos, with annual rent of wheat at 44 artabas for 
half sown in wheat and 2 artabas of barley for half 
sown in chortos. 
1 Kind – Barley. P.Oxy. LXIX 4753 
341 Oxyrhynchite Lease of 6 arouras to be sown half and half in wheat 
and chortos. The rent for the portion sown in chortos is 
150,000 dr. 
Unknown Cash. SB XVI 13035 l.11-6 
341 Oxyrhynchite Lease to be sown partly in wheat and chortos. The rent 
for the 1.75 arouras sown in chortos is 87,000 dr. 
Unknown Cash. SB XVI 13035 l.17-21 
341 Oxyrhynchite Lease to be sown partly in barley and chortos. The rent 
for the 1.5 arouras sown in chortos is 75,500 dr. 
Unknown Cash. SB XVI 13035 l.26-30 
341 Oxyrhynchite Lease to be sown at least partly in chortos. The rent for 
the unknown number of arouras sown in chortos is 
62,500 dr. 
Unknown Cash. SB XVI 13035 l.55-7 
4th C Other Lease of 24 arouras at a share-cropping rent of half the 
crop with the land to be sown in aracus and chortos. 




Date Nome Description Duration Fodder rental form Reference 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 1.8125 
arouras to be sown in chortos at the rate of 0.625 
solidus per aroura. 
Unknown Cash. P.Col. VIII 238 l.1 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 0.75 
arouras to be sown in chortos at the rate of 2 artabas of 
barley per aroura. 
Unknown Kind – Barley. P.Col. VIII 238 l.9 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 0.875 
arouras to be sown in chortos at the rate of 7 artabas of 
some kind per aroura. 
Unknown Kind – Unknown. P.Col. VIII 238 l.21-2 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 0.8125 
arouras to be sown in chortos at the rate of 2 artabas of 
barley per aroura 
Unknown Kind – Barley. P.Col. VIII 238 l.24-5 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 1 aroura 
to be sown in chortos at the rate of 0.625 solidus per 
aroura. 
Unknown Cash. P.Col. VIII 238 l.28 
4th C Oxyrhynchite List of land rented at different crops and rents: 2.5 
arouras to be sown in chortos at the rate of 7 artabas of 
barley per aroura. 
Unknown Kind – Barley. P.Col. VIII 238 l.35 
4th C Unknown Lease of unknown number of arouras with annual rent 
of 6.5 artabas of wheat and 6.5 artabas of aracus. 







Appendix 3.2.5 Fodder Land Rates of Return 
Assigned date Nome Rate % pa Reference 
21 Arsinoite 6.3% P.Mert. I 10 
22 Arsinoite 15.4% P.Athen. 14 
30 Arsinoite -4.0% P.Mich. XII 633 
32 Arsinoite -1.8% SB XX 14315 
42 Arsinoite -1.2% P.Mich. II 121r IV i 
44 Arsinoite 0.3% P.Mich. V 315 
52 Oxyrhynchite 1.9% PSI IX 1029 
70 Oxyrhynchite -0.8% P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
70 Oxyrhynchite 1.3% P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
71 Other 17.2% P.Lond. III 1225 
72 Oxyrhynchite 1.8% P.Oxy. XLIX 3489 
90 Arsinoite -1.1% P.Lond. II 287 
107 Oxyrhynchite 1.3% P.Oxy. XVIII 2188 
112 Oxyrhynchite 2.8% P.Oxy. XXII 2351 
119 Oxyrhynchite 1.3% P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 
121 Oxyrhynchite 5.0% P.Oxy. III 499 
123 Other 7.1% P.Sarap. 24 
124 Other 5.7% P.Sarap. 25 
124 Other 4.6% P.Sarap. 48b 
125 Other 5.3% P.Sarap. 26 
125 Other 3.0% P.Sarap. 27 
125 Other 2.8% P.Sarap. 28 
125 Other 6.0% PSI VII 788 
127 Other 3.0% P.Vind.Sijp. 8 
130 Oxyrhynchite 2.6% P.Oxy. IV 730 
134 Oxyrhynchite 5.3% P.Oxy. IV 810 
135 Arsinoite 0.1% P.Kron. 34 
136 Arsinoite -3.0% P. Mert. II 68 
136 Oxyrhynchite 1.8% PSI IV 315 
140 Arsinoite 0.1% P.Kron. 41 
140 Arsinoite 4.5% P. Tebt. II 375 
140 Other -3.2% P.Flor. I 41 
141 Other 6.5% P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.10-3 
143 Arsinoite -1.0% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 238 
145 Other 15.7% P.Lond. III 1229 
150 Arsinoite 1.1% PSI X 1124 
150 Arsinoite -4.6% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 289 
150 Arsinoite -1.3% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 295 
150 Arsinoite 8.7% P.Mil.Vogl. III 187 
155 Arsinoite 1.8% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 288 
159 Other 2.7% P.Michael 13 




Assigned date Nome Rate % pa Reference 
165 Arsinoite 1.5% P.Mil.Vogl. III 132 
165 Arsinoite -1.8% P.Mil.Vogl. III 134 
165 Arsinoite 23.4% BGU III 708 
166 Arsinoite 2.3% P.Mil.Vogl. III 144 
170 Arsinoite 0.9% SB XIV 11720 
170 Arsinoite 0.0% SB XIV 11720 
170 Arsinoite -2.5% P.Mil.Vogl. II 63 
180 Oxyrhynchite 3.2% SB VIII 9918 
184 Oxyrhynchite 3.8% P.Oxy. XIV 1687 
187 Other 1.7% SB XVIII 13287 
187 Oxyrhynchite 2.6% P.Oxy. III 501 
190 Oxyrhynchite 1.0% P.Fouad I 43  
190 Oxyrhynchite -5.1% P.Fouad I 43  
192 Arsinoite -2.8% P.Lips. II 148 
194 Arsinoite 0.3% PSI XV 1531 
197 Oxyrhynchite 2.1% P.Oxy. VI 910 
199 Oxyrhynchite 0.2% P.Oxy. LVII 3911 
199 Oxyrhynchite 0.8% P.Oxy. LVII 3911 
200 Other 3.5% BGU XI 2125 
202 Oxyrhynchite 5.7% P.Oxy. LXIX 4745 
212 Arsinoite -4.9% P.Tebt. II 377 
210 Other 18.1% SB XX 14201 
211 Arsinoite 1.4% SB XIV 12197 
213 Oxyrhynchite 4.8% BGU XIII 2340 
217 Other 5.7% P.Stras. I 2 
217 Other 2.1% P.Stras. I 2 
219 Oxyrhynchite 1.9% P.Oxy. L 3591 
219 Oxyrhynchite 2.2% P.Oxy. LV 3800 
226 Oxyrhynchite 2.2% P.Oxy. XVII 2137 
230 Oxyrhynchite 1.5% PSI I 73 
240 Oxyrhynchite 3.1% SB XX 14983 
240 Oxyrhynchite 0.6% P.Oxy. L 3592 
247 Oxyrhynchite -1.0% PSI IX 1069 
250 Arsinoite -1.8% BGU IV 1018 
259 Oxyrhynchite 2.4% P.Wisc. I 7 







Appendix 3.2.6 Arable Land Rates of Return 
Assigned date Nome Crop Rate % pa Reference 
21 Arsinoite Barley 23.0% P.Mert. I 10 
22 Arsinoite Wheat 32.0% P.Athen. 14 
22 Arsinoite Wheat 24.5% P.Athen. 14 
25 Arsinoite Wheat 16.1% P.Mich. XII 634 
26 Arsinoite Wheat 12.3% P.Mich. V 348 
26 Arsinoite Wheat 23.0% P.Mich. V 348 
26 Arsinoite Wheat 15.9% SB VI 9110 
26 Arsinoite Wheat 42.2% SB XVI 12539 
27 Arsinoite Wheat 10.0% P.IFAO I 1 
30 Arsinoite Wheat 37.2% P.Mich. XII 633 
32 Arsinoite Wheat 37.6% SB XX 14315 
42 Arsinoite Wheat 31.0% P.Mich. II 121r IV ii 
44 Arsinoite Wheat 13.6% P.Mich. V 315 
50 Other Wheat 20.7% PSI XVII 1678 
52 Oxyrhynchite Barley 14.2% PSI IX 1029 
52 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 11.8% PSI IX 1029 
52 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 7.8% PSI IX 1029 
70 Other Wheat 25.2% P.Lond. III 1225 
70 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 7.6% P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
70 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 4.8% P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
72 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 10.1% P.Oxy. XLIX 3489 
75 Arsinoite Wheat 8.6% P.IFAO I 10 
89 Arsinoite Wheat 15.8% P.Soter. 3 
100 Other Wheat 23.2% P Flor. III 356 
102 Other Wheat 12.6% P.Sarap. 22a 
107 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 14.2% P.Oxy. XVIII 2188 
112 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 12.0% P.Oxy. XXII 2351 
113 Other Wheat 9.5% P. Flor. III 379 l.36 
113 Other Wheat 20.3% P. Flor. III 379 l.39 
113 Other Wheat 15.8% P. Flor. III 379 l.43 
119 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 15.0% P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 
122 Other Wheat 13.6% P.Sarap. 28 bis 
123 Other Barley 15.0% P.Sarap. 48 bis 
123 Other Wheat 31.1% P.Lond. III 838 
125 Other Wheat 25.1% PSI VII 788 
125 Other Wheat 17.8% P.Sarap. 27 
127 Other Wheat 18.9% P.Vind.Sijp. 8 
127 Other Wheat 15.7% P.Vind.Sijp. 8 
132 Arsinoite Wheat 26.3% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 220 
132 Other Wheat 14.5% P.Sarap. 28 ter 
132 Other Barley 6.6% P.Sarap. 28 ter 




Assigned date Nome Crop Rate % pa Reference 
135 Arsinoite Wheat 10.3% P.Kron. 34 
136 Arsinoite Wheat 27.2% P.Mert. II 68 
136 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 11.0% PSI IV 315 
139 Arsinoite Wheat 38.1% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 286 
140 Arsinoite Barley 8.7% P. Tebt. II 375 
140 Arsinoite Wheat 50.7% P. Tebt. II 375 
140 Arsinoite Wheat 4.4% P.Kron. 41 
140 Other Wheat 9.9% P.Flor. I 41 
140 Other Wheat 17.0% P.Flor. I 41 
141 Other Wheat 31.8% P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.10-3 
141 Other Barley 16.0% P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.14-18 
143 Arsinoite Barley 25.4% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 238 
143 Arsinoite Wheat 23.9% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 238 
149 Oxyrhynchite Barley 1.8% P.Berl. Leihg. XX 1 
149 Oxyrhynchite Barley 4.0% P.Berl. Leihg. XX 2 
150 Arsinoite Barley 28.5% PSI X 1124 
150 Arsinoite Barley 16.8% P.Mert. III 107 l.6-10 
150 Arsinoite Wheat 14.2% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 289 
150 Arsinoite Wheat 44.4% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 290 
150 Arsinoite Barley 28.4% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 294 
150 Arsinoite Wheat 29.6% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 295 
150 Arsinoite Wheat 14.3% P.Mil.Vogl. III 187 
153 Other Wheat 24.1% P.Lond. III 858a 
155 Arsinoite Wheat 22.3% P.Mil.Vogl. IV 288 
159 Other Barley 5.7% P.Michael 13 
159 Other Wheat 29.6% P.Michael 13 
160 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 14.0% P.Lips. I 118 
163 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 20.4% PSI VII 739 
165 Arsinoite Wheat 51.7% P.Mil.Vogl. III 132 
165 Arsinoite Wheat 39.8% P.Mil.Vogl. III 132 
165 Arsinoite Barley 17.2% P.Mil.Vogl. III 137 
165 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 4.1% P.Oxy. XIV 1686 
166 Arsinoite Barley 27.7% P.Mil.Vogl. III 144 
169 Arsinoite Wheat 52.4% P.Mil.Vogl. III 139 
170 Arsinoite Barley 22.3% SB XIV 11720 
170 Arsinoite Wheat 45.8% P.Mil.Vogl. II 63 
170 Arsinoite Barley 22.3% SB XIV 11595 
170 Arsinoite Barley 5.4% SB XIV 11595 
176 Arsinoite Wheat 53.5% P.Mil.Vogl. III 140 
187 Other Wheat 31.5% P.Michael 13 
187 Other Wheat 20.4% SB XVIII 13287 
187 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 13.2% P.Oxy. III 501 




Assigned date Nome Crop Rate % pa Reference 
190 Oxyrhynchite Barley 5.7% P.Fouad I 43  
190 Oxyrhynchite Barley 4.2% P.Fouad I 43  
190 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 11.1% P.Fouad I 43  
192 Arsinoite Barley 8.9% P.Lips. II 148 
194 Arsinoite Wheat 33.2% PSI XV 1531 
197 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 12.1% P.Oxy. VI 910 
199 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 13.4% P.Oxy. LVII 3911 
199 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 10.9% P.Oxy. LVII 3911 
200 Other Barley 14.2% BGU X1 2125 
202 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 7.7% P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.8 
202 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 15.9% P.Oxy. LXIX 4745 
212 Arsinoite Barley 5.6% P. Tebt. II 377 
211 Arsinoite Wheat 18.0% SB XIV 12197 
212 Oxyrhynchite Barley 0.9% P.Koeln III 149 
212 Oxyrhynchite Wheat -1.0% P.Koeln III 149 
216 Other Wheat 6.9% SPP XX 22 
218 Arsinoite Wheat 4.1% SB XVI 12323 
219 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 9.2% P.Oxy. L 3591 
219 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 15.5% P.Oxy. LV 3800 
223 Arsinoite Wheat 5.4% BGU XI 2040 
225 Other Barley 4.9% CPR I 36 
228 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 1.2% P.Oxy. LXVII 4594 
230 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 10.2% PSI I 73 
231 Arsinoite Wheat 16.6% P.Stras. V 460 
239 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 14.9% P.Oxy. L 3592 
249 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 13.0% P.Harr. I 80 
250 Arsinoite Wheat 14.7% BGU IV 1018 
250 Other Wheat 15.6% SPP XX 55 
250 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 5.2% P.Oxy. XXXVI 2795 
250 Oxyrhynchite Barley 13.8% PSI IX 1072 
250 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 16.5% PSI IX 1072 
250 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 10.1% PSI IX 1072 
259 Oxyrhynchite Wheat 8.0% P.Wisc. I 7 







Appendix 3.2.7 Mixed and Multi-year Rates of Return 
 
Assigned date Nome Rate % pa Reference 
21 Arsinoite 24.5% P.Mert. I 10 
22 Arsinoite 24.5% P.Athen. 14 
26 Arsinoite 13.8% P.Mich. V 348 
26 Arsinoite 17.2% P.Ryl. II 166 
30 Arsinoite 18.7% P.Mich. XII 633 
32 Arsinoite 26.9% SB XX 14315 
42 Arsinoite 14.9% P.Mich. II 121r IV ii 
44 Arsinoite 6.9% P.Mich. V 315 
44 Arsinoite 13.3% P.Mil.Congr.xiv pg64 
52 Oxyrhynchite 9.8% PSI IX 1029 
69 Arsinoite 5.1% BGU II 644 
70 Other 21.1% P.Lond. III 1225 
70 Oxyrhynchite 3.2% P.Oxy. XLIX 3488 
72 Oxyrhynchite 5.9% P.Oxy. XLIX 3489 
82 Other 10.7% PSI I 30 
88 Oxyrhynchite 3.4% P.Oxy. II 280 
100 Arsinoite 14.2% BGU II 538 
103 Arsinoite 14.7% P.Hamb. I 64 
103 Oxyrhynchite 5.5% P.Oxy. XLI 2973 
107 Oxyrhynchite 9.8% P.Oxy. XVIII 2188 
108 Oxyrhynchite 7.4% P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2874 
110 Arsinoite 5.9% BGU III 918 
112 Oxyrhynchite 6.7% P.Oxy.  XXII 2351 
119 Oxyrhynchite 8.2% P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 
121 Arsinoite 6.9% P.Mich. III 184 
121 Arsinoite 5.4% P.Mich. III 185 
125 Arsinoite 16.5% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 267 
125 Other 10.4% P.Sarap. 27 
126 Arsinoite -2.5% CPR I 240 
127 Other 10.1% P.Vind.Sijp. 8 
127 Oxyrhynchite 12.9% P.Oxy. LXIX 4739 
128 Arsinoite 11.0% P.Mich. IX 563 
135 Arsinoite 4.4% P.Kron. 34 
136 Oxyrhynchite 6.4% PSI IV 315 
140 Arsinoite 2.1% P.Kron. 41 
140 Arsinoite 20.0% P. Tebt. II 375 
140 Other 8.8% P.Flor. I 41 
141 Arsinoite 8.0% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 271 
141 Other 19.1% P.Heid. Inv.G 24 l.10-13 
142 Oxyrhynchite 7.5% P.Oxy. I 101 




Assigned date Nome Rate % pa Reference 
144 Arsinoite 4.6% SB XVI 13006 
149 Arsinoite 11.8% P.Stras. V 362 
150 Arsinoite 14.8% PSI X 1124 
150 Arsinoite 5.6% P.Ryl. 322 
150 Arsinoite 5.7% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 289 
150 Arsinoite 14.0% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 295 
150 Arsinoite 11.4% P.Mil.Vogl. III 187 
150 Oxyrhynchite 11.1% P.Oxy. L 3589 
151 Arsinoite 14.3% BGU I 227 
154 Arsinoite 8.8% CPR I 31 
155 Arsinoite 19.9% P.Mil.Vogl. VI 288 
155 Arsinoite 25.5% P.Phil. 14 
158 Arsinoite 21.2% SB XIV 11603 
158 Arsinoite 7.7% P.Diog. 26 
159 Arsinoite 13.2% P.Amh. 90 
159 Arsinoite 9.5% P.Amh. 91 
159 Other 15.5% P.Michael 13 
160 Oxyrhynchite 8.3% P.Lips. I 118 
162 Arsinoite 16.9% PSI I 31 
164 Arsinoite 9.5% P.Cair.Mich. II 21 
165 Arsinoite 20.8% SB XVI 12983 
165 Arsinoite 50.1% P.Mil.Vogl. III 132 
165 Arsinoite 18.2% P.Mil.Vogl. III 130 
166 Arsinoite 15.0% P.Mil.Vogl. III 144 
170 Arsinoite 14.1% SB XIV 11720 
170 Arsinoite 21.7% P.Mil.Vogl. II 63 
172 Oxyrhynchite 9.4% SB XII 10780 
173 Oxyrhynchite 2.5% P.Oxy. LXXI 4827 
184 Arsinoite 14.0% BGU I 39 
187 Other 11.0% SB XVIII 13287 
187 Oxyrhynchite 7.6% P.Oxy. III 501 
188 Arsinoite 16.1% P.Oslo II 34 
190 Oxyrhynchite 4.6% P.Fouad I 43  
192 Arsinoite 3.0% P.Lips. II 148 
194 Arsinoite 16.7% PSI XV 1531 
195 Arsinoite 14.0% P.Fam.Tebt. 47 
197 Other 2.6% P.Ryl. II 169 
197 Oxyrhynchite 7.1% P.Oxy. VI 910 
199 Oxyrhynchite 6.4% P.Oxy. LVII 3911 
200 Other 8.8% BGU X1 2125 
202 Oxyrhynchite 10.8% P.Oxy. LXIX 4745 
205 Oxyrhynchite 11.4% SB X 10263 




Assigned date Nome Rate % pa Reference 
211 Arsinoite 9.6% SB XIV 12197 
212 Arsinoite 1.9% BGU III 920 
212 Arsinoite 16.4% P.Mich. XVIII 791 
214 Arsinoite 9.9% SB VI 9562 
215 Arsinoite 1.3% P.Mich. IX 565 
219 Oxyrhynchite 8.9% P.Oxy. LV 3800 
219 Oxyrhynchite 5.5% P.Oxy. L 3591 
220 Arsinoite 7.8% P.Bour. 17 
221 Arsinoite 13.4% BGU II 633 
223 Arsinoite 9.3% P.Berl.Leihg. I 19 
223 Oxyrhynchite 15.1% P.Oxy.Hels. 41 
225 Arsinoite 6.0% P.Diog. 29 
225 Arsinoite 9.2% SB V 7665 
230 Arsinoite 3.2% P.Stras. V 465 
230 Oxyrhynchite 6.3% PSI I 73 
240 Oxyrhynchite 7.6% P.Oxy. L 3592 
250 Arsinoite 6.4% BGU IV 1018 
259 Oxyrhynchite 5.2% P.Wisc. I 7 
261 Oxyrhynchite 5.2% P.Oxy. LXVII 4595 
263 Arsinoite 3.8% SPP XX 57 










Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  
Unknown (U) Nome Description Reference 
11 
 
740 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of a house with veranda and atrium and adjacent vacant 
lot for 740 dr.  P.Vind.Sal. 4 
14 
 
1,500 U Arsinoite 
Offer to purchase a house, veranda, courtyard and vacant lot for 
1,500 dr. CPR XV 5 
29-30 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of three storey house and courtyard for 420 dr. associated 
with a loan of same amount. P.Mich. V 328 




Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of a one storey house for 100 dr., though in subscription it 




Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of three-quarters of a house and courtyard (with another 
masonry building) of 72 dr. associated with a loan of same amount. P.Mich. V 329 
41 1,200 V Arsinoite Purchase of half a house for 600(?) dr. P.Mich. V 235 
42-43 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of two-thirds of a three storey house for 100 dr. associated 
with loan of same amount. PSI VIII 908 
42 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of two-sevenths of a two storey house and court and half 
of a ruined house for 34 dr. associated with loan of same amount. P.Ryl. II 160d 
47 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of a two storey house with courtyard for 84 dr., associated 
with a loan of same amount. SB XII 10804 
47-48 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of one quarter of a new three storey house for 132 dr. with 
an associated loan for the same amount. P.Mich. V 332 
54 
 
Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of two storey house and courtyard for 260 dr. associated 




Not used V Arsinoite 
Purchase of a two storey house with courtyard, in which there is a 
new two storey hall, and a portico, for 448 dr. associated with a loan 
of same amount. P.Mich. V 335 








Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  





6,000 U Oxyrhynchite Purchase of a house for 6,000 dr. P.Yale I 66 
82-96 320 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and court for 320 dr. SPP XXII 23 
75 
 
612 V Arsinoite Purchase of one ninth of a house and courtyard for 68 dr. 
P.Stras. IV 208 with 
BGU I 184 
76 220 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house for 220 dr. PSI XIII 1319 
78 
 
225 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of one third of a house and courtyard and one ninth of an 
old house which was partly fallen in ruins for 100 dr. P.Mich. X 583 
78 280 U Arsinoite Purchase of half of a house for 140 dr. SPP XXII 175 
83 600 P Oxyrhynchite Purchase of two-thirds of a house for 400 dr. SB XVI 12391 
Late 1st C 160 V Arsinoite Purchase of one eighth of a house and courtyard for 20 dr. P.Louvre I 10 
83 
 
1,200 P Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of half a two storey house for 600 dr. or 45 talents of 
bronze. P.Oxy. II 334 
83 320 V Arsinoite Purchase of half a house for 160 dr. BGU XI 2095 
84 
 
533 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of three-quarters of half of a house and courtyard for 200 
dr. P.Ryl. II 107 
89 700 P Oxyrhynchite Purchase of a house for 700 dr, equal to 52 talents 3000 dr. bronze. P.Oxy. II 333 
82-96 
 
750 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of two-fifteenths of a house and a courtyard in which there 
is an atrium for 100 dr. P.Ryl. II 312 
82-96 
 
256 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of one sixth or one tenth of a two storey house and 
courtyard for 32 dr. P.Ryl. II 313 
82-96 320 V Arsinoite Purchase of one half of a two storey house and courtyard for 160 dr. PSI XIII 1320 
84-96 320 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house for 320 dr. SPP XXII 23 
90 
 
800 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of one quarter of a two storey house and courtyard for 200 
dr. SB XXVIII 16904 
93 60 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and courtyard for 60 dr. P.Narm.2006 3 
99 
 
180 U Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of a house for 13 talents and 3000 copper dr. equal to 180 








Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  




540 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of two-thirds of a house and courtyard for 60 plus at least 
200 dr. Assumed that price for two-thirds is 360 dr., based on editor 
comment. P.Stras. IX 886 
97-118 320 U Arsinoite Purchase of one quarter of a house (?) for 80 dr. SB XVI 16476 
103-114 300 V Arsinoite Purchase of a fallen down house for 300 dr. SB XVI 12957 
103-115 1,500 V Arsinoite Purchase of one third of a house, courtyard and atrium for 500 dr. BGU I 350 
117-118 
 
300 P Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of two-thirds of a house for 15 talents of bronze equal to 




667 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and courtyard for 500, 700 or 800 dr. P.Stras. IX 889 
127 200 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and courtyard for 200 dr. P.Tebt. II 323 
134 600 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and courtyard for 600 dr. SB XII 14572 
134 
 
200 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of one half of a house and courtyard for 100 dr. Associated 




800 U Other 
Purchase of half a house and courtyard for 400 dr. However, note 
that mother of vendors has usufruct of property for remaining 
lifetime which might influence price. CPR I 198 
138 250 P Arsinoite Purchase of a new house(?) and an old house(?) for 500 dr. P.Bagnall 31 
143 240 V Arsinoite Purchase of one third of a house and courtyard for 80 dr. P.Vind.Tand. 26 
139-161 800 P Arsinoite Purchase of half a house for 400 dr. P.Dubl. 10 
153 
 
1,286 U Other 
Purchase of one third of a house, one sixth of another house and 
courtyard and 10 thirty-sixths of a house and courtyard for 1,000 dr. P.Stras. VI 585 
154 800 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and two courtyards for 800 dr. P.Mich. VI 428 
155 
 
6,400 V Arsinoite 
Tax receipt for purchase of one quarter of a house and a courtyard 
for 2 talents and 400 dr. equal to 1,600 dr. P.Tebt. II 580 
159 120 V Arsinoite Purchase of half a house and courtyard for 60 dr. P.Ryl. II 162 
168 400 V Arsinoite Purchase of half a house for 200 dr. SPP XX 10 
175 600 P Arsinoite Purchase of a partly ruined house for 600 dr. P.Stras. V 370 








Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  




383 V Arsinoite 
Offer to purchase confiscated property of one third of a house, 
courtyard and oil press for 120 dr. plus charges (assumed to be 6 






638 P Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of a confiscated house and courtyard for 600 dr. plus 
charges of 1/16th. Note that the subsequent sale at 1,800 dr. to the 
original owner is not considered since this amount is likely to 
represent the debt to the fiscus rather than the value of the 
property. P.Oxy. III 513 
184 
 
1,733 V Arsinoite 
Value of property contained within an official letter as 1,300 dr. for 
three-quarters of a house, atrium, courtyard and barn. P.Petaus 10 
184 
 
3,349 V Arsinoite 
Value of property contained within an official letter as 600 dr. for 
forty three-two hundred and fortieths of a house and courtyard. P.Petaus 11 
184 
 
2,400 V Arsinoite 
Value of property contained within an official letter as 400 dr. for 
one sixth of a house and courtyard. P.Petaus 11 
184 
 
4,200 V Arsinoite 
Value of property contained within an official letter as 700 dr. for 




85 V Arsinoite 
Offer to purchase a new house that was built upon a third share of 
an older house, two-thirds of a house and courtyard and two-thirds 
of a house for 200 dr. All property had been confiscated by the state. P.Petaus 14 
182 3,000 P Other Purchase of a two storey house, courtyard and atrium for 3,000 dr. P.Stras. IX 894 
186 267 V Arsinoite Purchase of half of a quarter of a house for 200 dr. BGU I 243 
188 320 V Oxyrhynchite Value of half(?) of a house(?) for 160 dr. SB XXVI 16461 
190 800 V Oxyrhynchite Offer to purchase a house from the state at a price of 800 dr. SB XX 14974 
193 
 
2,000 V Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of half of two houses, one a two storey house and the 
other a house with courtyard for 2,000 dr. P.Oxy. IV 719 
194 500 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house and courtyard for 500 dr. SB X 10571 
209 750 V Arsinoite Purchase of four-fifths of one sixth of a house for 100 dr. P.Hamb. I 16 








Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  
Unknown (U) Nome Description Reference 
212 
 
1,200 P Other 
Purchase of half of a two storey house with cellar and courtyard for 
600 dr. P.Lond. III 1164c 
212 
 
2,914 P Other 
Purchase of one third of a three storey house with cellar and one 
quarter of a one storey house and courtyard for 1,700 dr. P.Lond. III 1164e 
212 
 
1,400 P Other 
Purchase of half a two storey house with cellar and courtyard for 
700 dr. P.Lond. III 1164f 
212 
 
6,000 P Other 
Purchase of one third of a house, courtyard and other buildings in 












1,300 P Other Purchase of half a house for 600+ dr.  CPR I 147 
215 3,000 U Arsinoite Purchase of a house for 3,000 dr. BGU II 362 
222 
 
21,600 P Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of a stone house and court, with a cellar underneath, for 
21,600 dr. P.Oxy. XIV 1634 
222 800 V Arsinoite Purchase of a house without courtyard for 800 dr. BGU II 667 
226-227 900 P Other Purchase of one third of a house and courtyard for 300 dr. P.Lond. II 1158 
231 900 P Other Purchase of one third of a house and courtyard for 300 dr. P.Lond. III 1298 
238 
 
1,600 P Oxyrhynchite 
Offer on behalf of city to buy an unoccupied house now partly fallen 
into ruin for 1,x00 dr (at least 1,200). P.Oxy. LXX 4778 
249 1,400 P Oxyrhynchite Purchase of half of an old house for 700 dr. P.Oxy. X 1276 
250 712 P Oxyrhynchite Purchase of a half of an old house for 3(.)5 dr. 5 1/2 ob.  P.Oxy. X 1284 
Mid 3rd C 6,000 U Arsinoite Purchase of one third of a house and courtyard for 2,000 dr. CPR I 3 
256 500 P Other Purchase of a house and courtyard for 500 dr.  M.Chr. 172 
260 
 
24,800 U Arsinoite 
Purchase of one thirty-second of each of a house plus another old 








Village (V)  
Poleis (P)  
Unknown (U) Nome Description Reference 
266 
 
2,000 P Other 
Offer to purchase of a house and surrounding ground in ruinous 
state from the city of Hermopolis for 2,000 dr. SPP V 119 col. 4 
271 
 
7,200 P Other 
Purchase of a house and court for 7,200 dr.  Price is 4,200 dr. 
settlement of debt and a further payment of 3,000 dr. SPP XX 72 
Late 3rd C 7,100 P Oxyrhynchite Purchase of half of a house and yard for 3,500 to 3,599 dr. P.Laur. III 74 
298 
 
3,000 V Arsinoite 
Purchase of a one storey house previously a mill with a dilapidated 
yard for 3,000 dr. P.Wisc. II 58 
305 9 tals. P Arsinoite Purchase of a house, previously a fuller's establishment for 9 talents. P.Sakaon 59 
306 10 tals. P Arsinoite Purchase of a house for 10 talents. P.Sakaon 60 
307 6,900 V Arsinoite Purchase of a small one storey house for 6,900 dr. P.Graux II 17 
309 13 tals. P Arsinoite Purchase of a house for 13 talents SB XVI 12289 col. 2 
318 
14 tals 
4,000 dr. P Oxyrhynchite 
Purchase of an empty house below which is a cellar for 14 talents 
and 4,000 dr. SB X 10728 
320 8 tals. P Other Purchase of a quarter of a house for 2 talents. P.Kellis I 37 
330-340 1,080 tals. P Other Purchase of a quarter of a house for 270 talents. SB XII 10784 





Appendix 4.1.2 Private Vacant Lot Sales – Ordered by Date of Transaction  
Document Date Reference Document Date  Reference Document Date  Reference 
11 P.Vind.Sal. 4 1st C  P.Mich. V 282 98-117 P.Heid. X 447 
11 CPR XV 2 1st C  P.Mich. V 285 113 BGU III 914 
16 P.Lond. II 355 1st C  P.Mich. V 287 119 P.Giss. I 8 a 
18 BGU III 911 1st C  P.Mich. V 291 119 P.Giss. I 8 b 
18 P.Mich. V 250 1st C  P.Mich. V 297 120-121 P.Tebt. II 472 
19 P.Mich. V 251 1st C  P.Mich. V 301 128 SPP XXII 85 
1st half 1st C P.Hamb. III 217 1st C  P.Mich. V 305 133 P.Oxy. I 100 
1st half 1st C P.Genova II 61 1st C  P.Mich. V 308 137 P.Phil. 11 b 
42 P.Mich. II 121v I 3 1st C  P.Mich. V 309 138-139 PSI XV 1525 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VIII 18 50 P.Vindob.G 31933 139 P.Oxy LII 3691 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX 11 51 P.Vind.Tand. 25 2nd C CPR I 221 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII 11 52 M.Chr. 159 2nd C P.Vand.Tand. 25 a 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII 18 Prior to 77-80 P.Oxy. II 330 a 138-61 P.Diog. 24 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII 19 69-79 P.Lond. II 140 159 P.Prag. I 20r 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII 20 69-79 P.Mich. IX 541 162 P.Flor. I 67 col. II 
42 P.Mich. II 123r III 29 77 P.Oxy. II 242 b 179 CPR I 154 
42 P.Mich. II 123r VI 14 77 P.Oxy. II 242 a 184 CPR 17B 6 l.16-35 
42 P.Mich. II 123r IX 38 77-80 P.Oxy. II 330 a 184 P.Petaus 11a 
42 P.Mich. II 123r X 8 77-83 P.Oxy. II 330 b 184 P.Petaus 11b 
42 P.Mich. II 123r X 15 83 P.Dime III 32 182-7 P.Petaus 16 
42 P.Mich. II 123r XVI 27 92 P.Harr. I 138 1 l.1-11 189 BGU I 71 
42 P.Mich. II 123r XXI 30 92 P.Harr. I 138 3 l1-11 190 SB X 14974 
46 P.Mich. V 352 89-94 P.Oxy. XLVII 3334 c.200 CPR I 137 
47 SB I 5247 1st to 2nd C P.Flor. III 324 1st to 4th C SB I 5173 l.9-18 





Document Date Reference Document Date  Reference Document Date  Reference 
221 SB XX 15625 Col. XXXV 240-80 P.Oxy. XIV 1699 3rd C P.Neph. 29 
222 P.Oxy. XIV 1634 266 P.Oxy. IX 1200 331 P.Kellis I 4 
3rd C P.Oxy. LXVII 4586 269 P.Oxy. XIV 1698 341-2 P.Cair.Goodsp. 13 
3rd C PSI VIII 946 279-82 P.Oxy. XII 1562 






Appendix 4.1.3 House Sales between Family Members 
Document Date  Reference Document Date  Reference Document Date  Reference 
23 P.Dime III 8 48 P.Mich. V 277 121 SB XXII 15704 
29 P.Dime III 13 41-54 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2720 134 SB XXII 15472 
29-30 P.Mich. V 328 55 P.Dime III 28 190-1 P.Marm. r 
29 P.Ryl. II 160 55 P.Oxy. I 99 193 P.Bodl. I 18 
30 P.Mich. V 253 55 SB I 5117 194 SB X 10571 
37 P.Mich. V 264 79 P.Oxy. II 243 217 P.Flor. I 47a 
37? P.Mich. V 290 83 BGU XI 2095 226 P.Lond. III 1158 
41 P.Mich. V 235 83 SB XVI 12391 227 P.Lond. III 942 
42 P.Ryl. II 160 d 84 P.Ryl. II 107 231 P.Lond. III 945 
45 SB XIV 11895 90 SB XXVIII 16904 250 P.Oxy. X 1284 
47 P.Mich. V 276 108 CPR I 11  
 
Appendix 4.1.4 Vacant Lot Prices to AD 274 
Document Date Price (dr.) Reference Document Date Price (dr.) Reference 
69-79 124 P.Lond. II 140 161-9 200 P.Flor. I 67 col.II 
77 692 P.Oxy. II 242 179 460 CPR I 154 
77-83 240 P.Oxy. II 330 184 40 and 300 P.Petaus 11 
1st to 2nd C 300 P.Flor. III 324 189 300 BGU I 71 
106 600-699 P.Lond. III 903 c.200 40 CPR I 137 
120-1 200 P.Tebt. II 472 3rd C 100 P.Oxy. LXVII 4586 
128 200 SPP XXII 85 266 1,200 P.Oxy. IX 1200 
133 2,200 P.Oxy. I 100  
139 200 P.Oxy. LII 3691 












42 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v I l.8 
42 Arsinoite 60 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v III l.20 
42 Arsinoite 60 Fraction P.Mich. II 121v III l.21 
42 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v IV l.4 
42 Arsinoite 100 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v V l.9 
42 Arsinoite 128 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v V l.15 
42 Arsinoite 7 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v X l.13 
42 Arsinoite 48 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v XI l.10 
42 Arsinoite 60 Unknown P.Mich. II 121v XII l.17 
43 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. V 237 l.22 
45 Arsinoite 24 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r II l.42 
45 Arsinoite 140 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r V l.33 
45 Arsinoite 120 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.4 
45 Arsinoite 80 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.11 
45 Arsinoite 32 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.19 
45 Arsinoite 48 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.39 
46 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. II 123r X l.2 
46 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r X l.33 
46 Arsinoite 28 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r X l.35 
46 Arsinoite 12 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r X l.36 
46 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XI l.12 
46 Arsinoite 46 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XI l.23 
46 Arsinoite 104 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XI l.37 
46 Arsinoite 156 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XII l.9 
46 Arsinoite 48 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XII l.44 
46 Arsinoite 28 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XII l.45 
46 Arsinoite 52 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.36 
 
568 This appendix excludes evidence for the few rental agreements for individual rooms, as in the case of SB VIII 
9898 (AD 240) which is a list of rooms let out by an estate owner, courtyards without attaching housing or the 
more numerous cases of commercial property. 
569 This amount is generally the amount of the annual rent, but in the case of the abbreviated contracts in the 
Tebtunis grapheion register it is quite possible that they refer to the amount of an antichretic loan, since when 
we have copies of both the full description and the abbreviated entry this is indeed the case. See P.Mich. II 
123v III l.17 and P.Mich. II 123r IV ix for an example of the abbreviated and full description of the same 
transaction.  However, sometimes there is a distinction made in the abbreviated listings in that in some, but 
not all, cases there is a specific reference to an associated loan, which might imply that different types of 
housing agreements are hidden by the abbreviated listings. See, for instance, P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.1-4 which 
contains the abbreviated listings of three housing transactions made on the same day by the same scribe. Two 
listings make no mention of a loan document whilst one explicitly states that a loan was associated with the 
housing agreement. Given this uncertainty, I have included all abbreviated listings which do not make specific 
reference to a loan in this appendix rather than in appendix 4.2.2. I prefer not to assume, as Samuel and Youtie 
do, that all inhabitation documents must be antichretic loans: Samuel 1965: 305-6 and Youtie 1976: 108. These 
abbreviated listings have not, in any event, been included in the detailed analysis in this section given the 









46 Arsinoite 120 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XIV l.19 
46 Arsinoite 56 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XIV l.23 
46 Arsinoite 240 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XV l.9 
46 Arsinoite 20 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XV l.21 
46 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XV l.35 
46 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.2 
46 Arsinoite 40 1 P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.6 
46 Arsinoite 340 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.15 
46 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.16 
46 Arsinoite 29 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.29 
46 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XX l.12 
46 Arsinoite 300 Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.27 
46 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.50 
46 Arsinoite 64 Unknown P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.1 
46 Arsinoite 20 Unknown P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.2 
46 Arsinoite 56 Unknown P.Mich. II 128 II l.25 
46 Arsinoite 60 Unknown P.Mich. II 128 III l.27 
46 Arsinoite 156 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 II l.60 
46 Arsinoite 100 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 II l.85 
46 Arsinoite 24 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 II l.106 
46 Arsinoite 120 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 III l.160 
46 Arsinoite 24 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 IV l.180 
46 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Mich. V 238 IV l.185 
46-9 Arsinoite 28 Unknown P.Mich. II 124 I l.8 
46-9 Arsinoite 28 Unknown P.Mich. II 124 I l.17 
46-9 Arsinoite 200 Unknown P.Mich. II 124 I l.19 
46-9 Arsinoite 124 Unknown P.Mich. II 124 II l.16 
46-9 Arsinoite 100 Unknown P.Mich. II 126 l.3-5 
Other 
41-54 Arsinoite Unknown 1 P.Thomas  4  
49 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Oxy. X 1321  
89 Arsinoite 600 Unknown BGU I 260  
83-96 Arsinoite 8 0.5 P.Soter. 26  
98 Unknown 40 1 P.Mich. XIV 678  
102 Arsinoite 40 Unknown P.Rein. I 43  
100-125 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 183  
114 Arsinoite 28 1 P.Kron. 53  
123 Arsinoite Unknown 1 P.Fay. 98  
124 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 196  
125-6 Unknown Unknown Unknown SB  9855  
131-2 Arsinoite 12 Unknown P.Oxy. VI 986 col. 3 l.8 
131-2 Arsinoite 4 Unknown P.Oxy. VI 986 col. 3 l.13 









134 Other 5+ Unknown O.Ashm.Shelt. 15 
135-6 Arsinoite 60 1 SB VI 9636  
138 Arsinoite 20 0.5 P.Lips. I 16  
141 Arsinoite 25.33333 1 P.Tebt. II 372  
142 Arsinoite 20 1 SB XX 14281  
144 Arsinoite 60 1 SB XVI 13005  
144 Arsinoite 48 1 SB XVI 13011  
148 Other Unknown Unknown P.Vind.Sal. 11  
150 Arsinoite 12 Unknown BGU I 293  
2nd C Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Stras. VIII 726  
151 Unknown Unknown Unknown BGU I 289  
151 Arsinoite Unknown 1 P.Mil.Vogl. II 56  
155 Other 360 1 P.Worp 20  
159 Arsinoite 78 Unknown CPR VIII 9  
163 Oxyrhynchite 40 Unknown P.Yale inv. 1224  
164 Oxyrhynchite 200 1 P.Oxy. III 502  
170-1 Arsinoite 80 1 P.Mil.Vogl. III 143  
173 Oxyrhynchite 20 Unknown P.Oxy. VIII 1128  
157-88 Oxyrhynchite 180 1 P.Yale inv. 685  
174 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 238  
174 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown PSI XVII 1699 
177 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 240  
183 Oxyrhynchite 60 Unknown P.Oxy. VIII 1127  
186 Other 8 Fraction P.Sijp. 21a 
187 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 251  
190-1 Other 32 1 P.Marm.r col. VI l.44 
194? Other Unknown Unknown O.Amst. 53  
194 Other Unknown Unknown O.Heid. 257  
194 Unknown Unknown Unknown SB XIV 11400 l.3-7 
194 Unknown 5 Unknown SB XIV 11400 l.8-11 
2nd to 3rd C Oxyrhynchite 72 0.5 P.Oxy. XLIV 3200  
214-5 Oxyrhynchite 8 Unknown P.Oxy. X 1262v 
214 Oxyrhynchite 85 Unknown P.Yale I 69  
214 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Yale I 69  
215-6 Arsinoite 33.33333 1 BGU II 362 Frag3 Page XIII  
215-6 Arsinoite 10 1 BGU II 362 Frag3 Page IX 
214-7 Arsinoite 48 Unknown P.Louvre I 41  
219-23 Arsinoite 20 Unknown P.Louvre I 42  
221-6 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 1 P.Harr. II 225  
Start 3rd C Arsinoite 3000 1 BGU XI 2034  
200-250 Arsinoite 48 1 P.Flor. III 340 l.10-2 
226-242 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 0.5 P.Koeln III 150  









235 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Oxy. VI 912  
241-2 Other Unknown Unknown P.Flor. I 77  
242 Arsinoite 12 Unknown O.Medin.Madi 20  
244-8 Arsinoite 1200 Unknown BGU I 253  
246 Other 160 0.666667 SPP XX 53  
232-64 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Col. VIII 233  
233-265 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 0.5 P.Oxy. VI 911  
3rd C Other Unknown Unknown BGU II 407  
3rd C Arsinoite Unknown Unknown BGU VII 1646  
225-75 Oxyrhynchite 140 Unknown P.Giss. I 49  
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.1-2 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.3-5 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.6 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.7-8 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.8 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Ryl. II 285 l.9-10 
3rd C Arsinoite 32 Unknown SB XXII 15866  
249-61 Arsinoite Unknown Unknown P.Flor. I 10  
258 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 1 P.Oxy. XX 2284  
266 Oxyrhynchite 200 1 PSI VIII 940  
268 Other 96 1 SPP V 119r l.III 
270 Arsinoite 2160 1 P.Turner 37  
269-272 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 1 SB IV 7442  
272 Oxyrhynchite 400 1 P.Oxy. VII 1036  
250-300 Oxyrhnchite Unknown 1 SB XVI 12268 
280 Oxyrhynchite 1000 1 P.Oxy. XIV 1694  
3rd to 4th C Unknown 8 Unknown P.Wash.Univ. I 45  
306 Other Unknown Unknown P.Kellis I 31  
307 Oxyrhynchite 2400 1 SB VI 8998  
316 Other 1200 0.25 P.Gen.2 I 10  
320 Other 3000 Unknown P.Panop. 11  
323 Oxyrhynchite Unknown Unknown P.Oslo III 138  
323 Oxyrhynchite 3000 Unknown P.Oslo III 138  
325 Arsinoite Unknown Fraction P.Haun. III 55 
327 Oxyrhynchite 260 Unknown SB IV 7444  
331 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 1 P.Oxy. XLVIII 3384  
321-52 Other Unknown Unknown CPR XVIIA 38  
337 Other 150000 Unknown P.Panop. 12  
330-45 Other Unknown Unknown P.Flor. I 103  
338 Oxyrhynchite 120000 0.5 P.Oxy. XLVIII 3386  
339 Other 150000 Unknown P.Panop. 13  
344 Oxyrhynchite 120000 Unknown P.Mert. I 33  









345 Oxyrhynchite 540000 1 P.Harr. I 82  






Appendix 4.2.2 Antichretic Housing Loans  
Date Nome Description Amount (dr.) Reference 
16 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one half of a house. 
24 P.Lips. II 130  
20-21 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, habitation 
rights to some part of a house 
with courtyard. 
84 SB XII 11041  
29-37 Oxyrhynchite Repayment of 160 dr. which 
was an antichretic loan 
relating to one third of a house 
160 SB VIII 9827  
42 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit dwelling. 
20 P.Mich. II 121r I ii 
42 Arsinoite Repayment of 60 dr. which had 
been owed under a contract 
for lodging. 
60 P.Mich. II 121r III ix 
42 Arsinoite In lieu of interest on a loan of 
40 dr. lodging is provided and 
asses may be stabled in 
courtyard. 
40 P.Mich. II 121r IV ix 
42 Arsinoite In lieu of interest on a loan of 
28 dr. lodging in half of house 
and courtyard is provided. 
28 P.Mich. II 121r IV xi 
44 Oxyrhynchite In lieu of interest, right to live 
in some part of a house. 
400 P.Fouad I 44  
44 Other In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one-sixth of house and 
court. 
220 P.Lond. III 1168  
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
120 P.Mich. II 123r VI 
l.29 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
80 P.Mich. II 123r VII 
l.20 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
120 P.Mich. II 123r VII 
l.38 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
100 P.Mich. II 123r VII 
l.41 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
372 P.Mich. II 123r XIX 
l.19-20 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
124 P.Mich. II 123r XVII 
l.21-23 
46 Arsinoite Agreement for furnishing 
lodging in a third-share of a 
house and court for a loan of 
80 dr. This contract is unlike 
others in the archive and the 
editor believes it may relate to 
an antichretic housing loan. 
The fee charged by the scribe 
of 14 dr. is, however, very high 
for such a contract. 





Date Nome Description Amount (dr.) Reference 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
Unknown P.Mich. II 123r XXII 
l.9 
46 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
100 P.Mich. V 238r III 
l.108-9 
46 Arsinoite Loan(?) of a stone used in the 
manufacture of pottery in 
exchange for lodging. 
NA P.Mich. V 238r III 
l.143 
46-7 Arsinoite Loan associated with contract 
for lodging. 
200 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) 
l.4 
41-54 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit a pastophorion (house) 
within temple precincts. 
Unknown P.Thomas 4  
52 Oxyrhynchite Repayment of loan where in 
lieu of interest, right to inhabit 
premises. 
72 SB V 8034  
41-68 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit pastophorion (house). 
Unknown SB XVI 12263  
68 Oxyrhynchite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit house. 
80 P.Oxy. XIV 1641  
71 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one ninth of house and 
courtyard. 
200 P.Mich. XII 635  
74 Oxyrhynchite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit some premises. 
120 P.Mich. inv. 87 
79 Oxyrhynchite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit some premises. 
430 SB VIII 9765  
79 Arsinoite The original editor describes 
this as a receipt for rent but I 
have followed Youtie 1976: 
108 in considering this the 
repayment of an antichretic 
housing loan. No information 
is provided on the size of the 
dwelling inhabited. 
40 dr. and 3 
artabas of 
barley 
P.Fouad I 56  
87 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one twenty-seventh of 
dwelling. 
60 P.Mich. X 585  
89 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit half of house, vacant 
lots and chamber. 
600 P.Hamb. I 30  
81-96 Oxyrhynchite Right to inhabit three-fifths of 
house. Associated with 
mortgage. 
400 P.Oxy. VIII 1135  
96 Oxyrhynchite Within a will, a woman notes 
that her husband has the right 
to live in her house until such 
time as a debt, originally 600 
dr., has been paid off at a rate 
of 48 dr. a year. 




Date Nome Description Amount (dr.) Reference 
96 Arsinoite Repayment of loan where in 
lieu of interest, right to inhabit 
house and courtyard. 
100 P.Soter. 25  
105-6 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
occupy premises. 
Unknown P.Mich. IX 570  
117 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to live 
in four-twenty-sevenths of 
house. 
60 P.Mich. XI 605  
121 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one-third of house. 
300 SB XXII 15849  
120 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit a house. 
300 P.Mich. III 188  
123 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one ninth and one 
twenty-seventh part of 
dwelling. 
60 P.Mich. III 189  
126 Arsinoite Tax receipt for renewal of 
habitation agreement, where 
in lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit one ninth and one 
twenty-seventh part of 
dwelling. 
200 SB XXVIII 17056 
219-40 Arsinoite In lieu of interest, right to 
inhabit half of house. 







Appendix 5.1.1 Moneylender and Pawnbroking Documents 
Date  Reference 
10 BC to AD 34 P.Fay. 109 
Second half 1st C P.Oslo III 130 
93 SPP XX 2 
1st to 2nd C P.Oslo III 130 
Early 2nd C P.Oxy. X 1269 
141-2 P.Herm. Inv.G 24 
147 SB XX 14401 
2nd C P.Oxy. III 530 
2nd C SB XVI  12421 
192 P.Hombert I 32 
2nd to 3rd C P.Oxy. I 114 
3rd C P.Oxy. VI 936 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 
200-325 SB VIII 9834 
Late 3rd C P.Ryl. IV 606 






Appendix 5.1.2 Transactions with Usufruct of Land or other Asset – not Housing 
Date  Reference 
1st C P.Duk. inv. 956 
54 P.Ryl. II 119 
82 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2773 
81-96 BGU XI 2121 
100-25 P.Ryl. II 335 
114 BGU I 101 
After 126 P.Corn.  7 
126-35 SB XXII 15386 
146 P.Kron. 20 
149 P.Oxf. 11 
138-61 BGU I 179 
167 P.Ryl. II 120 
176 BGU XIII 2338 
177-78 P.Lips. I 10 






Appendix 5.1.3 Loans between Family Members 
Date  Reference 
23 P.Dime III 8  
29-30 P.Mich. V 328 2 
33 P.Tebt.Wall  9  
37 P.Oxy. II 267  
37 SB X 10238  
44 P.Lond. III 1168  
46 P.Mich. II 123v V l.12-3 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r I l.24 
1st C  P.Amst. 40  
52 SB V 8034  
60 P.Mich. III 191 a 
60 P.Mich. III 191 b 
60 P.Mich. inv. 78  
60 P.Mich. inv. 79  
60 P.Mich. inv. 80  
65 P.Oxy. XLIX 3487  
73-4 P.Mich. inv. 92  
75 P.Yale I 64  
85 P.Oxy. LXVI 4532  
81-94 P.Mich. V 554  
75-100 P.Oxy. II 348  
81-96 P.Oxy. XLIX 3466 a 
81-96 P.Oxy. XLIX 3466 b 
90 P.Fouad I 48  
96 P.Oxy. I 104 l.20-2 
98 P.Bodl. I 104  
98-9 P.Oxy. II 241  
102-3 P.Fam.Tebt. 7  
108 P.Fam.Tebt.  10  
108-9 P.Fam.Tebt.  11 a 
98-117 P.Stras. VI 525  
112 P.Fam.Tebt. 11 b 
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 d 
116 P.Fam.Tebt. 16 a 
125 CPR VI 1 b 
126 P.Princ. II 33  
128 P.Amh. II 112  
131 BGU I 70 a 
131 BGU I 70 b 
131 P.Oxy. III 472 a 
138 SB XXII 15704  
139 SB VI 9353  
147 BGU II 378  
149 SPP XXII 53  
150 BGU XI 2043  
2nd C P.Louvre I 17  




Date  Reference 
154 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2722  
126-200 SB XIV 12037  
177 BGU III 970  
186 SB XXIV 16009  
201 P.Oxy. XII 1473 a 
201 P.Oxy. XII 1473 b 
221 P.Harr. II 227  
222 P.Flor. I 48  
227 P.Lond. III 943  
310 P.Panop. 20  






Appendix 5.2.1 Interest-bearing Cash Loans 
Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
6 Arsinoite 84 12 Unknown P.Duk. inv. 7 
7 Arsinoite 100 18 Unknown SB I 5243 
8 Arsinoite 72 18 Fiduciary BGU I 189 
16 Other 168 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 241 l.15-23 
16 Other 100 12 None P.Mich. V 241 l.39-45 
17 Arsinoite 480 18 None P.Corn. 6 
18 Arsinoite 84 12 Fiduciary BGU III 911 
23 Arsinoite 65 12 Fiduciary P.Lond. II 277 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 300 12 Unknown P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.1-4 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.5-6 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 240 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.7-8 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 36000 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.9-10 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 340 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.11-3 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 600 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.14-6 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 200 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.17-9 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite 200 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.20 
1st half 1st C Oxyrhynchite Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.22-3 
26 Arsinoite 544 12 Fiduciary PSI IX 1051 
27 Other 200 6 Pawn C.Ep.Lat. 13 
27 Other 450 18 None P.Mich. V 336 
29 Arsinoite 593 12 Fiduciary P.Dime III 11 
29 Unknown 593 18 Unknown P.Lond. III 1273 
29-30 Arsinoite 420 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 328 
32 Arsinoite 100 12 Fiduciary P.Ryl. II 160 c 
40-1 Other 72 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 329 
41-2 Arsinoite 50 12 None BGU III 713 
41 Arsinoite 90 12 None C.Pap.Gr. I 18 
42 Arsinoite 34 12 Fiduciary P.Ryl. II 160 d 
42-3 Other 100 12 Fiduciary PSI VIII 908 
46 Arsinoite 100 12 Fiduciary BGU XIII 2337 
46 Arsinoite Unknown 12 None BGU XI 2044 
47 Arsinoite 240 12 None P.Fouad I 47 
47-8 Other 132 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 332 
47 Arsinoite 84 12 Fiduciary SB XII 10804 
52 Other 760 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 333 
54 Arsinoite 260 12 Fiduciary P.Dime III 27 
42-68 Arsinoite 140 12 Unknown SB XXVI 16566 
56 Other 448 12 Fiduciary P.Mich. V 335 
70 Arsinoite 100 12 Mortgage BGU III 910 
76 Arsinoite 220 12 Fiduciary PSI XIII 1319 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
79 Oxyrhynchite 1300 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. II 243 
81 Oxyrhynchite 38 12 None P.Oxy. XII 1471 
86-7 Oxyrhynchite 80 15 Unknown P.Oxy. LXXV 5052 
89 Arsinoite 360 12 None P.Tebt.Tait  49 
90 Arsinoite 200 12 Unknown P.Fouad I 48 
93 Arsinoite 2160 8 Pawn SPP XX 2 
94 Oxyrhynchite 3500 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. II 270 
98 Other Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Brem.  69 
98 Oxyrhynchite 356 12 Mortgage P.Genova II 62 
98-9 Arsinoite 1200 12 Unknown SB XVIII 13234 
99 Other 1300 12 Mortgage P.Brem. 68 
1st or 2nd C Unknown Unknown 12 Unknown P.Harr. I 84 
98-102 Arsinoite 560 12 None P.Münch. III 94 
1st or 2nd C  Other 224 12 None P.Princ. III 142 
100 Arsinoite 252 12 Mortgage SB VI 9539 
1st or 2nd C Arsinoite Unknown 12 None SB XXVI 16567 
102 Other 100 15 None P.Sarap. 13 
103 Other 500 12 Mortgage P.Flor. I 81 
98-117 Unknown 1500 12 Unknown P.Lond. II 202 l.3 
98-117 Unknown 1000 18 Unknown P.Lond. II 202 l.5 
98-117 Unknown 260 22 Unknown P.Lond. II 202 l.8 
108 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. III 483 
103-15 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Münch. III 95 
113 Arsinoite 400 10 None BGU I 68 
103-22 Arsinoite Unknown 12 None P.Athen.  22 
Early 2nd C Unknown 1000 18 Unknown P.Mich. III 145 
114 Arsinoite 124 12 None P.Alex. 7 
116 Unknown 3000 12 Mortgage PSI VI 688 r b 
116 Unknown 4500 8 Mortgage PSI VI 688 r c 
116 Unknown 4500 12 Mortgage PSI VI 688 r d 
117 Oxyrhynchite 84 12 Unknown P.Harr. I 85 
122 Oxyrhynchite 2000 12 None P.Ups.Frid.  3 
125-6 Other 200 12 None P.Heid. X 448 
101-50 Unknown 120 12 Unknown P.IFAO I 28 
125 Other 300 24 Unknown P.Mil.Vogl. III 188 
127-8 Unknown 520 14 Unknown SPP XXII 4 Col. 3 
128 Other 900 8 Unknown P.Sarap. 62 l.2-6 
117-38 Arsinoite 2100 12 Mortgage P.Bas. 7 
117-38 Unknown Unknown 12 Mortgage SB XVIII 13103 l.11-7 
117-38 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Stras. VII 646 
129 Oxyrhynchite 7500 6 Unknown P.Oxy. XXXVI 2774 
130 Other 6200 12 None SB X 10538 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
131-2 Unknown 700 12 Unknown PSI VIII 962 
132 Arsinoite 100 12 None P.Diog. 25 
133 Other 1300 12 Mortgage SB XII 10786 
133 Other 1200 12 Mortgage SB XII 10787 
75-199 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Fay. 344 
138 Arsinoite 1120 12 None BGU I 272 
138 Other 1800 12 Unknown P.Kron. 16 
140 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.266-8 
140 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.345-8 
141-2 Arsinoite 524 12 None P.Louvre I 18 
141-2 Oxyrhynchite 700 3 Unknown P.Oxy. I 98 
141 Other 3500 12 Mortgage P.Tebt. II 389 
131 Arsinoite 748 12 Mortgage SB XVI 12520 
143 Oxyrhynchite 1000 6 Mortgage P.Oxy. III 506 
143 Other 800 12 Mortgage BGU III 741 
143-4 Arsinoite 64 12 None P.Stras. IV 230 
144 Other 2600 12 Mortgage M.Chr. 240 
144 Oxyrhynchite 300 12 Unknown P.Oxy. LV 3798 
138-61 Unknown Unknown 12 Unknown SB I 5168 
145-6 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown BGU III 710 
146 Oxyrhynchite 260 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. III 507 
147 Other 120 12 Unknown P.Coll.Youtie I 25 
148-9? Arsinoite Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Horak 23 
149 Other 1200 12 Mortgage M.Chr. 237 
149 Arsinoite 240 12 Unknown CPR I 15 
138-60 Other Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Laur. II 28 
149 Arsinoite 420 12 None SPP XXII 53 
2nd C Unknown 10400 10 Mortgage P.Erl. 94 l.2 
2nd C Unknown 3400 10 Mortgage P.Erl. 94 l.3 
138-61 Arsinoite 384 12 Unknown BGU I 179 
150 Arsinoite 840 12 Mortgage BGU XI 2043 
138-61 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Bour. 15 
2nd C Unknown 7200 12 Mortgage P.Erl. 94 l.8 
2nd C Arsinoite 160 12 Unknown P.Flor. III 316 
2nd C Other 260 12 Unknown P.Kron. 23 
150 Oxyrhynchite 600 12 Mortgage P.Oslo II 40 a 
150 Oxyrhynchite 1400 12 Mortgage P.Oslo II 40 b 
2nd C Oxyrhynchite 200 12 None P.Oxy. VIII 1125 
2nd C Oxyrhynchite 200 12 Unknown P.Sijp. 49 
138-61 Arsinoite 2240 12 None P.Stras. IV 293 
2nd C Unknown Unknown 12 None P.Stras. V 374 
138-61 Unknown Unknown 12 Unknown SB XVIII 13228 l.1-9 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
2nd C Arsinoite 11 22 Pawn SB XVI 12421 l.22 and l.27 
2nd C Arsinoite 8 40 Pawn SB XVI 12421 l.20 
2nd C Unknown Unknown 36 Unknown PSI XVII 1689 
151 Other 2000 7 Mortgage P.Stras. I 52 
152 Arsinoite 100 12 None P.Stras. IV 209 
153 Other 200 12 Mortgage P.Flor. I 1 
154 Other 150 12 None P.Mil.Vogl. II 68 
146-61 Other 300 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. IV 712 
154 Oxyrhynchite 600 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. XXXIV 2722 
154 Other 132 12 None PSI X 1142 
155 Arsinoite 1360 12 Mortgage P.Vars. 10 
156 Other 380 12 Unknown P.Select. 3 
156 Other 176 12 Mortgage SB XIV 12017 
157 Arsinoite 900 12 Mortgage BGU I 301 
157 Arsinoite 2000 12 Mortgage SB X 10294 
138-177? Other Unknown 12 Unknown SB XIV 11607 
158 Arsinoite 108 12 None P.Münch. III 96 
158-9 Arsinoite Unknown 48 Unknown P.Fouad I 26 a 
158-9 Arsinoite Unknown 48 Unknown P.Fouad I 26 b 
146-71 Oxyrhynchite 144 12 Unknown P.Oxy. XLIV 3198 
136-81 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Unknown P.Stras. IX 835 
160 Arsinoite 2000 12 Mortgage BGU III 888 
162-3 Oxyrhynchite 600 24 Unknown P.Oxy. VIII 1132 
163 Unknown 116 8 None P.NYU II 27 
163 Arsinoite 140 12 Unknown CPR I 16 
163 Arsinoite 112 12 None P.Heid. III 239 
163-4? Oxyrhynchite 200 12 None P.Oxy. L 3560 
163-4? Oxyrhynchite 160 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. L 3560 
161-9 Arsinoite 48 12 None P.Stras. IV 204 
167 Arsinoite 400 12 None M.Chr. 174 
167 Oxyrhynchite 800 12 Mortgage P.Oxy.Hels. 36 
167 Other 124 12 Mortgage P.Tebt. II 390 
c.170 Oxyrhynchite 1800 6 Mortgage P.Oxy. XVII 2134 
161-80 Arsinoite 150 12 Unknown P.Münch. III 97 
2nd half 2nd C Unknown Unknown 12 Unknown P.Stras. IV 225 
177 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Mortgage BGU VII 1574 
176 Arsinoite 250 12 None SB XXII 15325 
177-9 Other 683 12 Mortgage P.Flor. I 28 
178 Oxyrhynchite 900 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. III 485 
182 Other 240 12 None P.Fam.Tebt. 43 
183 Oxyrhynchite 300 12 Unknown P.Thomas 13 
183-4 Arsinoite 160 12 None P.Petaus 31 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
184-5 Arsinoite 1200 12 None P.Petaus 32 
184 Arsinoite 100 12 None P.Vind.Sijp. 12 
185 Other 100 12 None P.Bon. 25 
186 Other 6000 6 None M.Chr. 185 
186 Arsinoite 12000 8 None PSI XII 1253 
186-7 Arsinoite 160 12 None SPP XXII 69 
End 2nd C Arsinoite 440 12 None BGU XI 2117 
175-200 Oxyrhynchite 1000 7 Mortgage P.Oxy. XIV 1648 
188 Other 1500 8 Mortgage P.Giss. I 32 
Later 2nd C Oxyrhynchite 500 48 Unknown P.Mert. I 23 
189 Unknown 1200 12 None M.Chr. 227 
189 Other 60 12 Unknown SB XVI 12690 
190 Other 500 12 None P.Vind.Sal. 6 
191 Other 600 12 None P.Mert. II 78 
193 Other 342 12 None SPP XX 16 
179-211 Other 110 12 Mortgage P.Amh. II 98 
195 Oxyrhynchite 220 12 None P.Oxy. LXXI 4828 
195 Arsinoite 6000 12 Mortgage PSI IV 314 
197 Oxyrhynchite Unknown 7 Unknown P.IFAO I 12 
c 200 Arsinoite 261 6 Unknown P.Stras. VI 554 l.1-2 
c 200 Arsinoite 152 6 Unknown P.Stras. VI 554 l.3-8 
2nd or 3rd C Other 150 12 Unknown P.Hamb. IV 270 
175-225 Arsinoite 150 12 None P.Mil. II 58 
175-225 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Stras. V 324 
2nd or 3rd C Hermopolite 40 45 Unknown P.Prag. III 214 
2nd or 3rd C Oxyrhynchite 200 48 Pawn P.Oxy. I 114 
201 Oxyrhynchite 6000 10 Mortgage PSI XIII 1328 
201 Oxyrhynchite 15000 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. XII 1473 
201-2 Oxyrhynchite 600 12 Mortgage SB XXII 15738 
203 Oxyrhynchite 30000? 12 Unknown SB VI 9201 
203 Oxyrhynchite 30000? 12 Unknown SB VI 9201 
204 Oxyrhynchite 1700 10 Mortgage SB XII 11228 
205 Other 1479 12 Unknown O.Stras. II 902 
205 Other 116 12 None SB XVI 13030 
210 Arsinoite 300 12 Mortgage P.Hamb. I 14 l.15 
210-1 Other 1800 12 Unknown SB XXVI 16423 
211 Unknown 68 12 None P.Stras. III 143 
212 Other 1000 6 Unknown P.Flor. III 318 
212? Unknown 3000 8 Unknown P.Harr. I 66 
212-3 Oxyrhynchite 3000 8 Unknown P.Oxy. I 70 
212 Other 2080 12 Unknown P.Lond. III 1164 
213 Oxyrhynchite 3000 Under 12 None P.Oxy. LXX 4772 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
211-7 Other 2000 12 Mortgage SB XVIII 13858 
215 Arsinoite Unknown 6 Unknown BGU II 362 Frag 3, 1 
215 Arsinoite 14000 6 Mortgage BGU II 362 Frag 3, 9 
215 Arsinoite Unknown 6 Mortgage BGU II 362 Frag 3, 11 
215 Arsinoite 6000 6 Mortgage BGU II 362 Frag 3, 15 
200-229 Arsinoite 11600 11 Pawn SB VIII 9834 
212-7 Other Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Graux II 27 
217-8 Other Unknown 12 None CPR XVIIB 13 
217-8 Other Unknown 12 Unknown CPR XVIIB 17 
After 218 Arsinoite Unknown 12 None BGU VII 1650 
220 Other 840 12 Mortgage M.Chr. 210 
221 Arsinoite 400 12 None SB IV 7467 
222 Other 6000 6 None P.Flor. I 48 
223 Oxyrhynchite 1000 12 None BGU XI 2118 
224 Unknown Unknown 12 Mortgage P.Iand. VII 145 
225 Unknown 64 12 None P.Lond. III 939 
225 Other 400 12 None P.Vind.Tand. 23 
226 Other 200 12 None M.Chr. 136 
228-9 Other 9080 12 Mortgage P.Stras. VIII 732 
229 Other 900 12 Mortgage SB I 4370 
233 Other 750 12 Mortgage P.Lips. I 9 
233-4 Other 732 12 Mortgage P.Flor. I 56 
229 Arsinoite Unknown 12 Mortgage PSI XII 1238 
246 Oxyrhynchite 2552 12 None PSI IX 1068 
247 Other 1200 12 None P.Lips. I 11 
249 Oxyrhynchite 4500 12 None SB V 7634 
3rd C Arsinoite 100 12 Unknown P.NYU II 24 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 4000 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. XIV 1701 a 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 5100 12 Mortgage P.Oxy. XIV 1701 b  
3rd C Unknown Unknown 12 Unknown P.Stras. VIII 748 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 150 12 Unknown PSI VI 700 
3rd C? Other 200 12 Unknown PSI VI 701 
3rd C Unknown 55 12 None SB XIV 11598 
after 250 Arsinoite 780 12 None SB XVIII 13974 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 28 24.5 Pawn PSI XVII 1707 l.7 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 40 21.4 or 42.9 Pawn PSI XVII 1707 l.8 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 100 13.7 Unknown PSI XVII 1707 l.16 
3rd C Oxyrhynchite 40 35.7 Pawn PSI XVII 1707 l.19 
252 Other 60 12 None P.Gen.2 I 9 
252-3 Other 3250 12 Unknown SB XVI 12240 
267 Other 6000 6 Unknown SPP XX 66 l.1-3 
267 Other 3000 6 Unknown SPP XX 66 l.4-6 




Date Nome Amount (dr.) 
Interest rate 
p.a. Security Reference 
267 Other 4000 6 Unknown SPP XX 66 l.18-21 
268 Oxyrhynchite 5225 12 None P.Oxy. XII 1561 
281 Other 152 12 Unknown P.Lond. III 1243 
282 Arsinoite 7260 12 Unknown P.Cair.Isid. 93 
267-99 Arsinoite 400 48 Unknown P.Cair.Isid. 132 
286-7 Other 600 12 None P.Vind.Bosw. 12 
3rd or 4th C Arsinoite Unknown 12 None SB XXII 15327 
303 Arsinoite 20160 97 Unknown P.Oxy. LXXIX 5211 
326 Arsinoite 210000 54 None SB XIV 11385 
337 Oxyrhynchite 3000000 27 None P.Oxy. XLV 3266 
345 Oxyrhynchite 180000 20 None P.Col. inv. 185 
325-75 Other 4000000 6 Unknown P.Leid.Inst.  17 







Appendix 5.2.2 Paramone Loans 
Date Nome Type Reference 
10 Oxyrhynchite Apprentice P.Tebt. II 384  
Early 1st C Unknown Work PSI X 1120  
24-May Arsinoite Work P.Mich. X 587  
30 Arsinoite Work P.Ryl. II 128  
38 Arsinoite Work P.Mil. I 7 b 
41 Arsinoite Nurse PSI X 1131 
42 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 121r I viii and ix 
42 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 121v I l.6 
42 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 121v VI l.20-1 
42 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 121v XII l.8-9 
42 Arsinoite Work P.Mich. II 121r IV viii 
43 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 237 e 
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r III l.32-3 
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r IV l.18-9 
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r VI l.22 
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r VI l.23 
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r VII l.46-7  
45 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r VII l.7-8 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r X l.23-4 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r X l.3-4  
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r X l.9-10  
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.33-5 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.38 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.40-1 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XIV l.31-2 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XV l.7-8 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.28-9 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.32 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.25-6 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.19 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 128 II l.17-8 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. II 128 III l.46 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 I l.27-8 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 II l.62-3 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 III l.110-1 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 IV l.191-2 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 III l.113-4 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 III l.136-7 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 III l.152-3 
46 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 238 IV l.216-7 




Date Nome Type Reference 
46 Arsinoite Work P.Mich. V 238 a15 
46-9 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 124r l.8-11 
46-9 Arsinoite Nurse P.Mich. V 124v l.8-9 
89 Arsinoite Work P.Alex. 8 
98-102 Arsinoite Work P.Oxf. 10  
117-38 Arsinoite Nurse P.Stras. VII 646 l.6-11 
128 Arsinoite Work BGU I 339  
132 Other Work PSI VIII 962 b 
75-199 Arsinoite Work P.Fay. 344 l 
140 Arsinoite Work P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.151-4 
140 Arsinoite Work P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.269-76 
140 Arsinoite Work P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.348 
145 Arsinoite Work SPP XXII 36  
2nd C Unknown Work P.Mil. II 60 l.14-25 
158 Arsinoite Work P.Flor. I 44 
164-5 Arsinoite Work P.Mert. III 105  
176 Arsinoite Work P.Aberd.  56  
2nd - 3rd C Other Work SB V 7612  
207 Arsinoite Work P.Diog. 16  
253 Oxyrhynchite Apprentice P.Oxy. XXXI 2586  
276-82 Arsinoite Work SB IV 7358 b 







Appendix 5.2.3 Interest Rates on Loans in Kind 
Date Nome Amount of loan and comments Interest Rate  Reference 
3 Arsinoite Loan of 6 artabas of barley with the additional half. 50 P.Berl.Möller 4 
16 Other Repayment of seed loan of wheat to state bank. 50 O.Bodl. II 970 
25-6 Other Loan of 8 artabas of wheat with the additional half.  50 O.Bodl. II 1978 
65 Other 
c.20 artabas of wheat with repayment of 35 artabas at a rate of 33% plus 
12.5%. 
46 P.Lond. III 1215  
128-9 Other 
A mixed interest-bearing loan where 1 and one third artabas of wheat are 
borrowed suggesting that the interest is 33%. 
33 P.Flor. I 72  
128 Other 
Mixed loan, associated with lease,  including 48 artabas of wheat with interest 
at 50%. 
50 P.Sarap. 62 l.2-6 
2nd C Unknown 
Mixed loan including 10 artabas of wheat where 12% appears to apply to both 
cash and kind elements. 
12 P.Stras. V 374  
2nd C Unknown 
3 artabas of wheat to be measured out with interest charges of one third. Note 
that editor interprets this as implying 50% interest, but no reason why 2.25 
artabas could not have been provided. 
33 P.Stras. I 71  
161-2 Oxyrhynchite 9 artabas of barley. 33 P.Oxy. LXXVII 5109  
2nd half 2nd C Oxyrhynchite 3 artabas of wheat. 33 P.Stras. VI 588  
190-1 Oxyrhynchite 4 artabas of wheat, within lease of land. 33 P.Fouad I 43 l.30-1 
217 Other Loan of unknown amount of vegetables. 50 CPR XVIIB 13 l.1-6 
224 Unknown Loan of unknown amount of wheat. 50 P.Iand. VII 145 c 
225 Oxyrhynchite 300 artabas of wheat. 25 P.Oxy. XXXI 2566 col. ii 
225 Oxyrhynchite 2 artabas of wheat. 50 P.Col. X 277  
225 Oxyrhynchite 4 artabas of wheat.  50 P.Oxy. VIII 1040  
252 Other 10 artabas of vegetables. 40 P.Gen.2 I 9  
258-9 Oxyrhynchite 5 artabas of barley. 33 P.Oxy. LXIV 4439  
c.258-9 Oxyrhynchite 6.5 artabas of wheat. 100 P.Mich. XI 614  
295 Arsinoite 3 and one third artabas of wheat. 50 P.Oslo II 37  
310 Arsinoite 6 artabas of wheat. 50 P.Cair.Isid.  95  





Date Nome Amount of loan and comments Interest Rate  Reference 
275-350 Unknown 1 artaba of wheat. 50 SB XVI 12496  
314 Other Loan of agriculgtural produce with 50% interest. 50 P.Lond. III 975 
325 Arsinoite 25 and two-third artabas of wheat. 50 P.Col. VIII 176  
326 Oxyrhynchite 60 artabas of wheat. 50 SB XX 14301  
329 Arsinoite 4 artabas of wheat. 33 P.NYU I 22  
336 Arsinoite 1.5 artabas of wheat. 33 P.Col. VIII 178 a 
337 Unknown 3 artabas of barley. 50 P.Jena II 3  







Appendix A – Measures, Money and Months 
Measures 
The following measures are referenced within the main body or other appendices of this thesis. 
Aroura: This is a measure of land area and is assumed to be equivalent to 2,760m2.570 
Artaba: This is a measure of dry volume used for produce such as wheat. It is assumed to be equivalent to 38.8 litres. The artaba was divided into choenices, 
the number varying according to local practice and date. In any calculations I have assumed 40 choenices to the artaba, although there is also evidence for 
48 choenices to the artaba being used.571  
Bikos: This is a measure of land area used in urban areas, for instance in defining the size of vacant lots. Its equivalent size in modern terms is unknown. 
Keramion monochoron this is a measure of liquid volume often used for wine. It is assumed to be equivalent to 7.3 litres. The keramion is a jar and there are 
different types including: the dichoron which is assumed to be twice the volume of the monochoron and the oxyrhnchition which is assumed to be 1.5 times 
the volume of the monchoron. The kotule is a smaller measure and 36 are assumed to the monochoron. There are a number of other measures of liquid 
volume or jar descriptions used within the documents analysed. These are the chous, hemikadion, knidion, sextarius and spathion.572  
Money 
The monetary system of Roman Egypt was different from, and separate to, that which applied to the rest of the empire up until the end of the third century 
AD. From AD 1 to AD 273 there was a period of relatively stable prices and even though there was a significant reduction in the silver content of coins, 
coined money seems to have maintained its fiduciary value in market exchange. 
It is thus fortunate that for the bulk of the period under consideration there is a common nominal currency for most the transactions we are dealing with: 
the silver drachma. Although the Egyptian monetary system was closed to the rest of the empire, there was a theoretical and, to some extent, real silver 
value equivalence between the denarius and the tetradarchm.573  In coinage the silver drachma was normally traded using the Alexandrian silver 
tetradrachm coin which had a value of four drachmas and this explains the tendency which we will see in the transactions for amounts to be in multiples of 
four, e.g. 24, 28 drachmas etc.  For large amounts, these were often expressed in talents, which were each equal to 6,000 silver drachmas. 
 
570 See Rathbone 1991: xvi, which together with Rathbone 1997: 199, 223-33 for wine, supplies the data for the other measures in this appendix, unless otherwise stated.  
571 Shelton 1977: 56, Rathbone 1983: 271. 
572 See appendix 2.1.4 for my assumptions as to the sizes of these measures,  taking into account Kruit & Worp 2001: 87 and Mayerson 2002: 170, 206. 





As regards fractions of drachmas I have converted where possible all values to the Alexandrian silver drachma standard generally using seven obols to the 
silver drachma after AD 190 and six obols per drachma for the earlier part of the period unless there is evidence to the contrary. 574  The obol could further 
be divided into chalkoi and eight chalkoi are assumed per obol. 
Certain transactions in the earlier part of the period express prices in bronze drachmas but these prices may be considered as conventional in nature rather 
than as exchange values. In the latter part of the period, after AD 274, there appears to be a divergence between different forms of money, with units of 
account differing from coinage in circulation, and this follows on from Aurelian’s currency reform.575 Given the nominal inflation that occurred in silver 
drachma units, prices and rents tended to be described in myriads of drachma (10,000) or gold solidi. 
Months 
Throughout the thesis references are made to Egyptian months. The Egyptian year started in Thoth, roughly equivalent to September, and ended in late 
August with the month of Mesore.576 
The equivalence to modern days of the year is, of course, only approximate, since the treatment of leap years was different from modern practice and thus 
the modern day equivalent will have varied from year to year. ‘Intercalary’ days were added to the months above to allow for the difference between lunar 




574 Rathbone 1997: 189-90. 
575 See Haklai-Rotenberg: 2011, for a description of this reform. 





Appendix B - Statistical Techniques and Mathematical Terms. 
Best-Fit regression lines  
These are the lines which are the closest fit to the data points on a scatter chart. They reduce the error of the line (the distance from the line to the point) 
to the minimum by calculating the sum of the squares of the difference between the data points and the line. Regression lines may be either a straight line, 
or curved, as they follow a mathematical function such as a polynomial equation. 
Correlation Coefficients   
A correlation coefficient is a numerical measure of the statistical relationship between two variables and in particular it measures how closely they move 
together. Correlation coefficients vary between −1 and +1, where +1 indicates that the two variables move in tandem and −1 when they move in opposite 
ways. Pearson’s ‘r’ is used to assess the relationship between prices for different goods, rather than the alternative ‘Spearman's ρ’, given that  although 
Spearman’s coefficient is a more appropriate measure for non-linear variables, it tends to underestimate the effect of outlying data and thus produce a high 
correlation factor, and I would prefer to be conservative in my assessment of the likelihood of close correlation between prices for different goods. 
Logarithmic scale 
A logarithmic scale is a non-linear scale used when a quantity has a wide range. It is particularly useful when displaying data which may be growing 
geometrically. 
Mann-Whitney U test 
A statistical test to determine whether two samples come from populations with the same distribution. 
Monte Carlo 
This is the repetition of a process a large number of times using a random number generator to produce a series of possible stochastically derived 
outcomes.  
Polynomial 
An equation consisting of more than two algebraic terms which contains different powers of the same variable. A polynomial is given an order according to 








R2 or r2 and pronounced ‘R squared’, is the coefficient of determination, and is the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is predictable 
from the independent variable. It is commonly used to determine the degree to which a line fits the data from a scatter diagram. 
The higher the R² coefficient, the better the line fits the data and if all the data points were on the line the fit would be exact and the coefficient would be 
equal to 1 and if the data were randomly distributed the coefficient would be 0. 
Relative Standard Deviation 
This is a measure for comparing the variability of a sample from one type of data to another. It is the standard deviation divided by the mean of the sample. 
Standard Deviation   
The standard deviation is a measure that is used to quantify the amount of variability of a set of data points.  A low standard deviation indicates that the 
data points tend to be close to the mean of the set, while a high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a wider range. It 
measures the sum of the square of the difference between the data points and the mean. 
Stochastic model 
Stochastic models rather than deterministic models can be described as follows: ‘models whose inputs and outputs are probability distributions rather than 
discrete values. The underlying principle is that one first represents the uncertainty about the underlying processes or input variables mathematically and 
then calculates the implied uncertainty about the outcome measure—a method called the forward propagation of uncertainty.’577 
In order to define the probability distribution assumptions need to be made as to the minimum lower bound, most likely value and maximum upper bound 
of each variable. A further assumption needs to be made as to the likelihood of a variable taking a value within the range set by the minimum and 
maximum bounds. For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that a normal distribution applies to all stochastic variables. 
Z-test  
When the means of two samples are compared within the thesis, a two sample Z-Test has been used to determine the level of statistical significance of any 
difference between the means. This compares the means of the two samples and determines the probability that they are the same.  
  
 





Appendix C Modelling Age at Inheritance 
 
When examining why transactions occurred, the likelihood of an individual coming into an inheritance is of relevance. The age at which someone would 
have been most likely to receive an inheritance from their parents, assuming that both have died, can be modelled. The distribution of ages at inheritance is 














































In order to model this distribution I needed to assume mortality, fertility and marriage rates as well as the age of marriage for both parties. The mortality 
table used is the Coale and Demeny Model West Table Level 3 which has an expectation of life at birth of 25 years which lies in the conventional range for 
the empire as a whole.579 Fertility rates are assumed such that a married woman on average produced 0.36 children per year (based on a rate for societies 
without modern birth control methods less an allowance for some family limitations).580 The marriage rates, the difference in age at marriage and the ages 




579 Jehne 2006: 11. 
580 Hin 2013: 198. 





Appendix D Data of Particular Interest582 
Appendix D.1 Land Sale Transactions 
Date Reference 
50 BC to AD 50 P.NYU II 16  
6 CPR I 224  
13-4 P.Oxy. IV 721  
14-5 P.Dubl.  3  
14 SB I 5236  
14-6 P.Oxy. IV 835  
18 P.Mich. XVIII 784  
25-6 P.Mich. V 252  
25-6 PSI X 1118  
1-50 SB XVI 12277  
29-30 P.Mich. V 254  
29-30 P.Mich. V 256  
31-2 P.Ryl. II 159  
31 SB VI 9109  
32-3 P.Mich. V 258  
33 P.Mich. V 259  
c.34-5 BGU III 906  
35 P.Kron.  48  
34-6 P.Mich. V 262  
35-6 P.Mich. V 263  
38 P.Mich. V 266  
38-9 PSI VIII 918  
37-40 P.Lips. II 133  
41-2? P.Mich. V 267  
41 P.Mich. V 331  
42 P.Mich. II 121v I l.4 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.16 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.17 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IV l.18 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII l.13 
42 P.Mich. II 121r II l.9 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.10 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.11 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.16 
44 P.Coll.Youtie I 19  
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.8 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.10 
45-6 P.Mich. V 272  
45 P.Mich. V 338  
 






46-7 W.Chr.  365  
46 P.Bingen  60  
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.11 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.17 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.7 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.11 
46 P.Mich. V 238r V l.242 
46 P.Mich. V 238r IV l.179 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.138 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.141 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.150 
46 P.Mich. V 239 l.9-11 
46 P.Mich. V 273  
47 BGU I 177  
46-8 P.Mich. V 274  
48 P.Mich. V 353  
26-75 BGU XIX 2801 l.18-23 
1st C  P.Mich. V 303  
57-8 P.Koeln III 141  
1-125 P.Fay.  154  
1st to early 2nd C P.Oslo III 114 l.1-13 
68 P.NYU II 15  
69 SB XVIII 13229  
70 P.Oxy. XLIX 3508 a 
70 P.Oxy. XLIX 3508 b 
c.70? PSI XVI 1622  
69-78 SB XVIII 13235  
81 SB XVI 12613  
81 SB XXII 15351  
83-4 P.Oxy. XII 1462 1 
83-4 P.Oxy. XII 1462 2 
83-4 SPP XX 1 1 
83-4 SPP XX 1 2 
84 P.Flor. I 92  
85 P.Oxy. IV 794  
86-7 P.Münch III 64  
83-8 P.Oxy. I 47  
88 BGU XI 2017  
88 P.Lond. II 141  
76-100 P.Oxy. II 344  
88 P.Oxy.Desc.  6  
75-100 SB X 10752  






81-96 P.Ross.Georg. II 14  
90 P.Lond. II 285  
90 P.Oxy. I 72  
89-92 P.Amh. II 68  
92 P.Fam.Tebt.  3  
92 P.Harr. I 138 1 l.11-8 
92 P.Harr. I 138 1 l.19-25 
92 P.Harr. I 138 3 l.11-29 
93 PSI VIII 897 pg.1 
93 PSI VIII 897 pg.2 
95 P.Oxy. I 45  
95 SB V 7599  
97 P.Lond. II 143  
95-100 P.Oxy. II 347  
99 P.Mil.Vogl. III 186  
99 P.Oxy.Desc.  7  
91-108 SB XX 14336  
1st to 2nd C O.Petr.  306  
75-125 P.Bagnall  47 a 
75-125 P.Bagnall  47 b 
75-125 P.Bagnall  47 c 
1st to 2nd C P.Bingen  67  
1st to 2nd C P.Lips. inv. 3194  
100 P.Oxy. I 46  
c.100 P.Oxy. II 341  
100 P.Oxy. II 342  
100 P.Oxy. II 346  
100 P.Oxy. III 641  
c.100 P.Oxy. L 3556  
c.100 P.Stras. IV 266  
1st or 2nd C PSI VIII 875  
101 SB XVIII 13238  
104-5 P.Hamb. I 97  
104 SB XIV 11533 col. I a 
104 SB XIV 11533 col. I b 
104 SB XIV 11533 col. II and III 
105 P.Corn. XL 40  
105 P.Stras. I 19  
100-11 BGU IV 1048  
106 BGU XI 2050  
106-7 CPR I 188  
107-8? P.Narm.2006  6  
98-117 P.Stras. IX 807 l.21-34 






98-117 P.Stras. V 331  
109 P.Amh. II 95  
103-14 P.Fam.Tebt.  8  
109 P.Rein.  II 98  
103-17 CPR I 170  
90-133 P.Sarap.  77  
112-3 PSI X 1153  
100-25 BGU XI 2053  
100-25 M.Chr..  217  
100-125 P.Oxy. III 504  
115 BGU I 50  
115-6 P.Stras. VI 583  
115-7 SB XIV 11381  
117 P.Rein I 44 a 
117 P.Rein I 44 b 
117 P.Rein I 44 c 
117 P.Rein I 44 d 
117 P.Rein I 44 e 
117 P.Rein I 44 f 
117 P.Rein I 44 g 
117 P.Rein I 44 h 
117 P.Rein I 44 i 
117 PSI XVII 1697  
118? CPR I 172  
123 P.Fam.Tebt.  23  
124 SPP XXII 44  
125 BGU XI 2093  
2nd C P.Gen. II 100  
100-50 P.Münch III 85  
100-50 SB XVIII 13742 l.7-11 
126 P.Harr. I 142  
128 P.Mil.Vogl. I 26 a 
128 P.Mil.Vogl. I 26 b 
128 P.Mil.Vogl. I 26 c 
128 P.Mil.Vogl. I 26 d 
128 P.Oxy. LXII 4335  
117-38 SB XX 14636  
129 P.Lond. II 300  
123-37? P.Louvre II 109  
131 P.Athen.  43r l.1-4 
131 P.Athen.  43r l.5-7 
131 P.Athen.  43r l.8-10 
131 P.Athen.  43r l.12-4 






131 P.Mich. IX 572  
131 P.Oxy. II 348  
131 P.Turner  21  
134 P.Mich. VI 427  
135-6 P.Petaus  127 l.1-15 
135-6 P.Petaus  127 l.22-30 
136 P.Batav.  10  
126-49 BGU XI 2051  
138 CPR I 198  
138 CPR  I 17  
75-200 P.Ryl. II 315  
139-40 BGU II 422  
139 P.Oxy. LII 3690  
139 P.Oxy. LII 3691  
140 P.Ryl. II 163 a 
140 P.Ryl. II 163 b 
141 P.Phil.  11 l.9 
142-3 P.Giss. I 28  
c.143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 1 l.12-20 
c.144 P.Stras. IV 236  
145-6? P.FuadUniv.  19  
147 SB I 5673  
148 BGU III 959  
142-53 CPR I 222  
2nd C BGU II 567 l.12 
2nd C BGU II 602  
138-61 BGU III 709  
2nd C BGU III 883  
2nd C BGU VII 1642  
2nd C BGU XI 2052  
2nd C BGU XI 2055  
2nd C BGU XI 2114  
2nd C CPR I 110  
2nd C CPR I 111  
2nd C CPR I 114  
2nd C CPR I 116  
2nd C CPR I 117  
2nd C CPR I 139  
2nd C CPR I 186  
2nd C CPR I 189  
2nd C CPR I 201  
2nd C CPR I 208  
2nd C CPR I 214  






138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.15-22 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.83-9 
2nd C P.Iand. IV 54  
2nd C P.Mich. VIII 492 a 
2nd C P.Mich. VIII 492 b 
2nd C P.Oslo inv. 1129  
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 38  
2nd C P.Ryl. II 316  
2nd C P.Tebt. II 457  
2nd C P.Tebt. II 511  
138-61 P.Tebt. II 515  
2nd C PSI VI 704  
138-61 SB X 10526  
2nd C SB XIV 11399  
138-61 SB XXIV 15963 l.1-7 
138-61 SB XXIV 15963 l.8-9 
2nd C SPP XX 13 I 
2nd C SPP XXII 79  
148-54 P.Turner  24  
151-2 SB X 10527  
148-61 SB XVIII 13764 1 
148-61 SB XVIII 13764 2 
156 P.Ross.Georg. II 23  
159 P.Oxy. X 1270  
157-61? PSI III 189  
162-3 P.Flor. I 40 l.7-16 
162 P.Flor. I 67 col. I 
162-3 P.Flor. I 97 l.12-8 
162-3 P.Flor. I 97 l.27-8 
162-3 P.Stras. IX 831  
101-225 SB XX 14952  
163 SB XXIV 14652  
163 SB XXIV 16252  
161-9 BGU I 233  
165 BGU II 542  
167-9? BGU I 240  
101-225 P.Bodl. I 68  
168-9 SPP XX 50  
170-1 SB X 10757  
161-79 SB XII 11229  
171 P.Ryl. II 164  
169-77 BGU II 446  
176-7 P.Amh. II 170r 






177 BGU II 666  
177 P.Brook.  8  
177-8 P.Princ. III 149  
175-80 BGU I 282  
178-9 BGU XI 2113  
178-9 BGU XI 2115  
178 P.Oxy. LXII 4337 l.1-14 
178 P.Oxy. LXII 4337 l.15-8 
179 P.Mich. VI 364 
179-80 P.Oxy. IV 718  
181-2 P.Matr.  2  
182 BGU II 622  
183 P.Wisc. I 9  
184-5 CPR XVIIB 3 l.1-16 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.25-6 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.27-9 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.32-3 
184-5 P.Petaus  14  
184 P.Petaus  17  
185 P.Petaus  18  
185 P.Petaus  20  
185 P.Petaus  22  
185-6 P.Petaus  23  
177-92? SB VI 9625  
182-92 P.Hamb. I 84  
187 PSI VII 770  
184-92 BGU XI 2054  
176-200 P.Bour.  18 col. II 
175-200 P.Oxy. XIV 1648 l.35 
175-200 P.Oxy. XIV 1648 l.36 
190 CPR I 175  
190-2 CPR I 104  
189-93 SB XVI 12333 2 
189-93 SB XVI 12333 1 
192 SB VI 9618 2 
192 SB VI 9618 1 
193-4 SB VIII 9906  
179-211? P.Amh. II 98 l.6-11 
196 SB XVI 12642  
199 SB XXII 15612  
2nd to 3rd C BGU III 901  
c.200 CPR I 155  
2nd to 3rd C CPR I 200  






2nd to 3rd C CPR I 218  
2nd to 3rd C P.Diog.  31  
2nd to 3rd C P.Diog.  36  
200 P.Koeln II 88  
199-201 P.Mich. XV 702  
1st to 4th C SB I 5167 l.27-32 
2nd to 3rd C SB XVI 12553  
201-2 BGU I 156  
202 P.Giss. I 51  
202-3 SB XVI 12643  
203-4 P.Flor. III 380  
201-11 P.Lond. III 1238  
211 P.Lond. III 933  
212 P.Oxy. III 488  
213 P.Amh. II 96  
200-225 P.Oxy. XIV 1724 l.5-14 
213-4 SPP XX 65 l.10-5 
213-4 SPP XX 65 l.1-9 
217? PSI XV 1546 I.1-27 
218 SPP XX 25  
219-21 CPR I 61  
218-22 CPR I 62  
220 P.Oxy. LI 3638  
214-25 SB XX 14292  
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. II  
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. III 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. V 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. VI 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. X 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XII 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XX 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XXI 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XXIII 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XXV 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XXVII 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. XLIV - XLV 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. L 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. LIV 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. LV 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. LXIX 
221 P.Bub. I 4 col. LXX 
221-6? CPR I 78  
224 P.Bub. I 1 XVII-XIX 






224 P.Bub. I 1 XX-XXI 
224 P.Bub. I 2 VII 
224 P.Bub. I 2 V 
224 SPP XX 26 a 
224 SPP XX 26 b 
224 SPP XX 26 c 
224 SPP XX 26 d 
224 SPP XX 26 e 
200-50 CPR I 83  
200-50 CPR I 90  
200-50 CPR I 94  
200-50 CPR I 108  
200-50 CPR I 125  
200-50 CPR I 133  
1st half 3rd C CPR I 134  
1st half 3rd C CPR I 136  
201-50 CPR I 138  
201-50 CPR I 141  
201-50 CPR I 156  
201-50 CPR I 161  
201-50 CPR I 162  
201-50 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2723  
200-50? PSI XV 1533  
200-50 PSI XV 1550  
227 CPR I 64  
227 SPP XX 28  
227 SPP XX 29r 
222-35? CPR I 73  
222-35 CPR VI 73  
229 P.Oxy. XIV 1725 l.10-4 
229 P.Oxy. XXVII 2473  
222-35 SB XXII 15326  
231-5 CPR I 225  
234-5? P.Oxy. VII 1044 i. l.7-8 
234-5? P.Oxy. VII 1044 i. l.27 
234-5? P.Oxy. VII 1044 ii. l.6 
234-5? P.Oxy. VII 1044 ii. l.16 
234-5? P.Oxy. VII 1044 ii. l.22 
176-300 BGU II 616  
238 SB I 5283  
241 P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 1 
241 P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 2 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.13 






245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.30 b 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.30 c 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.30 d 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.30 e 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.33  
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.35 a 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.35 b 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.21 a 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.21 b 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.22 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.25 a 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.25 b 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.26 a 
245 P.Oxy. XLII 3047 l.26 b 
245 P.Stras. III 144  
246 P.Lond. III 1157v 
247 P.Gen. II 116  
249 P.Oxy. XIV 1636 a 
249 P.Oxy. XIV 1636 b 
249 P.Oxy. XIV 1636 c 
3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.1-4 
3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.5-10 
3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.10-14 
3rd C BGU VII 1624 l.15-20 
3rd C CPR I 89  
3rd C CPR I 103  
3rd C CPR I 199  
3rd C P.FuadUniv.  20  
3rd C P.Harr. II 228  
3rd C P.Koeln XIII 535  
3rd C P.Leid.Inst.  50  
3rd C P.Lips. inv. 2579  
3rd C P.Mich. XV 719  
225-75 P.Oxy. XX 2278  
3rd C P.Oxy. XLI 2989  
3rd C P.Ross.Georg. V 25  
250 P.Vind.Bosw.  6  
226-275 PSI V 450 l.48-68 
3rd C PSI X 1126  
3rd C PSI X 1127  
3rd C PSI XII 1255 1 
3rd C PSI XII 1255 2 
3rd C SB VI 9069  






3rd C SB XXIV 15933  
257 BGU XIX 2764r 
257 CPR I 176  
253-60 P.FuadUniv.  21  
257-8 P.Oxy. LXXV 5058  
c.250-70 CPR I 126  
266 P.Ryl. II 165  
267 P.Oxy. XII 1475 a 
267 P.Oxy. XII 1475 b 
272 P.Giss. I 100  
274 P.Oxy. XLIX 3498  
250-300 P.Berl.Möller   6  
275 P.Oxy. XIV 1633  
272-9 P.Coll.Youtie II 70  
276 SPP XX 74  
277-8 P.Vind.Bosw.  3  
279-80 SB XVI 12242  
279-80 SB XVI 12243  
281 P.Coll.Youtie II 71 a 
281 P.Coll.Youtie II 71 b 
284-5 SB VI 8971  
275-300 P.Oxy. XIV 1700  
275-300 SB XIV 11703  
289 BGU I 94  
289 P.Coll.Youtie II 73  
291 P.Oxy. IX 1208 a 
291 P.Oxy. IX 1208 b 
298 P.Oxy. XIV 1704  
3rd to 4th C P.Cair.Cat.  10686  
3rd to 4th C SB XXIV 15965  
305 CPR VII 14  
306 P.Lips. I 6  
309-10 BGU XIX 2830  
319 SB VI 9219  
321 CPR XVIIA 17 a 
300-50 P.Cair.Salem  7  
326 P.Gen. IV 185  
c.329 P.Panop.  31  
330 CPR I 19  
336 P.Oxy. XII 1470  
336 P.Panop.  22  
342 BGU IV 1049  
342? P.Col. VII 173  






348 BGU III 917  
4th C P.Kellis I 39  







Appendix D.2 Land Lease Transactions 
Date Reference 
1 O.Petr.  190  
100 BC to AD 100 P.Erl.  69  
1 P.Oslo II 32  
6 P.Oxy. II 374  
7 P.Oslo inv. 787  
8 P.Lips. II 129  
8-9 P.Mich. XV 689  
1-25 BGU XIII 2344  
16 P.Lond. III 892  
16-7 P.Mich. V 346  
17 BGU I 197  
20 BGU II 636  
21 O.Leid.  316  
21 P.Mert I 10  
22 P.Athen.  14  
22 P.Bingen  58  
25-6 P.Mich. XII 634  
26-7 P.Mich. V 310  
26 P.Mich. V 348  
26 P.Mich. XII 632 a 
26 P.Mich. XII 632 b 
26 P.Oxy. LXXXIII 5360  
26 P.Ryl. II 166  
26 SB VI 9110  
26 SB XVI 12539  
26 SB XX 14314  
27 P.IFAO I 1  
29-30 P.Mich. V 254  
29 P.Oslo II 33r a 
29 P.Oslo II 33r b 
c.30 P.Mich. XII 633  
31 P.Yale I 67  
32 P.Wisc. II 52  
32-3 SB XX 14315  
33 P.Bingen  59  
34 P.Mich. V 311  
35 P.Fouad I 40  
34-6 PSI XV 1518  
36 SB X 10531  
38 P.Mich. XII 630  
41-2 P.Lond. III 1171v a 






42 P.Mich. II 121r I i 
42 P.Mich. II 121r I v 
42 P.Mich. II 121r I x 
42 P.Mich. II 121r I xii 
42 P.Mich. II 121r I xiv 
42 P.Mich. II 121r II i 
42 P.Mich. II 121r II v 
42 P.Mich. II 121r II vi 
42 P.Mich. II 121r II vii 
42 P.Mich. II 121r III viii 
42 P.Mich. II 121r III x(a) 
42 P.Mich. II 121r III x(b) 
42 P.Mich. II 121r III xi 
42 P.Mich. II 121r III xiv 
42 P.Mich. II 121r IV ii 
42 P.Mich. II 121r IV v 
42 P.Mich. II 121r IV x 
42 P.Mich. II 121r IV xii 
42 P.Mich. II 121v I 10 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IV l.3 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IV l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121v V l.4 
42 P.Mich. II 121v V l.7 
42 P.Mich. II 121v V l.17 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VI l.1 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VI l.7 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VI l.8 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VI l.11 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.5 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.8 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.11 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VII l.13 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VIII l.2 
42 P.Mich. II 121v VIII l.8 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.1 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.2 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.3 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.12 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.13 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.14 
42 P.Mich. II 121v IX l.15 
42 P.Mich. II 121v X l.5 






42 P.Mich. II 121v X l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121v X l.18 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XI l.6 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XI l.7 
42 P.Mich. II 121v XII l.16 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.5 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.14 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.18 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.22 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.24 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.25 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.26 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.28 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.32 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.33 
43-5 P.Mich. V 315  
44 SB XIV 11279  
45 P.Mich. II 123r II l.21 
45 P.Mich. II 123r II l.31 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.3 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.4 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.10 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.12 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.13 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.17 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.22 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.23 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.24 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.30 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.36 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.37 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.43 
45 P.Mich. II 123r III l.46 
45 P.Mich. II 123r II l.49 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.3 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.4 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.6-7 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.8 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.9 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.11 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.13 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.17 






45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.33 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.36 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.37 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.38 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.39 
45 P.Mich. II 123r IV l.41 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.1 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.3 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.4 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.5 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.7 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.10 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.11 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.13 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.14-5 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.16 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.28 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.34 
45 P.Mich. II 123r V l.38 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.5 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.8 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.11 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.12 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.24 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.27 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.28 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.30 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.31 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.32 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.36 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.37 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.38 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VI l.40 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.3 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.4 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.5 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.9 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.11 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.23 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.26 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VII l.29-30 






45 P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.12 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.35 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.40 
45 P.Mich. II 123r VIII l.41 
45-6 P.Mich. II 125 l.17 
45-6 P.Mich. II 125 l.17 
45-6 P.Mich. V 272  
46 P.Mich. II 123r IX l.31 
46 P.Mich. II 123r IX l.39 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.20 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.21 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.25 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.27 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r X l.30 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XI l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XI l.44 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.5 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.21 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.26 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XII l.38 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.21 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.39 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIII l.43 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIV l.11 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIV l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.12 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XIX l.30 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XV l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XV l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.9 






46 P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVI l.35 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.12 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVII l.144 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.17 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.27 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.30 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.31 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.33 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XVIII l.35 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XX l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XX l.25 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XX l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XX l.30 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XX l.33 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.37 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.38 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.39 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXI l.48 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.3 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.4 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.6 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.7 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.17 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.21 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.26 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123r XXII l.36 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.10 
46 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.3 
46 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.5 
46 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.6 
46 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.7 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.5 






46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.21 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.26 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.2 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.18 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.25 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.30 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.36 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.37 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.41 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.42 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.44 
46 P.Mich. V 238r V l.220 
46 P.Mich. V 238r V l.239 
46 P.Mich. V 238r V l.240 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.54 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.55 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.57 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.67 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.72 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.76 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.79 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.86 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.89 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.95 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.97 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.99 
46 P.Mich. V 238r II l.101 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.112 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.115 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.125 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.131 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.135 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.139 
46 P.Mich. V 238r III l.147 






46 P.Mich. V 239 l.12-3 
46 P.Mich. IX 560  
48 P.Lond. II 139 a l.1-7 
48 P.Lond. II 139 a l.8-9 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r I l.13 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r I l.20 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r I l.25 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r I l.27 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124r II l.8 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.4 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.15 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.18 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.19 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.21 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.22 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124v I l.26 
46-9 P.Mich. II 126 l.15-9 
25-75 BGU XIX 2801 l.1-8 
25-75 BGU XIX 2801 l.11-7 
1st C P.Hamb. I 99  
1st C P.Heid. inv.G 163  
1st C P.Lips. inv. 1499  
1st C  P.Mich. V 314  
1st C P.Mich. V 344  
50 P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2836  
51 PSI I 57  
1st  C PSI XVII 1678  
52-3 PSI IX 1029  
53 P.Cair.Preis.  35  
55-6 P.Ryl. II 171  
55 P.Stras. IV 185r 
55-6 SB XVI 12383  
56-7 BGU II 591  
55-67 SB X 10256  
62 P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2873  
62? SB XXVI 16569  
62-6 P.Ryl. II 119  
65 P.Lond. III 1215  
65 P.Stras. IV 298  
65 PSI I 82  
65 PSI XVI 1623  
66-7? P.Soter.  9  
68 P.Oxy. XLVII 3352  






69 P.Soter.  1  
70-1 P.Lond. III 1225  
70 P.Oxy. XXII 2349  
70-1 P.Oxy. XLIX 3488  
71 P.Soter.  2  
72-3 P.Oxy. XLIX 3489  
73-4 P.IFAO III 31  
74 P.Oxy. XIV 1661  
50-100 P.IFAO I 10  
75 P.Soter.  10  
50-100 P.Stras. VIII 705  
77 P.Soter.  11  
78 P.Amh. II 85  
78 P.Amh. II 86  
65-93 P.Soter.  8  
81 SB XXII 15351  
82-3 P.Stras. VIII 704  
82 PSI I 30  
83 P.Soter.  12  
83-4 P.Soter.  14  
83-4 SPP XX 1  
85 BGU XI 2123  
85-6 P.Soter.  15  
86 BGU II 526  
86 P.Warr.  8 a 
86 P.Warr.  8 b 
87-8 P.Lond. II 151  
87 P.Soter.  4  
87-8 SB X 10532  
88 P.Lond. II 163  
75-100 P.Lond. II 361r 
88-9 P.Oxy. II 280  
88 P.Soter.  6  
88-9 PSI XVII 1677  
81-95 SB XVIII 13102  
88-9 SB XXII 15346  
83-95 P.Flor. III 353  
89 P.Hamb. I 5 a 
89 P.Hamb. I 5 b 
89 P.Oxy. XLII 3051  
89-90 P.Soter.  3  
83-96 P.Athen.  15  
90 P.Lond. II 287  






91 P.Flor. I 85  
91 P.Soter.  7  
91 PSI X 1134  
91-2 SB XIV 11487  
92 P.Harr. I 138 I l.19-25 
94-5 P.Soter.  5  
95 PSI IV 317 a 
95 PSI IV 317 b 
95-6? SB XIV 11431  
95 SB XIV 11843  
97 PSI X 1135  
98 P.Laur. III 71  
98 P.Warr.  11  
98 SB X 10274  
99 P.Mich. VIII 464  
99 P.Oxy.Elmag.  2  
99 P.Wuerzb.  11  
99 PSI VIII 879  
100 BGU II 538  
1st to 2nd C P.Bodl. I 156  
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.16 
1st to 2nd C P.Flor. III 354  
1st to 2nd C P.Flor. III 356  
1st to 2nd C P.Freib. IV 58  
76-125 P.Iand. III 26 a 
1st to 2nd C P.Lips. inv. 3193  
1st to 2nd C P.Lips. inv. 3259  
98-101 PSI XVII 1680 col. II 
1st to 2nd C SB XIV 12119  
92-108? SB XIV 12192  
101-2 P.Aberd.  63  
102 APF  61 pg.327-9 
102-3 P.Sarap.  22 a 
103 P.Hamb. I 64  
103 P.Oxy. XLI 2973  
103 PSI IX 1043  
103 SB XX 14337  
105-6? P.Heid. IV 329  
105 SB VI 8976  
107 P.Hamb. III 219  
103-11 P.Mich. IX 558 a 
103-11 P.Mich. IX 558 b 
107 P.Oxy. XVIII 2188  






98-117 PSI VII 772  
109 P.Bad. II 19 B 
109-10 P.Brem.  45 a 
109-10 P.Brem.  45 b 
109-10 P.Brem.  45 c 
103-15 P.Sarap.  31  
110-1 BGU III 918  
110 P.Kron.  25  
110 P.Oxy. III 575  
110 P.Sarap.  30  
110-1 P.Tebt. II 373 a 
110-1 P.Tebt. II 373 b 
111 SB XXII 15613  
112 P.Oxy. III 590  
112 P.Oxy. XXII 2351  
107-16 P.Stras. IV 244  
113 P.Flor. III 379 l.36 
113 P.Flor. III 379 l.39 
113 P.Flor. III 379 l.43 
113 P.IFAO I 22  
101-125 P.Laur. I 8 l.17-22 
114 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 268  
114-5 P.Sarap.  22  
113-7 P.Brem.  75  
115-6 P.Tebt. II 593  
116 P.Kron.  10 a 
116 P.Kron.  10 b 
116-7 P.Tebt. II 309  
117-8 P.Sarap.  48 c 
118 P.Mil.Vogl. II 101 a 
118 P.Mil.Vogl. II 101 b 
118 P.Mil.Vogl. II 101 c 
118-9 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 a 
118-9 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2776 b 
118 P.Sarap.  43  
119 P.Corn.  10  
117-20? P.Giss. I 46  
119 P.Mich. IX 562  
119 P.Sarap.  32  
120 P.Oxy. XXIV 2410  
120 P.Ryl. II 168  
120 SB XX 14338  
121 P.Lips. II 139  






121 P.Mich. III 185  
121 P.Oxy. III 499  
121 P.Sarap.  23  
121-2 P.Sarap.  33  
122 P.Kron.  26  
122 P.Sarap.  28 bis 
123 O.Brux.  12  
123 P.Kron.  27  
123 P.Lond. III 838  
123 P.Sarap.  24  
123 P.Sarap.  34  
123 P.Sarap.  44  
123 P.Sarap.  48 a 
123 P.Sarap.  48 bis 
123 P.Sarap.  48 ter 
123 P.Sarap.  48  
124 P.Gen.2 I 25  
124 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 269  
124 P.Sarap.  25  
124 P.Sarap.  35  
124 P.Sarap.  48 b 
124 P.Stras. IV 291  
100-50 P.Mil.Vogl. II 50  
125-6 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 267  
125 P.Sarap.  26  
125 P.Sarap.  27  
125 P.Sarap.  28  
125 P.Sarap.  36  
125 PSI VII 788  
126 CPR I 240  
126 P.Sarap.  2  
127 P.Flor. I 20  
127-8 P.Fouad I 55  
127 P.Mil.Vogl. II 104  
127 P.Oxy. LXIX 4739  
127 P.Sarap.  45  
127-8 P.Soter.  18  
127 P.Vind.Sijp.  8  
118-38 P.Laur. III 72  
128-9 P.Mich. IX 563  
118-38 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 240  
128 P.Oxy. LXII 4335  
128 P.Sarap.  38  






128 P.Sarap.  46  
128 P.Sarap.  47  
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.2-6 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.20-1 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.4 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.5 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.6 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.7 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.8 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.9 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.10 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.11 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.12 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.13 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.14 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.15 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.16 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.18 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.20 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.21 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.23 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.24 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.25 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.26 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.27 
128 P.Sarap.  63 l.28 
129 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 270  
129 P.Sarap.  40  
129 P.Sarap.  41  
130-1 P.Kron.  33  
130 P.Oxy. IV 730  
130 P.Ryl. II 287v 
131 P.Mich. IX 572  
131 P.Sarap.  47 bis 
132 P.Fay.  307  
132 P.Flor. III 370  
132-3 P.Mil.Vogl. II 105  
132-3 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 220  
132 P.Sarap.  28 ter 
133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 a 
133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 b 
133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 c 
133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 d 






133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 f 
133-4 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 275 g 
133 P.Oxy. L 3558  
133-4 SB XXII 15832  
134 P.Fouad I 41  
134-5 P.Lond. II 438  
134 P.Mil.Vogl. II 106  
134-5 P.Oxy. IV 810  
134 P.Tebt. II 311  
135 P.Kron.  34  
135-6 P.Kron.  35  
135-6 SB VI 9636  
136 P.Hamb. I 8  
136 P.Mert. II 68  
136 P.Oxy. IV 838  
136-7 PSI IV 315  
75-199 P.Fay.  344 x 
137 P.Kron.  38  
135-8 P.Oxy. IV 707 a 
135-8 P.Oxy. IV 707 b 
138-9 P.Athen.  16  
75-200 P.Lond. II 365  
138-9 P.Mil.Vogl. II 78  
138 P.Oxy. IV 729  
138 P.Stras. VI 507  
75-200 P.Tebt. II 553  
138 SB XVIII 13161  
139-40 P.Fay.  345  
139 P.Kron.  39  
139 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 286  
139 P.Oxy. LII 3690  
139-40 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.305-8 
139 P.Ryl. II 97  
140 BGU II 661  
140 P.Flor. I 41  
140 P.Kron.  41  
140 P.Mil.Vogl. III 196 ` 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 17  
c.130-50 P.Ross.Georg. II 36 l.4-7 
140 P.Tebt. II 375  
140-1 SB XVI 12693  
141-2 P.Heid. inv.G 24 l.10-3 
141-2 P.Heid. inv.G 24 l.14-8 






141-2 P.Oslo III 136  
141-2? P.Prag. III 245  
141 P.Ross.Georg. II 19  
141 SB XIV 11718  
141? SB XVIII 13850  
142 P.Oxy. I 101 a 
142 P.Oxy. I 101 b 
142 P.Oxy. IV 728  
143 P.Mil.Vogl. II 79  
143-4 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 238  
139-49 P.Flor. III 369  
144-5 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 297  
144 SB XVI 13006  
144 SB XVI 13008  
144 SB XVI 13010  
145 P.Flor. I 23  
145 P.Kron.  19  
145-6 P.Kron.  19 a 
145 P.Lond. III 1229  
145 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 221  
145-6 SB XVI 12672  
145-6 SB XVI 12672  
147-8 P.Flor. I 18  
147 PSI VIII 923  
148 P.Kron.  42  
c.149-50 BGU III 890  
149 P.Aberd.  64  
149 P.Berl.Leihg I 20 1 
149 P.Berl.Leihg I 20 2 
149 P.Fay.  60  
149 P.Lond. II 314  
149-50 P.Stras. V 362  
138-60 SB X 10749  
149-50? SB XX 14311  
2nd C BGU VII 1684  
2nd C BGU XI 2038  
2nd C BGU XIII 2341  
2nd C BGU XV 2484  
2nd C CPR I 245  
2nd C P.Aberd.  57  
138-61 P.Bodl. I 142  
2nd C P.Bon.  27  
150-1 P.Eleph.Wagner I 101  






2nd C P.Giss. I 110  
2nd C P.Hamb. I 36  
2nd C P.Harr. I 137  
2nd C P.IFAO I 23  
138-61 P.IFAO III 2  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 2387  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 2427v 
2nd C P.Mert. III 107 l.1-2 
2nd C P.Mert. III 107 l.2-6 
2nd C P.Mert. III 107 l.6-10 
2nd C P.Mert. III 107 l.10-6 
150 P.Mich. IX 564  
150-1 P.Mil.Vogl. II 88  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. III 141  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. III 187  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. IV 241  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 289  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 290  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 291  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 292  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 293  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 294  
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. VI 295  
2nd C P.Münch III 87  
2nd C P.Münch III 88  
2nd C P.Oslo III 115 l.6-11 
2nd C P.Oxy. VIII 1125  
2nd C P.Oxy. XIV 1758  
2nd C P.Oxy. L 3589  
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. V 14  
2nd C P.Ryl. II 322  
2nd C P.Stras. IV 258  
2nd C P.Stras. V 387  
2nd C P.Stras. VI 535  
138-61 P.Stras. VI 568  
2nd C P.Stras. VIII 726  
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.3-8 
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.9-14 
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.15-20 
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.21-8 
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.29-32 
2nd C P.Tebt. II 497  
138-61 P.Vars  11  






2nd C PSI III 221 l.7-18 
150 PSI X 1124  
2nd C SB VI 9205  
2nd C SB XIV 11282  
1st to 3rd C SB XVIII 13859  
2nd C SB XX 14464  
2nd C SB XXII 15724  
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.1-4 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.5-7 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.8-9 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.10-3 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.14-6 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.19-21 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.22-4 
2nd C SPP XXII 178 l.17-8 
151 BGU I 227  
151 P.Flor. III 302  
151 P.Louvre II 112  
151 P.Mert. III 123  
151 P.Mil.Vogl. II 56  
151 P.Oxy. XXXIII 2676  
151 SB XII 10920  
152 P.Corn.  41  
152 PSI VIII 877  
153 CPR I 31  
153 P.Kron.  46  
153-4 P.Lond. III 858 a 
153-4 P.Mil.Vogl. II 107  
153-4 P.Phil.  15  
154-5? BGU III 862  
154-5 P.Oxf.  13  
154 SB XVIII 13306  
c.155-6 BGU II 462  
155 P.Berl.Leihg I 22  
132-77 P.Bodl. I 131  
144-65 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 274  
155 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 288  
155 P.Phil.  13  
155 P.Phil.  14  
155 P.Tebt.Pad. I 22  
156 P.Fam.Tebt.  36  
156 P.Gen.2 I 34  
156 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 239  






156-7 P.Stras. VIII 788 l.6 
157 BGU I 166  
138-76 BGU XI 2124  
155-8 SB I 5672  
158-9 BGU XIII 2345  
158 P.Mert I 17  
157-9 SB XIV 11603  
159 P.Amh. II 90  
159 P.Amh. II 91  
159 P.Diog.  26  
159 P.Fay.  99  
159-60 P.Michael.  13  
137-82? P.PalauRib  7  
159 SB VIII 9922  
160-1 P.Lips. I 118  
161-2 BGU III 904  
161 P.Phil.  16  
161 P.Stras. VI 534  
161 SB XX 15006  
162-3 BGU XI 2036  
162 P.Lond. II 168  
162 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 284  
162 P.Oxy. XLI 2974  
150-74? P.Phil.  12  
162 P.Tebt. II 376  
163-4 PSI I 31  
163 PSI VII 739  
164-5 BGU I 237  
164 P.Cair.Mich. II 21  
164-5 P.Michael.  14  
164 PSI X 1143  
165 BGU III 708  
165 P.Coll.Youtie I 27  
165 P.Mil.Vogl. II 67  
165 P.Mil.Vogl. III 130  
165 P.Mil.Vogl. III 132  
165-6 P.Mil.Vogl. III 134  
165-6 P.Mil.Vogl. III 135  
165-6? P.Mil.Vogl. III 136  
165-6 P.Mil.Vogl. III 137  
165? P.Mil.Vogl. III 142 l.6 
165? P.Mil.Vogl. III 142 l.10 
165? P.Mil.Vogl. III 142 l.11-2 






165-6 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 242  
165 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 272 a 
165 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 272 b 
165-6 P.Oxy. XIV 1686  
161-9 P.Stras. IV 282  
161-9 P.Tebt. II 496  
161-9 P.Tebt. II 541  
161-8 PSI XVII 1698  
161-9 SB XVI 12983  
166 P.Mil.Vogl. III 144  
167-8 BGU II 604  
168 BGU II 603  
168 P.Grenf. II 57  
168 P.Mil.Vogl. VI 273  
168 SB XII 11062  
169 P.Berl.Leihg I 24  
169 P.Mil.Vogl. III 139  
169 P.Stras. VI 511  
170 P.Mil.Vogl. II 63  
160-80? P.Mil.Vogl. II 65  
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.8-15 
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.28 
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.30 
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.33 
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.37-46 
158-182? SB XIV 11595  
170 SB XIV 11720  
172-3 SB XII 10780  
172 SB XIV 11281  
173 P.Oxy. LXXI 4827  
150-200 P.Alex.Giss  6  
150-200 P.Berl.Leihg II 31 II l.13 
150-200 P.Berl.Leihg II 31 II l.16 
150-200 P.Berl.Leihg II 33 III l.30 
175 P.Stras. VI 571  
140-210 SB XX 14984  
176 P.Lond. III 920  
176 P.Mil.Vogl. III 140  
178 P.IFAO I 19  
178-9 P.Leid.Inst.  37  
179 P.Warr.  12  
179-80 SB VIII 9918  
184-5 CPR XVIIB 1 l.62-93 






184-5 P.Oxy. XIV 1687  
185 P.Mich. XII 631  
185-6 PSI VIII 947  
186 BGU I 39  
186 P.Tebt. II 310  
187 P.Oxy. III 501  
187-8 SB XVIII 13287  
188-9? BGU IV 1029  
188-9 P.Oslo II 34  
188 P.Oxy. XIV 1692  
150-225 SB XX 14399r 
189 P.Fam.Tebt.  44  
189-90 P.Fouad I 43  
161-219 O.Erem.  33  
190 P.Fam.Tebt.  45  
192 P.Lips. II 148 a 
192 P.Lips. II 148 b 
192 P.Vind.Sal.  5  
192 PSI IX 1036  
194-5? PSI XV 1531  
195 P.Fam.Tebt.  47  
197 P.Oxy. VI 910  
197 P.Ryl. II 169  
198-9 SB XIV 11436  
199 P.Oxy. LVII 3911 a 
2nd to 3rd C BGU I 269 l.2-5 
2nd to 3rd C BGU I 269 l.6-9 
2nd to 3rd C BGU IV 1017  
2nd to 3rd C BGU XI 2125  
2nd to 3rd C CPR I 47  
2nd to 3rd C CPR I 244  
2nd to 3rd C P.Alex. inv. 67  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 575  
2nd to 3rd C P.Alex. inv. 594  
2nd to 3rd C P.Amst.I  32 l.1-3 
175-225 P.Harr. II 224 a 
175-225 P.Harr. II 224 b 
175-225 P.Leid.Inst.  48  
2nd to 3rd C P.NYU II 37 a 
2nd to 3rd C P.NYU II 37 b 
2nd to 3rd C P.NYU II 37 c 
2nd to 3rd C P.NYU II 37 d 
2nd to 3rd C P.NYU II 37 e 






175-225 SB XX 14237  
2nd to 3rd C SB XXIV 15926  
175-225 SB XXIV 15942 l.15-8 
175-225 SB XXIV 15943 l.6-8 
202-3 P.Oxy. XLV 3251  
202 P.Oxy. LXIX 4745  
202-3 P.Ryl. II 170  
204 P.Col. X 273  
204 P.Diog.  33  
204 P.Fay.  88  
204 P.Oxy. XIV 1719  
204 SB X 10263  
204 SB XII 11228  
200-11 P.Duk. inv. 524  
201-11 P.Gen.2 I 39  
208-9 P.Aberd.  65  
208? P.Oxy. XVII 2141  
208 P.Ryl. II 172  
208 PSI I 32  
209 BGU XV 2485  
209 P.Corn.  44  
209 SB VIII 9783  
210 P.Tebt. II 377  
209-11 SB XX 14201  
211 BGU XI 2039  
211 P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.2 
211 P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.3 
211 P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.8 
211 P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.14 
211 P.Oxy. XXXI 2584  
211 P.Turner  33  
211 SB XIV 12197  
212 BGU III 920  
212 P.Koeln III 149  
212-3 P.Mich. XVIII 791  
212-3 P.Rein. II 100  
212-3 P.Stras. V 336  
212-3 SB XX 14116  
200-25 BGU XIII 2340  
200-25 P.Amh. II 101  
201-25 P.Erl.  70  
214 P.Ryl. II 184  
214 SB VI 9562  






215-6 CPR I 46  
215-6 P.Mich. IX 565  
200-29 P.Wisc. II 57  
215 SPP XX 21  
216-7 SPP XX 22  
217 P.Stras. I 2  
218 SB VI 9243  
218 SB XVI 12323  
204-34? P.Corn.  11  
219 P.Oxy. XVIII 2189  
219 P.Oxy. L 3591  
219 P.Oxy. LV 3800  
217-23 CPR I 34  
220 P.Bour.  17  
221 BGU II 633  
221-2 P.Diog.  35  
221 P.Mich. XVIII 792 a 
221 P.Mich. XVIII 792 b 
221 SB IV 7468  
222 P.Turner  35  
223 BGU XI 2040  
223-4 P.Athen.  18  
223 P.Oxy. XXII 2350  
223-4 P.Oxy.Hels.  41  
223 P.Vet.aelii  15  
221-6 P.Berl.Leihg I 19  
222-6 P.Oxy. XIV 1630  
224 SB XIV 11911  
225 CPR I 36  
200-50 CPR I 43  
225 P.Diog.  29  
200-50 P.Flor. III 340 l.3 
200-50 P.Flor. III 340 l.6 
225 P.Lond. III 938  
225 P.Vet.aelii  16  
225 SB V 7665  
226 P.Oxy. XVII 2137 a 
226 P.Oxy. XVII 2137 b 
222-31 P.Diog.  34  
228 P.Oxy. VII 1031  
228 P.Oxy. LXVII 4594  
228 P.Stras. V 458  
222-34 P.Stras. V 461  






223-33 P.Vet.aelii  7  
229 P.Stras. V 459  
227-30 P.Stras. V 466  
229-30? P.Yale I 70  
230 P.Stras. V 465  
230 PSI I 73  
230? SB IV 7441  
231 P.Stras. V 460  
231-2 SB XXII 15868  
234 P.Got.  10  
235 SB I 5806  
175-300 P.Ryl. II 322 Br 
239 P.Flor. I 16  
218-61 P.Oxy. L 3592  
220-60 SB XX 14983  
244 P.Mich. XI 609  
244 P.Ryl. IV 683  
245 BGU VII 1645  
230-63 P.Yale inv. 696  
247-8 PSI IX 1069  
248 BGU VII 1665  
248 P.Flor. I 19  
249 P.Harr. I 80  
3rd C BGU IV 1018  
3rd C P.Aberd.  183  
3rd C P.Brook.  18  
3rd C P.Col. VIII 232  
3rd C P.Fay.  305  
225-75? P.Flor. I 24 l.26-8 
225-75? P.Flor. I 25 l.10-2 
3rd C P.Fouad I 42  
3rd C P.Gen.2 I 78  
3rd C P.Koeln XIV 579 a 
3rd C P.Koeln XIV 579 b 
3rd C P.Lips. inv. 624  
3rd C P.Lond. II 157 b 
3rd C P.Michael.  19  
3rd C P.NYU II 11  
3rd C P.Oslo III 137  
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1688  
250 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2795  
3rd C P.Princ. II 39  
3rd C? P.Princ. III 150 col. II 






225-75 PSI IX 1072  
3rd C SB VIII 9900  
3rd C SB XII 12964  
3rd C SB XIV 11604 a 
3rd C SB XIV 11604 b 
3rd C SB XX 14290  
3rd C SB XX 14291  
3rd C SB XXVI 16554  
250 SPP XX 55  
252 P.Berl.Leihg I 23 a 
252 P.Berl.Leihg I 23 b 
252 P.Harr. I 139  
254-5 PSI VIII 880  
254-5 SB IV 7474  
255-6 P.Princ. II 37  
253-61 P.Bingen  112  
257 P.Oxy. XLVII 3354 a 
258 P.Hamb. I 20  
258 P.Oxy. XX 2284  
259-60 P.Wisc. I 7  
260 P.Oxy. XII 1502v 
254-68 BGU III 860  
261 P.Oxy. LXVII 4595  
261 SPP XX 70  
263 SPP XX 57  
265 P.Tebt. II 378 a 
265 P.Tebt. II 378 b 
266 P.Coll.Youtie II 68  
266 P.Oxy. XIV 1689  
268 P.Stras. I 10  
269-70 P.Erl.  101 l.11-2 
268-70 P.Oxy. XIV 1646 col. i 
271 SB XIV 11589  
268-76 P.Cair.Isid.  143  
269-77? P.Col. X 280  
250-300 BGU XII 2133  
250-300 P.Cair.Isid.  107  
276 P.Cair.Isid.  108  
272-9 P.Coll.Youtie II 70  
279 P.Cair.Isid.  109  
280-1 P.Cair.Isid.  110  
280 P.Narm.2006  143  
280 P.Oxy. XIV 1631  






282 P.Mich. XI 610  
285-6? SB I 4428  
285 SB IV 7443  
286 BGU III 922 l.5-8 
287 P.Oxy. XIV 1690  
275-300 P.Aberd.  182  
275-300 P.Hamb. IV 269  
275-300 SB VIII 9919  
288 SB XII 10982  
275-300 SB XIV 12025  
289-90 P.Laur. IV 166  
289-90 P.Oxy. LXI 4121  
289-90 P.Prag. I 117  
290-1 P.Stras. VI 539  
291-2 P.Cair.Isid.  98  
291-2 P.Oxy. XIV 1691  
291 P.Stras. VI 557  
291 PSI III 178  
292-3 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2712  
293-4 P.IFAO I 9  
294 BGU VII 1644  
296 P.Michael.  23  
296 P.Oxy. LV 3802  
296 P.Oxy. LXIX 4747  
296 PSI IX 1071  
297 P.Cair.Isid.  99  
297 P.Cair.Isid.  100  
297 P.Cair.Isid.  104 a 
297 P.Cair.Isid.  104 b 
297 P.Michael.  24  
298 P.Cair.Isid.  111  
298-9 P.Panop  1  
293-305 P.PalauRib  12  
299 PSI XIII 1338  
300 CPR I 40  
3rd to 4th C P.Amst.I  42  
300 P.Cair.Isid.  101  
300 P.Cair.Isid.  112  
300 P.Col. VII 179  
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.8 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.9-13 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.14-7 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.18-21 






275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.27-30 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.35-8 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.39-42 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.62-8 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.69-74 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.79-83 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.84-6 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.87-9 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.90-6a 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.97-101 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.102-4 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 l.105 
275-325 P.Flor. I 64 Frag.r l.2-5 
3rd to 4th C P.Lips. inv. 1500  
3rd to 4th C SB X 10216  
3rd to 4th C SB XX 14642  
303-4 P.Cair.Isid.  102  
303 P.Cair.Isid.  113  
304 P.Ant. II 106  
304 P.Cair.Isid.  114  
304 SB VI 9269  
-30 to 640 P.Duk. inv. 85  
-30 to 640 P.Duk. inv. 743  
305 P.Laur. IV 165  
306 P.Cair.Isid.  116  
306 P.Oxy. I 102  
306 P.Oxy. I 102  
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.10-1 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.2 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.3 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.15-6 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.19-20 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.21-2 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.23-4 
305-11 P.Cair.Isid.  18 l.4-5 
308 P.Lips. I 18 a 
308 P.Lips. I 18 b 
308 P.Panop  2  
309 P.Cair.Isid.  117  
309 SB XXII 15838  
310 P.Panop  3  
311 P.Cair.Isid.  119  
313 BGU I 349  






313 BGU II 409  
313 CPR XVIIA 2  
300-25 P.Ant. II 89  
313 P.Cair.Isid.  103  
314 BGU II 411  
314 CPR XVIIA 4  
314? P.Charite  1  
314 P.Gen.2 I 13  
314 P.Panop  4  
314 SB XVI 13004  
314 SB XXII 15381  
315 P.Cair.Isid.  74  
315 P.Cair.Isid.  122  
315 P.Oxy. XXXI 2585  
315 P.Oxy. XLV 3255  
315 SB VIII 9881  
315 SB XXII 15719  
316 P.Oxy. I 103  
312-22? P.Charite  2  
317? P.Charite  3  
317 P.Oxy. XLV 3256  
318 P.Oxy. XLV 3257  
319 P.Col. VII 185  
319 P.Oxy. XLV 3258  
319 P.Oxy. XLV 3259  
320 CPR V 8  
320 CPR XVIIA 10  
320 CPR XVIIA 11  
320 P.Lips. I 19  
c.320? P.Sijp.  47  
321 P.Sakaon  67  
321 SPP XX 79  
315-31? P.Col. VII 180  
323 P.Oxy. XLV 3260  
323-4? PSI XII 1233  
324 BGU II 586  
324 P.Oslo II 44  
300-50 P.Cair.Preis.  41  
1st half? 4th C P.Prag. III 217  
325 P.Sakaon  68  
325 P.Stras. III 137  
328 PSI IV 316  
328 SPP II pg.33-4  






331 P.Sakaon  69  
332 SB XIV 11711  
332 SB XXVI 16819  
334 P.Panop  5  
334 PSI V 469  
335 CPR I 247  
c.320-50 P.Charite  4  
c.320-50 P.Charite  5  
336 P.Freib. II 11  
336 P.Panop  6  
338-9 P.Panop  7  
338 P.Panop  8  
338 P.Sakaon  70  
339 P.Münch III 89  
339 P.Panop  9  
341 P.Flor. I 17  
341 P.Oxy. LXIX 4753  
341 P.Panop  10  
341 SB XVI 13035 l.3 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.4-9 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.10 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.11-6 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.17-21 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.22-5 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.26-30 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.35-40 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.40-2 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.43-5 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.46-7 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.52-3 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.55-7 
341 SB XVI 13035 l.58-64 
342 P.Narm.2006  13  
346-7 P.Batav.  16 a 
346-7 P.Batav.  16 b 
346 P.Lond. III 979  
347 P.Charite  7  
348 P.Charite  8  
4th C BGU II 519  
4th C BGU XIX 2802  
4th C CPR I 42  
4th C CPR I 44  
4th C CPR VIII 46  






4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.1 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.2 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.3 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.6 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.10 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.11 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.14 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.21 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.28 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.34 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.35 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.12-3 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.2-3 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.6-7 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.7-8 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 L.9 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.10-1 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.11-2 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.17-8 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.18-9 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.21-2 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.22-3 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.23-4 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.24-5 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.25-6 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.26-7 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.27-8 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.28-9 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.29-30 
4th C P.Col. VIII 238 l.30-1 
4th C P.Herm.  57  
4th C P.Lips. I 24  
4th C P.Lips. inv. 606  
4th C P.Lips. inv. 1119  
4th C P.Lips. inv. 1305  
4th C P.Lips. inv. 1422  
4th C P.Lond. V 1833  
4th C P.Stras. V 358  
4th C P.Stras. VII 673  
4th C P.Vind.Bosw.  10r 
4th C SB III 6662  
4th C SB XIV 12118  






Appendix D.3 House Sale Transactions 
Date Reference 
2 BGU II 580  
7-6 BC to AD 16-17 P.Dime III 4  
11 P.Dime III 5  
25 BC to AD 50 P.Dime III 1  
1-25 P.Mich. V 293  
c.14 CPR XV 5  
15 SB I 5232  
16 P.Mich. V 241 l.1-14 
18 BGU III 911  
18 P.Mich. V 249  
23 P.Dime III 8  
23 SB XVIII 13579  
1-50 P.Ryl. II 304  
1-50 P.Ryl. II 306  
1-50 P.Ryl. II 307  
1-50 P.Ryl. II 308  
15-36 P.Ryl. II 160 a 
14-37 P.Ryl. II 305  
29 P.Dime III 13  
29 P.Dime III 14  
29-30 P.Hamb. III 218  
29-30 P.Mich. V 328  
29 P.Ryl. II 160  
30 P.Mich. V 253  
30 P.Mich. V 257  
24-37 P.Dime III 17  
32 P.Ryl. II 160 c col i 
34 P.Dime III 15  
34? P.Dime III 16  
37 P.Mich. V 264  
37? P.Mich. V 290  
37 P.Ryl. II 160 b 
37 PSI XVII 1715  
37-40 P.Lond. III 1285  
40-1 P.Mich. V 329  
41 P.Mich. V 235  
42 P.Mich. V 269  
42? P.Mich. V 304  
42 P.Ryl. II 160 d 
42-3 PSI VIII 908  
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.9 






45 BGU XIII 2337  
45 P.Dime III 21  
45 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.3 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.4 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.5 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.7 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v XII l.1 
45 P.Mich. II 121 v XII l.7 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.30 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.21 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.42 
45 P.Vind.Tand.  24  
45 SB XIV 11895  
46-7 CPR XV 47  
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.33 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.42 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.25 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIX l.33 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.17 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVI l.3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.36 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.66 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.87 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.142 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.145-6 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.186 
47 P.Mich. V 276  
47-8 P.Mich. V 332  
47 SB I 5247  
47 SB XII 10804  
48 P.Louvre I 9  
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r II l.21 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 v l.16 
48 P.Mich. V 277  
41-54 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2720  
41-54 P.Stras. IV 265  
45-55 P.Dime III 30  
1st C  P.Mich. V 287  
1st C  P.Mich. V 288  






1st C  P.Mich. V 295  
1st C  P.Mich. V 296  
1st C  P.Mich. V 298  
1st C  P.Mich. V 299  
1st C  P.Mich. V 300  
1st C  P.Mich. V 307  
50 P.Vindob. G   31933  
1st C PSI VIII 915  
51 P.Vind.Tand.  25  
52 P.Mich. V 354  
52 P.Oxy. LXXVIII 5176  
54 P.Dime III 27  
54-5 P.Oxy. VI 962 v l.1-4 
54-5 P.Oxy. VI 962 v l.6-8 
41-68 P.Athen.  26  
55 P.Dime III 28  
55 P.Oxy. I 99  
55 SB I 5117  
c.56 P.Mich. V 335  
58-9 SB X 10249  
60-1 BGU I 112  
60 P.Mich. III 191  
60 P.Mich. inv. 78  
62 BGU III 748  
68 P.Lond. II 154  
70 BGU III 910  
72 P.Oxy. XLI 2972  
75 BGU I 184  
50-100 P.Yale I 66  
76 PSI XIII 1319  
78 P.Mich. X 583  
78 SPP XXII 175  
79 P.Oxy. II 243  
81 P.Ryl. II 161  
81-3 P.Oxy. II 334  
83 BGU XI 2095  
83 P.Dime III 32  
83 SB XVI 12391  
84 P.Ryl. II 107  
85-6 P.Oxy. II 335  
82-8 PSI XIII 1320  
End 1st C? P.Louvre I 10  
75-100 SB VIII 9831  






89 P.Oxy. II 333 b 
82-96 P.Ryl. II 312  
82-96 P.Ryl. II 313  
81-96 P.Stras. IX 806  
90 SB XXVIII 16904  
84-96 SPP XXII 23  
91 P.Lond. II 289  
c.90-6 BGU XV 2478  
93 P.Narm.2006  3  
98-99 P.Oxy. II 340  
99 P.Fay.  100  
99-100 P.Oxy. II 338  
1st to 2nd C CPR I 179  
c.100 P.Stras. III 151  
104-5 P.Hamb. I 97  
96-117 P.Tebt.Wall  11  
108 CPR I 11  
98-117 CPR I 171  
98-117 P.Heid. X 447  
98-117 SB XXVI 16476  
103-15 BGU I 350  
103-14 SB XVI 12957  
c.112 SB VIII 9642 1 
101-25 P.Oslo III 107  
100-25 P.Tebt.Wall  10  
109-17 PSI X 1145  
114-5? P.Tebt. II 510  
117-8 P.Oxy. III 577  
c.120 CPR I 178  
138 SB XXII 15704  
100-150 P.Stras. VI 543  
101-50 P.Stras. IX 811  
100-50 P.Stras. IX 889  
117-37 CPR I 223  
127 P.Tebt. II 323  
127 P.Tebt. II 489 v 
125-30 P.Fay.  31  
108-50 SB VIII 9643 1 
131 P.Athen.  43 r l.18-19 
131 P.Mich. III 180 
134 P.Mich. VI 427  
134 SB XXII 15472  
138 CPR I 198  






140 BGU XI 2092  
143 P.Vind.Tand.  26  
143-4 SB I 5168 l.6-13 
145 CPR I 173  
146-7 P.Lond. III 1169  
146-7 P.Lond. III 1179 l.59-66 
146-7 P.Lond. III 1179 l.71-8 
147 P.Wisc. I 36  
2nd C BGU II 540 l.17-9 
2nd C BGU III 883  
2nd C BGU VII 1643  
2nd C BGU VII 1687  
2nd C BGU XI 2114  
2nd C CPR I 105  
2nd C CPR I 121  
2nd C CPR I 139  
2nd C CPR I 189  
2nd C CPR I 214  
2nd C P.Bad. IV 77  
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.123-26 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.131-34 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.45-51 
138-61 P.Diog.  24  
139-61 P.Dubl.  10  
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 32  
138-61 P.Tebt. II 515  
2nd C SPP XX 12  
152-3? P.Harr. II 191  
153 P.Paris  17  
153 P.Stras. VI 585  
154 P.Mich. VI 428  
155 P.Tebt. II 580  
155 SB XVI 13072  
159 P.Ryl. II 162  
155-68 P.Eirene III 1  
163-4 P.IFAO I 33  
101-225 PSI XII 1259  
166 P.Lond. II 334  
167-9 PSI XVI 1530  
168 SPP XX 10  
168-9 SPP XX 50  
2nd Half 2nd C PSI.Congr. XXI 9  
175-80 BGU I 282  






179 SB XX 14119  
180 SB XXIV 15964  
181 P.Amh. II 97  
182 P.Stras. IX 894  
184-5 CPR XVIIB 6 l.16-35 
184 P.Oxy. III 513  
184 P.Petaus  10 l.14-5 
184 P.Petaus  10 l.16-7 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.21-2 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.23-4 
184 P.Petaus  11 l.30-1 
184-5 P.Petaus  13  
184-5 P.Petaus  14  
184-5 P.Petaus  15  
182-7 P.Petaus  16  
186 BGU I 243  
180-92 PSI VIII 922 l.10-3 
180-92 PSI VIII 922 l.1-5 
175-200 P.Bour.  18 col.I 
175-200 P.Oxy. XIV 1648 l.13-25 
175-200 P.Oxy. XIV 1648 l.26-31 
190-1 BGU III 825  
190 P.Marm.   r col.5 
190 SB XX 14974  
193 P.Bodl. I 18  
193 P.Oxy. IV 719  
194 SB X 10571  
179-211? P.Amh. II 98 l.6-11 
2nd to 3rd C BGU I 83  
175-225 CPR I 54  
c.200 CPR I 155  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 303  
2nd to 3rd C P.Lips. inv. 2258  
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. II 172  
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 a 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 b 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 c 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 d 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 e 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 f 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 g 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 h 
2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 31 i 






2nd to 3rd C P.Stras. I 56  
2nd to 3rd C PSI III 190 l.7-18 
c.209-10 P.Hamb. I 14  
209 P.Hamb. I 16  
211 P.Münch III 84  
212 P.Lond. III 1164 c (i) 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 c (ii) 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 d 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 e 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 f 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 k 
212 P.Mich. IX 542  
Early 3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1724 l.17-9 
Early 3rd C P.Oxy. XIX 2236  
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag. 3 pg. 9 
212-7 CPR I 57  
217 P.Flor. I 47 a 
214-25 SB XX 14292  
221 P.Bub. I 4 LI-LII 
221 P.Bub. I 4 XXII 
222 BGU II 667  
222 P.Oxy. XIV 1634  
224 P.Bub. I 1 XI 
224 P.Bub. I 2 VII 
200-50 CPR I 94  
200-50 CPR I 95  
First half 3rd C CPR I 102  
200-50 CPR I 127  
200-50 CPR I 131  
200-50 CPR I 147  
201-50 SB XXVI 16478  
226 P.Lond. III 1158  
227 P.Lond. III 942  
222-35 CPR I 75  
229 P.Oxy. XIV 1725 l.7-9 
222-35 SB XXII 15793  
231 P.Lond. III 945  
238 P.Oxy. LXX 4778  
241 P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 a 
241 P.Oxy. XLVII 3365 b 
212-69 SB XVI 13063 l.7-12 
244-9 P.Fouad  39  
247 P.Gen. II 116  






249 P.Oxy. X 1276  
225-75 CPR I 3  
3rd C CPR I 120  
249-51 P.Harr. I 75  
3rd C P.Oxy. VI 980 a 
3rd C P.Oxy. VI 980 b 
3rd C P.Oxy. VI 980 c 
250 P.Oxy. X 1284  
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1701  
3rd C P.PalauRib  11  
3rd C P.Pintaudi  35  
3rd C PSI VIII 946  
250-1 SB I 4651  
3rd C SB XVI 12547  
3rd C SB XVIII 13322  
3rd C SB XX 14113  
252 P.Oxy. LXIV 4438  
256 P.Lips. I 3  
259 SB VIII 9878  
260 P.Gen.1 2ed  44  
240-80 P.Oxy. XIV 1699  
c.261 P.Oxy. XIV 1703 a 
c.261 P.Oxy. XIV 1703 b 
266 SPP V 119 col. IV 
267 P.Oxy. XII 1475 a 
267 P.Oxy. XII 1475 b 
269? P.Oxy. XIV 1698  
271-2 SPP XX 72  
272 P.Leid.Inst.  54  
274-5 P.Stras. VII 671  
275-81 P.Oxy. IX 1199  
279 P.Sakaon  60 b 
281 P.Coll.Youtie II 71 a 
281 P.Coll.Youtie II 71 b 
279-82 P.Oxy. XII 1562  
283 P.Corn.  12  
275-300 P.Laur. III 74  
Late 3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1700  
275-300 SB XX 14681  
289 P.Coll.Youtie II 73  
298 P.Mich. XII 627  
3rd to 4th C P.Neph.  29  
305 P.Sakaon  59  






307 P.Graux II 17  
309? SB XVI 12289 col. I 
309? SB XVI 12289 col. II 
Early 4th C P.Princ. II 77  
318 SB X 10728 1 
318 SB X 10728 2 
320 P.Kellis I 37  
321 PSI VII 771 a 
321 PSI VII 771 b 
323 P.Neph.  48  
300-50? P.Cair.Salem  7  
328 P.Oxy. XLIII 3126  
330-40? PSI.Congr. XX 16  
330-40 SB XII 10784  
341 P.Cair.Goodsp.  13  
4th C P.Erl.  76  
326-75 P.Mert. I 38  









Appendix D.4 Credit Transactions 
Date Reference 
1 P.Oslo II 32  
c.1  P.Oxy. IV 799  
End of 1st C BC, Start of AD 1st C PSI X 1120  
100 BC to AD 100 SB XII 11007  
3 P.Berl.Möller   4  
6 P.Duk. inv. 7  
7 BGU I 189  
7 SB I 5243  
7 SB XIV 12172  
8 BGU XI 2047  
9-10 P.Col. X 249  
9 P.Fay.  89  
10 P.Tebt. II 384  
10 BC to AD 34 P.Fay.  109  
1-25 P.Leid.Inst.  86  
13 PSI VIII 989  
13-5 CPR XV 8  
15 PSI IX 1028  
16 O.Bodl. II 970  
16 P.Lips. II 130  
16 P.Mich. V 241 l.15-23 
16 P.Mich. V 241 l.39-45 
17 P.Corn.  6  
17 P.Lond. II 263  
18 BGU III 911  
20 SB X 10222  
20-1 SB XII 11041  
21 P.Oxy. X 1281  
23 P.Dime III 8  
23 P.Lond. II 277  
23 P.Oxy. II 259  
23 SB XX 14394  
24-5 P.Mich. X 587  
24 P.Princ. III 141  
24 P.Ryl. II 326  
25-6 BGU XI 2116  
25-6 O.Bodl. II 1978  
1-50 P.IFAO III 30  
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 i l.12 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 i l.1-7 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 i l.8-11 






1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.1-4 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.14-6 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.17-9 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.20-1 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.22-3 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.24-7 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.28f 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.5-6 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.7-8 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 ii l.9-10 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 iii l.1-3 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 iii l.4-6 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 iii l.7-8 
1-50 P.Wash.Univ. II 78 iii l.9 
26 P.Mich. V 348  
26-7 P.Oslo III 190  
26 P.Oslo  1491  
26 P.Oxy. LXXVIII 5173  
26 PSI IX 1051  
14-37 SB XX 15028  
27 C.Ep.Lat.  13 a 
27 C.Ep.Lat.  13 b 
27 P.Dime III 10  
27 P.Mich. V 336  
29 P.Dime III 11  
29 P.Lond. III 1273  
29-30 P.Mich. V 328 2 
29 SB XVI 13042  
30 P.Ryl. II 128  
31 PSI XIII 1318 col. I 
32 P.Ryl. II 160 c col. ii 
33 P.Ryl. II 310  
33 P.Tebt.Wall  9  
34 P.Oslo II 33 v 
34 P.Oxy. XLVII 3351  
34 P.Ryl. II 173  
35 SB X 10234  
36 P.Mich. V 232  
37 P.Oxy. II 267  
37 SB X 10238  
38 P.Alex. inv. 512  
38 P.Mil. I 7 a 
38 P.Mil. I 7 b 






38 P.Oxy. XLIX 3485 b 
37-41 P.Lond. III 1161  
40-1 P.Mich. V 329  
40? P.Narm.2006  2  
41-2 BGU III 713  
41 P.Mich. V 331  
41 PSI X 1131  
41 SB X 10240  
42 P.Mich. II 121 r I ii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r I vii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r I viii and ix 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r II iii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r II x 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III ii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III iii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III iv 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III ix 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III vi 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r III xiii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r IV ix 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r IV viii 
42 P.Mich. II 121 r IV xi 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v I l.6 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v III l.19 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.16 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.20 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.21 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.22 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.5 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IV l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IX l.16 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IX l.17 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IX l.19 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IX l.5 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v IX l.6 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.1 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.11 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.19 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.20 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.3 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.5 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v V l.8 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VI l.10 






42 P.Mich. II 121 v VI l.16 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VI l.22 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VI l.6 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VII l.1 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VII l.14 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VII l.19 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VII l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v VIII l.20 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.12 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.15 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.19 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.20 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.4 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v X l.7 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XI l.1 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XI l.20 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XI l.5 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XI l.9 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XII l.12 
42 P.Mich. II 121 v XII l.8-9 
42 P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2834  
42 P.Ryl. II 160 d 
42-3 PSI VIII 908  
43 P.Col. X 250 a 
43 P.Col. X 250 b 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.15 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.36 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.39 
43 P.Mich. V 237 l.30-1 
43-4 P.Stras. VIII 703  
44 P.Fouad I 44  
44 P.Lond. III 1168  
44 SB IV 7465  
45 BGU XIII 2337  
45 P.Mich. II 123 r II l.39 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r II l.41 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r II l.43 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r II l.47 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r II l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r III l.1 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r III l.16 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r III l.21 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r III l.32-3 






45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.12 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.14 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.19-20 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.2 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.26 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r IV l.31 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.25-6 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.30 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.32 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.33 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.6 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.7 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.8 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.12 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.18 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.2 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.23-4 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.39 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.8 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r V l.9 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.22 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.23 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.29 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.33 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.35 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VI l.39 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VII l.20 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VII l.38 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VII l.41 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VII l.45-47 (28) 29 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VII l.7 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.16 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.25 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.27 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.28 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.33 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.45 
45 P.Mich. II 123 r VIII l.6 
45 P.Mich. II 123 v II l.1 
45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r V(a) l.3 
45-6 P.Mich. II 125 l.16 
45 P.Vind.Tand. 0 24  
46 BGU XI 2044  






45-6 P.Mich. II 123 r IX l.41 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.16 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.18 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.23-24 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.26 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.3-4  
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.37 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r X l.9-10  
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XI l.18 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XI l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XI l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XI l.38 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.48 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.6 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XII l.8 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.16 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.20 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.33-5 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.38 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.40-1 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIII l.42 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.16 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.18 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.31-3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIV l.46 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIX l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIX l.16 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIX l.19 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XIX l.5 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.11 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.2 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.20 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.25 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.31 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.5 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XV l.7-8 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVI l.19 






46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVI l.26 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVI l.28-9 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVI l.31 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.1 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.13 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.18 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.20 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.21-3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.35 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.41 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.42-3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVII l.5 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVIII l.11 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVIII l.18-9 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVIII l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVIII l.25-6 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XVIII l.40 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XX l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.22 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.28 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.43 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.44 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.47 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.49 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXI l.51 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.12 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.19 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.20 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.48 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.49 
46 P.Mich. II 123 r XXII l.9 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v III l.12 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v IV l.16-9 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v IV l.20-2 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v IV l.9-15 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v V l.12-3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v VIII l.19-21 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.12 






46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.22-3 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.24-5 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.29 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.32 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.34 
46 P.Mich. II 123 v XI l.35 
46 P.Mich. II 124 v l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 124 v l.20 
46-7 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.4 
46-7 P.Mich. II 128 I(b) l.9 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.10 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.15 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II l.9 
46 P.Mich. II 128 II 17-8 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.4 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.11 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.14 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.16 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.23 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.24 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.38 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.43 
46 P.Mich. II 128 III l.46 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.218 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.222 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.223 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.224 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.226 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.231 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.232 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.233 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.234 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.239 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.240 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r V l.246 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.169 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.184 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.187 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.190 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.194 
46 P.Mich. V 238  IrV l.204 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.210-1 






46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.16 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.19 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r l.27-8 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.62-3 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III 110-1 
46 P.Mich. V 238 IV 191-2 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III 113-4 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.136-7 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.152-3 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.108-9 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.132 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.133 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.134 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.145-6 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.143 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.155 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.156 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.157 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r III l.161 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV 216-7 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.44 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.53 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.58-9 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.65 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.68 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.70 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.73 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.74 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.78 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.80 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.81 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.82 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.83 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.84 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.105 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.3-4 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.8-9 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.17-8 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.30-1 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r I l.50 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.52 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r II l.64 
46 P.Mich. V 238 r IV l.201 






46 P.Mich. V 239 l.7-8 
47 P.Fouad I 47  
47-8 P.Mich. V 332  
41-54 P.Thomas  4  
47 SB XII 10804  
41-54 P.Louvre I 16  
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r I l.8-11 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r I l.28 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r II l.10 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r II l.18 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r II l.22 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r II l.9 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 r I l.24 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 v l.1 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 v l.2 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 v l.11 
46-9 P.Mich. II 124 v l.8-9 
48 P.Stras. IV 289  
1st C  BGU II 664  
1st C  BGU XI 2119  
1st C P.Alex.  9  
1st C  P.Amst.  40  
1st C P.Duk. inv. 87 r 
1st C P.Duk. inv. 956  
1st C P.Leid.Inst.  26  
1st C P.Lips. inv. 2945  
1st C P.Mil. II 49 l.6-8 
1st C P.Mil. II 49 l.13-5 
1st C P.Oxy. VII 1027  
c.50 P.Oxy. XXVII 2471  
1st C P.Oxy. XLIX 3468  
1st C P.Ryl. II 327  
1st C? P.Ryl. IV 684  
1st C P.Stras. I 33  
1st C P.Tebt. II 444  
44 or 58 P.Brem.  67  
52 P.Mich. V 333 a 
52 P.Mich. V 333 b 
52 SB V 8034  
53 P.Pintaudi  31  
54 P.Dime III 27  
55 P.Wisc. II 53  
55 SB X 10246  






41-68 SB XXVI 16566  
56 P.Alex. inv. 585  
c.56 P.Mich. V 335  
56 P.Oxy. II 271  
57 P.Hamb. I 1  
57 P.Oxy. II 269  
57-8 P.Stras. VII 663  
51-65 P.Rein. II 106  
58-9 SB X 10249  
59 P.Hamb. I 2  
59 SB XIV 11491  
60 P.Mich. III 191 a 
60 P.Mich. III 191 b 
60 P.Mich. inv. 78  
60 P.Mich. inv. 79  
60 P.Mich. inv. 80  
61-2 P.IFAO III 39  
55-67 P.Oxy.Hels.  32  
1st to early 2nd C P.Oslo III 114 l.14-5 
64 P.IFAO I 8  
62-6 P.Ryl. II 119  
64 P.Vind.Tand.  22  
64 P.Yale I 63  
65 P.Lond. III 1215  
65 P.Oxy. XLIX 3487  
66 P.Oxy. II 272  
65-8 P.Oxy. IV 808 a 
65-8 P.Oxy. IV 808 b 
65-8 P.Oxy. IV 808 c 
65-8 P.Oxy. IV 808 d 
68 P.Oxy. XIV 1641  
69-70 P.Stras. VI 503  
69 P.Turner  17  
69 P.Turner  17  
70 BGU III 910  
69-71 P.Berl.Möller   2  
70 P.Oxy. XXII 2349  
70-1 P.Oxy. XLIX 3488  
70 P.Oxy. XLIX 3508  
71 P.Freib. IV 55  
71 P.Mich. XII 635  
71 P.Vars.  12 l.10+ 
71 P.Vars.  12 l.5-9 






73 P.Mich. inv. 84  
73-4 P.Mich. inv. 92  
73 P.Tebt. II 387  
69-79 P.Alex.  10  
74 P.Mich. inv. 85  
74 P.Mich. inv. 86  
74 P.Mich. inv. 87 a 
74 P.Mich. inv. 87 b 
74 P.Mich. i 93  
74 P.Mil. II 57  
72-8 BGU I 184  
75 P.Amh. II 110  
50-100 P.Oslo III 130  
75 P.Yale I 64  
50-100 SB XIV 11303  
75 SB XX 14096  
50-100 SB  XVI 12515 col.II l.7 
76 PSI XIII 1319  
77 P.Oxy.Hels.  30 a 
77 P.Oxy.Hels.  30 b 
78 P.Mich. IX 567  
76-9 SB XX 14097  
79 P.Fouad I 56  
79 P.Oxy. II 243  
79-80 P.Oxy. II 373  
81 P.Lond. II 283  
81 P.Oxy. XII 1471  
81 SB VIII 9765  
82-3 P.Flor. I 82  
82 P.Oxy. II 286  
82 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2773  
83 P.Oxy. X 1282  
83-4 P.Tebt.Wall  2  
83-4 SPP XX 1  
83-4 SPP XX 1  
84 BGU II 536  
86-7 P.Flor. I 8 d 
85 P.Flor. I 61  
85 P.Oxy. LXVI 4532  
85-6 PSI VII 802  
86 P.Athen.  28  
86-7 P.Flor. I 8 a 
86-7 P.Flor. I 8 b 






86-7 P.Flor. I 8 e 
86-7 P.Oxy. LXXV 5052 a 
86-7 P.Oxy. LXXV 5052 b 
86 P.Oxy.Hels.  31  
End 1st C P.Fouad I 50  
81-94 P.Mich. IX 554  
87 P.Mich. X 585  
75-100 P.Oxy. II 329  
c.88 P.Oxy. II 345  
75-100 P.Oxy. II 348  
86-9 PSI XII 1235  
75-100 SB XIV 11302  
75-100 SB XIV 11302  
81-96 BGU I 190  
81-96 BGU XI 2121  
89 P.Alex.  8  
89 P.Hamb. I 30  
89 P.Lips. I 120  
89 P.Mich. IX 566  
81-96 P.Oxy. VIII 1105  
89 P.Oxy. XLII 3051  
81-96 P.Oxy. XLIX 3466 a 
81-96 P.Oxy. XLIX 3466 b 
89 P.Tebt.Tait  49  
89 SB XII 11019  
90 P.Fouad I 48  
91 BGU XIII 2331  
91 Rotulus VII 2523  
91 SB XIV 11847  
92 P.Fam.Tebt.  2  
92 P.Harr. I 138 III l.11-29 
92 P.Mich. IX 568  
c.92 P.Michael.  9  
92 PSI VI 715  
90-5 P.Stras. IV 210  
93 SB VI 9291  
93 SPP XX 2  
94 P.Fam.Tebt.  4  
94 P.Fay.  110 a 
94 P.Fay.  110 b 
94 P.Fay.  110 c 
94 P.Oxy. II 270  
94 P.Stras. V 382  






91-6 SB XIV 11600  
95 P.Lond. II 142  
96 P.Brem.  69  
96 P.Gen.2 I 24  
96 P.Mich. IX 571  
96 P.Oxy. I 104 l.20-2 
97 P.Lond. II 143  
96-8 P.Stras. IX 826 A 
98 BGU IV 1065  
98 P.Bodl. I 104  
98-9 P.Fam.Tebt.  6  
98 P.Genova II 62  
98-9 P.Lips. II 135  
98 P.Mich. inv. 4174 b 
98-9 P.Oxy. II 241 . 
98 P.Stras. IX 825  
98 P.Tebt. II 388  
98 SB X 10274  
98-9 SB XVIII 13234  
99 P.Brem.  68  
99 P.Dubl.  6  
99 P.Fay.  91  
99 P.Oxy. III 511 b 
c.98-100 P.Oxy. LXXIV 4984  
99-100 P.Princ. II 32  
99 P.Ryl. II 173 A 
99-100 SB X 10276  
1st to 2nd C O.Theb.  134  
1st to 2nd C P.Bingen  66  
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.12-5 
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.2 
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.5-6 
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.5-6 
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.7 
1st or 2nd C P.Dubl.  7 l.8-9 
1st or 2nd C P.Eirene III 9  
1st to 2nd C P.Eleph.Wagner I 308  
100 P.Fouad I 49  
1st or 2nd C P.Fouad I 58  
1st or 2nd C? P.Harr. I 84  
98-102 P.IFAO I 25  
c.100 P.IFAO III 1  
1st to 2nd C P.Lips. inv. 1220 r 






98-102 P.Münch III 94  
98-102 P.Oxf.  10  
1st to 2nd C P.Oxy. VIII 1118  
1st to 2nd C  P.Princ. III 142  
c.100 P.Stras. IX 887  
1st to 2nd C PSI VI 687 l.3 
100 SB VI 9539  
1st to 2nd C SB XVI 13041  
1st or 2nd C  SB XXVI 16567  
101 P.Oxy. III 510  
102 BGU I 44  
102 BGU XV 2473  
102-3 P.Fam.Tebt.  7  
102 P.Flor. I 81 b 
102 P.Oxy. III 508 a 
102 P.Oxy. III 508 b 
102 P.Oxy. XXII 2342 a 
102 P.Oxy. XXII 2342 b 
102 P.Sarap.  13  
102-3 PSI V 470  
102 SB XVIII 13233  
c.103 P.Fay.  119  
103 P.Flor. I 81 a 
103 P.Mert. I 14 a 
103 P.Mert. I 14 b 
103 P.Mil.Vogl. II 108  
103 P.NYU II 26  
103 P.Oxy. III 511 a 
103 P.Oxy. XLI 2973  
103 P.Sarap.  14  
103 P.Soter.  22 a 
103 P.Soter.  22 b 
103 P.Stras. VI 582 l.7 
103 P.Stras. VI 582 l.8-9 
103 P.Stras. VI 582 l.10 
104-5 P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2852  
104 P.Sarap.  15  
104 SB X 10539  
105 BGU XI 2042  
100-10 O.Did.  134 a 
100-10 O.Did.  134 b 
105 P.Lond. II 172  
105-6 P.Mich. IX 570  






105 SPP XXII 76  
106 BGU III 856  
106 P.Kron.  7 a 
106 P.Kron.  7 b 
98-114 P.Mil. II 59  
106 P.Soter.  23  
106 P.Soter.  24  
107 P.Fam.Tebt.  9  
107 P.IFAO III 13  
97-117 P.Lips. inv. 1495  
98-117 P.Meyer  5  
98-117 BGU II 436  
108 BGU XI 2122  
108 P.Fam.Tebt.  10  
108-9 P.Fam.Tebt.  11 a 
98-117 P.Lond. II 202 l.3 
98-117 P.Lond. II 202 l.5 
98-117 P.Lond. II 202 l.8 
108 P.Oxy. III 483  
108 P.Oxy. III 588  
98-117 P.Stras. III 147  
98-117 P.Stras. VI 525  
98-117 P.Stras. IX 807 l.12-20 
98-117 P.Tebt.Pad. I 20  
109-17 BGU I 196  
109 P.Kron.  8  
103-15 P.Münch III 95  
109 P.Soter.  25  
109-10 P.Stras. VIII 764 l.23-5 
102-16 SB XIV 11284  
102-16 SB XIV 11284  
109 SB XVIII 13239 a 
109 SB XVIII 13239 b 
109-10 SPP IV pp116-8  
103-16 BGU I 281  
110? P.Fay.  247 a 
110? P.Fay.  247 b 
110? P.Fay.  247 c 
110? P.Fay.  247 d 
110? P.Fay.  247 e 
110? P.Fay.  247 f 
110? P.Fay.  247 g 
110? P.Fay.  247 h 






110? P.Fay.  247 k 
110? P.Fay.  247 l 
110? P.Fay.  247 m 
110? P.Fay.  247 n 
110-1 P.Lond. III 837  
111 P.Fouad I 57  
111 P.Kron.  9  
111 PSI VIII 929 a 
111 PSI VIII 929 b 
109-12 SB XVI 12611  
111 SPP XX 3 a 
111 SPP XX 3 b 
111 SPP XX 3 c 
111 SPP XX 3 d 
112-3 BGU III 832  
112 P.Fam.Tebt.  11 b 
112 P.Oxy. XXII 2351  
112 P.Ryl. II 174  
Early 2nd C P.Wisc. I 1  
113 BGU I 68  
113 BGU III 783  
113 BGU III 857 a 
113 BGU III 857 b 
110-5 O.Did.  131  
113 P.Alex.  7  
103-22 P.Athen.  22  
100-25 P.Laur. I 8 l.1-3 
100-25 P.Laur. I 8 l.15-16 
100-25 P.Mich. III 145  
100-25 P.NYU II 29  
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 a 
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 b 
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 c 
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 d 
100-25 P.Oxy. X 1269 e 
100-25 P.Oxy. LVIII 3917  
100-25 P.Ryl. II 335  
100-25 SB XXII 15385  
114 P.Sarap.  17  
115 BGU I 101  
116 P.Fam.Tebt.  16 a 
116 P.Fam.Tebt.  16 b 
116 P.Kron.  10  






116 PSI VI 688 r b 
116 PSI VI 688 r c 
116 PSI VI 688 r d 
116 PSI VI 688 r a 
116-7 SB XVI 12954  
117 BGU XI 2062  
113-20 P.Alex.Giss  48  
113-20 P.Brem.  51 a 
113-20 P.Brem.  51 b 
113-20 P.Brem.  51 c 
113-20 P.Brem.  51 d 
117 P.Fay.  296  
117 P.Harr. I 85  
117 P.Kron.  21  
117 P.Mich. XI 605  
117 P.Rein. I 44  
117 P.Sarap.  18  
117 SPP XXII 46  
118? P.Alex. inv. 518  
118 P.Fam.Tebt.  19 1 
118 P.Fam.Tebt.  19 2 
118 P.Oslo III 131  
118 P.Sarap.  19  
98-138 P.Tebt.Wall  1  
118 SB VI 9252  
120 BGU I 69 a 
120 BGU I 69 b 
120 P.Berl.Leihg  10  
120 P.Hamb. I 32  
120 P.Mich. III 188  
120 SB XX 14338  
121 P.Athen.  29  
100-41 P.FuadUniv.  18  
121 P.Sarap.  20  
121 P.Stras. V 437  
121 SB XXII 15849  
122 P.Fam.Tebt.  22  
122 P.Ups.Frid.  3 a 
122 P.Ups.Frid.  3 b 
122-3 SB XII 10781  
123 BGU III 985  
123 O.Bankes  1  
123 P.Mich. III 189  






123-4 P.Tebt. II 312  
123 SB XVI 12610  
123? SB XXIV 16202  
124 P.Lond. II 298  
125 CPR VI 1 a 
125 CPR VI 1 b 
2nd C P.Gen. II 100  
125 P.Gen.2 I 26  
125-6 P.Heid. X 448  
100-50 P.IFAO I 28  
125 P.Meyer  6  
125 P.Mil.Vogl. III 188  
125-6 P.Oxy. L 3557  
100-50 P.Stras. IV 231  
100-50 P.Stras. V 344  
100-50 SB XVIII 13742 l.5-6 
126 P.Corn.  7 a 
126 P.Corn.  7 b 
126 P.Fouad I 51  
126? P.Harr. I 142  
116-36? P.Kron.  15  
126 P.Princ. II 33  
126 P.Sarap.  21  
126 SB XXVIII 17056  
127 P.Duk. inv. 781 r (b) 
127 P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 a 
127 P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 b 
127 P.Mil.Vogl. II 104  
117-37 SB XIV 11396  
127 SB XX 14635  
127-8 SPP XXII 4 col. 3 
128 BGU I 339  
128 P.Amh. II 112  
117-38 P.Bas.  7  
117-38 P.Duk. inv. 959  
128-9 P.Flor. I 72  
128 P.Lond. II 196 a 
128 P.Lond. II 196 b 
128 P.Lond. II 196 c 
128 P.Lond. II 196 d 
128-9 P.Mert. III 121 r l.5 
128-9 P.Mert. III 121 r l.9 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.2-6 






128 P.Sarap.  62 l.11-2 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.13-4 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.15 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.16-7 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.18 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.19 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.20-1 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.22-3 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.23-4 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.25-6 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.27 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.28 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.29 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.30 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.31 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.32 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.33-4 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.35-6 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.37-8 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.39-41 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.42 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.43-4 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.45 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.46 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.48 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.49 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.50 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.51 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.52 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.53 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.54-5 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.56 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.57 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.58-9 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.60-1 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.62 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.63 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.64 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.65 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.66 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.67-8 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.69 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.70 






128 P.Sarap.  62 l.73-4 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.75-6 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.77 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.78 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.79 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.80 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.81 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.82 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.83 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.84 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.85 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.86-7 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.88 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.89 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.90 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.91 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.92 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.93 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.94 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.95-6 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.97 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.98 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.99 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.100 
128 P.Sarap.  62 l.101 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.10 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.11 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.3 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.4 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.5 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.6 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.7 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.8 
128 P.Sarap.  67 l.9 
117-38 P.Stras. VII 646 l.13-5 
117-38 P.Stras. VII 646 l.6-11 
117-38 P.Tebt. II 530  
117-38 P.Tebt.Wall  6  
117-38 SB XVI 12225  
117-38 SB XVIII 13103 l.11-7 
129 BGU XIII 2342  
129 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2774  
129 SB XIV 12105  






130 P.Ryl. II 287 r 
130 P.Ryl. II 287 v 
130 P.Ryl. II 330  
130 SB X 10538  
130 SB XIV 11934  
131 BGU I 70 a 
131 BGU I 70 b 
131 P.Athen.  21  
131 P.Mich. IX 572  
131 P.Oxy. III 472 a 
131 P.Oxy. III 472 b 
131 P.Oxy. III 472 c 
131 P.Oxy. III 486  
131 P.Wisc. I 14  
131-2 PSI VIII 962 a 
131-2 PSI VIII 962 b 
131-2 PSI VIII 962 c 
131 SB VI 9190 a 
131 SB VI 9190 b 
132 P.Amh. II 111  
132 P.Diog.  25  
132 P.Stras. IV 256  
128-35 SB XXII 15386  
133 P.Fam.Tebt.  29  
133-4 P.Ryl. II 331  
133 SB XII 10786  
133 SB XII 10787  
133 SB XXII 15611  
134 P.Fouad I 41  
134 P.Lond. III 907  
134-5 P.Tebt. II 392  
136 P.Batav.  10  
136 P.Fay.  155 a 
136 P.Fay.  155 b 
136 P.Oxy. XII 1472 a 
136 P.Oxy. XII 1472 b 
137 BGU II 394  
137 BGU II 465  
75-199 P.Fay.  344 a 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 b 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 d i 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 d ii 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 e 






75-199 P.Fay.  344 g ii 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 h 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 i 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 j 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 l 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 m 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 n 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 o 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 r 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 s  
75-199 P.Fay.  344 v 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 x i 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 x ii 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 y 
75-199 P.Fay.  344 z 
137 P.Kron.  13  
137-8 P.Kron.  14  
137 P.Oxy. IV 729 l.12-8, l.38-45 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.2 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.3 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.4-5 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.5-6 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.6-7 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.8 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.9 
137-8 SB V 7570 l.10 
137 SB XII 11005  
138-9 BGU I 272 a 
138-9 BGU I 272 b 
138 BGU II 464  
138 BGU IV 1014  
138 P.IFAO I 38  
138 P.Kron.  16  
138 SB XXII 15704  
138 SB XXIV 16203  
139 BGU II 472  
139 BGU II 635  
139-40 BGU II 645 l.1-12 
117-61 P.IFAO III 54  
139 P.Ryl. II 174 A 
139 P.Ryl. II 324  
139 P.Ryl. II 332  
139 PSI X 1140  






140 C.Ep.Lat.  154  
140 P.IFAO I 14  
140 P.Kron.  17  
140-1 P.Oxy. XLIX 3490  
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.120-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.139-40 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.151-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.155-6 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.157-60 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.167-9 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.198-9 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.209 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.210-1 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.214-7 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.218-9 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.220-3 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.243-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.245-8 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.266-8 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.269-72 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.272-6 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.292-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.295-8 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.329-31 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.332-6 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.345-7 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.348 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.35-8 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.39-42 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.53-6 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.5-7 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.60-1 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.62-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.83-4 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.93-5 
140 P.Ross.Georg. II 18 l.96-100 
c.130-50 P.Ross.Georg. II 36 A l.8-11 
c.130-50 P.Ross.Georg. II 36 B l.7-13 
c.130-50 P.Ross.Georg. II 36 B.14-6 
c.130-50 P.Ross.Georg. II 36 C l.8-11 
159-60 P.Ryl. II 378 v 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.1-5 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.11-3 






c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.39-41 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.48-54 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.22-3 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.24-6 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.31-3 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.42-7 
c.140 P.Stras. VII 628 l.8-10 
140 P.Wisc. I 16  
140-1 SPP XXII 78  
141 BGU VII 1573  
141-2 P.Fouad I 54  
141-2 P.Herm. Inv.G 24 l.33 
141 P.Louvre I 18  
141-2 P.Oxy. I 98  
141 P.Tebt. II 389  
c.131-50 P.Tebt.Wall  4  
142 P.Tebt. II 398  
142 SB XVI 12520  
143 BGU III 741 a 
143 BGU III 741 b 
143-4 P.Bodl. I 119  
143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 l.1-5 
143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 l.23-6 
143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 l.6-8 
143-4 P.Hamb. IV 251 l.9-11 
143 P.Oxy. III 506 a 
143 P.Oxy. III 506 b 
143-4 P.Stras. IV 230  
143-4 P.Vind.Worp  10  
141-4 P.Yale I 65  
143-4 PSI VIII 921 l.6-9 
143-4 PSI VIII 921 l.10-3 
144 BGU III 729  
144 BGU IV 1038  
138-50 P.Bingen  73  
144 P.Oxy. LV 3798  
144 P.Princ. II 34  
144 SB I 5168 l.1-2 
144 SB I 5168 l.4-5 
144 SB I 5168 l.21 
144 SB XVI 12521  
144 SB XVI 13010  
145-6 BGU III 710 l.27-33 






145 SPP XXII 36  
146 P.Col. X 259  
146 P.Gen.2 I 6  
146 P.Kron.  20 a 
146 P.Kron.  20 b 
146 P.Lond. II 310  
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 A. l.17-9 
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 B l.43-51 
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 C l.55-6 
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 D l.102 
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 D l.95 
146-7? P.Lond. III 1179 D l.86-9 
146 P.Oslo II 39  
146-7 SB XIV 11488 a 
146-7 SB XIV 11488 b 
147 BGU II 378  
147 P.Coll.Youtie I 25 a 
147 P.Coll.Youtie I 25 b 
147-8 PSI XIII 1323  
147 SB XX 14401  
148-9 BGU II 445  
148-9? P.Horak  23  
148 P.Oxy. XIV 1710  
148? P.Prag. I 31  
149 CPR I 15  
149 P.Heid. VII 399  
138-60 P.Hib. II 277  
138-60 P.Laur. II 28  
137-61 P.Lips. inv. 1158  
149 P.Lond. II 311  
149 P.Oxf.  11  
149? SB XIV 11850 l.1-10 
149? SB XIV 11850 l.11 
149 SB XX 14970  
149 SPP XXII 53  
138-61 BGU I 179  
150 BGU I 290  
2nd C BGU II 540 l.7 
2nd C BGU II 601  
2nd C BGU III 813 a 
2nd C BGU III 813 b 
2nd C BGU III 865  
2nd C BGU VII 1651  






2nd C BGU XI 2046  
138 - 61 BGU XI 2120  
2nd C CPR I 119  
2nd C O.Amst.  85 a 
2nd C O.Amst.  85 b 
2nd C P.Aberd.  184  
2nd C P.Athen.  64  
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.199-204 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.10-1 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.4-7 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.8-9 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.44 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.54-5 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.63 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.64 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.65 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.66 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.67 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.68 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.69-70 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.71 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.74 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.80 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.81 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.90-1 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.92-6 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.112-4 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.127 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.128 
138-61 P.Bour.  15 l.135-47 
138-61 P.Brook.  72  
2nd C P.Brook.  135  
2nd C P.Cair.Salem  2  
2nd C P.Duk. inv. 528  
2nd C P.Erl.  60  
2nd C P.Erl.  61  
2nd C P.Erl.  62  
2nd C P.Erl.  94 l.2 
2nd C P.Erl.  94 l.3 
2nd C P.Erl.  94 l.8 
138-61 P.Fay.  205  
138-61 P.Flor. I 51 l.9-10 
2nd C P.Flor. III 316  






2nd C P.Graux II 23 b 
2nd C P.Hamb. I 10  
138-61 P.Hamb. I 102  
2nd C P.Hamb. IV 252 l.1-4 
2nd C P.Hamb. IV 252 l.7-10 
2nd C? P.Harr. I 141  
2nd C P.Kron.  22  
2nd C P.Kron.  23  
138-61 P.Laur. IV 160  
2nd C P.Leid.Inst.  43 l.7-22 
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 160v 
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 248  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 1174  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 2421  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 2448r 
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 3044  
2nd C P.Lips. inv. 3565  
2nd C P.Louvre I 17  
139-60 P.Louvre II 110  
2nd C P.Mert. III 109  
2nd C P.Mert. III 111  
2nd C P.Mert. III 122  
2nd C P.Mil. II 60 l.1-13 
2nd C P.Mil. II 60 l.14-25 
2nd C P.Mil.Vogl. III 146  
2nd C P.Münch III 68  
150 P.Münch III 101  
150 P.Oslo II 40 a 
150 P.Oslo II 40 b 
2nd C P.Oslo inv. 1237  
2nd C P.Oxy. III 471  
2nd C P.Oxy. III 526  
2nd C P.Oxy. III 530 a 
2nd C P.Oxy. III 530 b 
2nd C P.Oxy. VII 1034  
2nd C P.Oxy. VIII 1125  
2nd C P.Oxy. L 3589  
2nd C P.PalauRib  9  
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 35 B l.13-6 
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 35 B l.4-5 
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 35 B l.6-7 
2nd C P.Ross.Georg. II 35 B l.9-12 
2nd C P.Ryl. II 333  






2nd C P.Sijp.  49  
138-61 P.Stras. I 13  
2nd C P.Stras. I 71  
138-61 P.Stras. IV 293  
2nd C P.Stras. V 374  
138-61 P.Stras. VI 509 l.3-5 
2nd C P.Stras. VIII 746  
2nd C P.Stras. IX 812 l.21-8 
150 P.Tebt. II 395  
2nd C P.Tebt. II 500v 
138-161 P.Tebt.Pad. I 21  
2nd C P.Warr.  14  
2nd C PSI XIV 1411  
2nd C PSI XVII 1689  
2nd C SB VI 9204  
2nd C SB X 10722  
2nd C SB XIV 12023  
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.10 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.13-5 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.18 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.19 a 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.19 b 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.2 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.20 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.21 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.22 & l.27 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.23 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.24 a 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.24 b 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.26 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.28 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.29 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.3 (i) 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.3 (ii) 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.30 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.32 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.33 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.34 (i) 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.34 (ii) 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.35 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.36 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.4 (i) 
2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.4 (ii) 






2nd C SB XVI 12421 l.5 
2nd C? SB XVIII 13165  
125-75 SB XVIII 13167  
138-61 SB XVIII 13228 l.1-9 
138-61 SB XVIII 13228 l.10-3 
2nd C SB XX 14975  
2nd C SB XX 15135  
2nd C SPP XX 12  
2nd C SPP XXII 24  
2nd C SPP XXII 82  
151 BGU III 702  
151 P.Stras. I 52  
147-55 P.Stras. V 383  
151 PSI III 159  
145-56 SPP XXII 72  
146-56 SPP XXII 83  
147-56 P.Oslo III 132  
152 P.Stras. IV 209  
152-3 PSI VIII 878  
153 BGU I 155  
153 P.Flor. I 1  
153 P.Fouad I 45  
153-4 P.Gen. II 106  
153 P.Kron.  46  
130-75? P.Ross.Georg. II 30  
153-4 P.Stras. I 54  
154 P.Horak  80  
154 P.Mert. III 110  
154 P.Mil.Vogl. II 68  
146-61 P.Oxy. IV 712  
154 P.Oxy. XXXIV 2722  
154 PSI X 1142  
154 SB XXII 15384  
155 BGU I 86  
155 P.Vars.  10 col. 1 
155 SB X 10565  
155 SB XII 11006 a 
155 SB XIV 11599  
156 P.Ross.Georg. II 23  
156 P.Select.  3  
156 SB XIV 12017  
157 BGU I 301  
157 P.Amh. II 113  






157 SB X 10294  
138-177? SB XIV 11607  
158 BGU III 800  
158 O.Buch.  108  
158 P.Flor. I 44  
158-9 P.Fouad I 26 a 
158-9 P.Fouad I 26 b 
158 P.Münch III 96  
158-9 P.Oxy. XXXI 2591  
158 P.Theon  13  
158-9 SB XVI 12747  
159 CPR VI 3  
136-81 O.Brux.  13  
159 O.Wilck.  240  
146-71 P.Oxy. XLIV 3198  
136-81 P.Stras. IX 835  
160 BGU III 888  
160 BGU XV 2472  
143-77 P.Duk. inv. 46r 
160 P.Giss. I 96  
160-1 PSI VI 714  
160 SB VI 9206  
161 P.Oxy. III 653 b 
161-2 P.Oxy. LXXVII 5109  
161 P.Phil.  16  
c.161 P.Princ. II 35  
161-2 P.Tebt. II 523  
161 PSI XV 1527  
161 SB X 10723  
161 SB XVIII 13895  
162-3 P.Flor. I 97 l.1-11 
162-3 P.Oxy. VIII 1132  
160-3 P.Tebt. II 342  
163 CPR I 16  
101-225 P.Harr. I 104  
163 P.Heid. III 239  
163 P.NYU II 27  
163-4? P.Oxy. L 3560 a 
163-4? P.Oxy. L 3560 b 
163-4? P.Oxy. L 3560 c 
2nd to early 3rd C P.Tebt. II 435  
125-200 SB XII 11255  
126-200 SB XIV 12037  






164-5 P.Iand. VII 142 l.17 
164-5 P.Mert. III 105  
161-9 P.Stras. IV 204  
161-9 P.Stras. V 303  
166 P.Lond. II 332  
166 P.Tebt. II 318 a 
166 P.Tebt. II 318 b 
166 SPP XXII 172  
167 P.Lond. II 336  
167 P.Oxy.Hels.  36  
167 P.Ryl. II 120  
167 P.Tebt. II 390  
167 P.Tebt. II 505  
168 P.Fam.Tebt.  38  
168 P.Lond. II 470  
168-9 P.Oxy. LXVII 4589 l.1-7 
168-9 P.Oxy. LXVII 4589 l.8-12 
168-9 P.Oxy. LXXI 4826  
168 P.Ryl. II 175 a 
168 P.Ryl. II 175 b 
169 P.Oxy. III 507  
169-70 SB VI 9247  
c.170 P.Oxy. XVII 2134  
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.1-7(i) 
169-71 P.Oxy. LXII 4336 l.1-7(ii) 
171 P.Lond. III 918  
161-80 P.Münch III 97  
169-75 BGU I 77  
172 BGU II 514  
172 BGU II 520  
172-3 P.Oxy. LXVII 4589 l.22-3 
173-4 P.Brook.  123  
c.173-4 P.Oxy. XXIV 2411 l.29-38 
c.173-4 P.Oxy. XXIV 2411 l.43-52 
173 PSI V 473  
173 PSI XIII 1324  
175 P.Oxy. XLIX 3493  
175 P.Oxy. XLIX 3494  
150-200 P.Stras. IV 225 l.25-33 
150-200 P.Stras. VI 588  
175-6  SB VIII 9923  
150-200 SB XX 15163  
177 BGU VII 1574  






176 P.Aberd.  56  
176 SB XXII 15325  
177 BGU I 4  
177 BGU III 970  
177 SB IV 7379  
177-9 P.Flor. I 28  
177-80 P.Hib. II 278  
178 P.Oxy. III 485  
178-9 P.Oxy. L 3562  
178 SB XVI 12295  
181 BGU XIII 2346  
169-92? P.Lips. II 143  
182-3 BGU III 782  
182 P.Fam.Tebt.  43  
183 P.Thomas  13  
183 P.Flor. I 42  
183 P.Lond. II 341  
183-4 P.Petaus  31  
184 CPR I 29  
184-5 CPR XVIIB 2 l.4-21 
184-5 CPR XVIIB 3 l.17-27 
184-5 CPR XVIIB 4 l.1-8 
184-5 CPR XVIIB 4 l.9-15 
184-5 CPR XVIIB 9 l.11-17 
184 P.Oxy. III 513  
184-5 P.Petaus  32  
184 P.Vind.Sijp.  12  
184 SB VI 9619  
185 P.Bon.  25  
157-213 SB XXVI 16382  
180-92 BGU III 907  
186-7 P.Amh. II 79 l.50-60 
186 P.Flor. I 46  
186 P.Oxy. II 237  
180-92 PSI VIII 922 l.6-9 
186 PSI XII 1253  
186 SB XXIV 16009  
186-7 SPP XXII 69  
175-200 BGU XI 2117  
187 P.Ryl. II 182  
187 SB XVI 13070  
176-200 P.Bour.  28  
175-200 P.Bour.  53  






188 P.Lond. II 343  
175-200 P.Mert. I 23  
175-200 P.Oxy. III 509  
175-200 P.Oxy. XIV 1648 l.68-71 
188 P.Oxy. XVII 2135  
188 P.Tebt. II 396  
188 PSI XII 1228  
189 BGU II 578  
189 SB XVI 12690  
190-1 P.Fouad I 43  
190 P.Vind.Sal.  6  
191 P.Mert. II 78  
192 P.Hombert I 32  
166-217 P.Prag. II 126r 
192-3? PSI VII 818  
193 SPP XX 16  
179-211 P.Amh. II 98 l.13-4 
193-8 P.Lips. I 31 l.12-5 
193-8 P.Lips. I 31 l.30-6 
195 P.Mich.Mchl.  17  
195 P.Oxy. LXXI 4828  
195 PSI IV 314  
196 P.Stras. V 386  
197 P.IFAO I 12  
197 P.Oxy. VI 910  
176-220 O.Did.  137  
181-214 P.Duk. inv. 650r 
198 P.Oxy. XLI 2975  
198 P.Tebt. II 397  
198-9 P.Warr.  6  
2nd to 3rd C BGU I 238  
1st C to 4th C Chla XLVII 1443  
2nd to 3rd C O.Bodl. II 1982  
2nd to 3rd C O.Bodl. II 2406 a 
2nd to 3rd C O.Bodl. II 2406 b 
Roman O.Lips. inv. 2079  
2nd to 3rd C O.Narm.  90  
2nd to 3rd C P.Aberd.  19  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 119  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 159  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 318  
1st to 4th C P.Alex. inv. 517  
2nd to 3rd C P.Bour.  46 l.1-3 






2nd to 3rd C P.Bour.  46 l.8-11 
2nd or 3rd C P.Diog.  17  
2nd to 3rd C P.Gen.2 I 2  
2nd or 3rd C P.Hamb. IV 270  
175-225 P.Iand. VI 94 a 
175-225 P.Iand. VI 94 b 
175-225 P.Iand. VI 94 c 
2nd to 3rd C P.Lips. inv. 2701  
175-225 P.Mil. II 58  
2nd to 3rd C P.Narm.2006  141  
2nd to 3rd C P.Oslo III 94  
2nd or 3rd C P.Oxy. I 114  
2nd to 3rd C P.Oxy.Hels.  48  
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. III 214 l.1-4 
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. III 214 l.5-8 a 
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. III 214 l.5-8 b 
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. III 214 l.9-10 
2nd to 3rd C P.Prag. III 214 l.11-4 
175-225 P.Stras. V 324  
c.200 P.Stras. VI 554 l.1-3 
c.200 P.Stras. VI 554 l.4-8 
c.200 P.Stras. VI 554 l.9-10 
2nd to 3rd C PSI III 190 l.1 
2nd to 3rd C SB I 5166 l.16 
1st to 4th C SB I 5167 l.34-5 
2nd to 3rd C SB V 7612  
176-225 SB XXIV 15942 l.10-1 
176-225 SB XXIV 15943 l.1 
2nd to 3rd C SB XXVI 16645 a 
2nd to 3rd C SB XXVI 16645 b 
2nd to 3rd C SB XXVI 16645 c 
2nd to 3rd C SB XXVI 16645 d 
184-218 CPR XXVI 37  
201 P.Oxy. XII 1473 a 
201 P.Oxy. XII 1473 b 
201 P.Oxy. XII 1473 c 
201 PSI XIII 1328  
201-2 SB XXII 15738  
202-3 P.Lond. II 438  
202-3 P.Oxy. XLV 3251  
203 P.Oxy. I 56  
203 SB VI 9201 l.13-5 
203 SB VI 9201 l.17 






198-210 P.Tebt.Wall  7  
204 SB XII 11228  
204-5 SB XXII 15862 a 
204-5 SB XXII 15862 b 
205 O.Stras. II 902  
205-6 P.Lond. II 348  
200-10 P.Ryl. II 176  
205 SB XVI 13030  
198-211 SB XXVI 16550  
205 SPP XX 18  
207 P.Diog.  16  
208 BGU III 990  
208 P.Amh. II 94  
208 PSI VII 736  
208 SPP XXII 41  
206-12 P.Col. X 265  
206-11 P.FuadUniv. APP.II 290  
c.209-10 P.Hamb. I 14 l.15 
c.209-10 P.Hamb. I 14 l.13-4 
210 P.Hamb. I 15  
210 P.Oxy. VII 1039  
210-1 SB XXVI 16423  
211 P.Lond. III 932  
211 P.Oxy. XIX 2240 l.8 
211 P.Stras. III 143  
212 BGU II 637  
212 BGU VII 1652  
212 BGU VII 1653  
212 P.Flor. III 318  
212? P.Harr. I 66  
212 P.Lond. II 167  
212 P.Lond. III 1164 b 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 c 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 d 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 g 
212 P.Lond. III 1164 k 
212-3 P.Oxy. I 70  
200-25 BGU II 390  
213 BGU VII 1656  
213 P.Diog.  27  
201-25 P.Hamb. IV 253  
200-25 P.Oxy. XII 1501  
200-25 P.Oxy. XIV 1724 l.21-2 






200-25 P.Oxy. XIV 1724 l.26-8 
200-25 P.Oxy. XIV 1724 l.32-3 
200-25 P.Oxy. XIV 1726 l.10-1 
200-25 P.Oxy. XIV 1726 l.7 
213-4 P.Oxy. LXX 4772  
213 SB XIV 11705  
201-25 SB XXIV 15941  
212-16 P.Bodl. I 42  
214 P.Mert. I 25  
211-7 SB XVIII 13858 a 
211-7 SB XVIII 13858 b 
214-5 SB XX 14628  
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.1  
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.1  
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.11 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.15 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.3a 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.3b & pg.9 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.3c 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.3d 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.8a 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.8b 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.8c 
215-6 BGU II 362 Frag.3 pg.9 
215 BGU XI 2045  
215 O.Did.  136  
212-7 P.Duk. inv. 964  
212-17 P.Graux II 27  
214-6 P.Ryl. II 337  
200-229 SB VIII 9834 a 1 
200-229 SB VIII 9834 a 2 
200-229 SB VIII 9834 a 3 
216 BGU I 159  
216 P.Louvre I 19  
216 P.Oxy. XII 1474  
217 BGU XI 2048  
217-8 CPR XVIIB 11 l.11-19 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 11 l.29-35 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 11 l.36-46 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 11 l.47-53 
217 CPR XVIIB 12 l.1-8 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 12 l.9-16 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 13 l.1-6 






217-8 CPR XVIIB 13 l.22-26 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 13 l.27-34 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 13 l.7-15 
217-218 CPR XVIIB 14 l.1-8 
217-218 CPR XVIIB 14 l.9-13 
217 CPR XVIIB 15 l.10-15 
217 CPR XVIIB 15 l.1-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 16 l.1-5 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 16 l.6-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.10-5 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.16-20 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.1-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.21-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.30-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 17 l.40-2 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 18 l.15-31 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 19 l.1-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 20  
217-8 CPR XVIIB 23 l.4-9 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 25 l.1-4 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 25 l.5-13 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 26 l.8-17 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 27 l.1-8 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 27 l.9-14 
217-8 CPR XVIIB 36  
217-8? CPR XVIIB 38  
217-8 CPR XVIIB 42  
217-8 CPR XVIIB 43 l.1-12 
218 BGU VII 1650  
220 P.Lips. I 8  
c.214-25 SB XX 14292  
221-2 BGU IV 1015  
221 P.Harr. II 227  
221 SB IV 7467  
222 P.Flor. I 48  
222 P.Oxy. XIV 1634  
222 P.Prag. II 163  
223 BGU XI 2118  
223 P.Oxy. XXII 2350 c 
223 SB VI 9155  
224-5 P.Iand. VII 145 a 
224-5 P.Iand. VII 145 b 
224-5 P.Iand. VII 145 c 






224 P.Oxy. VI 988  
222-6 P.Oxy. XIV 1630  
224 P.Oxy. XXII 2350 a 
224 P.Oxy. XXII 2350 b 
224 P.Pintaudi  32  
225 P.Col. X 277  
201-50 P.Hamb. IV 279  
225 P.Lond. III 939  
225 P.Oxy. VII 1040  
225 P.Oxy. XXXI 2566 col. i 
225 P.Oxy. XXXI 2566 col. ii 
225 P.Oxy. XXXVIII 2848  
225 P.Vind.Tand.  23 a 
225 P.Vind.Tand.  23 b 
226 M.Chr.  136  
226 P.Gen.2 I 43  
227 O.Wilck.  282  
227 P.Lond. III 943  
228-9 P.Stras. VIII 732  
222-35 P.Diog.  30  
229 SB I 4370  
219-40 P.Princ. III 144  
230 SPP XX 30  
231 BGU VII 1657  
231 P.Stras. V 460  
232-3 SB I 5676  
233-4 P.Flor. I 56  
233 P.Lips. I 9  
234 BGU VII 1658  
234 P.Fay.  90 a 
234 P.Fay.  90 b 
234 P.Fay.  90 c 
220-50 O.Did.  135  
237 CPR VII 11  
237 P.Bodl. I 43  
238 SPP XX 51  
222-55 P.Vet.Aelii  10  
222-55 SB XVI 12837 a 
222-55 SB XVI 12837 b 
240 P.Lips. I 10  
240 P.Oxy. LXI 4117  
241 P.Hamb. I 55  
244 PSI XII 1238  






246 PSI IX 1068  
247 P.Lips. I 11  
231-63 P.Mil.Vogl. IV 243  
247 P.Oxy. XLII 3049  
232-64 P.Oxy. LXVII 4596  
248 P.Rain.Cent.  69  
249 P.Lond. III 1157 v(b) 
249 SB V 7634  
3rd C BGU I 24  
3rd C BGU VII 1659  
225-75 CPR I 3  
3rd C? O.Bodl. II 1963  
3rd C O.Mich.  148  
3rd C P.Alex.  28  
3rd C P.Berl.Bibl.  24  
3rd C P.Bour.  59 l.4 
3rd C P.Bour.  59 l.5 
3rd C P.Brook.  18  
3rd C P.Cair.Cat  10574  
3rd C P.Erl.  63  
225-75 P.Flor. I 24 l.10-1 
225-75 P.Flor. I 24 l.20-1 
225-75? P.Flor. I 25 l.16 
3rd C P.FuadUniv.  41r 
3rd C P.Iand. VI 96r 
3rd C P.Iand. VI 98  
3rd C P.Leipz.  10  
3rd C P.Lips. inv. 1250  
3rd C? P.NYU II 24  
3rd C P.Oxy. VI 936  
3rd C P.Oxy. VIII 1158  
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1701 a 
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1701 b 
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1769  
3rd C P.Oxy. XIV 1773  
3rd C P.Oxy. XLII 3083 a 
3rd C P.Oxy. XLII 3083 b 
3rd C? P.Oxy. LXVII 4625  
3rd C P.Oxy.Desc.  13  
3rd C P.Pintaudi  35  
225-75 P.Stras. V 391  
3rd C P.Stras. VI 575  
3rd C P.Stras. VIII 748  






3rd C P.Tebt. II 418v 
3rd C P.Vars.  37  
3rd C PSI III 198  
3rd C PSI VI 699  
3rd C PSI VI 700  
3rd C? PSI VI 701  
3rd C PSI VI 702  
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.7 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.8 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.9 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.10 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.11 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.12 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.13 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.14 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.15 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.16 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.17 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.18 
3rd C PSI XVII 1707 l.19 
3rd C SB XIV 11598  
3rd C SB XIV 11602  
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.10 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.11 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.12 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.5 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.6 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.7 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.8 
3rd C SB XVI 12308 l.9 
250 SB XVIII 13974  
3rd C SB XVIII 14016  
3rd C SPP XX 23  
251 P.Oxy. LI 3610  
252 P.Gen.2 I 9  
252 P.Oxy. XIV 1640  
252-3 SB XVI 12240  
253 P.Oxy. XXXI 2586  
254 SPP XX 13 II 
250-61 P.Flor. II 212  
c.258-9 P.Mich. XI 614  
258-9 P.Oxy. XLIII 3134  
258-9 P.Oxy. LXIV 4439  






260 P.Gen.2 I 44  
261 P.Lips. inv. 133  
263 SPP XX 66 l.1-3 
263 SPP XX 66 l.4-6 
263 SPP XX 66 l.6-9 
263 SPP XX 66 l.9-11 
263 SPP XX 66 l.11-2 
263 SPP XX 66 l.16-8 
263 SPP XX 66 l.18-21 
264 BGU VII 1649  
265 P.Grenf. II 69  
268-9 PSI IV 295  
269-70 P.Erl.  101 l.6-7 
269 P.Oxy. XII 1561  
c.269-71? P.Oxy. LXXI 4829  
271 SPP XX 72 a 
271 SPP XX 72 b 
271 SPP XX 72 c 
272 P.Fouad I 52  
250-300 P.Oxy. XX 2280  
250-300 P.Ryl. II 338  
277-8 BGU IV 1064  
279 P.Oxy. XIV 1713  
272-85 PSI VII 775  
280-1? P.Wash.Univ. I 22  
277-82 SB IV 7358 a 
277-82 SB IV 7358 b 
281 P.Lond. III 1243  
282 P.Cair.Isid.  93  
267-99 P.Cair.Isid.  132  
286-7 P.Vind.Bosw.  12  
287 P.Oxy. XIV 1711  
287 P.Oxy. LXI 4120  
275-99 P.Ryl. IV 606 l.18-9 
275-99 P.Ryl. IV 606 l.34-8 
287 P.Sijp.  17  
275-300 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2775 a 
275-300 P.Oxy. XXXVI 2775 a 
275-300? P.Oxy.Hels.  43  
275-300 P.Stras. VII 636  
288 SB XIV 11386  
289 P.Oxy. XXXI 2587  
292 P.Oxy. XIV 1715  






294? P.NYU II 25  
295 BGU III 858  
295 P.Oslo II 37  
285-304? P.Oxy. XIV 1714  
298 SB XIV 12190  
c.300 BGU VII 1682  
276-325 P.Bad. IV 87  
300 P.Berl.Möller   1  
3rd to 4th C P.Iand. IV 60  
3rd to 4th C P.Lips. I 12  
3rd to 4th C P.Lips. inv. 2188  
3rd to 4th C P.Lips. inv. 2397  
3rd or 4th C SB XXII 15327  
3rd to 4th C SB XXIV 15881  
303 P.Oxy. I 71 a 
303 P.Oxy. I 71 b 
303 P.Oxy. LXXIX 5211  
303 P.Sakaon  96  
304 BGU XIII 2334  
304 P.Kellis I 49  
304 P.Oxy. LXIII 4353  
304 SB I 4652  
-30 to 640 P.Duk. inv. 61v 
-30 to 640 P.Duk. inv. 527r 
-30 to 640 P.Duk. inv. 1127r 
306 P.Col. X 283  
306-7 P.Kellis I 40  
307 P.Duk. inv. 16  
307 P.Oxy. LXIII 4355  
307 P.Sakaon  64  
308 P.Cair.Isid.  97  
308 P.Grenf. II 72  
308 P.Oxy. X 1318  
308-9 P.Oxy. XXXIII 2666  
310 P.Cair.Isid.  95  
310 P.Cair.Isid.  96  
310 P.Kellis I 41  
310 P.Panop.  20  
300-25 P.Aberd.  180  
300-25 P.Cair.Cat  10749  
312 P.Cair.Isid.  94  
312 P.Oxy. LIX 3981  
312 P.Sakaon  38  






300-325 PSI.Congr.XVII  27  
300-325 SB VIII 9834 b 1 
300-325 SB VIII 9834 b 2 
300-325 SB VIII 9834 b 3 
300-325 SB VIII 9834 b 4 
300-325 SB VIII 9834 b 5 
275-350 SB XVI 12496  
314 P.Amst.  44  
314 P.Lond. III 975  
314 P.Select.  7  
314-5 SB VI 9192  
315 P.Cair.Isid.  74  
315-6 P.Cair.Isid.  76  
315 P.Lond. III 976  
315 P.Panop.  21  
316 CPR XVIIA 5 a 
316 P.Bad. II 27  
316 P.Mich. IX 573  
316 P.Stras. IV 278  
318 P.Col. VII 169  
318 P.Oxy. LXI 4124  
322 P.Oxy. LXI 4125  
322 P.Panop.  26  
324-5 SB XVI 12673  
324 SB XXII 15608  
300-50 P.Bodl. I 143 l.5-6 
325 P.Col. VII 176  
325 P.Oxy. LIV 3756  
325 P.Oxy. LIV 3757  
300-350 SB XX 14298  
300-50 SB XXIV 15879  
326-7 P.NYU I 23  
326 P.NYU II 23  
326 SB XIV 11385  
326 SB XX 14301  
327 P.Col. VII 178  
328 P.Sakaon  65  
328 P.Sakaon  66  
329 P.Harr. II 236  
329 P.NYU I 22  
c.329 P.Panop.  31  
331 P.Bad. II 28  
331 P.Oslo II 41  






333 P.Oxy. XIV 1716  
330-40 P.Lond. VI 1915  
330-40 P.Lond. VI 1916  
336 P.Col. VII 178 a 
336 P.Panop.  22  
337 P.Jena II 3  
337 P.Oxy. XLV 3266  
337 SB VI 9191  
331-2? or 346-7? P.Charite  33  
339 PSI III 215  
340 P.Stras. IX 817  
341 P.NagHamm.  63  
344 P.Neph.  32  
344 P.Princ. II 81  
345 P.Col. inv. 185 a 
345 P.Col. inv. 185 b 
345-6 P.Oxy. LVI 3874 l.17 
345-6 P.Oxy. LVI 3874 l.40 
345-6 P.Oxy. LVI 3874 l.52 
346 P.Abinn.  51  
346 P.NagHamm.  64  
346 SB XIV 12088  
347 P.Oxy. XLIII 3146  
4th C BGU III 984  
325-75 P.Abinn.  21 1 
325-75 P.Abinn.  21 2 
325-75 P.Abinn.  37  
325-75 P.Abinn.  42  
4th C P.Bodl. I 129 a 
4th C P.Bodl. I 129 b 
4th C P.Brook.  9  
4th C P.Brook.  73  
4th C P.Coll.Youtie II 88 l.1-17 
4th C P.Coll.Youtie II 88 l.18-22 
4th C P.Fay.  135  
4th C P.Fouad I 53  
4th C P.Giss. I 53  
4th C P.Giss. I 118  
c.350 P.Kellis I 18  
4th C P.Kellis I 90  
4th C P.Laur. III 76  
325-75 P.Leid.Inst.  17  
4th C P.Lips. inv. 1634  






4th C P.Lond. III 870  
4th C P.NagHamm.  81  
4th C P.Oxy. XII 1495  
4th C P.Oxy. XII 1590  
4th C P.Oxy. XLVIII 3411  
4th C P.Oxy. XLVIII 3419  
4th C P.Oxy. LIX 3999  
4th C P.PalauRib  13  
4th C P.Prag. II 192  
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.1 
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.3 
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.8 
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.9 
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.10 
4th C P.Ross.Georg. V 51 l.11 
4th C P.Ryl. IV 700  
4th C P.Ryl. IV 710  
4th C P.Stras. VIII 776  
4th C P.Vind.Sijp.  15  
4th C PSI I 42  
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